chaanakya wrote:http://pamirtimes.net/2013/04/01/sost-p ... d-traffic/
Sost, April 1: Pakistan and China have resumed trade and traffic on the Karakoram Highway, through the Khunjerav Pass. The two countries had earlier this year agreed to open the border on 1st April, instead of 1st May, as was the past practice.
A bus carrying passengers from China reached the Pakistan Customs House located in the border town of Sost today.
The importance of the trade through the Karakoram Highway has increased significantly due to the powerful presence of Chinese business companies in Gawadar. It is pertinent to note that the outgoing Pakistan government had handed over the management of Gawadar Port to a Chinese company recently.
The trade through Karakoram Highway has badly been disrupted due to the blockade and destruction caused by the Attabad Landslide and the dammed Hunza River.
currently, tunnels are being constructed near Attabad and Ayeenabad to realign the KKH. The realignment work is not likely to be completed before mid of 2014, according to China Roads and Bridges Corporation (CRBC) officials, who are working on expansion and realignment of the KKH.
Managing Chinese Threat
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Last edited by svinayak on 29 Apr 2013 23:00, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
KP Nayar is doing what Telegraph(Amrita Bazar patrika group) does best :Defend INC at all costs for it can do no wrong.
Anyway who are the China baiters in the GOI that revealed the Chinese occupation! There are limits to nonsense being peddled due to patronage and parochialism.
He has a few theories(Chinese want to test Indian Ambassador in Beijing before he becomes the Secy MEA, new Beijing leadership wants to visit India to show India's importance!, China baiters tom-tommed the news of PLA inside Indian side of LAC, disloyal to the great MMS who is working tirelssesly to solve the China border, etc.) all running simultaneously but the fact of the matter is PLA troops are 19 km in Indian side of LAC and the govt is wringing its hands and its minions in press are blaming those out of the government.
I don't find the article interesting at all. Its based on sarkari khyali(dreams) pullao.
Anyway who are the China baiters in the GOI that revealed the Chinese occupation! There are limits to nonsense being peddled due to patronage and parochialism.
He has a few theories(Chinese want to test Indian Ambassador in Beijing before he becomes the Secy MEA, new Beijing leadership wants to visit India to show India's importance!, China baiters tom-tommed the news of PLA inside Indian side of LAC, disloyal to the great MMS who is working tirelssesly to solve the China border, etc.) all running simultaneously but the fact of the matter is PLA troops are 19 km in Indian side of LAC and the govt is wringing its hands and its minions in press are blaming those out of the government.
I don't find the article interesting at all. Its based on sarkari khyali(dreams) pullao.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Dont dismiss it.ramana wrote:KP Nayar is doing what Telegraph(Amrita Bazar patrika group) does best :Defend INC at all costs for it can do no wrong.
Anyway who are the China baiters in the GOI that revealed the Chinese occupation! There are limits to nonsense being peddled due to patronage and parochialism. .
The China baiters are mostly Uncle admi inside desh
Other power have a stake in making sure India China dont talk much. I heard it from few gora myself
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
How does a group of 20 or so soldiers get pushed out?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
First cut off re-supplies!shyamd wrote:How does a group of 20 or so soldiers get pushed out?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Was making reference to the fact that they came 30km and were "pushed out" back another 11 km or so ?
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Media ban issued issued in Arunachal and Eastern Ladakh (in army areas only). Info is tightly controlled.
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Media ban issued issued in Arunachal and Eastern Ladakh (in army areas only). Info is tightly controlled.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
pro-pak and pro-US group in China is same group. And if this major-general who cannot/wont retrieve his troops from frontline means that military is against new Leader. If he isn't taken care of in 2 weeks, then it would mean that Chinese leadership isn't in control. & that is codswallop. Only real-time intel can confirm what positions IA has taken along LAC and if they have advanced and this is Chinese tit-f-tat in an area where they presume advantage.
my position is that this is a quid-pro-quo stand taken by Chinese army for IA's stand elsewhere before talks. Some inkling that Li Jinping is interested in resolution of border for further thrust by Chinese companies, which is very important if they wish to diversify out of US. IA has far greater chance of being penetrated by foreign powers than PLA imho. So lots of lentils in the black.
my position is that this is a quid-pro-quo stand taken by Chinese army for IA's stand elsewhere before talks. Some inkling that Li Jinping is interested in resolution of border for further thrust by Chinese companies, which is very important if they wish to diversify out of US. IA has far greater chance of being penetrated by foreign powers than PLA imho. So lots of lentils in the black.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
yeah, ddm is giving very poor quality reportsshyamd wrote:Was making reference to the fact that they came 30km and were "pushed out" back another 11 km or so ?
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Media ban issued issued in Arunachal and Eastern Ladakh (in army areas only). Info is tightly controlled.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Hopefully media ban aids position of India in many ways such as keeping defense positions secret on Indian side.shyamd wrote:Was making reference to the fact that they came 30km and were "pushed out" back another 11 km or so ?
