News - Osama Bin Laden - killed In Pakistan

[Rahul M]

c'mon people, some thread discipline or this thread will be locked.

[Christopher Sidor]

New yorker, please do not confuse with New York Times, is running a article,
US Support for Pakistan: A Long Messy History

Some important points from this article are as follows

....
Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. gave billions of dollars to Pakistan, most of it in unrestricted funds, to combat terrorism. Pervez Musharraf, who served as President between 1999 and 2008, now admits that during his tenure he diverted many of those billions to arm Pakistan against its hobgoblin enemy, India. “Whoever wishes to be angry, let them be angry—why should we bother?” Musharraf said in an interview on the Pakistani television channel Express News. “We have to maintain our security.”
....
....
Ali Soufan, a former F.B.I. special agent who interrogated many of the Al Qaeda members captured in Pakistan, told me that “the majority of them said that Lashkar-e-Taiba had given them shelter.” After the battle of Tora Bora, he added, the Al Qaeda members who fled to Pakistan—including top leaders—were greeted by Lashkar operatives and taken to safe houses.
....
....
I began to wonder, What would happen if the Pakistani military actually captured or killed Al Qaeda’s top leaders? The great flow of dollars would stop, just as it had in Afghanistan after the Soviets limped away. I realized that, despite all the suffering the war on terror had brought to Pakistan, the military was addicted to the money it generated. The Pakistani Army and the I.S.I. were in the looking-for-bin-Laden business, and if they found him they’d be out of business.
....
....
When I had the opportunity to ask a question, I pointed out that, since 9/11, the U.S. had given eleven billion dollars to Pakistan, the bulk of it in military aid, much of which was misappropriated to buy weapons to defend against India. If Pakistan didn’t have the equipment to fight insurgents and terrorists in the tribal areas, was that really America’s fault? And if American aid to Pakistan—especially military assistance—had done more harm than good, shouldn’t it be drastically reduced?
Another retired general on the podium, Talat Masood, responded that the losses Pakistan had suffered in the “so-called war on terror” amounted to more than forty billion dollars. “So please don’t harp on the eleven billion,” he said.
....
....
Many foreign-policy experts maintain that America cannot, at this juncture, cut off military aid to Pakistan—even if elements of the I.S.I. turn out to have harbored bin Laden. There are two prongs to this argument. One is that America needs Pakistan’s support in order to defeat the Taliban. If the U.S. withdraws aid, it is argued, Pakistan might insist that we can no longer fly drones over tribal areas. The more pressing concern is that radical Islamists will somehow get their hands on a nuclear bomb, either through covert means or by actually coming to power. “The military is playing on this fear,” a Pakistani reporter, Pir Zubair Shah, told me.
....
....
Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom.

The more the things change the more they remain the same. I have argued previously that all the hot air that is being blown in US and Pakistan is just that hot air. Things have not changed. Let us see what is on offer over here
1) Kashmir has to be given independence. Why is it so important? Because an independent Kashmir shares borders with Afghanistan, PRC and India. He who controls Kashmir controls the roof of the world and has ability to influence a major part of the world. It is not Tibet that is the roof of the world, rather it is Kashmir. Just like Imperial Britain/UK the same hidden agenda is on display with the new imperial USA.
2) Our interests and american interests are not the same. Let us have no illusion that what Americans is doing in Pakistan, can be done to us also in future if circumstances are different.
3) American aid has been used to build up pakistan army. Tomorrow if Indian soldiers die in a shooting war with Pakistan, then quite a significant number of them will be killed by weapons bought by american money. That is if one is able to ignore those soldiers who are already dying or died in the years immediately after 9/11.

One thing we can all take away from Osama episode is that all the american talk about Pakistan antics and displeasure with Pakistan is just theater. Put on for show and we have a tendency to lap it up. And really we have nothing to show for joining with US in this so called war against terror. This is an american war not ours. We have to fight our wars, which are different that those of Americans.

[CRamS]

Guys,

Did anyone watch the following interview with Mush rat that Karan thappad did?

http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/151640/osa ... arraf.html

I watched few mins, did a fast forward, but the interview was as if thappad is working for an American audience, for American media. Not a single, at least to the best of my knowledge on what is of interest to India, namely, why are the other terrorists like Dawood, Hafeez etc targetting India finding safe haven in TSP. Americans get India cheaply, free of cost. No wonder bhadarurs like Strobe Talbot have the brazen confidence to suggest that India will roll back its nuke with the mere promise of a promise of a US presedential visit.

[Manish_Sharma]

Or KSA that burns Quran every day at its airports and uses Kaffir French commandoes against Muslim radicals.

[/quote]
Karna_A! Does it really happen? why do they do it?

[Rudradev]

To all those who have expressed appreciation of my post on OBL, thank you very much. I am humbled by your kind words; please feel free to distribute/share in any way that you might feel is useful to India's interest.

[Rudradev]

A few questions/doubts have been raised as well, and I will do my best to respond.

Rudradev wrote:
....
10) It is important to note that at this stage, OBL never said a word about jihad in Kashmir.

In fact, I don't recall him mentioning Kashmir at all until about 2005. By that time he was a "guest" of ISI and the Hizbul Mujahedin, probably at Abbottabad. So, he was probably just relieving his polite obligations to his hosts by including Kashmir in his speeches.

There is a good reason why OBL... concentrating on Israel, the West and US-proxy-KSA...could not care less about Kashmir.

Really??? Really does not matter if the quotes came as a "guest" or not..

AmberG-ji,

Yes, really. I think it should be apparent from the context of my post, that when I spoke of OBL "mentioning" Kashmir, I meant in the audio/video addresses for which he was famous in inciting jihadi terrorism against various targets. As far as I recall, before 2005 Kashmir or India was never among the targets he specifically spoke of.

Obviously, I cannot vouch for anything OBL may or may not have mentioned, other than what he made public via his recorded speeches. The Times of India article you have linked to refute this point, does not constitute documentation of any public statements made by OBL, other than one answer he allegedly gave to a Paki reporter in 1998.

Allow me to analyze the Times of India article (people can make whatever they want of that source and its credibility, given that it's also the fountainhead of "Aman ki Asha" against a genuine enemy of India).

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... oups-osama

To me, the author of the article seems to be intent on projecting OBL as having a hand in J&K terrorism, evidently to support the fallacy that "US and India are on the same side in the global war on terror onlee." Unfortunately, the "evidence" he trots out seems specious.

1) "Much before 9/11, in November 1998, the Army claimed to have seized from militants, after an encounter in the Pir Panjal ranges, some cards with messages from Osama describing India as enemy No.1."

Terrorists in Kashmir have been found with all kinds of things. Messages from "Osama", pictures of Bollywood starlets, and fake Indian currency notes.

No doubt, many of these things were mass-printed at ISI facilities.

By 1998, OBL was a guest of the Taliban at the ISI's pleasure. Part of the deal was that ISI was given permission to leverage "Brand Osama" for its own purposes. This does not amount to Osama himself mentioning Kashmir as a target, let alone becoming involved with Jihad there.

Distributing "message cards" is no different from the media management exercises undertaken by the marketers of any "brand" in the West. Teenagers in the US buy posters of Britney Spears or John Mayer; in Pakistan they buy pictures of Osama Bin Laden, mass-produced for the purpose of expanding influence via brand loyalty to the jihadi ideology. I get birthday cards from "Geico" and a dozen other corporations every year, do they care that it is my birthday?

Osama's name and "message" appearing on cards given to Paki terrorists in Kashmir is simply a continuation of this exercise... it is ISI using "Brand Osama" to endorse its Kashmir jihad, that's all. This does NOT indicate that OBL was involved with the activities of the organization (ISI) behind that brand... and all available evidence suggests he was too busy with other things to bother with those activities.

Direct incitement of Kashmir terrorists by OBL (in videographed speeches) was conspicuous by its absence in 1998 and for many years afterwards. This suggests that ISI was simply using his name on those cards to reinforce the commitment of its recruits, just as NIKE might use Michael Jordan's name to sell its sneakers.

2) "The alliance between al-Qaida and Lashkar-e-Taiba, India's main terror threat, suggests that Osama had evolved into more than being just an inspirational figure for several terror groups targeting India."

What "alliance" is the author speaking of here? Other than a shared overall ideological commitment to global jihad, what specific evidence is there that OBL facilitated LeT in any way other than as an inspirational figure? LeT had plenty of support from the ISI in its mission, drawing from Pakistan government funds and facilities. OBL had many other priorities for his resources that had nothing to do with Kashmir. What did LeT need from OBL other than "inspiration", and what was OBL prepared to give other than "inspiration"? The statement sounds like an insinuation with nothing to back it up.

