The US and China in Pakistan - their respective roles

[shiv]

Over the past 2-3 years I have heard increasing references to China from Indian military and other sources. To a person like me - who has more or less followed Chinese developments since 1962 the new references came as a slight surprise. It's not as though China was doing anything new or sudden. China has been working on its defence for decades and is now reaching a level of power (at least on paper) that is causing some disquiet among a lot of nations who used to see China as either benign or toothless. For Indians neither is true - and I was wondering if there are some new reasons for talking about China.

One reason of course is the fact that the Pakistani conventional military threat has receded somewhat. I need to qualify that statement. The Pakistani military is probably more powerful today than it was in 1971 and is certainly better off than in 1999. They have received new US and Chinese arms. But I state that the Pakistani conventional military threat has receded for the following reasons. I quote two reasons and each of these has been inferred from actions that I will mention below after listing the two.

1) India after 2002 and 9-11 has changed its doctrine about an offensive war against Pakistan. There appears to be no intention of taking and holding territory. The nuclear question has become more clear since 1999 and has probably added to this. I believe that a change in India's doctrine where we are no longer looking at over-running and holding vast swathes of territory across the border make it easier to reduce India's force levels.

2) Although the Paki military has kicked and screamed and protested, the US has successfully managed to make them put many more men on their borders with Afghanistan than was the case in the past. The figures quoted a couple of years ago was 90,000. More recently a figure of 140,000 has been quoted.

Once Pakistan started pulling men away from its border with India - India started shoring up its situation vis a vis China. The raising of new mountain divisions etc were mentioned after Paki troops were acknowledged to have been pulled out by Indian military sources.

The one factor that is repeatedly discussed here is the way the US is said to have obtained a quid pro quo from India - to avoid attacking Pakistan in exchange for some pressure on Pakistan to wind down terrorism. That too could explain India's new focus on China.

That brings me to the really new news - Chinese troops at the LoC in POK. I am wondering if Chinese troops at the LoC are actually there at Pakistan's invitation. Pakistan has reduced its force levels with regard to India but does not trust the US enough - so a separate agreement may have been reached to allow the Chinese to sit on the border with India. Perhaps.

That actually creates a very interesting situation. All through the 90s and even now infiltration of Islamic terrorists across the border from PoK to India has been assisted by Pakistani troops. Are the Chinese now going to take over that role? Are they going to give intel information and covering fire to jihadis as they cross the LoC? This again is a topic that could fit both in this forum and the other one - but I put it here because of the geopolitical issues involved.

[SSridhar]

Shiv, you have a point about recession of Pakistani conventional threat and the reasons you have adduced are so true. Another reason I would add is also the fact that Pakistan has realized that the world powers (read USA) may not like such misadventure as war between the two nuclear neighbours especially when it is present in the region, a scenario likely to continue for some time. Even China, for all its posturing, may not welcome such a prospect now as Pakistan found to its cost in Kargil. At least not yet until an opportune time may come for it to strike at India collaboratively with Pakistan.

As for the India focus on China, it works both ways, IMO. Apart from the mutual distrust and the continuing non-resolution of the border dispute, a second influencing factor for India to focus on China is the compulsion of times. As countries with which we were not very close began to take a fresh look at India after the economic liberalization and the globalization, a rapidly growing India has to ensure that its spheres of influence are well protected, whether it is the IOR or the Arabian Sea or the Malacca Straits. The Indian Armed forces have gone in for rapid modernization as a result and other countries in the neighbourhood have recognized that. They all have border or economic issues with PRC and have naturally flocked with an Indian bird of the same feather. While these South East Asian countries have looked at the rapid and large-scale modernization of China with trepidation, the same has not been the case with India's modernization efforts (even the Aussie fears of the 90s died down later). The earlier-abandoned India-US-Japan-Australia naval exercise on stiff Chinese protest or the ongoing Malabar series where Japan has joined together are probably a direct result of this. Indian armed forces are establishing deeper relationships with Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand and Korea. While India embarked on a 'Look East' economic policy a few years ago, it seems to have silently launched a similar one in diplomatic and military areas as well. Nobody wants a war, but they must exhibit sufficient deterrence at least cost. The prominence of India in this coalition angers PRC and it counteracts. There is an escalation ladder here.

I believe that at this point the PLA may be involved in repairing the Karakoram and laying the railway line to Gwadar. They really want Tibet and Xinjiang to flourish economically hoping that their woes in these two places may naturally go away. So, the PLA, which traditionally takes part in infrastructure activities, is roped in. But, that also helps PLA in covertly establishing itself in Gilgit-Baltistan, in getting to know these areas first hand and setting up bases etc. The PLA may not so blatantly take over the Pakistani role of helping the jihadis because I do not see any reason as to why. The Pakistani Army is already doing a good job, it has all the wherewithal do do what it is doing, it needs to be seen to be providing this support to the jihadis, it has deep networks on the Indian side to do all these. The Chinese will be hampered by many things, not the least of which will be communication. One of the benefits for PRC by being present in GB area may be to stop infiltration of jihadis into Xinjiang from Pakistan.

IMO, PLA will simply stay put, get itself entrenched and pressurize India when border settlement talks reach a denouement or await an opportune time to attack India along with TSPA. But, the Chinese situation is somewhat similar to Pakistan since in both the countries the Armed forces, especially the Army, are assertive. The PLA has been pressurizing the CPC in many instances. So, while the CPC may take one line with GoI on disputes, we may not be certain whether that has the stamp of approval from the PLA. We have to be extremely vigilant therefore.

[arunsrinivasan]

@Shiv, further to our conversation in the BLR Aero India meet ...

US Congressmen question wisdom of financial support for Pakistan Please check the comments ... people in the US are not blind to the duplicity of TSP, and equally I dont think anyone (in US or for that matter India) has an answer on how to deal with TSP, so they muddle along IMHO.

[Johann]

The Pakistani generals got exactly what they wanted out of the negotiations, and the Americans got their man. The people who are left feeling humiliated are the Pakistani public, especially the religious nationalists.

Johann what, in your view, did the generals get from the negotiations?

I guess a few Pakistanis felt humiliated but the fact that the humiliation was not bad enough to spark an uncontrollable series of protests indicates either that the humiliation was not much and Pakistanis are beyond caring, or they are scared enough of the Pakistani army to avoid being critical. Ultimately the US got its man without public humiliation and the humiliation if any was Pakistan's. And the Pakistani army bent to the US's will without anything to show in public.

The quid pro quo that the Pakistani army has with the Taliban (don't attack us in Waziristan, and we won't attack you in GHQ) is hardly a victory for the Pakistan army. The Pakistani army is doing what the US says on the one hand and is also doing what the Taliban asks on the other. The only role for the army is to reach a middle position between the two forces that are dictating terms.

But this Pakistan army that serves many masters seems to have great popular support among ordinary Pakistanis. I can see that at least some of that support comes from the myths that have been built up about the army in past wars. More support possibly comes from the "Protector of Islam/Pakistan and Muslims" reputation of the army. But what is not clear to me is that there is at least some recognition in Pakistan that the army is a problem but that does not get too much publicity. It seems to me that this is kept at a minimum by strong-arm methods. To me that is good news. The Pakistan army will have to pay for that eventually.

Shiv,

The US is conducting a covert war within Pakistan, in many cases against the the PA's clients and allies. Raymond Davis was a foot-soldier in that war. The US has stopped pushing the envelope in that covert war. They've been reminded that they have to compensate the PA for the damage they do to its interests, and that the US personnel in Pakistan are vulnerable. The exact nature of the limits placed on US actions within Pakistan, and the full nature of the payment in cash and kind to ransom Raymond Davis will be clearer in time.