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Media ban issued issued in Arunachal and Eastern Ladakh (in army areas only). Info is tightly controlled.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Folks there was a post by Rudradev ji on 'why china could pick a fight with us' last year, have been trying to find it , but can't. In case anybody remembers I would be very grateful if you point to me.
Paging Rudradev ji too!
Paging Rudradev ji too!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
There are a number of theories doing the rounds why china is doing what it is doing - doubt we'll know the answer for some time. Waste of time to speculate.
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Maybe rohitvats can comment - will the area where the chinese have pitched their tents have to be vacated in winter?
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Maybe rohitvats can comment - will the area where the chinese have pitched their tents have to be vacated in winter?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
that KPN article is a bakwaas lifalifa article to save the excreta of the goverment. Nothing short of it.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Baasically UPA is preparing India and Indians to give up to China. JLN's famous "blade of grass" moment is all over that crappy Nayar article. Just disgusting folks.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
FirstPost:
Two maps tell dangerous story
Buried in it is a link to BRF hosting the Official War history of 1962!
Two maps tell dangerous story
Buried in it is a link to BRF hosting the Official War history of 1962!
As I said before the MMS govt is like the JLN govt and has the unique distinction in getting India slapped by both TSP and PRC. Despite all the nonsense and cleverness, PRC is occupying land 19km on the Indian side of the LAC....
These ideas all merit very serious discussion, but none will get the Chinese post out of the Depsang Bulge before the winter—and that is India’s critical short term concern.
It is interesting to consider the historical antecedents of this uncomfortable situation. From 1950-1959, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency history notes, “Nehru continued to see a border war as a futile and reckless course for India. His answer to Peiping [sic., Beijing] was to call for a strengthening of the Indian economy to provide a national power base capable of effectively resisting an eventual Chinese military attack”.
Eventual, the CIA’s analysts observed, was a neat evasion: “in the context of the immediate situation on the border, where Chinese troops had occupied the Aksai Plain in Ladakh, this was not an answer at all but rather an implicit affirmation that India did not have the military capability to dislodge the Chinese”.
Even though it’s improbable China wants war, India wants one even less. India’s political leadership is hesitant to authorise force, wary of the certain costs of precipitating a crisis. Later this year, as the cold sets in across Ladakh, China’s outpost will have to withdraw: there’s simply no way to survive the cold in temporary shelters. However, Chinese will by then have drawn lessons about Indian resolve—and it’s vital, in the long-term interests of peace, that they not be the wrong ones.
There are things India can do, short of setting off a firefight, which can signal seriousness of purpose: among them, more aggressive probes and presence-marking operations. There will be a price—but it will be cheaper than the cost of doing nothing now.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
In a way Chinese are proving the postulates of SHiv ji
India will roll over and run to hinterland of UP HP Assam WB Sikkim
Nam ka singh hai dill to chuva hai
India will roll over and run to hinterland of UP HP Assam WB Sikkim
Nam ka singh hai dill to chuva hai
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
HP and Sikkim probably does not belong to India as there are Himalyas are there in these states.pentaiah wrote:In a way Chinese are proving the postulates of SHiv ji
India will roll over and run to hinterland of UP HP Assam WB Sikkim
Nam ka singh hai dill to chuva hai
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
If Shiva and Buddha are Chinese, China is actually more. We are occupying a whole more area than we should. Nepal, Mukhteshwar, Uttaranachal, Lumbini and Bodh Gaya all are Chinese. The entire NE of course goes without saying. You don't understand China has many provinces. Folks this is not about some local differences in perceptions, it's about cultural imperialism. It is that we have to confront the Chinese head on including physically telling them their own culture is nothing but f-a-r-t and borrowed tradition from us. That we intend to uphold, and stake into our own cultural and religious lore in their narrow minded clutches that translates as forward policy. We need a Govt at the center that understands the cultural and religious onslaught that is being conducted for appropriation of our holiest symbols. And that is why i stress our case will have to be based on our stand on KM and Tibet. Else we lose. There are no middle paths to this diabolic game the Chinese are playing here.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
You got it totally wrong. There was an argument during heated discussion about India's nuclear testing freeze. There was almost an unanimity that India actually needs to construct a zillion lavatories and it does not have time and money to waste on unnecessary confrontation with super powers of the world. In that pursit what is the big deal in giving away just 20 more KM to China. They have digestive power on these mountains as they eat anything that walks.harbans wrote:If Shiva and Buddha are Chinese, China is actually more. We are occupying a whole more area than we should. Nepal, Mukhteshwar, Uttaranachal, Lumbini and Bodh Gaya all are Chinese. The entire NE of course goes without saying. You don't understand China has many provinces. Folks this is not about some local differences in perceptions, it's about cultural imperialism. It is that we have to confront the Chinese head on including physically telling them their own culture is nothing but f-a-r-t and borrowed tradition from us. That we intend to uphold, and stake into our own cultural and religious lore in their narrow minded clutches that translates as forward policy. We need a Govt at the center that understands the cultural and religious onslaught that is being conducted for appropriation of our holiest symbols. And that is why i stress our case will have to be based on our stand on KM and Tibet. Else we lose. There are no middle paths to this diabolic game the Chinese are playing here.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
harbans ji, I believe there is an inherent self-defeating Adharmic risk in conducting oneself individually or nationally based on mata-bheda (मतभेद) rather than dharma-viveka.harbans wrote:If Shiva and Buddha are Chinese, China is actually more. We are occupying a whole more area than we should. Nepal, Mukhteshwar, Uttaranachal, Lumbini and Bodh Gaya all are Chinese. The entire NE of course goes without saying. ...Folks this is not about some local differences in perceptions, it's about cultural imperialism. It is that we have to confront the Chinese head on including physically telling them their own culture is nothing but f-a-r-t and borrowed tradition from us. That we intend to uphold, and stake into our own cultural and religious lore in their narrow minded clutches that translates as forward policy.