Again, I will reiterate that after 2002 (op Parakram), Islamabad came under tremendous pressure from the US to cut back on terrorist attacks in J&K. Please see the first table on this page http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... tes/jandk/ to observe the steady decline in deaths of civilians and SF personnel in J&K from 2002 onwards.

This clearly shows that Islamabad could be compelled by US pressure to successfully cut down its terrorist activity in J&K. This was only possible because the J&K jihad was under the control of Islamabad and ONLY Islamabad.

If OBL had been involved in J&K jihad, why would he have listened to AMERICAN pressure to reel in the jihad there? If J&K jihad had been an Al-Qaeda (as opposed to an exclusively Islamabad/ISI project)... how would American pressure on Islamabad have been able to force it down since 2002?

3) "The links between anti-India terror groups and Osama's jihadis have been known at least since 1998 when members of Harkat-ul-Ansar, a terrorist group focused on Kashmir, training alongside al-Qaida members in Afghanistan were killed in a US missile attack.

This is an attempt by the Times of India author... sloppy at best, motivated at worst... to imply false causation by stating correlation.

Let us examine what is being linked here:
a) HuA/HuM was being trained in Afghanistan in 1998. Not surprising as they are a Deobandi group controlled by the ISI for J&K jihad, and the ISI had influence in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1998.

b) Al-Qaida was being trained in Afghanistan in 1998. Equally not surprising, as OBL was a guest of the Taliban in 1998.

c) The training camps were "alongside" or in close enough physical proximity, so that a missile attack aimed at Al-Qaeda could kill HuA/HuM members. Interestingly enough, that missile attack did not kill OBL or any of the Al-Qaeda leadership!

To infer from these statements that OBL/Al-Qaida were involved in supporting HuA/HuM attacks in Kashmir is like putting one plus two together and getting four!

Tenuous links between HuA and Al-Qaeda go back even further to the early/mid 1990s when HuA member Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was an MI6 asset in Bosnia/Herzegovina, assisting in the anti-Serb jihad there. Al-Qaeda were also involved in the Bosnia jihad. To me, this suggests that Omar Sheikh may have been sent to Bosnia by the West in order to forge links with Al-Qaida.

Omar Sheikh, however, turned against the West. He seems to have assimilated global jihadi ideas while also assisting the ISI in the Kashmir jihad. He was implicated in the HuA kidnapping of Western tourists in J&K in 1994, and also in the IC814 hijacking, establishing that he was involved in ISI operations against India. He was also involved in sending $100,000 to Mohammed Atta at the ISI's behest before the 9/11 attacks, and in the Daniel Pearl murder... demonstrating his links to Al-Qaida.

But this, again, establishes only that some ISI assets were involved in supporting OBL against the United States... NOT that OBL supported HuA/ISI assets against India.

None of the above support the idea that OBL had been involved in jihad against J&K. And of course they don't establish that OBL had mentioned J&K in any of his public statements at the time.

4) "In fact, the very first reference to India by Osama came in May 1998 when he said in a press conference at Khost in Afghanistan that he would love to join the jihad in Kashmir if the Pakistani authorities allowed him. Osama's answer came in response to a question from a Pakistani journalist. In the same conference, he announced the formation of International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the US and Israel."

Coming as this does with a double-whammy of credibility... a Times of India article quoting a Pakistani journalist ... I again, leave it to any reader to determine how factual it is.

But let us even assume that, in answer to some Pakistani journalist OBL mentioned that he would "love to join" the jihad in J&K... if the Pakistani authorities "allowed him!" A funny statement given that Pakistan only "allowed him” to be invited by the Taliban in the hope that he would assist them in J&K!

It sounds as sincere as US spokespersons declaring that India is a “natural ally” and that they will make India a “superpower”

What did OBL actually do to advance Pakistan’s jihad in J&K? The use of foreign/global-jihadi mercenaries as terrorists in J&K had been very much a part of ISI’s subconventional war at least since 1993: there is no indication that it intensified as a result of OBL’s presence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile OBL planned and executed the East African embassy bombings, the Khobar Towers massacre, the USS Cole attack, 9-11, the Australian nightclub bombing in Bali, the London and Madrid bombings, and countless operations in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan.

All of his resources, all of his activities were deployed against these other (primarily Western) targets. All of his video and audio messages were exclusively inciting jihad against other targets, with not a mention of J&K until around 2005. Against that, one answer that he supposedly gave to a Paki reporter in 1998 is supposed to establish his involvement? My credulity is stretched thin by the author of this TOI article.

And finally, to most people, it would certainly matter that his references to Kashmir only came when he was a “guest” of Pakistan. Consider a person who never has anything nice to say about you. Only after he lives under your roof, eats your food, enjoys your hospitality, does he finally begin to say nice things about you. And even after that point, this person takes your help to facilitate his own projects, but doesn’t make any significant contribution to assist your projects.

Under those circumstances, most people would recognize that whatever nice things he finally said about you, while staying as your guest, were vacuuous and insincere lip-service.

Link: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... oups-osama

Also, there are prayers going on for Osama ..
Geelani prays for Osama, Pakistan
Quote:
urriat hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani on Friday hold funeral prayers for slain al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in Jammu & Kashmir's Srinagar town.

There were prayers/demonstrations by ISI proxies every time any al-Qaida member was captured or killed by the West. These are showpieces orchestrated by the TSPA/ISI to show how “dangerously Islamized” the population is.

If these prayers/demonstrations happen in Pakistan, they are designed to blackmail the West into supporting TSPA/ISI as the “only secular pillar of the Pakistani state.” If they happen in J&K, as with Geelani, the ISI’s message in organizing them is “force India to give up J&K otherwise it will turn into a dangerous centre of Jihad.”

All BS. Geelani owes a lot more of his political stature to the US State Dept. than he does to OBL.

Could the US have conducted the raid without any knowledge of the TSPA/ISI top-brass? Unlikely.

However awesome the stealth helicopters, the NAVY seals, the high-tech jamming gear etc... there were just too many things that could have gone wrong with a purely unilateral operation, for Washington to risk it. From JSOC choppers getting shot down, to a fire-fight in urban Pakistan including civilian collateral damage, to the mistaken launch of a Pakistani nuke against India. Just too many unpredictable outcomes to consider, if the US had actually "gone it alone."

There is only one possible answer: the Pakis may have agreed to let the US snatch OBL on such humiliating terms because... the only alternative available to the Pakis was WORSE. Unkil has something so damaging to the Pakis, that he was able to threaten them with it, and dictate the terms of how the OBL raid was going to go... or else.

Well Rudraji starts with his judgement/speculation it is "unlikely" that the top ISI/TSPA did not know about the raid. Fine.

But then mentions (again just guesses) how effective (or lack of it) are helicopters, seals etc...

And draws a conclusion "only one possible answer"..

Other (at least one) at least a possible answer (and IMO more likely one) is Rudraji is wrong in his guesses. I don't think any of us know all the capabilities and operational details to say with certainty what they can not do. Best one can do is to guess, and present it as their opinion/guess.

Unless one can point to a basis (as in actual evidence that ISI/TSPA knew) it is not logical to draw "only one" conclusion. (I don't have to prove the opposite)

Actually, Amber-G ji, you are correct here.

Your critique itself is erroneous, because of course I have presented only speculation (and neither you nor I know any better what actually happened.) I have never claimed it is anything but a guess. It would be obvious to most readers that the "conclusion" I have drawn, depends on what is a best guess rather than a statement of fact, from the context in which it is presented.

However, you correctly point out where the conclusion itself is wrong.

My logic is in fact flawed in stating that there is only one possible reason, why TSPA/ISI sold out OBL to the USA... IF in fact they sold him out.

I stated in my original post that TSPA/ISI would only have sold out OBL if the alternative was something WORSE. That does not cover the whole realm of possibilities.

It is possible (though unlikely IMHO) that TSPA/ISI sold out OBL in the promise of something BETTER from the US. Something so good that it would make the pain and embarrassment of such a raid (publicized as happening without ISI knowledge, OBL being found next to PMA Kakul) worthwhile.

What that might be, I don’t know. If in fact it is because of something BETTER promised to TSPA/ISI, I would bet that it is something that will come at India’s expense. I don't think that is likely, as I said, but American and MMS' moves will have to be watched carefully in coming months to see the truth of that.