I would certainly agree that the PA's approach to the US has enriched it and strengthened it technologically, while weakening its international and domestic position. This is untenable, and this is precisely why for the past few years I have repeatedly said here that the PA will eventually be forced to break its relationship with the US in order to preserve its power.

As for the PA's overall reputation within Pakistan, I think they have recovered a great deal of lost prestige by pushing the Pakiban out of Swat, even though its really the determination of local residents who have made sure that the Taliban has not been able to re-establish control. Swat was Pakistan proper, even a playground of sorts. North Waziristan has always been a transitional place, the periphery. The Baloch resistance has not been able to take and hold territory, and India avoided crossing the LoC or IB in the Kargil war and Parakram confrontations. Between all of these the myth of the PA has survived within Pakjab, the heart of the country.

I would say the real myth that cements public support is not so much the PA's strength but that the PA brass == the PA == Pakistan == Islam

It was the Pakiban that came the closest to destroying that myth by declaring those that fought them to be kafirs, but they undermined their cause by killing Pakistani civilians even more indiscriminately than the PA. Given the choice of the Pakiban or PA, Pakistanis living in towns and cities would much hope and pray for the success of the PA. The Pakiban like the tribal lashkar which slowed down and lost Srinagar in 1947 in order to rape, loot and kill on the way there is even less self-restrained than the PA. The Pakiban would have to get much more politically sophisticated to win Pakistani hearts and minds away from the PA.

[SSridhar]

It was the Pakiban that came the closest to destroying that myth by declaring those that fought them to be kafirs, but they undermined their cause by killing Pakistani civilians even more indiscriminately than the PA.

Johann, how did you conclude the highlighted portion above ? As far as I can see, there are three types of killings which are going on in Pakistan today, apart from the regular crimes in any state. One is extremely targetted assassinations; like those of Khwaja or Col. Imam or the attempts on Fazl-ur-Rehman or the various unwilling tribal chiefs or pro-government lashkars etc. They are being denounced as traitors who have either sided with the kafir Americans or with the Pakistani Army which in turn is being accused of as a tool of the American infidels. The second is the blasting of shrines etc especially when prayers are going on. Those killed are branded as 'non-muslims' as the recently caught 14-year old would-be suicide bomber boy claimed. Though there could be some other reasons as well in isolated case, most of them are to cleanse the Sufi/Berelvi Islam of the infidel practices not sanctioned by Wahhabi/Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi sects. This is where there should rightly be public anger against the Pakiban; but, there has been none at all. No political leaders or the leaders of right-wing politico-religious parties have condemned these attacks. The public revulsion has been too muted. We have not seen even token demonstrations at all after any of these horrendous attacks. On the other hand, there have been attempts to implicate 'foreign hands' in these. The newspapers, except for a couple, have not published op-eds or editorials against these. The TV debates have been silent on these attacks. There have been absolutely no debates in the National Assembly. Zilch. The third type of killing is mostly sectarian with occasional attacks against the minorities, especially Ahmedis and Christians. The worst sufferers in these attacks are the Shi'a whether it is in Kurram or central Punjab. Obviously, the 80% Sunni population either applauds this or remains silent; but, does not condemn it.

Now, those who order, plan and execute the above three types of acts are all Pakiban. The purely sectarian outfits are Pakiban too. As there is no widespread protestation while one sees impromptu celebrations on the assassination of the likes of Salman Taseer or even fatwas from clerics of all sects of Pakistani Islam on what to do and not to do, one has to conclude that the Pakistanis acquiesce in these acts. The usual excuse of 'silent majority' cannot be appreciated because they cannot be so silent while being in such a majority after relentless atrocities of this nature, if they genuinely hated the Pakiban.

The Pakiban would have to get much more politically sophisticated to win Pakistani hearts and minds away from the PA.

Once again, Johann, I believe that the aim of Pakiban is not to defeat the forces ranged against them politically. Pakiban are no proponents of democracy and polity. They will vanquish them religiously through jihad-al-saif; not jihad-al-nafs. It is the battle between the purest of 'em all and the lesser ones. The PA will be swept away or mutate to become Pakiban themselves.

[Johann]

S Sridhar,

Leading public figures in Pakistan are careful to avoid drawing the Pakiban's attention by condemning them by name too strongly, but that hasn't changed the public sentiment of distaste and fear. Its not just the targeting of the majority Barelvis.
- Pakiban targeting of public areas like bazaars have not been popular
- The Pakiban's reign of terror in places like Swat and South Waziristan has horrified a lot of Pakistanis. A lot of ordinary people were publicly tortured and executed for things that most Pakistanis don't really regard as crimes.

Swat is an interesting test case of how ordinary Pakistanis in many areas would fare under and react to a Pakiban takeover.
The one place that may be different is southern Pakjab. People in Swat certainly blamed the ISI for having let the Pakiban get so strong in the first place, and blamed the PA for flattening a lot of their town, and not really doing much in the way of rebuilding - but this seems to pale in comparison with their relief at having forced out the Pakiban, and their recognition that the PA was the force that could have, and did come their rescue.

Ultimately the Pakiban, like Al Qaeda in places like Iraq, or the GIA in Algeria is its own worst enemy. You just can keep a hold of Sunni hearts and minds as long as you keep killing them left and right, even if you utterly terrify them in to silence. They will back the first alternative armed force that shows its face and is willing to hang around.

Its not hard to believe or understand that between beheadings and suicide bombings on hand, and the PA on the other, most Pakistanis would take the PA. After all theyre not Baluchis, Bangladeshis or Baltistanis with the same memories.

[shiv]

Leading public figures in Pakistan are careful to avoid drawing the Pakiban's attention by condemning them by name too strongly, but that hasn't changed the public sentiment of distaste and fear.

Johann - I find it difficult to swallow this "public sentiment of distaste and fear" without some qualification

I accept that there is both distaste and fear but I believe it is not the sort of distaste and fear that you and I would feel under similar circumstances. I believe that there is a huge proportion of denial in that distaste and fear. denial that Muslims could do this and the sense that this is instigated by foreign forces - aka "RAW/CIA/Mossad". Naturally this is a great thing for the army because its excesses will not be questioned by the majority Pakjabis. This gels in perfectly well with your statement

PA brass == the PA == Pakistan == Islam

Muslims can kill Muslims when some of the Muslims are declared unIslamic and both the Pakiban and the army are doing it. What the Pakiban are doing is building up unassailable support in NWFP and FATA (and perhaps Baluchistan?) because those are the people who are witnessing the killings by the Pakistan army. The Pakistan army on the other hand has support in Pakjab. The Pakistan army is using the air force there and is certainly not "restrained". I wonder what made you use the term restrained. I will shortly be putting up a selection of video clips that show among other things unexploded PAF bombs in civilian areas.

That essentially makes Waziristan and some areas of NWFP no go areas for the Pakistan army - much to the frustration of the US. There is, in other words already a de-facto split in Pakistan with Afghanistan on the one side, Pakistan on the other and "no man's land" in between where the Pakiban operate to oppose both the Pakistan army and the USA. Pakistan's "retaking" of Swat is in stark contrast to its inability to reclaim North Waziristan and if Pakistan has really had to move a lot of its regulars there it means (either) that those troops are there merely at the behest of the US or they are there because the Pakistani military sees a real threat in that area.

Now if those troops are there merely because the US wanted them there - then it means that the Paki army is still following US orders, But if the troops are there because the Pakistan military feels they are needed there - then I can understand the feeling that Pakistan is leaving the east undefended against India. That would be incentive for Pakistan to ask the Chinese to provide some degree of cover in the area. Frankly I would not be surprised if in desperation Pakistan hands over its so called "Northern areas" to Chinese control.

[Johann]

Shiv,

Of course there's an element of double think - the job of people like Zaid Hamid is to ensure that the Mossad, RAW and CIA are the first people blamed by at least some Pakistanis.