Mata-bheda is where you relate with others based mainly on their mata - opinion, ideology, religious/political affiliation, cultural preference. This is dangerous and could lead to Adharma, not Dharma. Instead, if one were to relate based on understanding the deeper characteristics by which someone is (or potentially could) contribute to bringing about Dharmic order, then it is better. To have the ability to trust such an eligible candidate whose mata is different or even opposed to one's own is actually Dharmic.
So while maybe there should be a small section of Indians who say the above, I believe the nation as a whole should not conduct its dialogue with other nations based on such rhetoric. It has to be far more nuanced, and one which invokes the self-determinism of the other as well as one's own.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Nat'l Post:
Jonathan Kay: China’s ruthless foreign policy is changing the world in dangerous ways
Jonathan Kay: China’s ruthless foreign policy is changing the world in dangerous ways
China’s foreign policy ambitions are growing in unexpected directions. As John Hopkins University scholar Christina Lin argues: “Paradoxically, while the U.S. is pivoting eastward to contain China in the Asia Pacific, the resurgent Middle Kingdom is pivoting westward on its new Silk Road across the Greater Middle East.”
Unlike the United States and its NATO allies, China never had any desire to see its soldiers patrolling the streets of Kabul and Kandahar, or to sacrifice lives and money in furtherance of “nation-building.” As with Chinese operations in Africa, Beijing’s initiatives in Central Asia and the Middle East are ruthless cost-benefit enterprises aimed at extracting Afghan mineral riches, and otherwise enhancing China’s national interests.
Those interests, Lin, notes, include (1) securing safe and secure oil and gas routes, such that China can ensure its energy needs are met even in the event that its coastal supply routes are blockaded or otherwise disrupted; (2) creating a bulwark against the infiltration of Islamist terrorists into China’s Muslim regions from Pakistan and neighboring Muslim countries; and (3) stabilizing and integrating the Xianjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which occupies a sixth of China and is regularly beset by Islamist agitation.
At the centre of China’s plan for Central Asia and the Middle East is a pipeline, road, rail and power network that could eventually extend from the Pearl River Delta, west through China into Central Asia, and eventually all the way to the Mediterranean. This scheme would greatly benefit landlocked nations such as Afghanistan, but it would also be a bonanza to Iran, which likely would end up being a full partner in any such megaproject. (Lin, for instance, has sketched out a scenario in which an Iranian railway line into the western Afghan city of Heart would be integrated with a Chinese network that extends south from Xianjiang into the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif.)
Of course, this is a region that could desperately use more economic development. But the prospect of such development being done under joint Iranian stewardship is a disturbing one — not least because it would completely undercut any effect that Western sanctions would have on Iran’s nuclear program.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The Chindu doing what one expects it to do: try not to be overtly pro-China (that will be a PR disaster) but pushing a pro-China stance in the garb of neutrality
Chinese troops erect another tent at DBO
but with the following sub-title
Chinese troops erect another tent at DBO
but with the following sub-title
China insists that some bunkers constructed by India at a key vantage point be dismantled
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
A chronicle of Chindu's Chinese propaganda articles:
1) Pass to better relations with China. @svaradarajan introduces this drivel with the tweet
3) Lesson from an unsettled boundary by Manoj Joshi. The sub-title at work again. For more puke, read the article in full
1) Pass to better relations with China. @svaradarajan introduces this drivel with the tweet
2) Troops still camped, but China denies LAC crossing by Ananth Krishnan and Sandeep Dikshit. It has an interesting sub-title (which seems to be their Modus Operandi these days)Pass to better relations with China. Good proposal by VS Verma, scholar at ICS and ex-army man
Oh oh - so "New Delhi" says this, reports The Chindu, the ever so neutral newspaper operating out of the UN Headquarters in New York CityBut New Delhi says that land where PLA put up a tent belongs to India
3) Lesson from an unsettled boundary by Manoj Joshi. The sub-title at work again. For more puke, read the article in full
@svaradarajan introduces the article with the tweetThe reality is that the Line of Actual Control between India and China is notional and has not been put down on any mutually agreed map
4) Don’t get China wrong by Srinath Raghavan and @svaradarajan introduces the article with a tweetLesson from an unsettled boundary. Manoj Joshi on the backstory to the Ladakh standoff
Don’t get China wrong. The ever insightful Srinath Raghavan, ex-Army man turned academic, on the Ladakh incident
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
As long as one has Chinese nuclear missiles stationed in Tibet targeted at our cities, we would find it difficult to go up the escalation ladder.