Between WORSE and BETTER the entire realm of possibilities why TSP/ISI might have sold out OBL... IF In fact they sold out OBL to the US, is covered.

[CRamS]

Rudradev,

I like your thoughts on another one of my thesis that hasn't gained much attention. Just as J&K was not on OBL's radar, is it not the case that its only US and Israel that were mainly on OBL's radar screen? Just as J&K was of little interest to him, so alsio Orieopeans were of no consequence to him. It was only after 9/11 that when every Orieopean pipsquek jumped on the US bandwagon that they became his enemy too? In other words, just as US & its lackeys profess "neutrality" or equal equal with respect to TSP terror against India, so also had been Orieopeans been neutral in the OBL & US slugfest, would they have suffered any blowback like 7/7, Madrid etc?

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

Just about twenty minutes from the time I make this post, the American TV program "60 Minutes" will feature an interview with Barack Obama, who will certainly be discussing the raid on OBL's compound, his killing, and certainly also Pakistan as well.

If you are interested, but you cannot watch it on TV, and if you cannot find a simulcast on the internet, I suggest you go to a Toronto radio station's website and click on the "Listen Live" button, whereupon you will hear a streaming audio broadcast of "60 Minutes".

Go to http://www.newstalk1010.com

[Bhaskar]

Just about twenty minutes from the time I make this post, the American TV program "60 Minutes" will feature an interview with Barack Obama, who will certainly be discussing the raid on OBL's compound, his killing, and certainly also Pakistan as well.

If you are interested, but you cannot watch it on TV, and if you cannot find a simulcast on the internet, I suggest you go to a Toronto radio station's website and click on the "Listen Live" button, whereupon you will hear a streaming audio broadcast of "60 Minutes".

Go to http://www.newstalk1010.com

Thanks for the link

EDIT : I think this has barely changed US policy on Pakistan, hearing Obama that is. I am sure that US was already aware of Pakistan's links with terrorism and it ignored it this time like it has in the past. Osama's death in Pakistan has only changed the public's opinion on Pakistan.

[Karna_A]

Or KSA that burns Quran every day at its airports and uses Kaffir French commandoes against Muslim radicals.

Karna_A! Does it really happen? why do they do it?

Any decorated Koran is destroyed at KSA Airports.

Also, probably Shia owned Korans don't count and are haram.
http://www.islamtimes.org/vdccp4qe.2bq408y-a2.html

All Pakistan Shia Action Committee (APSAC) showed its strong reaction at the killing of people of Bahrain by Saudi backed Al-Khalifa.
Condemning the brutalities of the Saudi forces in Bahrain, they pointed out that the Saudi forces torched dozens of copies of the Holy Quran and destroyed a 156 Mosques.

[Shaashtanga]

US says it wants access to bin Laden widows -http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110508/ap_ ... _bin_laden

[Rudradev]

Rudradev-ji

I disagree vehemently with the first part of your analysis. You are interpreting US actions in the "Evil Genius Mastermind" angle. Actually the right interpretation is the "Bumbling Idiot" angle. You have to realize that a "core" of the US, people in the CIA/Analysts think strategically and the rest -- Senate and the House are pretty much aandu--paandu types who will say and do the silliest things. Even the "core" has its energy and attention sapped by other issues and frequently does not drive policy.

Anujan-ji

It seems you have not read my post very carefully at all.

What you are “vehemently disagreeing” with above, is the exact opposite of everything I have said there!

Where did you get the idea that I’m interpreting the US as an “Evil Genius Mastermind”?

Even you recognize that a core of the GOTUS... Pentagon, CIA, State Dept, Think Tankers... are paid to formulate grand strategy. This has been true from the time of James Monroe (if not earlier) to Condoleezza Rice.

Very often other elements of the GOTUS work with these strategizers to implement the grand strategy they devise. This was true when Robert McNamara contrived the “Gulf of Tonkin” incident, justifying invasion of Vietnam in advancement of the “Domino Theory”. It was true when the US got behind the idea of using jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan... with Pakistan as a lynchpin of this strategy, as advocated by Zbignew Brzezinski.

As I say in my post, Brzezinski and his ilk were lionized by the US foreign policy establishment following the end of the Cold War. Their Pak-centric ideas had contributed to the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, and were considered relevant in further advancing US interests in Central Asia in the post-Cold-War period. Their influence was strong enough to form the nucleus of the groupthink which ruled the US foreign establishment for the next two decades, and it is still strong now.

However...
1) The grand strategy envisioned by people like Brezinski (or Dulles, or Kissinger for that matter) was based on deeply flawed assumptions. In Brezinski’s case, the assumption that TSPA/ISI are a useful and reliable lynchpin for the advancement of US interests.
2) Implementation of the grand-strategy was often extremely short sighted, with disastrous results. True in Vietnam and true in Af-Pak.

This is something I demonstrate again and again in my post.

In the early-mid 1990s, the US allowed Pakistan to dominate Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah government.... and the ISI/Taliban became the core facilitators of global jihad. Blowback!

The US initially supported the Taliban, hoping that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would give access to Central Asia by creating a viable environment for a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan UNOCAL pipeline. In fact the Taliban gave access to the rest of the world for Central Asian and Chechnyan jihadis. Blowback!

The US stationed troops in KSA after the Gulf War of 1991, and this angered OBL as the core issue behind his anti-Western jihad. Blowback!

In 1996 the US and Pakistan thought it would be a swell idea for OBL to move to Afghanistan, because they thought HE could be influenced by the Pakis to divert his attention away from the West and towards Kashmir. But in fact, OBL diverted the attention of Paki tanzeems and Talibs against the West! Blowback!

So where exactly is the implication of “genius mastermind” that you are seeing in my post?

The way to interpret US policy is "not-too-smart-shortsightedness"
1. This Shortsightedness had given rise to two aspects in US foreign policy
(a) Not realizing that improvement in communication and travel had rendered the american mainland vulnerable to attacks. The previous attack of any significance on US mainland by a foreign power was Pearl harbor. There is a reason why there was a long hiatus till 1993. For individuals and terror organizations to attack the US, communication and travel is necessary. In pre-internet/cell phone/cheap telephone days, it was simply very hard to communicate with sleeper cells inside the US. Only countries could do that. Again, in the pre-80's and 90's (before WTO ityadi), travel volume was much less. So screening people was more effective. The gradual change in communication and travel means that US today is vulnerable to terror attacks from small teams. The americans *simply did not realize* that the world has changed. Ergo they ignored Bin Laden who was some guy sitting in tent with camels tied nearby. Did they know OBL hated the US and the west? Yes. Did they think he would be able to pull of a spectacular attack? No. Nobody paid any attention to him at all! In fact Clinton cruise missile attacks were derided by Republicans as a cheap attempt to divert attention from the Monica issue!!

I’m not sure that formulaic oversimplification in either direction is useful in the interpretation of US policy.

In the first part of your post, you have made a distinction between the GOTUS’ strategizers and GOTUS “aandu-paandus” and the difference in involvement between these two groups in formulating foreign policy. That is correct.

But in the above passage you’re confusing the two once again, by referring simply to “Americans”. Which Americans?

WTO, the communications revolution, the explosion in international trade and travel were not something that happened while the US was sleeping. All of these trends were readily assisted and accelerated, if not formulated, by Hamiltonians in the GOTUS.

There are at least four schools of thought regarding US foreign policy direction; Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jacksonian and Jeffersonian. I’ve explained them in detail in this post.
http://216.14.115.66/viewtopic.php?p=91 ... 57#p918730

The four schools’ interests and priorities do not always mesh. Often one school becomes more influential at the expense of the others, depending on the vagaries of US politics; and then the other groups try to piggy-back on the ground realities influenced by the one that is in ascension.

For example: At first it was a triumph of Wilsonian doctrine to establish relations with PRC (under Kissinger) to counter the USSR/PRC alliance. Hamiltonians followed in their wake, in response to Deng Xiaoping opening up China for trade. The Wilsonians briefly became anti-PRC during the Tiananmen Square suppression of democracy. Later, when the Hamiltonians had gained influence by establishing a lucrative trade relationship with China, Wilsonians like Madeline Albright followed their lead and tried to embrace China as a partner in the new world order, even suggesting that PRC was master of Asia.

You mention that when Clinton bombed the Afghan training camps of OBL, “Americans” thought it was a distraction from the Monica issue. Again, an oversimplification. It was Jacksonian Americans, wilfully blind to anything but an isolationist “America-first” foreign policy, that the Republicans were appealing to by playing up this angle.