The problem is that this is hard to sustain when you know that the jihadis heading up the Pakiban were already knowing for hating the Americans, the Jews and the Hindus, the Shia and the Qadianis. Hardly any Pakistanis *really* think the Lal Masjid, or the suicide bombers who avenged them were controlled by the Americans or whomever.

I accept that there is both distaste and fear but I believe it is not the sort of distaste and fear that you and I would feel under similar circumstances. I believe that there is a huge proportion of denial in that distaste and fear. denial that Muslims could do this

Its actually exactly the same kind of fear and distate when they know that the Pakiban has declared them kafirs, and wajib al-qatl.

The defence against takfir (declaring someone a kafir) is counter-takfir; i.e. extremism is when a Muslim kills other Muslims declaring them to be non-Muslims; if he does that, then he himself has lost his right to be called a Muslim.

The real cognitive dissonance is accepting that people like Mullah Diesel, or the PA brass who became targets are people who have deliberately fostered extremism at home for decades.

Pakistan's "retaking" of Swat is in stark contrast to its inability to reclaim North Waziristan

There's a couple of things here. Firstly, the history of the tribal areas means that the Pakistani public does not expect the PA to operate in or take Waziristan. A light federal footprint is seen as part of the status quo. The PA going in would actually look worse, yet another public capitulation to US pressure. Secondly, N. Waziristan is not just occupied by the hostile Pakiban, but by entirely cooperative clients like the Haqqanis and the LeT fight the Americans and Karzai. Why would the PA want to lose this deniable forward base, especially if they can come to a modus vivendi with the Pakiban?

Frankly I would not be surprised if in desperation Pakistan hands over its so called "Northern areas" to Chinese control.

I can certainly see things going in this direction. It isnt simply the strain meeting military requirements both east and west. It is that the infrastructure of Gilgit-Baltistan needs huge investments which the Pakistanis are in no condition to provide. Pakistan is already handing out mining concessions to the Chinese in exchange; leasing areas, or outsourcing management is not unimaginable.

The possibility a significant PLA deployment to G-B and "Azad" Kashmir during an Indo-Pak military crisis is something I remember discussing here (or perhaps it was on email) with Vikram Vyas years ago. The Chinese like to put troops to protect their strategic financial investments.

[svenkat]

China is contemptuous of India.US knows that.US 'cannot' have the same contempt for India(It has to pretend neutrality like its controlled media) because of 'democracy,liberalism,blah-blah'.US is playing both sides.US would like Dragon to squeeze Indias balls and then offer support to India on piddling issues and infiltrate and subvert India.

Johann,
Pakistani 'public' does not 'like' TSPA to go into North Waziristan but have no qualms about genocide in Balochistan or East Bengal or Balwaaristan or Afghanisthan nor about PLA take over in Gilgit-Baltistan.What authority did Porkistan have over Balochistan or Gilgit or afghanisthan before 1947.

I am not a moderator.Why are we tolerating this non-stop nonsense from Johann which is nothing but an apology for the West.Why is Hakim Sahib not calling a spade a spade.Why cant we call out this trolling by Johann.Are we in awe of white skinned people.Why is no one calling out his propogandu?

[UBanerjee]

^^^ It looks to me like there is an articulate and interesting discussion going on that doesn't have clear sides or shills. What is this shrill overreaction?

[Johann]

Johann,
Pakistani 'public' does not 'like' TSPA to go into North Waziristan but have no qualms about genocide in Balochistan or East Bengal or Balwaaristan or Afghanisthan nor about PLA take over in Gilgit-Baltistan.What authority did Porkistan have over Balochistan or Gilgit or afghanisthan before 1947.

Pakjabis do not talk or think about Pashtuns, especially the 'pure' ones of the tribal areas in the way that they talk about any other Muslim ethnic group in the subcontinent.

There's a certain fear of upsetting the internal status quo. In comparison there's no real fear of the Balochs, or the Ismailis of the north, or the Muslim Bengalis, but rather contempt.

The role of fear or respect has international analogies as well; why was America willing to invade Iraq twice, while a far more hostile revolutionary Iran has avoided that sort of treatment?

I am not a moderator.Why are we tolerating this non-stop nonsense from Johann which is nothing but an apology for the West.Why is Hakim Sahib not calling a spade a spade.Why cant we call out this trolling by Johann.Are we in awe of white skinned people.Why is no one calling out his propogandu?

Sorry S Venkat, but what exactly is trolling again?

The expression of a coherently argued and supported opinion that differs from yours, accompanied by the wilingness to discuss those differences without personal rancour?

Or is it running around declaring assumptions about people's appearances, and other people's attitudes to those appearances?

I have been here on this forum for almost thirteen years, so either as you suggest this place is run by and populated by dhimmis, or alternatively, you could engage in some serious self-reflection.

If you think you're being a proud nationalist here by trying to enforce conformity to a particular line then I'd think again. Most Indians here have too much self-confidence and sense than to think that the real world, or even the world you want is about preaching to the choir.

[Sushupti]

http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/oreilly/t ... d-pakistan

Fox News. " The magic word is India "

[svenkat]

Johann,
I have no personal gripe against you.you have every right to articulate your(western 'neutral' view).I needed to make my point.you are a 'harmless' drone.I am 'inconsequential'.But you are getting a 'deferential' treatment which would not be given to say a chinese or paki poster,if they posted the same drivel. It is Indian politeness which does not take offence at 'harmless neutrality' and also does not like to upset 'old acquaintances'.I have had the benefit of such understanding large heartnedness.just thought i will get it out of my chest.Good luck!

[Johann]

S Venkat,

Its a pity that you have lost interest in the substantive part of the discussion. Do you disagree that Pakjabis fear the Pashtuns of the tribal areas in a way thats different from other provinces? Or perhaps you agree - I can't tell.

Still it was a far nicer post than the previous one, but still woefully off the mark on pretty much everything.

If you'd been on this forum longer, you would know that there have been various Westerners on it for various lengths of time. They didn't have a particularly easy time, and neither have I. If anything there is a greater level of scrutiny and sensitivity. This is not some 5 star hotel lobby.

You don't have to take my word for it - you can ask others who are long timers here.

Unlike most, or perhaps all of the others, I lived in in India, and continue to visit. Its part of my past, my present and future and its part of my family. I'm not here to pick fights like the Chinese or Pakistanis, or because of a mere passing interest. I am not intimidated or chased off by little temper tantrums and bad behaviour such as the one a few posts above this one.

Just a few things to really seriously ponder;
- explaining things is not the same as supporting them
- Dont imagine that you can stick a label on a person and then know them. Individuals are not the same things establishments or governments.
- people can be right about some things even if you personally dislike them, their style what they believe and stand for

[VikramS]

svenkat: I remember your diatribe about commentators blasting Sreesanth during the Cricket World Cup. I now see you making baseless, pointless accusations in a very impolite tone. Dude go take a chill-pill.

Johann: I also tend to agree with your view point that given the choice the people of TSP will prefer the TSPA instead of the Pakiban. TSPA is like an abusive husband; the people may not like them too much but it is all they have had. The Pakiban on the other hand not only takes away whatever fun/entertainment they can have, they also ruthlessly kill. The TSPA does not typically kill in the heartland; it is only in the hinterland that they practice their skills.

That is why I am not that optimistic that shiv's militant takeover of TSP hypothesis will come through. The TSPA itself will morph to the right degree of piousness based on whom it is dealing with. There is an element of truth when they point that the religious parties do not get too many votes. The mango Abdul or the RAPE may be pious, and perhaps acts a lot more pious; but very few would be interested in a regime where their piousness is put to the test everyday.

[svenkat]

vikrams,
I am a rice eating tamizh speaker.I will go and cower in my dhotis.Thanks for your advise saar.

[SSridhar]

svenkat, VikramS & Johann, enough has been said. Time for ceasefire and move on.