So ...
This doesn't mean we have to wait till all of this is in place before the throw out the Chinese from their current camps within India. But for a more durable "peace" the above would be necessary.
So ...
- We need just as many land-based nuclear missiles targeted at Chinese cities on the Eastern coast.
- We need nuclear-weapon submarines not far from Chinese Eastern shore.
- We need a much bigger deterrent, so Buddha needs to smile more often.
- We need a deep tunnel and bunker busting bombs.
- We need a very exact knowledge of geological fault-lines running through the region and how and where to strike to cause a targeted earthquake.
- We need to bring Nepal and Myanmar in our sphere of influence with an intensive civilizational luring.
- We need to train and arm each and every able-bodied Tibetan male for an insurgency in Tibet against Chinese rule.
- We need to support the insurgency in Turketstan in indirect ways.
- We need to raise a few more mountain strike forces and otherwise get conventional superiority over China.
- We need a huge expansion in our MIC.
This doesn't mean we have to wait till all of this is in place before the throw out the Chinese from their current camps within India. But for a more durable "peace" the above would be necessary.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Is that what's called a 3-front war?Singha wrote:kings of the hill fight like this to protect their vital interests http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qt2Q4BB8nRg
weak and pleasure seeking ruling classes hunt around for rationalizations for inaction.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Manish ji, glad you remembered! Maybe you mean these posts?Manish_Sharma wrote:Folks there was a post by Rudradev ji on 'why china could pick a fight with us' last year, have been trying to find it , but can't. In case anybody remembers I would be very grateful if you point to me.
Paging Rudradev ji too!
The first one starts off with some thoughts about Pakistan, and how the current (2011) Aman Ki Asha state of India's policy towards Pakistan may reflect India's perception of Chinese intentions (This is an intricately related matter, like it or not...)
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1159770
The second one is a follow up some pages later...Briefly: the state of Pakistan, or at least those groups with the capacity to exercise any sort of central authority there, have lost confidence in their ability to preserve the identity and viability of Pakistan. Allah, Army and America were the pillars of the state, the guarantors of its survival through the previous century. Today Allah and Army are fighting each other in a purer-on-pure conflict, and America is repeatedly sticking bamboos in the upturned GUBO orifice of the Pakistani state. The present and potential ruling elite, the empowered classes, are in a state of panic, reaching out desperately to all sorts of potential benefactors to guarantee the continuance of their empowered status. These include:
A) Maha-Islampasand Pakis, including many within ISI and TSPA, who are still holding out in the hope that a pan-Ummah caliphate ("Khorasan?") can be established and subsume present-day Pakistan. However, this group is grappling with twin calamities that have publicly exposed and undermined the fantastic and unsustainable nature of their goals; firstly, the exhaustion of fighting a ten-year war against drones, airstrikes, ANA artillery and US special forces in the Northwest, and secondly, the crisis of credibility that has resulted from the decapitation strike against Bin Laden. Additionally, the increasing transformation of the Taliban into a Pashtun nationalist movement has undercut the legitimacy of the Maha-Islampasand Pakis' argument that being Purest of All is the solution to saving Pakistan.
B ) Chinipakis: the remaining portion of TSPA and ISI, plus many elements of the RAPE "political" class (such as Zardari) who are relying on the Chinese to save the day. They are the ones doing their damndest to mortgage the whole Pakistani state as the newest province of China. These, from the Indian point of view, may be the most dangerous... for reasons I will go into later. They are playing for a coup... a two-front war prosecuted by China and Pakistan against India, that will at once humiliate India, make America less relevant, and seize Kashmir in a move that will confer political legitimacy on the leadership claims of the Chinipaki group.
C) A very small number of Paki elite and TSPA who are still pro-America, and cling to the hope that America will not leave the used condom shredded in the garbage when it pulls out.
D) An even smaller number of Paki elite who are, not pro-India, but at some level hope that India can sort things out and save Pakistan's skin (since the alternatives are all worse.) These are your Chaighar type Paki liberals, who still hate India and Hindus, who still justify the creation of Pakistan, but all said and done feel more affinity for India than for China, Ummah or America.
E) A substantial number of Pakis who do NOT belong to the traditional echelons of power, i.e.TSPA/ISI Top-Brass or RAPE; and who still hold out the hope that Pakistan as they once knew it can survive all this. Of all the categories this is the ONLY social class which actually has a vested interest in the survival and success of Pakistan as an *independent* nation state when all is said and done. They consist of a petit-bourgeoise (not-exactly-middle) class, ranging from shopkeepers to professionals and bureaucrats to smaller landowners who are not quite big enough to be RAPE or "political class" in the Zardari/Sharif mould.