Later on the GW Bush invasion of Iraq was an allegiance between Hamiltonians (energy interests), Bush-Wilsonians (neocon political agenda) and Jacksonians (“crusader” populists.) It was opposed by Jeffersonians (with their non-interference policy) and Clinton-Wilsonians (who were multilateralists and opposed any move without UN sanction.)

It’s a lot more complex than “sleeping” or “bumbling idiots”, though I agree with you that short-sightedness and flawed assumptions often play a role.

So the fact that OBL and his movements were largely ignored is *NOT* due to some malicious plan of using him against CAR and JK, but simply because US was sleeping.

There are no grounds to establish this.

Wilsonians like Brzezinski, most certainly wanted to use all the Afghan-Soviet war jihad veterans against CAR, and many of them believed that it would be in the US interest if J&K came under the ambit of a Jihadi state controlled by a US-friendly Pakistan. They continued seeing OBL as a tool who had been useful in the past and would be useful again.

The CIA’s job was to monitor potential threats to the US, and even though the US in general had heard that OBL was getting more and more anti-American; the CIA STILL did not move to act against Bin Laden. Some of this can be ascribed to the fact that other political schools in the US (Hamiltonians, Jacksonians etc.) did not consider OBL a priority until 9/11, but it is not the job of the entire US administration to ensure security. That is the CIA’s job... did they do it?

A CIA officer named Billy Waugh actually tracked down Bin Laden in Sudan in 1995, and was planning an operation to apprehend him... but he was DENIED authorization to go ahead, no doubt at the behest of the CIA HQ and Wilsonian-dominated State Department. Why?

Add to this the fact that the head of the CIA’s “Bin Laden Unit” in that phase was Michael Scheuer... an old hand of the Afghan War who along with Milt Bearden, was closely connected to the ISI.

It does not sound like they were “sleeping” at all to me.

(b) The second aspect of foreign policy is short sightedness. Saudis & US have nothing in common. Cheenis and US have nothing in common. Pakis and US have nothing in common. But in each of these cases, US wants something from them: Oil, counterweight to Russia, action in A'stan. So US goes and tries to build a relationship which caves in in the long term under its own contradictions. Again there is nothing "Strategic" about these relationships. They are driven due to short term considerations and die in the long terms.

All strategy is based on permanent interests, not permanent friends. Relationships are a tool for the advancement of interests, so they definitely have something to do with “strategy.” Relationships may die but interests remain the same.

The Wilsonians under Brezinski’s influence believed that for the expansion of US influence in Central Asia (an interest), Pakistan controlling Afghanistan via its global jihad allies (a relationship) was of key importance for the decades to come. Given Brzezinski’s success against the Soviets, nobody thought to question how flawed his assumptions were. Few people think to question him even today.

The fact that OBL moved to Afghanistan was largely ignored. US saw no threat from him and no use from him either.

That is inaccurate.

It is very well documented that the State Dept (Wilsonians) had been reaching out to the Taliban for years, sending teams of interlocutors, with Robin Raphel in charge. Raphel, of course, had a long history of working with the ISI, including organizing political support for J&K secession by building up the Hurriyat conference. So it is very telling that she was the one chosen to intercede with the Taliban... even to the extent of pleading for the Taliban government’s legitimacy before the UN Security Council.

The interest in maintaining Taliban control over Afghanistan had two components. Hamiltonians supported the idea of the UNOCAL TAP pipeline; Wilsonians wanted to create an Afghanistan under Pakistani domination that could serve as a geopolitical staging area for Western interests in Central Asia.

However, reaching out to the Taliban was PRIMARILY a Wilsonian initiative, with the Hamiltonians climbing on board ONLY LATER. See page 338 of Ghost Wars, last two paragraphs, for confirmation of this.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Dc4kRC ... &q&f=false

Clearly all this was a foreign policy initiative by Brzezinski Wilsonians to support Pakistan's takeover of Afghanistan via the Taliban... and NOT a case of UNOCAL’s short-sighted greed for Central Asian oil being the primary driver of US foreign policy.

The strategy was devised and implemented by the Wilsonians... and Hamiltonian interests were only wooed after the fact to garner additional political support for the initiative.

Even after OBL moved to Afghanistan, the talks between Raphel’s team and the Taliban continued. This was detailed in an article by a former State Dept employee that was linked on BRF some months ago... can’t find it now. The Taliban gave lots of chai-biskoot assurances to Raphel that OBL would not be allowed to harm *US* interests, and that was enough for Raphel to repeat those same assurances to Washington. US engagement of the Taliban continued even while OBL remained as a guest there, all the way upto 9-11.

If the American political mainstream “ignored” all this, that’s one thing. My point is that America pays professional organizations to take care of these things so that the mainstream does not have to worry about them... the CIA and State Dept among others. And THOSE organizations, specifically tasked with formulating policy around Af-Pak... chose the Brzezinski route of letting Pakistan dominate Afghanistan as a view to advancing US interests in Central Asia. No question about that.

2. On the other hand, Pakis learned the right lesson from the Soviet Jihad.
The best way for the Russians to end their afghan campaign would have been to bomb the daylights out of Pindi. They certainly had the airforce and missile armory to do so. At the very least, they could have atleast staged a massive cross border punitive attack in tribal areas. The reason they didnt do that is the not-too-subtle indication from the US that any attack on the Pakis would invite american retaliation. So Pakis realized that the two essential ingredients for staging successful Jihad action are

(a) Terror camps and infrastructure located far away from the place where the actual action is.
(b) Protection umbrella against conventional military retaliation

.

Pakis certainly derived a lesson from the US role in the Soviet Jihad. As you correctly say, the lesson was that the same technique used by the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan... sponsoring subconventional warfare under a nuclear umbrella... could be used against India in Kashmir.

Whether this is the “right lesson” remains to be seen. It isn’t turning out too well for the Pakistanis so far!

The "US left the area after their security objectives were met " towel has partial truth to it. During the Soviet Jihad, US was guarantor of Paki security *also from attacks from India* -- this guarantee was extracted from the Pakis after (a) When US stood idly by in 1971 (b) Perception in the US that India was in the Soviet camp and Soviets could persuade India to carry out punitive strikes on the Pakis to relieve some pressure on the Soviets. There might or might not have been some truth to (b) because India was non-aligned at that time. But Pakis had the US persuaded that India was in the soviet camp and ergo anti-US** and ergo wont hesitate to attack the Pakis as a Soviet proxy to relieve pressure on the Soviets. (will return to this later)

The terror attacks in India (in ‘93 Mumbai serial blasts for example) and the subsequent absence of punitive attacks from India should be seen in this light. To his credit PVN tried very hard to convince the US that Indian retaliation would be in reply to attacks in India and not because India was a soviet lackey. The US cover was gradually withdrawn after the Soviet withdrawal from A’stan and Pakis had to live with the knowledge that nobody was protecting them retaliation. Hence the ( about US “leaving the region”. To their credit, they did develop the bum and leave the SDREs shivering in their dhotis. Ofcourse that didnt help during Kargil.

I’m not sure what your point is in the above.

US did not “leave the area”... it was never IN the area, other than covertly in the form of money, weapons and CIA advisors helping to coordinate the ISI-backed jihad against the Soviets. The reason Brzezinski came out of the episode with such a glowing reputation, was that he had hit upon a very low-cost solution that inflicted a lot of military, financial and H&D damage to the Soviet Union. It is not as if the US had many divisions in Pakistan, or even several CBGs stationed off the Pakistani coast to protect Pakistan against an Indian attack... even during the Soviet jihad, let alone afterwards.

As far as the likelihood of India attacking the Pakis... it was during the CIA/Paki ops against USSR in Afghanistan, that the Israelis came to India with the idea of bombing Kahuta and disabling Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. However, India did not go along with even such a surgical attack, and even in cahoots with a strong US ally like Israel, precisely because it did not want to be dragged into America’s Great Game vs. USSR. The US certainly would have inferred that India was deterred from attacking Pakistan after that, and further after Brasstacks failed to materialize into an invasion of Pakistan. PVNR did not have to “convince” the USA of something they already knew.

Meanwhile, the US certainly continued to provide cover to Pakistan. Political cover, such as holding off the Pressler Amendment until they knew with certainty that Pakistan already possessed Chinese bombs. Diplomatic cover, as in allowing Pakistan to completely dominate Afghanistan, and overthrow any indigenous regimes like the Mojadeddi government. Economic cover, such as turning a blind eye to TSPA/ISI earning money via nuclear proliferation (BCCI) and heroin trade.