Thanks.

[shiv]

Hardly any Pakistanis *really* think the Lal Masjid, or the suicide bombers who avenged them were controlled by the Americans or whomever.

Sorry Johann, that is not what available facts suggest. I am not sure where you gained this impression from

Here is an al Jazeera poll result from 2009.
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009 ... 94769.html
Question: Some people believe that the (Pakistani) Taliban are the greatest threat to the country, some believe India is the greatest threat, whereas some believe US is the greatest threat. Who do you think is the greatest threat for Pakistan?

(Pakistani) Taliban 11%

India 18%

US 59%

Don't Know 12%

For 76 % of people in Pakistan in 2009 - it was NOT the Pakiban that was a problem. It was India/America.


From a 2010 Pew poll reported in http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=109403

Only 25 percent thought it would be bad for Pakistan if the Taliban were to again take over
Afghanistan, while 18 percent thought it would be a good thing and 57 percent said it did not
matter or had no opinion.

The respondents were less concerned about either group getting the upper hand in Pakistan: the
Taliban was rated as a serious threat by 54 percent, against 73 percent last year, and Al-Qaeda's
threat perception fell to 38 percent, from 61 percent.

Nevertheless, Pew noted, both groups still had an overall negative image in Pakistan with the
Taliban getting a 65 percent unfavorable rating and Al-Qaeda 53 percent.

When asked which was the bigger threat, Taliban, Al-Qaeda or India, 53 percent chose neighboring
India over 23 percent for the Taliban and only three percent for Al-Qaeda.
Despite Washington's poor rating, most Pakistanis (64 percent) believe it is important to improve
relations with their powerful ally, up from 53 percent last year, Pew Research said.

-------------------------------------------------------------

There's a couple of things here. Firstly, the history of the tribal areas means that the Pakistani public does not expect the PA to operate in or take Waziristan. A light federal footprint is seen as part of the status quo. The PA going in would actually look worse, yet another public capitulation to US pressure. Secondly, N. Waziristan is not just occupied by the hostile Pakiban, but by entirely cooperative clients like the Haqqanis and the LeT fight the Americans and Karzai. Why would the PA want to lose this deniable forward base, especially if they can come to a modus vivendi with the Pakiban?

No sir that is not what the poll says

From the poll

Question: Some people favour the military
operation by the government against the Taliban,
while some oppose. What is your view?

Favour 41%

Oppose 24%

Neutral 22%

Don't Know 13%

The largest group favor military action against the Taliban


The following stats are for Swat:

On dialogue vs military action in Swat
Question: In your view, should the Pakistani government have a dialogue with the Taliban of
Swat, or carry out military action? Some people support dialogue, others support military
action. What is your view?

Military Action 41%

Dialogue 43%

Don't Know 16%

[ramana]

Nightwatch


4/13/2011


On the recent spat betwqeen TSP and US on intel matters:

Pakistan: Two US remotely piloted aerial vehicles launched missile attacks that killed at least six people near the Afghan border in South Waziristan, Pakistan, according to Pakistani intelligence official on 13 April. The attacks targeted a vehicle and a motorcycle in a forested area.


Comment: In an intelligence system officially guided by the Director of National Intelligence's directive and emphasis on integration, a drone attack in Pakistan seemingly should not be approved when the head of Pakistani intelligence is visiting United States intelligence leaders to protest missile attacks by drones. The DNI nor the Director of CIA seem to be in control of the drone attacks.

The strain between the US and Pakistani intelligence is genuine, but not because of the drone attacks. The Pakistanis are putting distance between themselves and the US in order to gauge their vulnerability based on the extent of the drawdown of US forces that is to begin in mid-2011. In that context, the intelligence dispute is a cover for larger strategic concerns.

There are several issues. The threat to Pakistan does not arise from the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has not hunted or pursued the Quetta/Karachi Shura leaders from Afghanistan. They remain allies of Pakistan.

Pakistan has never accepted the US conflation of an AF-Pak enemy. While groups might cooperate, the Afghan Taliban who take guidance from leaders in Pakistan are not hostile to the Pakistan government. The Pakistani Taliban, on the other hand, seek to overthrow the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan Army operations always have been targeted against threats to the stability of Pakistan and not against elements based in Pakistan that threaten the stability of the present regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan's strategic interests in confronting India require access to a friendly Afghanistan, which is not now the case.

The Karzai government is friendlier to India than to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistani intelligence has not and most likely will never cut its connections and support to the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, especially if they return to power in Kabul.

Long after US forces depart, Pakistan must survive in a hostile environment. US support has flowed and ebbed in the recent past, but has never been enough to enable Pakistan to defeat India in conventional warfare. China has been the only ally of Pakistan that has provided the strategic advantage that deters India, in the Pakistani view: nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.

The intelligence dispute is a proxy for Pakistan's fundamental distrust of the US as an ally, compared to China. As the time for the withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan draws nearer, strain in relations will increase.

Will x-post in Af-pak.

[Johann]

Shiv,

Thanks for posting the poll data.

Lets look at it slightly more closely however;

The Pew Global Attitudes Project poll suggests that in 2009, 69% were very or somewhat worried about extremist groups taking control of Pakistan.

In 2010, just 51% of Pakistanis expressed such concerns, Pew found

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10805780

Where did that bump in confidence come from? Events on the ground, and the perceptions they generated.

The 2009 Pew poll was conducted from 22 May to 9 June 2009 (http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/265.pdf). A lot happened in the year before the next one. The PA's Swat operation began in May 2009, but it had a slow start and it wasn't until about a few months later it was clear that the attempted Taliban comebacks had all failed.

I would be very curious to see the results of 2011 poll data; my guess is that support for military action would have dropped because the Pakiban is back to being a background phenomenon. We will have to wait and see, but whats going on at the time of the poll will shape responses.

Again, the Pakiban's actions in Swat, and their suicide bombing campaign did not win public support

Even in 2010 the specifics of military action would have mattered.

Research in to polling has shown that people across the world give *very* different answers to specific questions from general ones thanks to the compartments within the human mind, and I think we can agree it is even more severe with most Pakistanis.

For example, if people asked "Should the PA take over N. Waziristan and confront the TTP?" might bring results that contradicted the general willingness in 2010 to confront the Pakiban.

If the question is framed as "Should the PA resist US pressure to enter North Waziristan" what would you think the answer would have been? Particularly keeping in mind that 6/10 in the same poll described America as an enemy....

There are dynamics underlying the public response, and those emerge when you pull general public opinion, major events and local competing media narratives together.

Again I have never seen Pakistanis suggest that Ghazi Abdul Rasheed and Maulana Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid, and their kendo-stix brigades were American/Israeli/Indian agents. Nor did they deny that these guys were close to the Pakiban (issuing pro-Pakiban, anti-PA fatwas, etc).

By the same token if you asked people whether Musharraf's invasion of the tribal areas, and storming of the Red Mosque were responsible for the Pakiban violence that followed many would probably agree - especially the kind of Pakistani who marched on the streets to remove him from power in 2008.

There was a widespread perception at the time that the situation would calm down once Musharraf was gone, and that his violent toadying to the Americans was the problem. Well that didn't happen.

There is also poll data to support the shift in Pakistani perceptions of the Pakiban that followed Musharraf's ouster and Pakiban mass violence against Pakistani civilians;

The question

"Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion: d. The Taliban"

had only 19% say "Very unfavorable" in spring 2008, but this rockets to 53% in Spring 2009.

They also asked

" Do you think there is a struggle in our country between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists or don’t you think so"

which 40% agreed with, 22% denied and 38% refused to answer or didnt know in 2009, numbers that hadnt seen a lot of changes in the previous 2-3 years

What is really interesting is how numbers within the first group, i.e. those who agreed there was a struggle, shifted significantly in the follow on question;

Which side do you identify with more in this struggle, the groups who want to modernize the country or Islamic fundamentalists

In 2008 the answer was 51% on the modernizers, and 44% on the side of the fundies. In 2009 it shifted to 73% on the side of the modernizers, and 16% on the side of fundies.