What India is trying to accomplish is not "strategy", at least not a Pakistan strategy that is viable in the long term. What India is trying to do is to make the best of a bad situation and strengthen Section D by drawing Pakis of Section E to it. We are playing to gain time, and avoid a two-front war with Pakistan+China; not to destroy Pakistan or redeem Pakistan or reclaim POK or any of those grand designs talked about on BRF. We are playing for time. That is all.
Section A is hopeless, and gives us entertainment value (IED mubaraks, Dronacharya strikes) at best while conducting terrorist attacks against Indian targets at worst.
Section B is very, very dangerous and their plans must be thwarted at ALL costs.
Section C is small enough to ignore entirely as a power bloc, but they may serve some limited purpose in advancing those few aspects of the Indian and American agendas that overlap.
However, there is still some hope for Section E (along with Section D) to create the sort of temporary respite that might postpone the inevitable collapse of Pakistan for a few decades, while neither engendering an overwhelmingly dangerous situation on our borders nor swamping us with a massive humanitarian disaster just as we are beginning to make economic progress.
Section E, it must be noted, does have considerable presence in the TSPA... the sons of petit-bourgeoise Pakistanis who joined the armed forces, and who have lost confidence in the RAPE-origin jernails to run the country after seeing the disaster perpetrated over the last ten years. Some of these Section E Pakis may even be as high up as Brigadier and Major General. These guys, as well as the Section C (pro-US) TSPA brass, are the intended audience of our dovishness that everyone from MMS to B Raman to Bharat Karnad have been prescribing ("non-threatening posture" et al.) Or at least, that's my guess.
India is hoping that these Section E TSPA officers will become a pro-Indian (or at least, "not-anti-Indian") constituency, and forestall the designs of either Section A Maha-Islampasand elements of TSPA, or Section B Chini-pasand elements of TSPA.
Make no mistake, the Section D/E Pakis do not love India, they do not necessarily favour forgive-and-forget with India, they do not necessarily see the Indian position on Kashmir as justified; but they DO see that India/Kashmir is far from the greatest problem that Pakistan faces right now, and they will take India's help in strengthening their position to ward off those other, bigger problems. For now. Or so India hopes.
So. Why do I say Section B are the MOST dangerous Pakis?
Because it may be that China really wants a war. Against India, with Pakistan as its ally.
China has been acting for the last several years, more aggressively than ever towards all its neighbours. Not ONE conciliatory move is made, but panga is taken with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines AND India at every opportunity. Why?
Because China needs a war. Or at least, one very powerful faction in the Chinese govt, including the PLA, is convinced that China needs a war.
Why does this faction think China needs a war?
It's like this. Throughout the '90s, the Chinese accumulated what they thought was going to be their greatest source and permanent guarantee of wealth; forex reserves of Western currencies, and more importantly, debt owed by Western governments. Mainly the US government.
That component... debt holdings, in the form of US treasury bonds and such, grew enormously through the '00s, as the US borrowed money to finance its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Chinese export markets in the US also grew enormously in the '00s... until things reached a point where Chinese industries relied on US consumer markets to absorb a very large portion of their output.
When the '08 financial crisis hit the Western world, especially the US, China's b@lls went into their mouth. It was a double-threat for China. On the one hand, all the US debt they held could become devalued in case of a depression. On the other hand, if US consumers stopped buying things, Chinese industries (which relied on US markets to absorb their output) would suffer. The resulting impact felt at home, by the Chinese economy, could have devastating consequences for a totalitarian regime.
So what option does a country have when so much of its wealth is in the form of debt? It must monetize the debt. It must turn the debt into something real, as soon as possible, before that wealth (in the form of treasury bonds) becomes more and more devalued as a result of its debtor's financial troubles.
How can China monetize the debt it holds? Here are some ways.
1) It can demand that the US pay up. But the US doesn't have money. If the US prints money, then China's own holdings become further devalued (as it happened with QE2, which further aggravated the situation.) Same for other Western countries, such as EU nations, which are also reeling financially.
2) It can print money and inject it into its own economy to increase domestic consumption. But this will inevitably lead to inflation, and cause civil unrest. Very bad idea, beyond narrow limits. Keeping tight control over money supply is much healthier from a totalitarian regime's point of view.
3) It can invest money into tinpot countries and gain goodwill. To some extent China has been doing this. But sooner or later, some returns have to be there no? So far, what returns have been generated by China's magnanimous projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe etc.?
4) It can start a war. It can arm up, invest wholesale in defense R&D, in procurement of foreign weapons systems and manufacture of its own weapons systems. And it can use these weapons systems in the pursuit of other kinds of power... geostrategic power. An additional benefit to this method of monetizing its debt is that it does not lead to civil unrest (at least as long as China can claim victory) but rather, to an upsurge in jingoistic nationalism that strengthens the position of an authoritarian government.