Only overt supply of military aid to Pakistan stopped after Pressler; and that was only to maximize the utility of F-16s and other goodies as “carrots” and provide some continuing leverage for Washington over the TSPA/ISI’s behaviour. There were no associated “sticks” at all.

So the rona-dhona about “US ignoring Pakistan after security objectives were met” is completely unfounded and unwarranted.

Where does this leave OBL? The Saudis actually *do* fear him. You have to understand that paranoia is inherent to authoritarian regimes. Like how China put down Falun Gong with an iron hand to make sure that there was no organization with the power to challenge the communist party. The Saudis are paranoid about religious groups -- They realize that the greatest threat to their monarchy is mass mobilization of people, and that can be easily done through religious rhetoric in the land of the two mosques.

Agreed. And that is why the Saudis, like TSP and even the US Wilsonians, were initially OK with OBL going from Sudan to Afghanistan. In Sudan/East Africa he was much too close to the Saudi heartland for their comfort. When he went to Afghanistan, they hoped he would become involved in J&K and leave them alone. This never happened, and indeed many Paki tanzeems were won over to OBL's anti-Western cause.

3. Pakis have never been able to convince anyone that their cause is Pan-Islamist
JK's initial troubles started with groups which were largely from the valley youth. This was hijacked by PakJabi groups whose leaders were Army munnas and footsoldiers were illiterate Pakis. This is a qualitative difference from the leadership of ALQ where OBL and his Shura *are really ideologically motivated Islamists* They cannot be convinced by the Paki army and ISI that JK is an Islamic cause because the top Jernails are clean shaven, breed dogs, swill whiskey and have 10,000 mistresses. If anything, OBL and ALQ will call for *their* ouster first before even thinking about JK. OBL (pre 9/11) was most definitely not in Paki control, leave alone Saudi or US control.

Yes, and that is why it is ridiculous to expect that OBL would have taken up the Kashmir cause when he became a guest of the Pakis (via Taliban) in Afghanistan. The Pakis believed that he would, because they thought they had successfully (after ISI-Afghan jihad) convinced the Ummah that their cause is Pan-Islamist. Of course they turned out to be wrong.

So again, I don’t see where this contradicts what I have said, in my post that you are disagreeing with.

[Shaashtanga]

On the other hand our own IBN peddling puki skepticism over Osama videos - http://ibnlive.in.com/news/scepticism-i ... 671-2.html

[ramana]

RD, Again very good rebuttal and more than that excellent clarification of US policy in Af-Pak from 1980s. In rebutting you have clarified the policy very well.

[Raja Bose]

Osama's house for sale; privacy guaranteed!

Article on Zee News.

[ManuT]

Rudradev saar,

My 2 cents, parts a bit OT, and I apologise. I am a few pages behind (as always) but I am trying to go through it. Apologies if points already answered.

I agree to the basic premise of your post that kashmir was never a priority for OBL. Kashmir is a jihad for TSP. Even first Kashmir war in 1948 was a jihad for Pakistan (now TSP).

OBL
---
Even if OBL made noises about Kashmir no one took notice of it, noone took OBL seriously before the Kenyan embassy bombings, even after the his 1996-7 interview. Al-
Khobar towers that killed US servicemen in KSA but they OBL was not really mentioned maybe muslim brotherhood. It was considered more in line with the attack on marine base on Lebanon.

OBL was not much of a muj 'fighter', he was a muj organizer for with his family money and connections. His was imaginary slight of Christian forces on the holy soil of KSA to fight against Saddam which conflicted with his world view of mujs taking on Saddam. It seems a little fake anger as mujahideen were useless before they were supplied with stingers which started taking out the choppers. Stretching it a bit OBL after such an defeat of Saddam by mujs, OBL would have collided with US anyways. (Remember Saddam fought a brutel 7 yr war with Iran and ended in an advantageous position. IRG would been pretty good against these rag tag mujs, and Saddam with scant regard to rules of war had 'successfully' put down Shia Kurd rebellions)


(Also, the defeat of Najibullah was not a given as long as the mujahideen were doing the (in-)fighting. The tide turned only after ISI led Taliban with TSPA military advisers run over afghanistan including other muj groups. Another even was the retreat of Abdul Rashid Dostum's Uzbeki militia that formed the best of Najibullah's troops. Correct me if I am worng here.)

Needless to say, I subscribe to the view that, TSP striking the first blow is myth. Nobody destroyed USSR, it collapsed on it's own weight because of it's economic policies.

USA
---
I have heard of the Unipolar world and Globocop appointing smaller regional cops appointed by the Globocop around 1993 (Clinton's first term?). Hyperpower much later in the 90's. Maybe I am wrong on this.

US's primary concern, I would guess, was busy securing nukes in the FSU in the 90's.

I am not sure about the Western China dagger. Maybe Central Asia. I think CA was still unstable with the former rebulbics fighting amongst each other (Nogorno-Karabakh, not sure of spelling). Chechenya was a 'good' cause for the west for a while before 911-attacks. So willing to go with the Great Game 2.0 theory here.


The US Taliban negotiations for the TAPI(?) pipline pre-911 attacks are cited as CT by TSPians, and I am little skeptical of their claims, as they tend to inflate their claims.


US gets took much credit for CT, of things for example 'a vaccum was created' I would think 'a vaccum got created'. But I'll say this. There can a big disconnect between what it professes and what it practices. I realised it with the Tienman massacre where it after a lot of talk Bush Senior renewed MFN status to China.

That doesn't mean the US should stop trying to live up to its ideals. Hopefully one day it will.
Like MKG said 'when thought, speech and action are the same'.


J&K
---
As Indians know, Pakistan's jihad for Kashmir is older than OBL's jihad. It can be stated that strategic depth is a TSP obsession not America's.

Let me point out where I slightly diverge:

1. Hurriyat came to life, when PVNR was the PM.

2. ISI saw an opportunity, Dawood took it. Dawood's hit with the help of ISI to teach kaffir a lesson, for other reasons.

3. J&K the 1990's was awash with terrorists but, at no point it was overrun.

Not counting Mufti's daughter's kidnap, which again was a screw up in its own right. Hazratbal 1 & 2, Charar-e-sharief (Must Gul) were akin to smash-grab jobs of musuem paintings, not much different from Mumbai 2008 attacks in nature (only scope).

Mirza Alsam Beg and Gul had Zia's plan but it was Faroq Abdullah that gave the opportunity. Before that separatists only had Maqbool Bhatt and Anamullah Khan to show for their troubles (killing of Indian diplomat Mahtre and 7 IAF personnel).

Before IB shutdown in J&K, one didn't see girls covered with headscarf.

Before KP were ethnically cleansed, there were targeted killings of IB officers whick resulted in loss of confidence of its informers, and as a consequence, in loss of network. This played havoc. (Connect this with I K Gujral wrt external intelligence). This was only somewhat corrected till the para-militaries intel was up an running (more than spotters and Ikhwan), but it came with certain cost. JK police was very unlike PP. SOG took time to come up.

KP were ethnically cleansed by their own KMs. (Just for the record stating that the Sikhs were not cleansed out) This was before Afghan surplus showed up after 2 years. The reason was, IMO, was because the masters in TSP were not happy about the progress made by the Kashmiri outfits. So the Pakjab and Afghan elements, were introduced as canon fodder to blunt IA. Bounties based on ranks were put on IA, paid to the families by TSP inevitably as the foreign elements were killed. TSP also recuited from its jails for this. Too many outfits were created so that only TSP can exercise control.

That goes to the core of Zia's philosophy of his words, (from memory), '... mistake we did earlier was to use the sword as a piecemeal... in the process the edge was blunted, ... this time we will wait to use our sword deliver the coup de grace in the end...' (maybe someone can produce the speech here). 'Bleed through a 1000 cuts' was stated only much later.

You have mentioned the other 'K' of K2, and basically India did a lot of own goals on that front too.

"We have survived the connivance of all these parties under much worse circumstances, when we were much weaker. With the wisdom of our ancestors, the courage of our people, and the virtuous sword arm of Dharma on our side we shall continue to survive it until we prevail. Jai Hind!"

I have a slight problem with this as it omits our own faults. The future is bright. Yes. Amen to that. But about the past, a lot of places where it could have plugged this earlier at less human cost and suffering. In the end it were the security forces holding the baby because of dysfunctional GOI. For example, India blurted out'hot pursuit' and lost the option to exercise it. Now India is tweaking cold start. More than external factors, I would say, J&K is still part of India inspite of screw ups and lack of a game plan of GOI. If game plan is economy, economy, economy it is an incomplete one.