This is why I said the recognition that some of these fundamentalists saw and treated their fellow Pakistani citizens not as Muslims but as Kafirs changed their feelings about the Pakiban.

[SSridhar]

Nightwatch
4/13/2011
On the recent spat betwqeen TSP and US on intel matters:

There are several issues. The threat to Pakistan does not arise from the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has not hunted or pursued the Quetta/Karachi Shura leaders from Afghanistan. They remain allies of Pakistan.

The Pakistani Taliban, on the other hand, seek to overthrow the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan Army operations always have been targeted against threats to the stability of Pakistan and not against elements based in Pakistan that threaten the stability of the present regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan's strategic interests in confronting India require access to a friendly Afghanistan, which is not now the case.

The Karzai government is friendlier to India than to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistani intelligence has not and most likely will never cut its connections and support to the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, especially if they return to power in Kabul.

The intelligence dispute is a proxy for Pakistan's fundamental distrust of the US as an ally, compared to China. As the time for the withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan draws nearer, strain in relations will increase.

By creating the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban achieved a few remarkable things.

• The TTP brought the dozens of terrorist organizations and individual warlords under an umbrella for a much better coordination of efforts. It was not a complete success because of the historical rivalries among the tribes, especially the Mehsuds and Wazirs, but it has been effective
• It kept up the pressure on the Pakistani government so that the latter did not run away with a full fledged support to American efforts. GoP would never have gone the whole hog with the Americans anyway, but the Afghan Taliban still had to ensure that. They know the Pakistani perfidy very well and did not want to take a chance. After all, they were being guided by Aslam Beg, Hamid Gul and Col. Imam who knew exactly what Pakistan was capable of doing
• The AQAM (Al Qaeda & Allied Movements) wanted the FATA Caliphate in order to escape the American onslaught and the TTP was the force to capture it and establish the rule there, which they did
• We do not know what the thinking is in the minds of the AQAM leaders. But, we can guess. After the merger of AQ and the Taliban after 9/11, their approach has become unified. The Pakistani outfits, the so called Punjabi Taliban, have joined in the party too. Hence the acronym AQAM. The latter have carried their 'Hanud' component to the 'Yahud-Nasara' theory of AQ. The collective wisdom now seems to be that Pakistan must also be turned into Taliban-style rule so that in future the Taliban regime of Afghanistan would be secure and a worldwide assault on the kafir can be sustained. The Afghan Taliban, while still needing the support of PA & GoP, has therefore outsourced that effort to TTP. They give the appearance of keeping the TTP at an arm's distance. The Pakistani Taliban thus seek to overthrow the Pakistani government. The PA & GoP have no option but to continue with their support for the Afghan Taliban as they blindly continue to chase the mirage of 'strategic depth'. The PA & GoP are thus caught in a cleft, from which they can come out only if they forsake their India-obsession, an impossibility. Thus the Afghan Taliban is the cleverest of 'em all as it gets support from Pakistan while at the same time bringing it under its sphere of influence (a reverse strategic depth).
• The presence of China in PoK is another one of those 'tactically brilliant but strategically stupid' moves. The Pakistanis may be doing this for several reasons. One, they may want to put pressure on the Americans by bringing in the Chinese so that the increasing strains between the US and Pakistan may be somewhat contained. Two, the Pakistani Army may conclude that with the significant drawdown of allied forces in Afghanistan, more Pakistani troops may need to be deployed in Af-Pak border in time to come, thus weakening the eastern border with India. They may hope the PLA's presence could act as a deterrent to India. Three, after the withdrawal of the US forces, US will not need Pakistan. From past experience, Pakistan knows that the US would not care for Pakistan after that and in the present circumstances (unlike in the Cold war era of 1989 or in 1965 or in 1972) of its close relationship with India, Pakistan would feel completely naked once that happens, in spite of nukes and missiles. The PLA boots on the ground at the border is therefore a hedge against any possible combined operation by the Yahud, Hunud and the Nasara.

[ramana]

Can you expand that into an article? One clue to their ideology is the Kunduz airlift. All those who escaped have created the TTP to ensure never again TSP will betray them. The oddest thing is neither US nor Karzai knows who were on that airlift.

[SSridhar]

One clue to their ideology is the Kunduz airlift. All those who escaped have created the TTP to ensure never again TSP will betray them.

Spot on, Ramana.

[shiv]

the Pakiban is back to being a background phenomenon. We will have to wait and see, but whats going on at the time of the poll will shape responses.

Johann if you look at the current running Pakistan thread - the links below refer to separate terrorist acts in Pakistan from 29th March to April 6th 2011. I don't think I have made repeat links to the same event and got tired of looking for more.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1057711
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1058263
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1059632
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1063102
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1063522
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1063636
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 9#p1065099

If this is what you mean by Pakiban becoming a "background phenomenon" it can only mean
a) That the violence is insufficient to evoke a response in Pakistan
or
b) The violence is being hidden from Pakistanis
or
c) The violence is known, causes concern, but the people do not believe it is the Pakiban, but believe that it is perhaps the US-India-Israel nexus that is causing violence.

In fact I suspect that all 3 are true to a greater or lesser extent. A huge constituency of Pakistanis have no clue of what is happening in what is nominally called "their country", and those who know are being told that it is a foreign conspiracy.

Your statement quoted above seems to contradict a statement you made later:

This is why I said the recognition that some of these fundamentalists saw and treated their fellow Pakistani citizens not as Muslims but as Kafirs changed their feelings about the Pakiban.

[Purush]

Apologies in advance if this has been posted before (couldn't find it on the last few pages anyway).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... lenews_wsj

South Asia's Looming Arms Race
By BRUCE RIEDEL

Pakistan's arsenal also is managed in a different way than is common in Western nuclear states. While relative transparency and geographical concentration are the norm in places like the U.S.—Washington is fairly open about how many warheads it maintains and where it houses them—Pakistan's program is marked by secrecy and dispersion. The Pakistani army makes every effort to prevent information about the locations of its weapons from falling into its enemy's hands, and especially American hands.

While India is the main enemy that has driven Pakistan's nuclear build-up, the army now also sees the bomb as a useful deterrent against Washington. Pakistani-American relations have become deeply troubled in the past few years, with both sides having little confidence in the other. Last fall, President Obama warned Islamabad, including its army chief Ashfaq Kayani, that another terror attack on the U.S. postmarked from Pakistan could lead to a profound crisis between the two countries. But Mr. Kayani understands that as long as Pakistan has a nuclear weapon, Washington will have to hesitate before using force.

Recent events in the Middle East have likely only heightened Islamabad's view of this deterrent. With the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya last month, Pakistan now has watched America take military action against three Muslim countries in the past decade. Mr. Kayani will doubtless conclude that if Libya had maintained the nuclear program that A.Q. Khan had sold it—rather than scrapping that program after the 2003 invasion of Iraq—the U.S. would have been more reluctant to start air strikes. His army will be more determined to build up the arsenal.

Washington now needs a policy toward Islamabad and its bomb which emphasizes constancy and consistency. It also needs to help Mr. Singh and Mr. Gilani address the root issues dividing the two nations. President Obama should encourage small steps at first like increased trade and communications, but press quietly behind the scenes to address Kashmir and other tough problems. The alternative, a full-blown South Asian arms race, will seriously threaten global security.

Is this Bruce Reidel guy normally pro-packee?