There you have it. Starting a war is likely considered a good option, given the prevailing economic situation, by a powerful faction within the ruling establishment of China. The US and West do not care if China starts a war with India; it will damage two of their biggest competitors. And Pakistanis of Section B, above, very much want this to happen and want to participate on the Chinese side.
The ONLY thing that would make the Chinese hesitate in starting a war with India would be India's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. And what has Bharat Karnad told us, between the lines, about that?
In summary, I am guessing that the GOI has understood all this. It understands that the danger of a two-front aggression by China and Pakistan is not just real but imminent. It has calculated that we cannot win, and that we cannot count on external help to win. It may have calculated (ref: Karnad) that we do not even have a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent this from happening.
So in a sense, just as we are the only hope for Pakis of Sections D and E... Pakis of Sections D and E are our only hope to avert disaster. That's why we're seeing the policies we're seeing, IMHO.
Gakakkad ji had asked, why would China go to war, why not just invest in weapons?
Kanson ji had asked, why would China pick a fight with India rather than say Taiwan?
My thoughts on these matters:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1160104
Gakakkad ji, the answer to your question "why go to war, why not just invest in weapons" is borne out by a truism which we have seen in action ever since WW I. The existence of a military industrial complex in modern states, inevitably leads to military conflict.
China has ALREADY been investing in weapons R&D, manufacture and procurement since the late '90s, more and more throughout the last decade. Now it is doing so even more intensely as a means of monetizing its debt. But as this happens, the pressure to use what has been accumulated, is also rising. Let me try to explain with an example.
Every year in the CPC politburo, different factions have to come up with requests for budget allocation. One very powerful faction may be the Militarists... PLA plus defense/armaments contractors. They are the ones who stand to benefit, when China decides to monetize its debt by investing in weapons R&D and procurement.
But there are other factions also. Let us say, in 2003, the Militarists put forth a budget of $10 billion (just a random figure.) Meanwhile, some party member from Shenyang wants $2 billion to build a Hello Kitty amusement park. Some other guy from Harbin wants $5 billion for a dam/irrigation project.
The Militarists insist that they should get the priority. After all China is in danger. Japan is acting tough on Senkoku Island. India has recently tested nukes and they might weaponize soon. Dalai Lama said something threatening in his speech.
Also, CPC economic czars favour the idea of spurring the economy by spending on defense, so the Shenyang guy and the Harbin guy are denied. The money is granted to the Militarists to manufacture SSNs and aircraft carriers.
This goes on every year. Let us say in 2009, the Militarists want $20 billion. They say that Taiwan is behaving very aggressively, Vietnam is taking control of the Spratly Islands, India is raising mountain divisions in "South Tibet" etc.
This time the Shenyang Hello Kitty guy and the Harbin Dam/Irrigation guy are more adamant in their refutation. They say, "we already had to go without funds because you Militarists were talking about Japan/Senkoku and Indian nukes in 2003. You got your money, what did you do with it? How are we more secure?"
However, once again the CPC czars favour the idea of monetizing the debt by spending on defense. So they give the Militarists $20 billion to spend on JF-17s, BMP knockoffs, IRBMs and whatever else.
But at the same time, pressure from the factions opposed to the Militarists is rising. Pretty soon the Militarists have to show results to justify all the money they have been getting, and the money they plan to keep getting in future.
One day in 2011, news comes that India is about to test the Agni V. This is a moment-of-truth for the Militarists. They HAVE to do something to justify the funds they have been getting all this time, at the expense of other interests, in order to keep future tranches of money flowing.
Note that at this time, even the opposition from the other Non-Militarist factions in the Politburo works in favour of starting a war. In my example, the Harbin guy and the Shenyang guy will start asking: "you have been taking money for years and years, while we have had to do without the Hello Kitty Amusement Park and the Dam. Now you tell us that India may soon have missiles capable of reaching Harbin! Meanwhile your precious SSNs and Carriers are rusting in the harbour. You have been given what you asked for in terms of budget, how are you going to serve our interests?"
The Militarists have painted themselves into a corner with their justifications for building a Military Industrial Complex. Their only choice is to say, now is the time, and manufacture a case for war. They go to town with propaganda, declaring that Vietnamese aggression in the South China Sea has reached unacceptable limits; that the ally Pakistan is now more anti-US than ever before; that the US is now weak and not likely to interfere in any war prosecuted by China; that India must be crushed before it deploys Agni III and test Agni V. They drum up a war-beat of "now or never."
Conflict is then a fait accompli; as it was for the Germans in 1914, the Americans in 1965 and 2003, the Russians in 1980. The political dynamics of a Military Industrial Complex will necessarily shift the equilibrium towards war. Whether it's a constitutional monarchy or a democracy or a socialist republic or a dictatorship doesn't matter. It always happens.
Of course, the factions opposed to the Militarists in the CPC politburo, will right at this moment be advancing the same counter-arguments against war that you have cited. India can cause a lot of pain in retaliation; Security Council will not support us; other countries like SoKo/Japan will get more nervous.