[ramana]

ManuT, It will help if you go back and add full form to abbreviations. As far as i can tell, Rudradev is trying to explain the US policy in Af-Pak since 1979. I don't see the gain in throwing in a few mea culpas for India. While at it throw a few hosannas to massa.

Let the ideas develop without throwing a few self blames. Why so early as the next couple of posts? Thoda dheeraj rako.

[CRamS]

I have a slight problem with this as it omits our own faults. The future is bright. Yes. Amen to that.

I don't want to puncture yours or RudraJi's optimism, but I'd like to know the source of this feel good prognosis? I mean I hate to post it, but please check timesNow web site where Arnab again makes a fool of himself inviting a bunch of Pakis to discuss Dawood. And they were pretty blunt when asked about India's options. They basically said, and I am paraphrasing, be nice to TSP, hand over Kashmir, yada yada, and then maybe they will consider Dawood. How does this kind of brazen talk from TSP augur well for the future, esepcailly if India herself has embarked on the same path? I need not repeat MMS's kirket diplomacy, and just witness Bhadrakumar shamelessly singing the same Paki tune the other day.

[negi]

OBL was just a jack(ghulam) the Ace of Spades(hukum ka ekka) ij Paki nukes and that is what Amrika bahadur is scared about; whether US policy makers were short sighted or not is a moot point , in hindsight at least one can say it paid rich dividends to the GOTUS while the tamasha lasted. The fact is today even if GOTUS admits to the fact that Af-Pak was a huge fck up it cannot 'pull out' from the region for a country of paranoids that Amrika is, it will never get a good night's sleep knowing that Baki nutcases cannot be trusted with nukes for after 9/11 the last thing they need is a baki carrying a suitcase of polk flied lice to Manhattan. Someone here might obviously ask what about India ? Well the answer to that is we need to earn 10 trillion dollahs first, until that we can and should withstand nuke strikes; in fact to quote certain Mr. Integrity "No-one can come in the path of our progress," .

Anyways coming back to the topic Bakistan continues to keep Americans interested , as far as India is concerned nothing has changed after 9/11 or even after OBL's death. As far as GoI is concerned I am reminded of a common adage from my madrasa days "haath mein leke baithe hain" (sitting with the mijjile in hand and doing nothing).

[Rudradev]

Ravi-ji,
Thank you for a very insightful critique of my post, and a very informative one as well. I learned many things from it, and it is indeed a valuable counterpoint to what I’ve written.

^^^^Rudradev, I would like to offer the following comments of the excellent post you made in this thread on “06 May 2011 12:04”;

To a very large extent, I agree with the bulk of what you have written in this post, but I would still like to add a few points/counterpoints, so that the understanding it purveys can be refined and made more accurate, and more importantly, more useful for Rakshaks. If anyone reading this post has not already read Rudradev’s excellent post referenced above, they should go back and read that post in its entirety first, before reading what I have written below.

2) ……….. A deliberate power vacuum was engineered in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, one that only Pakistan was capable of filling via its proxies. Washington, at that time, favoured the creation of an Af-Pak under Islamabad's TSPA/ISI rule. It fit in with Washington's game plan perfectly.

Actually, this situation wasn’t exactly a power vacuum. Following the slow, long, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, they left in place what was essentially a ‘caretaker government’ that was friendly towards the USSR. Some degree of Soviet military aid continued to trickle-in, but it was not enough, as history has shown.

The fight against the Soviet occupation forces, promptly targeted the Soviet-friendly caretaker regime left in its wake, and the rest is history.

Let me go into some more detail about what I meant here.

When I referred to a “deliberate power vacuum” I didn’t mean immediately after the Soviets left (1987-88), but in the decade following.

After the Soviets were gone, President Najibullah remained in power. His government, and the Afghan army, successfully fought the ISI’s jihadi hordes for years, forcing them to a stalemate in 1990. They might have held out longer except for the defection of some of their major warlord allies, including Rashid Dostum. By 1992, Najib’s government was on the backfoot, and trying to reach a UN-mediated compromise with Ahmed Shah Massoud; but eventually it collapsed and Najib resigned, seeking shelter in the UN compound at Kabul.

Many, many attempts were made by the Americans to destabilize Najibullah... the last capable ruler of Afghanistan... during his years in power. These ranged from continued, lucrative support to the pro-ISI mujahedin, to sponsoring a March 1990 coup against Najib by Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai (tellingly, when Tanai failed, he ran away to Islamabad!)

Was there a need for America to continue trying to destabilize Najibullah, even after the Soviets had withdrawn and the USSR itself had collapsed? Not unless they wanted to create a power vacuum that the Pakistanis would fill. This is borne out by further events.

When Najib finally resigned from office in 1992, an Interim Afghan Government came into power, headed by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Buhranuddin Rabbani. Mojadeddi and Rabbani had Islamist leanings, but were fundamentally Afghan nationalists. The Defense Minister of this Interim government was Ahmed Shah Massoud.

All of these were people who had fought in the anti-Soviet jihad, BUT were not amenable to taking further orders from the ISI, and had their own agenda for the rebuilding of Afghanistan as an independent nation. They had no interest in the continuing domination of Afghanistan by Pakistan.

Pakistan’s proxy in this Interim Afghan Government, was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: a man whose relationship with the ISI went back all the way to his terrorist campaign against the Daoud Khan government in Kabul. Hekmatyar, as Prime Minister, tried to grab power away from the other members of the Interim Afghan Government by threatening to kill them if they flew into Kabul. Mojadeddi refused to be cowed, and on his orders, Ahmed Shah Massoud kicked Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami thugs out of Kabul in 1992. (This was the beginning of the mutual hatred that developed between the ISI and Massoud, eventually leading to the assassination of the latter a few days before 9-11.)

From that point onwards came a terrible civil war in which the ISI-sponsored Hekmatyar repeatedly bombarded Kabul with rocket artillery, to terrorize its civilian population and destabilize the Rabbani-Massoud Interim Government. This went on for four years. THIS is the power vacuum I am talking about... and it was deliberately engineered by the ISI. American indifference to this interference by the ISI in post-Soviet Afghanistan, I am convinced, was deliberate.

One can accept that the Americans tried to destabilize Najibullah even after the Russian withdrawal, because he was a former Soviet ally (even though they did not seek similar vengeance against other pro-Soviet governments in Asia.)

But why did the Americans not use their influence to block Hekmatyar’s continuous and violent destabilization of Afghanistan from 1992-1996? After all, the government in Kabul at that time (Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud) had been US allies against the USSR. Why did the US not support their Afghan nationalist government, but instead allow the Pakis to continue destabilizing it via the proxy of Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami? Why did they let ISI/Hekmatyar impose a power vacuum by making war on a viable Afghan state... one which could have unified Pashtuns and Northerners given the Rabbani-Massoud alliance?

The obvious answer is that the Americans in fact did NOT favour a nationalist, independent government in Afghanistan... even one that was made up of their former anti-Soviet allies. The Americans preferred that Afghanistan suffer a power vacuum, one that could eventually be filled by a stronger ISI proxy (the Taliban) in 1996. The importance of this power vacuum is illustrated by the fact that exhausted Afghan citizens actually welcomed the Taliban invasion, in the hope that it would bring some order to the nation.

In effect, America favoured ISI proxies over its own Afghan-nationalist allies, and allowed ISI-proxies to displace the Afghan-nationalist Interim Government of Rabbani and Massoud. This clearly indicates that the US Wilsonians wanted an Afghanistan dominated by TSP/ISI, rather than an independent Afghanistan, to advance their interests in Central Asia.

Another important point to add here: Beginning in 1979, to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan; a charismatic and influential Palestinian cleric named ‘Abdullah Yusuf Azzam’ made his way to Pakistan, in service of what can be termed “defensive jihad” undertaken on behalf of the broader Ummah. One of his lieutenants was Osama bin Laden. Indeed, OBL’s wealth was underwriting much of the effort. Soon after this effort was under way; OBL organized his own sub-group, comprising Arab fighters exclusively, which he led on his own initiative (with a mix of moderate success and disastrous failure, it should be noted). This caused a rift, or more precisely, a ‘shism’ between the pan-Islamist, defensively-minded Azzam, and the more Arab-focussed, offensively-minded OBL.