[Purush]

--sorry, double post--

[SSridhar]

South Asia's Looming Arms Race
By BRUCE RIEDEL

While India is the main enemy that has driven Pakistan's nuclear build-up, the army now also sees the bomb as a useful deterrent against Washington. . . . But Mr. Kayani understands that as long as Pakistan has a nuclear weapon, Washington will have to hesitate before using force. . . . His army will be more determined to build up the arsenal

Why should the US hesitate against a nuclear-armed Pakistan ? Pakistan has no means to lob a bomb at the Americans or even American installations elsewhere except in Afghanistan. OTOH, the first thing Pakistan would do would be to attack India if the US attacks it. It will claim that the attack was a joint Indo-US operation against it and thus justified to attack India even with nukes because its threshold is low. It will claim a moral justification to launch a nuke attack on us. Normally, the US should not be too bothered by an attack against India but in the increasingly inter-dependent world where a shutdown in India could damage American economic interests, it won't be the most prudent step. Hence the hesitation. A terrorist act here or there against India is not damaging except for some travel advisories for a couple of days, but nuke attack is a different proposition because even a usually dhimmi India woul have no option but to counter-attack.

Washington now needs a policy toward Islamabad and its bomb which emphasizes constancy and consistency.

I was laughing after reading the above. The nuclear 'policy' of the USA of 1979 has come a complete circle and threatens to bite the very hand that fed it. We have been able to witness this in our life times.

It also needs to help Mr. Singh and Mr. Gilani address the root issues dividing the two nations. President Obama should encourage small steps at first like increased trade and communications, but press quietly behind the scenes to address Kashmir and other tough problems. The alternative, a full-blown South Asian arms race, will seriously threaten global security.

Once again, Pakistan has been successful in projecting 'Cashmere' as the root cause that derails the relationship between the two nations. I do not know what Mr. Reidel meant by 'other tough problems'. If he and the US Administration understand the 'real root issue' but obfuscates it deliberately because of 'sensitivities' involved, then at least there is some hope. But, if he meant Sir Creek, MFN, Siachen etc by his phrase above, then there is no hope.

Global security is not threatened by an arms race between India and Pakistan. From the Indian side at least, there is no arms race. However, the global security is threatened by the Islamic republic of Pakistan and its 3½ friends who continue to think that appeasing Pakistan would somehow bring them benefits.

Is this Bruce Reidel guy normally pro-packee?

Like Ms. Christine Fair, he is pro-American.

[Purush]

Sridhar Sir, thanks for the analysis.

WRT to paki nuclear strike on American interests: definitely, they won't dare attempt a direct shot using aircraft/subs/missiles even if they have the means of delivery, and probably this is not what the americans fear.

I think the americans are more worried about a smaller device being passed off to a ISI-friendly jihadi group to be used on american facilities/forces in the middle east (or even threat of a JDAM on the continental US?) under the cover of plausible deniability.

Even if the material damage is 'limited', the psychological impact of such an attack would be quite devastating to the americans..being hit with a nuke by a diffuse and 'unidentifiable' enemy. Since there would be no 'overt' involvement of the pakis, would the US still retaliate with massive force against Pakistan if such an event were to occur? How would they explain to their own people that it was american duplicity itself of the last 30 years that led to such an event. Why wouldn't they attack a convenient scapegoat such as Iran instead?

They didn't nuke/bomb pakistan even after clear evidence of ISI involvement in 9/11 and when they had every justification to do so.

I could be completely wrong about all the above since I am no expert on US/pakistani strategy, so kindly ignore/forgive if it is nonsensical.

Washington now needs a policy toward Islamabad and its bomb which emphasizes constancy and consistency.

I was laughing after reading the above. The nuclear 'policy' of the USA of 1979 has come a complete circle and threatens to bite the very hand that fed it. We have been able to witness this in our life times.

Very much so, it appears.

[SSridhar]

Purush, you are right about the 'dirty bomb'. IMO, it is quite tough to smuggle one such device into mainland USA. Attacking American bases in the ME with nuclear devices is also a tough proposition. It may be easier to attack them with conventional methods including suicide bombing. There are no longer big American presence as it used to be in Riyadh, Al Kharj, Dhahran, Hafr-ul-Batein etc. The only large presence is in Bahrain where too a conventional attack like on the USS Cole could be more effective. The cost-benefit ratio would be more favourable to such type of attacks. The dirty bomb would be a counter value proposition in large urban areas causing widespread damage, panic and demoralization.

[Johann]

the Pakiban is back to being a background phenomenon. We will have to wait and see, but whats going on at the time of the poll will shape responses.

Johann if you look at the current running Pakistan thread - the links below refer to separate terrorist acts in Pakistan from 29th March to April 6th 2011. I don't think I have made repeat links to the same event and got tired of looking for more.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1057711
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1058263
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1059632
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1063102
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1063522
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1063636
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 9#p1065099

If this is what you mean by Pakiban becoming a "background phenomenon" it can only mean
a) That the violence is insufficient to evoke a response in Pakistan
or
b) The violence is being hidden from Pakistanis
or
c) The violence is known, causes concern, but the people do not believe it is the Pakiban, but believe that it is perhaps the US-India-Israel nexus that is causing violence.

In fact I suspect that all 3 are true to a greater or lesser extent. A huge constituency of Pakistanis have no clue of what is happening in what is nominally called "their country", and those who know are being told that it is a foreign conspiracy.

Your statement quoted above seems to contradict a statement you made later:

This is why I said the recognition that some of these fundamentalists saw and treated their fellow Pakistani citizens not as Muslims but as Kafirs changed their feelings about the Pakiban.

Yes, there's certainly double-think, but double-think is easier when you can afford it.

The pattern of violence has changed over the last 18 months - instead of spectacular attacks in major metropolitan areas in the Pakistani heartland, instead of districts falling under formal Taliban control we have a localised insurgency centred on NWFP and the Tribal areas.

People living in Pakjab and Sindh dont have a lot to fear under those conditions, other than a change from the status quo and a return to the 2008-09 situation.

I lived in Colombo in the 1980s when the war was raging both against the LTTE in the north and the JVP in south, and it was strange just how normal things could be, or how the state and the public would acknowledge the war against against the Tamils, while downplaying the Singhalese civil war. I remember the time I spent in south India while the insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir raged, and terrorist attacks took place in Delhi and Bombay - it just felt so far removed. Human individual and mass psychology is not really a rational thing.

[shiv]

I have cooked up the mother of all conspiracy theories. I can't say I believe it myself - but I cooked it up in my mind to explain the inexplicable.

1) the fact that there is widespread antagionism to "normalization" of ties with Pakistan should be obvious to the PMO
2) the fact that terror attacks are still being planned against india in Pakistan must be clearly known to the opposition as well as the PMO.
3) Yet the PM invites Gilani, there is talk us dialog no matter what, cricket ties and the BJP sits mum. The only people speaking up apart from BRF are a few lonely media voices.

Is there anything that can explain all this?

One explanation is that the PM represents a soft headed, treacherously weak person who years for a peace prize. But this fais to explain the silence of the opposition.

One alternative possibility that comes to mind is a delicate three-way game between India, Pakistan and the USA.

Pakistan is widely considered to be a failing sate living on handouts where Islamic extremists are dictating the way life is lived, apart from cross border Islamic extremism in India and Afghanistan and a slow leakage of extremists making plots against other nations.

The US is sitting in Pakistan exerting a degree of control over the Pakistan army, trying to get that army to fight the extremists - who are allies of the Pakistan army. The Pakistan army makes it clear that those extremists, no matter what they do in Pakistan, are needed for defence against India.

Note: It is another matter that the excuse is a lame one and has a lot going against it, but there is little the US can do to make the Pakistani army comply as long as that excuse is being used. The US cannot "hand Kashmir to Pakistan". The US and the media constantly ask that the "Cashmere problem should be addressed to reduce Pakistani paranoia so that Pakistan;s support to terror cells can be reduced. The GoI like everyone else also knows that this is bullshit.