But given historical precedent, all these sensible reasons are simply ignored or consumed by war hysteria, which the Militarists are trying to build up. For everything there is a counter argument: India will only become more powerful given time, we must consolidate "Southern Tibet" or we will lose our chance, India must be taught a lesson before it commits to increasing naval presence in the South China Sea or forming a military alliance with US/Japan/Australia. Given the political momentum, war is inevitable.
*****
Now to Kanson's question about Taiwan. If PRC wanted a war, why would they pick India and not Taiwan? I think the answer is, they're still not sure (despite US' apparent weakness) that US and Japan will not rush to Taiwan's defense. However, they may calculate that this is not true of India. With Pakistan on their side, and US staying out of the conflict, the PRC Militarists may feel more confident of securing a military "victory" against India than one against Taiwan.
Also, Kanson, about Agni V testing this year. If it happens, it is a good thing. It is a sign that we are not idly waiting with the axe over our heads, that we are trying to close the window of opportunity for China to prosecute a two-front war against us. Still, for the present Agni V is untested and I don't know if Agni III is even deployed. IF what Bharat Karnad says is true, 20kT weapons is the most we have. So the assessment, that GOI is trying very hard to avoid war by courting certain factions within Pakistan, holds good.
Fortunately, as we all know, Agni V was successfully tested since the time I made this post.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
RD now read the Shyam Saran speech posted in the deterrence thread.
While understand BK's urge to proof the arsenal, I submit things are not all where they are said to be.
While understand BK's urge to proof the arsenal, I submit things are not all where they are said to be.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Yesss yesss thaaank yoooouu sooo much Rudradev ji, I was looking for these, need these for facebook and also to debate a few.
Many pranaams.
Many pranaams.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
^^^ Since 2005 especially, Tahir ul Qadri has been giving speeches on Ghazwa e Hind - even to massive audiences within India. In recent years he has been saying that Ghazwa e Hind involves not just 'Hind and Pak' but 'China' is also included in Arabic 'Hind', he says.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Brahma Chellaney:
India sings peace to an occupier
India sings peace to an occupier
The same old scenario has unfolded again: China quietly occupies a strategic area and a diffident India is left preaching the virtues of diplomacy and peace. When China set out to eliminate the historical buffer with India by invading Tibet, New Delhi opposed Lhasa’s desperate plea for a discussion at the United Nations. And when China stealthily took control of the Switzerland-size Aksai Chin plateau and began building the Tibet-Xinjiang highway through it, India’s first response was to send a démarche asking Beijing naively as to how it despatched workers to Indian territory without seeking visas for them.
Whereas the People’s Republic of China was born in and built on blood, modern India was founded on a continuing myth—that it won independence through non-violence, not because Britain was in no position after the devastation wrought by World War II to hold on to its colonies. It was not until 1962 that India woke up reluctantly to Leon Trotsky’s warning: “You may not be interested in war but war is interested in you.”
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
To me, these series of article in TOI and other newspapers (except The Hindu) showcase the line of reasoning inside the Indian Government (except the MOD/IA) and MEA. These articles are a window into setups like Chinese Study Group (CSG) and tell the arguments they have for behaving the way they do. We have always wondered as to why the GOI has been behaving in a certain way with respect to the Chinese all these years...and these articles tell the reason why.shyamd wrote:What Indian side does not want to talk about when it comes to China
<SNIP>
Sources in New Delhi confirmed such progress although they insisted that the border problem was nowhere near any final solution. They refused to prematurely share any details. A leap in Sino-Indian relations and light at the end of the tunnel on the vexed border dispute have the potential to shape the Prime Minister’s legacy in foreign policy before the UPA heads into a general election.
Given this background, there is surmise in South Block about the reasons for China staying put in the areas of the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh instead of the decades-old practice of coming and going through the disputed territory just as India does from time to time.
One view is that the Chinese wanted to test how much the political leadership on Raisina Hill was aware of the ground situation in Ladakh and how much of these fine and elaborate details were being shared by the army’s Northern Command with South Block, which also houses Antony’s office. This assumed relevance in the context of Gen. V.K. Singh’s lone-ranger one-upmanship against the civilian leadership of the defence ministry.
I have never seen a more blatant piece of drivel and nonsense being written against Indian interests. The Congress/GOI PR machinery has gone overboard in painting Indians culprits who had it coming from the Chinese. But for the shenanigans of India and Indian Army, everything will be hunky-dory on the LAC. Ack Thoo!!!
Antony, it is understood, is now aware that India’s permanent encampments have gradually inched forward east and north of the Siachen glacier, that India has built three air strips on disputed territory and that it has beefed up its positions to such an extent that its forces can now monitor movements on the Karakoram highway and has a critical eye on roads that connect to Sinkiang.