Although OBL’s sub-group was fighting the Soviets at the time, I believe that this was undertaken in order to harden his Arab fighters for the real jihad that OBL’s had in mind; which was to be directed against the decadent KSA. Over time, this anti-KSA motive grew to encompass the KSA’s backers, which OBL identified as “Christians and Jews”, in what can be termed pre-emptive or “offensive jihad”.

In the ensuing years after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban; OBL had offered his fighters to protect first Saudi Arabia and then also Kuwait from the US-backed Saddam Hussein – only to be rebuffed both times. To add fuel to OBL’s fire about this; both the KSA and the Kuwaitis turned to the Kaffir Khans for their defence. This seared into OBL’s mind, his perception of who his enemies were – who were the true enemies of Islam, according to him.

It is also important to note that upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, at first, the Americans had nothing to say about it, and seemed to take no interest whatsoever. Indeed, some have even argued that then US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, had actually communicated to Saddam Hussein what was essentially a ‘green light’ for the invasion. It took several weeks, and finally a personal, *impromptu* visit to George Bush-41 by then UK-PM Margaret Thatcher, to turn the American tide against Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait (probably because Kuwaiti oil was pumped by BP, and Kuwaiti oil wealth was banked in the UK).

To your point, Rudradev; had OBL remained under the tutelage of Abdullah Azzam; I am sure that J&K would have had a much heavier involvement of Arab-origin jihadi-inspired ‘attention’. But having broken-away from Azzam, India was spared from suffering OBL’s attention. I wouldn’t give too much credit to “Washington’s game plan”, nor would I say that it worked out “perfectly”, to use your term. I would say that things happened the way they did, more on account of American handling of the Iraq-Kuwait-KSA situation, and because of OBL’s personality, beliefs and gripes, rather than for any grand design hatched in Washington.

The “game plan” I was referring to in my post, was Washington’s decision to let post-Soviet Afghanistan devolve into a power vacuum that could be filled by ISI proxies. Thanks to Hekmatyar and later the Taliban, that part did in fact work out perfectly. With regard to OBL, Iraq-Kuwait etc... Washington’s grand designs failed miserably!

No arguments and, in fact, thank you for your detailed exposition of OBL’s tutelage under Abdullah Azzam. You have, in fact, filled up the missing piece of the story I told in my post... OBL’s origins and the beginnings of his ideological motivation.

My post took up the story in 1988, at the point where OBL split off from the Maktab-el-Khidamat... which, in fact, is the organization that Azzam and OBL set up together to facilitate the Afghan Jihad.

3) The game plan was ultimately, to…………….. threaten a recalcitrant Iran, and give the US "pro-Islamic" credibility with the Arab street.

Rudradev, while I can agree with you that the American game plan for Pakistan was that it could be used as a base against “a recalcitrant Iran”, it should be noted that Pakistan’s perfidy extends to this aspect of its ‘usefulness’ as well, since there is solid evidence that the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation scheme benefitted the Iranian regime also. No doubt, this has displeased the Americans, but more so, the Saudi royals, who are more worried about the intentions of the Iranians then they are concerned about the machinations of Americans. (This is yet another fault-line that has so far been under-exploited by Bharat Rakshaks, IMO.)
Furthermore, I think you are misreading the “Arab street” if you think they have love for Pakistan. They do not. For the record, the “Arab street” has witnessed Pakistanis backing (and staffing) oppressive Arab regimes – most notably during the forcible expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan; and more recently in the murderous response to the “Arab spring” now coursing across the Middle East. Pakistanis may have favour in the halls of power in this region, but I doubt if they would enjoy the same welcome on the “Arab street”.

Perhaps you mis-wrote this point because you were focussed on another issue – which I can understand – but it bears my pointing this out; particularly because the “Arab spring” currently underway, has the potential for blowback against the Pakistanis, and this is to be noted and welcomed by readers of this thread. We should all be careful to draw a distinction between ‘hitherto fore’ Arab leadership, and the emerging dispensation that a democratic Arab revolution may potentially bring.

Ravi-ji, I think you may have misread this point as articulated in my post.

I do not at all subscribe to the idea that Pakistan wields any credibility in the Arab street. The Arabs have nothing but contempt for the Pakis. What have they ever done to assist any Paki cause? Once in a while OIC will make some chai-biskoot statement about Kashmir. But anything of substance?

No Arab state has ever sanctioned India over J&K or “2000 Muslims killed in Gujarat” or any of the other breathless Paki rallying cries. No Arab street has ever turned out in support of these Paki causes, even as they have relentlessly rallied against the Israelis and the United States for several decades.

Arabs in general could not care less about Paki whinings: they see Pakistan not as an Islamic state, but for the Western rentier it is. Much of their rage against the US and Israel is post-colonial in origin rather than "Islamist"... and to them, Western Munna Pakistan is a symbol of neo-colonialism, rather than a symbol of Islam!

Meanwhile, they appreciate Indian money for their oil and gas, Indian doctors, Indian software techs, Indian drivers and Indian construction workers. These days they appreciate Indian business investment as well, and will continue to do so.

As far as J&K is concerned... the Arabs only laugh at the “martial Ghazi” Pakis for not being able to resolve that issue against a largely dhimmified, mostly harmless kaffir nation like India! OBL’s views, as I have said, were much the same.

What I said in my post regarding this issue, specifically is:

Additionally, such an Af-Pak power under Islamabad could stabilize the Eastern flank of West Asia, threaten a recalcitrant Iran, and give the US "pro-Islamic" credibility with the Arab street. (I'm speaking of US Wilsonian perceptions, rather than reality, here!)

Essentially the very "Great Game" ideas behind the creation of Pakistan in 1947, were seen to be "borne out" by the eventual usefulness of Pakistan in defeating the Soviet Union.

I’m not saying there was any substance to the idea that Pakistan could give the West “pro-Islamic” credibility with the Arab street. I am saying that the US Wilsonians in 1990, like the British in 1947, THOUGHT that it could. This is pure colonialist conceit on the part of the West, having imbibed their own T.E. Lawrence mythology. The West does not seem to have internalized the fact that Pakistan will never be accepted as a leader of the Islamic world, especially by the Arabs.

The original supporters of Pakistan in the Clement Attlee government, such as Philip Noel-Baker, repeatedly justified their support with the false notion that Pakistan would prove to be the West’s source of credibility in the Arab world; that it would be a pro-British Muslim Country that could watch out for Western interests in the oil-rich Middle East and balance Arab opinion against the Western support for Israel. These attitudes have been inherited by the American (Wilsonian) supporters of Pakistan in decades and century following. They are, of course, complete hogwash.

More on your other points later, I'm quite tired now!

Briefly, when I spoke of the "last chapter"... of course, I meant that the raid of May 2nd was the last chapter for OBL, not for the entire Af-Pak-US game in progress right now. That plot has only been thickened with the death of OBL, and resolution seems even further away.

Also, I remain far from convinced that the raid was an independent, unilateral US action. However, I have some doubts whether I should articulate the reasons for my belief in this thread, open as it is to the public... including Paki public. Better to let them think it was unilateral! I will respond to that part of your critique later on, under GDF burkha.

[Theo_Fidel]

A major part of this 'get justice for Osama' strategy is to go after Obama as having committed a war crime. There are influential legal right wing sections that believe that they can 'get' the president for this.

[ShyamSP]

OBL was just a jack(ghulam) the Ace of Spades(hukum ka ekka) ij Paki nukes and that is what Amrika bahadur is scared about; whether US policy makers were short sighted or not is a moot point , in hindsight at least one can say it paid rich dividends to the GOTUS while the tamasha lasted. The fact is today even if GOTUS admits to the fact that Af-Pak was a huge fck up it cannot 'pull out' from the region for a country of paranoids that Amrika is, it will never get a good night's sleep knowing that Baki nutcases cannot be trusted with nukes for after 9/11 the last thing they need is a baki carrying a suitcase of polk flied lice to Manhattan.

While unkil may be scared of abdul paki carrying suitecase or giving it some al-saudi, not pulling out of afpak is by design. Unkil will be in afpak for next 50 years at least even though they might reduce troop level. To be that long you need to show host country think you're a joke or create situation where you are shown unable to leave. 911 bought them to station in afpak for last 10 years. Taking out OBL will give another 10 year reason. Giving a billions for a training ground and target practice is not a bad idea.

[ldev]

If the senior decision making elite of the Pakistani establishment was aware of OBL's actual location, he probably would have been moved around from safe house to safe house on a frequent basis. It just does not make sense to have him holed up in one location for 5 years. It is possible that elements within the ISI were aware of his actual location and provided local tactical protection, but had the elite decision making establishment as a whole been aware of his location, he would have been moved around periodically.