Then why does the GoI not tell teh US and Pakistan to fug off and stuff it?

Perhaps the reason is a follows. As long as India does not talk to Pakistan - Pakistan claims fear of India. The Paki army fails to act on US instructions because of "fear of India". So the US then lectures India and the US supplies money and arms to Pakistan. Telling the US not to do that earns the reply "You need to appear less threatening and you need to solve the Cashmere problem" And the more threatening India is, the more the fears of the Paki army are "proven right" - getting them aid and keeping them in power even as they refuse to fight the US's war as the Paki prostitute is meant to do.

One possible solution for this - to get the US off our backs and force the US to pressurize the Paki army si to appear less threatening. One way of appearing less threatening is to keep singing the words of peace. as long as India is talking and sharing a common culture and playing cricket - there is no way the US can accuse India of not trying and there is no excuse for the Pakistani army to be reluctant to do the US's job. Once India looks like a push over ready to talk to Pakistan, the Paki army has no more excuses to give the US. And when the Paki army runs out of excuses, the friction with the US increases. That in fact is what we are seeing now.

What is important now for India while acting supine and weak is to see that

1) There is a complete shut down of terrorism from Pakistan
2) there is a stoppage of US aid to Pakistan that can be used against india
3) A persistence of friction between the US and Pakistan as the India excuse is no longer present for the Pakistani army.

If is a terror act - all bets are off and the US will not be in a position to lecture India. but they will equally not be able to lecture Pakistan either - but if the terror attack comes from Pakistan they will lose all credibility and clout with India unless they stop aid to Pakistan.

From this point on it is possible to game the gains and losses to various nations from various events

A. India supine, Talks to Pakistan. No terror attack from Pakistan
India 0 points
Pakistan -1 (minus 1) (the India threat is removed, terror tap is off, US's work must be done)
USA +1 (india supine, Pakistan toeing the line)

B. Terrorist act in India (or war with India)
India -1
Pakistan -1 (US disapprobation, India threat high)
USA -1 (India out of control, Pakistan not toeing the line)

C. India not talking with Pakistan, and pressurizing Pakistan
India -1 (Pakistan gets US support and arms)
Pakistan +1 (Not doing US's job. Getting aid and arms, proved right about its India fears)
USA -1 (India not listening, Pakistan not toeing the line)

D) India attacks Pakistan even when no terrorist attack occurs
India -1
Pakistan 0 (gets knocked out in war but gets US and international sympathy and aid)
USA -1 (Nothing is working for USA)

Scenario A looks like the best of four bad choices for India. It is also the best for the US. Scenario C is the best for Pakistan.

[Pranav]

Perhaps the reason is a follows. As long as India does not talk to Pakistan - Pakistan claims fear of India. The Paki army fails to act on US instructions because of "fear of India". So the US then lectures India and the US supplies money and arms to Pakistan. Telling the US not to do that earns the reply "You need to appear less threatening and you need to solve the Cashmere problem" And the more threatening India is, the more the fears of the Paki army are "proven right" - getting them aid and keeping them in power even as they refuse to fight the US's war as the Paki prostitute is meant to do.

One possible solution for this - to get the US off our backs and force the US to pressurize the Paki army si to appear less threatening. One way of appearing less threatening is to keep singing the words of peace. as long as India is talking and sharing a common culture and playing cricket - there is no way the US can accuse India of not trying and there is no excuse for the Pakistani army to be reluctant to do the US's job. Once India looks like a push over ready to talk to Pakistan, the Paki army has no more excuses to give the US. And when the Paki army runs out of excuses, the friction with the US increases. That in fact is what we are seeing now.

What is important now for India while acting supine and weak is to see that

1) There is a complete shut down of terrorism from Pakistan
2) there is a stoppage of US aid to Pakistan that can be used against india
3) A persistence of friction between the US and Pakistan as the India excuse is no longer present for the Pakistani army.

India should talk to the Paks (to the extent possible) in the hope of reducing the utility of Pak as an anti-India lever.

At the same time India should engage with the 3.5 baaps and set up carrots and sticks to encourage behavior modification. This is where both economic and military capabilities are required.

[RajeshA]

X-Posted from Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Thread

Published on Apr 15, 2011
By Yogesh Joshi
Understanding U.S. Policy on China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal: World Politics Review

Sourcing from elsewhere, as subscription dependent:

Code: Select all

http://www.pkarticleshub.com/2011/04/17/understanding-u-s-policy-on-china-pakistan-nuclear-deal/

China, however, never went to the NSG for a waiver. And although U.S. nonproliferation hawks made a lot of noise when the Sino-Pakistani deal was announced in the summer of 2010, it now appears that the U.S. has tacitly approved the deal. On a recent visit to China, Robert Blake, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asia, expressed U.S. acceptance of the new plants as a way to address Pakistan’s chronic energy deficits.

The reason for China’s decision to forego an NSG waiver is straightforward. Unlike the U.S.-India nuclear deal, China would never have received approval from the NSG for civilian cooperation with Pakistan without full-scope IAEA safeguards. First, aside from China, none of the NSG members will benefit from allowing the Sino-Pakistani nuclear deal to go through. Whereas the U.S.-India nuclear deal effectively opened India to the international nuclear market, bringing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of trade to the table, civilian nuclear cooperation with an ailing economy like Pakistan’s was a nonstarter. Indeed, China will invest 80 percent of the capital required for the new nuclear plants. Second, it takes a great deal of political capital to get the NSG, a nonproliferation norms-enforcer, to agree on exceptions like the Sino-Pakistani deal. China may be a rising power with considerable global political clout, but it can hardly match the influence of the U.S. when it comes to the nonproliferation regime.

Washington’s silence on the deal is more surprising, however. The Chinese decision to bypass the NSG constitutes a serious challenge to the norm-based nuclear order. Even if outlier states like India and Pakistan need to be accommodated in the nonproliferation regime, the process of accommodation needs to be “orderly and coordinated.” While the U.S.-India nuclear deal was an exception to established norms, it was based on a process of democratic accountability and global consensus. Unlike Pakistan, India has an unblemished nonproliferation record. Moreover, India also implicitly agreed to continue its voluntary moratorium on further nuclear weapons testing and to seriously consider signing disarmament treaties such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The Sino-Pakistani nuclear deal does not further the cause of nonproliferation and disarmament, since it fails to extract guarantees and commitments, whether explicit or implicit, from Pakistan. Nor does it enjoy the kind of universal support that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement did.

Two factors help to explain the U.S. position. First, had the U.S. attempted to force China to go to the NSG for an exception and the group ultimately denied the request, there was a strong probability that China would exit the group altogether. With global demand for nuclear energy set to rise, Washington preferred that Beijing remain half-inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime rather than go fully rogue. Second, allowing the Sino-Pakistani deal to go through will assuage Pakistan’s anxieties vis-à-vis India. The U.S. engagement with Pakistan is one of the most complex strategic relationships of 21st century, and the U.S.-India deal created a lot of bad blood between Islamabad and Washington. Pakistan has often demanded that it receive the same treatment as India, but to no avail. Domestic U.S. politics and Pakistan’s checkered nuclear past rule out any possibility of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear energy sector. By removing itself as an obstacle to China’s nuclear relationship with Pakistan, the U.S. is attempting to consolidate its position in Pakistan by pacifying its troublesome ally.

Nevertheless, U.S. reticence on the issue should not be interpreted as a sign of relative decline or a kowtow to China. Even since the financial crisis, the U.S. has increased its commitments in East and Southeast Asia. It has supplied arms to Taiwan and has stood firmly behind Japan and Vietnam on their territorial disputes with China. And despite innumerable warnings issued by China, the U.S. has continued conducting naval exercises in and around the South China Sea and the Korean peninsula.