This is biggest BS of all the arguments...Indians are calling Indian territory as disputed and Indian actions as being aggressive without even bothering to check the geography and facts on the ground...![]()
Some one ask this ch@@t as to how can Indian positions go north of Siachen...where is the fvcking real estate for that? We're sitting on the Karakoram watershed in Siachen with Shaksgam Valley to north of this watershed...where can India go further north from here?
And how east have the Indians go? Is is bad/not done if India builds infrastructure to protect what it considers its territory? When has doing so become an issue? And as for the airfields - someone please tells this a$$-hole that DBO/Nyoma/Fukche are in Indian territory. At no point in time did China even claim these areas...So, why the fvck is this b@ll-licker making such preposterous arguments?
No Indian will fault the army for doing this, but these are exactly activities that inflame public discourse in India whenever the Chinese are accused of doing so on their part in disputed territories.
Here we go again...please ask this hero to mention one Indian act of creating infrastructure inside the disputed area?
<SNIP>
One of the biggest grouse we have is the slow pace/level of increment in the offensive options against the Chinese...Now, if certain sections within GOI view Indian actions to enhance its defense preparedness as being 'alarmist' (like the drift in above article), then the pace of such developments is definitely going to be slow. It seems that there are multiple thought centers in the GOI on how to move ahead with the Chinese. And any proposal from the MOD/Services will be opposed by these thought centers which want to take a more 'appeasement' oriented line with respect to the Chinese.
To me, this represents the classic dilemma in Indian Foreign Policy when it comes to all such threats - appeasement and lying low with the hope that situation will correct itself. We have done that with respect to Pakistan and the same is being played here again on the China front.
We now know the lens through which Indian establishment sees the Chinese and their actions.
These articles should be archived for sake of posterity.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Chinese Tourist Boat Heads Toward Disputed Paracel Islands despite Vietnam's protests
For China, India = Vietnam.
The confidence with which China is staking itself out on all fronts with multiple nations is fascinating.
For China, India = Vietnam.
The confidence with which China is staking itself out on all fronts with multiple nations is fascinating.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Time that one of the nation's calls China's bluff. I believe more in Vietnam delivering that b!tch sl@p to this hollow shell called China than it being India.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
probably japan can get away with it easier than vietnam...if they can work themselves up to it. unlike vietnam they have a powerful military than can deal with PLAN + PLANAF combo.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
What is exasperating is the complete lack of clarity from anywhere. What are the coordinates of Chinese camp, is it surrounded, is it getting resupplied, what has gone on in the flag meetings, whether there have been any written statements from Chinese side, coordinates of the "fortifications" to which they have objected, what is our perception of the LAC, what is our perception of their perception of the LAC, whether the said fortifications fall in our perception of the disputed zone, when the said fortifications were built etc etc.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
At this rate, Chinese bordering states will begin to think exactly why should they be with a country whose government is only interested in what happens in NCR & their bank accounts. Aak thoo.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
@admin
You should change http://bharat-rakshak.com to http://bharat-whining.com
I bet a lot of these members who registered in the last 5 yrs or so are 15yr old teens.
You should change http://bharat-rakshak.com to http://bharat-whining.com
I bet a lot of these members who registered in the last 5 yrs or so are 15yr old teens.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
nvishal wrote:@admin
You should change http://bharat-rakshak.com to http://bharat-whining.com
I bet a lot of these members who registered in the last 5 yrs or so are 15yr old teens.
Yes saar, we are all 14 year old girls. Now, you can stop whining yourself.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Actually this thread was meant to do long term, strategic analysis of the Chinese threat and how to deal with it.
Chinese Incursion into India is a major event, so though somewhat belatedly I am creating a new dedicated thread for it. Please continue the discussion there.
On the other thread - "India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India", whining and cursing are also allowed!
Chinese Incursion into India is a major event, so though somewhat belatedly I am creating a new dedicated thread for it. Please continue the discussion there.
On the other thread - "India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India", whining and cursing are also allowed!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
India sings peace to an occupier - Brahma Chellaney on Live Mint
In this way, China is encroaching, little by little, on Indian land in the Chip Chap and Skakjung regions of Ladakh. Chumar in Ladakh was raided last September by helicopter-borne PLA troops, who destroyed Indian bunkers before returning. Officials in Arunachal Pradesh are tired of complaining about the Union government’s nonchalant attitude to PLA’s aggressive activities along their state’s border.![]()
India initially blacked out the incursion, in the way it has suppressed its own figures showing a rising pattern of Chinese cross-border military forays. A whole week went by before New Delhi said a word on record about the PLA’s furtive ingress. The first public word, tellingly, came after Beijing issued a bland denial of the incursion in response to Indian media reports citing army sources. Another five days passed before New Delhi revealed the incursion’s true depth—19km.![]()
It is a pity that India, instead of feeling insulted by Li’s plan to stop over in New Delhi on his way to his country’s “all-weather ally” Pakistan to bless the new government to be appointed there, is bending over backward at a time of aggression. Has an Indian Prime Minister dared to combine a Beijing stopover with a visit to China’s rival Japan? In fact, Taiwan should be to India what Pakistan is to China.