U.S. acceptance of China-Pakistan nuclear engagement flows from American strategic interests in Pakistan and the desire to keep China in the nonproliferation regime. As such, it is a reflection not of its declining power relative to China, but of a savvy diplomatic approach to two thorny problems.

Yogesh Joshi is a graduate student at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and a CSIS-Pacific Forum Young Leader.

Seems like a jholawala trying to wipe off American sins of nuclear proliferation!

[ramana]

When the mask drops on an Indian Leftie it reveals a Western supported entity.

[shiv]

One more data point on the "harmless" and insignificant arms aid to America. Page 52. This is 2011. he US has been giving arms to Pakistan that are useful against india from the 1960s.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ ... mbrace.pdf

We decided to give Pakistan F-16s back in
the Reagan Administration. Pakistan doesn’t have advanced attack
helicopters. It doesn’t have drones. So when they fight the militants in
Swat or Waziristan, they use the platform they have, which is an F-16. It’s
not the optimal platform. When they started doing (inaudible) in Swat,
Pakistani pilots were given a photograph taken on the ground of the target
and they taped it inside the cockpit, and their mission was go bomb that
thing. That’s insanity. After Swat, they came -- the Pakistani air force
came to us and said we need to have the advanced radar systems and
guidance systems to be able to do a proper job.

Now, that was a hard policy decision for the Obama
Administration, a very tough policy decision. Because the same radar
systems, the same advanced avionics that allow you to attack a target in
the Swat Valley will also be perfect for attacking an Indian armored
column in the Punjab someday. But these are the kind of real-world
decisions that we have to make about Pakistan. I think the Obama
Administration did the right thing. It gave them those avionics, which may
come back to haunt us someday, but in the real world it was the right
decision to make.

[negi]

^ Shiv ji actually Unkil is smart they publish such half cooked stories depicting their dilemma for their lobbyists and chamchas in desh to present their case as a helpless supelpowel; the fact is all those arms supplies are very much pre-calculated and well thought out by the folks in Dupli-City. Remember we are talking about the same paranoid bunch who have put some of India's academic institutes on their watch-list in the name of controlling export of dual use technology.

[devesh]

^^^
the implication is that India can invest time, money, sweat and toil and rapidly advance its indigenous military base, but in the end, all advantages that are gained wrt Pak will be neutralized by Uncle's alms-giving. it doesn't matter how many billions we spend. in the end Uncle will always neutralize our edge. looking deeper, this is a scorched earth policy ( i've borrowed the phrase in this context from Anurag Sanghi). basically Uncle will use its financial power to mount asymmetric warfare on India. it is asymmetric b/c it's got nothing to do with Pak's real strength. the real enemy here is not Pak. they are just slaves. just proxies. Uncle is the one waging the war. they just don't want to be identified as such.

[ramana]

X_posted from OBL thread...

I had almost started a new thread on the issue of what it would take tactically to de-nuke TSP. However, I realized that before any tactics could be discussed, the strategic ground-work needs to be done.


IMHO, of the P5 it is only China which *may* have a reservation in de-nuking TSP. The rest of the P5 would rather have a fissile free TSP than a TSP with nukes, IF they have a way of doing it without risking a blow back.

For China to come aboard a few things have to happen.

1. The realization that TSP in its current form is too unstable to serve as a viable commercial transit lane to the Gulf or Central Asia.
2. That any more sleeping with TSP will more or less push India in to the arms of other super powers. This does not necessarily mean the US only. It also includes Russia. In the really big picture the interests of the US and the Russians are not diverging as much as they used to, especially when it comes to China.
3. That unstable TSP may eventually come to haunt parts of China too via the Jehadi bug.

If China does come to the table, it will require some guarantees of a significant role in shaping the post-nuke TSP which accommodates here core commercial interests. However, if China is at the table, the tasks become much easier. The towel will be thrown.


Suppose China does not come to the table, can the rest of the world bypass China and go ahead? While China has provided vital support to TSP, when it comes to putting boots on the ground, especially when it comes to Indo-TSP issues, China has so far been reluctant whether it was 71 or Kargil.

However, before China backs down, it has to be convinced that the rest of the world is serious. This may take other forms, but nothing beats a massive show of force. i am talking AT LEAST half a million men ready to take on the TSP with participants from the P4 + RSA+ Brazil + Aussies + NATO + Nordics + Japanese + SoKo etc. Essentially who ever matters in the free world.

The actual snatch will require a massive search and steal operation with overwhelming display of available power to neutralize any resistance. It may require networked gieger counters at every crossing and bazaar of TSP, and QRTs within minutes of the scene of the crime.

Denuking of course will have to be a precursor to de-martialising the TSP society. This is a much longer term project but something which needs to be done to prevent a slide.

This is where the Iran-Shia-bomb also comes in.

BTW, I think the reason the rest of the world will gang up on TSP is that they perhaps realize, that it is just a matter of time before the fissile material gets lost. The Japanese earthquake and the aftermath has highlighted that you do not need a nuclear explosion to cause havoc. Just the release of fissile material can make a place unusable for generation.

I can not imagine the economic impact of Manhattan or London or Tokya being rendered unlivable thanks to Paki Plutonium which fell from a truck when being transported. And I would not be surprised if the Pakis themselves pull this stunt off just to keep themselves relevant.

The Kicking the Can down the road will eventually come to an end. TSP is in a mad rush to produce more fissile material and the longer the wait is, the worse the situation becomes.

VikramS, Please lead the discussion in this thread as TSP nukes are due to the above two countries in the title.

[ramana]

VikramS, I think its the US that has to be convinced by India that its in best interests to take them out.

If US threatens PRC and TSPA they will give up the nukes. But the price will be pro quid quo from India.

Instead if India threatens PRC then also it might work. But it needs India to be bigger in many ways.

The root cause is that both US and PRC do not want India to emerge as a new military power regional or global. And without military backing it will be a Japan/Germany situation. In end quarrels will be settled with arms.

Soft power needs to be backed with hard power.

Bismark etc have said it many times.

Even US is soft power with extreme hard power that its brittle.

[VikramS]

ramana:

I think it will be best if India has the least of role to play in de-nuking. She of course will have a major role in de-martialization, as perhaps will Bangladesh, Malaysia and other Islamic countries which are fed up of Islam being usurped by the TSP.

This awakening has to come from the rest of the free world. It can not come from India since then the =/= wallahs will have a free day. India has to be conspicuous by her absence


In a lot of way, I am happy that barring TimesNow which is calling TSP snakes to highlight their perfidy, the overall Indian media has been very understanding of the loss of TSP H&D. I like that. India should hold TSP in a tight embrace while its H&D is being shot. If it takes another few cuts tolerate it. However, work behind the scene to create that global consensus.

I think India should be engaging China strongly. The Chinese will have to be persuaded. If the last 50 years are any indication, it should be clear that India aint breaking down; they better make up and work with India. If Indian and China cooperate, a lot of Chinese commercial and strategic goals can be achieved. They can have that secure trade corridor, access to vast growing market and keep other super-powers out of the theater. The Chinese can be the first among equals; India has always deferred that role to China.

But if the Chinese want to supplant the US, then they better be ready to face the elephant. A must elephant rules the jungle and no tiger or dragon can stop it.
==================

Quite frankly, even in massa-land I do not feel that we are secure from TSP perfidy. Perhaps being around NYC during the 2001 era left a permanent scar. But that is the fact that anyone who really has understood TSP games can not dismiss. The risk represented by TSP has to be widely and broadly shared with everyone and anyone who matters.

TSP sheltering OBL is a seminal, ground changing event, which has left mouths open all over the world. It is during these times of shock that the minds are the most receptive. Otherwise in a few weeks the establishment will start repeating the old lies and people will forget. Strike while the iron is hot; share the risk which TSP exposes to the free world.