Heck, even Dawood is moved around frequently....because he is regarded as an asset vis a vis India by the ISI and they are aware of his whereabouts and they dont want to loose him. Arguably OBL was an even bigger asset....the source of Pakistan's ability to continue to blackmail the US and extract billions of dollars every year in the "war on terror".

And you do not just leave such a valuable asset.... indeed if you are aware of that asset and his whereabouts.... holed up in one location for 5 years. And... OBL alive to Pakistan was worth far more than OBL dead.

As such, any theories that the OBL killing was a joint operation between the US and Pakistan is IMO a lot of wishful thinking....comforting if one wants to wallow in a state of victimhood....but unlikely in fact.

[Anujan]

ldev-ji
that is not actually completely true. It is well known in new-clear detergent circles for example, that moving nukes around offers the highest chance of detection. However it has the beneficial side effect of revealing capability while thwarting attacks on them (you dont know if you are going to hit them) and hence is stabilizing.

However not moving nukes at all and concealing them make them susceptible to attacks (if detected) and is destabilizing because the enemy does not know how many nukes you have, and will make it part of his attack plan if shooting starts, so you dont know if he has detected it.

So moving = Inform the world of the maal, while deterring attacks on it.
Not moving = Conceal the maal from the world, while making it susceptible to attacks.

Dawood vis-a-vis India falls into the former category. OBL vis-a-vis the US falls into the latter category. Our triad falls into the former category. JDAMs fall into the latter category.

[ramana]

I think the crucial event in the OBL episode is the earlier US raid on the Bali bomber in 2011.
TSP got blinded by cognitive dissonance or excessive "need to know" myopia to not understand that other high value targets in TSP and in Abbotabad in particular could also be at risk of US action.

They mis-perceived the OBL raid as a follow-up of the old raid on other linked elements.

[ldev]

Anujan,

That is precisely my point. If the Pakistan establishment as a whole was protecting OBL, it is a non issue moving one person around or even a family on a piecemeal basis. Your analogy makes sense for an inanimate object such as a warhead, but individuals come into contact with other individuals however compartmentalized the reporting lines are and over a period of time this information will leak out. That is precisely how the US found out where OBL was. And that is the reason why high value individual assets are moved around IF they are protected by the state as a whole. But if there is no STATE protection, they will not be moved around.

Hence my position as stated in my earlier post.

[Sanku]

Those who crib at Arnab inviting Paki's to strut about on TV. Please realize Shiv-ji's dictum, 99.99999% of India is NOT at BRFite level. The DiE are particularly hopeless -- even the current behavior of the Paki guest on TV comes as a shock to them. They ask "Arreee look at these A-holes? How can some one be such a A-hole? Burka aunty-ji says they are such good people, how come these A-holes?" Then they start thinking.

It would be good to keep the ground reality of India in mind.

As it stand Arnab is HATED for being a far-right bombastic jingoist aggressive militant anchor. He can not play god and overnight change the the self-loathing DiE born India to nationalists. He needs contacts and people from the same cess-pool of JNU based reporters.

[Anujan]

ldev-ji

I think you misunderstood my post. Pakis vis-a-vis Dawood are saying "We have Dawood, you cant do Sh1t!!" to India. Pakis vis-a-vis OBL are saying "OBL? Who OBL? What OBL? We dont know!! heh heh. Give more baksheesh please" to US. Their objective vis a vis Dawood is to reveal to India they have Dawood *but* protect him from RAW going over and sniping his brains off or giving him an IED mubarak. Their objective vis-a-vis OBL is *not to reveal* that they have OBL at all!! Else they would get their testimonials squeezed by the US.

In both cases, the state is sheltering them. But the objectives are different.

[Johann]

Rudradev,

I have some important disagreements far as your analysis of the USG's position with regards to Bin Laden in the mid 1990s. Your assumptions about the timing of the changes in policy are not correct.

a) Bhutto and Babar had overseen the expulsion of 'Arab Afghans' from Peshawar's New Town area in 1993 and FATA when the Egyptians and other Arab states brought pressure to bear along with the Americans to a lesser extent following the WTC bombing. At this point many of Arab Afghans moved to Sudan which is under Turabi's influence. Bin Laden pays for the airlift. The initial US intelligence community's assessment of Bin Laden in the early 1990s was that he was one among many wealthy Gulfies funding jihadi movements around the world. No special attention was paid to him

b) The US intelligence community in general, and the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) only really woke up to the the scale of the Sunni Salafi Jihadist threat as a distinct phenomenon (separate from Palestinian, Hezballah, or Libyan proxy terror) in 1995 after two incidents - the discovery of Plan Bojinka (Ramzi Yousef btw was renditioned from Islamabad), and the attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak in Addisababa. The response was a new National Intelligence Estimate, and presidential findings for the CTC.

c) The US response to this was the rendition programme, designed by Michael Scheuer, and led by the CTC. This was a compromise approach to disrupting cells given that the concerns about violating the executive ordinances against assassinations and the US inability to try terrorists for acts planned against third parties. What it *counted* on was that their country of origin had a warrant/conviction, or would generate one. The US would find the Arab jihadi in question and hand them over. This was the procedure with Egypt, Jordan and others, and the project got underway by the end of 1995.

d) In Sudan by late 1995 / early 1996 Turabi falls out with the Army, who begins to push out the Salafi Jihadis under international pressure. The problem with Bin Laden in May of 1996 was that Saudi did not have the stomach to put Bin Laden on trial or incarcerate him. He had not yet conducted the attacks that would earn him an indictment that would allow rendition for trial in the US. The Bin Laden Unit ('Alec' Station') had only been opened under Scheuer in January of 1996 by the CTC, which (in part because of Egyptian and Jordanian reports) that Bin Laden was special. The rest of the US intelligence community did not share that assessment.

e) Bin Laden was not invited by the Taliban, but by Younus Khalis in Nangarhar, the Afghan Mujaheddin leader/warlord he had the closest ties to. When the Taliban advanced on Khalis's position, Bin Laden retreated with Khalis. He did not trust the Taliban because it was closely associated with Benazir Bhutto's and her Interior Minister, Naseerullah Babar.

f) However, the NIE was only revised to list Bin Laden by April of 1997, after Bin Laden was already in Afghanistan. Much of the rest of the USIC was still skeptical. However the Bin Laden Unit and the CTC took him seriously enough that they revived intelligence contact by sending the first 'Jawbreaker' team to meet with Massood and the Northern Alliance (dropped after the US closed the arms pipeline in 19991) in the Autumn of 1997, By December of 1997 the Clinton White House asks the BLU and CTC to find a direct way to disrupt Bin Laden.

To get an idea of the vast gulf between the CTC and the White House CT staff on the one hand, and the rest of the CIA, consider this; in November 1997 Egyptian named Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed walked into the US embassy in Nairobi, and told CIA officers of a group planning to blow up the embassy. Some of his information checks out, some does not. He is labeled a fabricator and told to get lost.

h) Bin Laden declares the formation of his "World Front Against Crusaders & Jews" in February 1998.

i) Richard Clarke is appointed White House CT coordinator in May of 1998, and Clinton signs a covert action finding authorising a snatch mission for Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and the US Attorney's office is preparing a sealed indictment so that he can be tried in the United States, which is complete in June. The logistical and operational challenges of capturing Bin Laden are simply massive.

j) August 1998. East African embassy bombings. Clinton for the first time authorises kill option, launches 66 cruise missiles against Bin Laden shura council meeting. Probably tipped off by the Pakistani military. This is the point Clinton and the rest of the CIA *really* wake up to what the CTC and White House CT staff have been saying about Bin Laden.

[ldev]

Anujan,

I do not want to go OT here, but in the old days many of the dons in Mumbai's underworld, did not spend two consecutive nights in one location...same theory....chances of being in your opponents crosshairs get higher if you stay static. Ofcourse Pakistan was/is extracting money from the US for its ostensible help in the "war on terror". How much safer would this be if its primary cash generating asset OBL, was moved around every 6 months or more often? Even if the US got a lead, chances are it would lead to the older safehouse and not the current safehouse?

Hence I dont think the US and Pakistan were in cahoots on this issue. On many other issues, yes but not this one.

[ldev]

Johann,

One of the big mysteries to me is why did OBL stay on in Afghanistan-Pakistan post 9/11. While he was persona non grata in KSA, he could have slipped into Yemen and even into the southwestern part of KSA through the porous borders both into Yemen and then into KSA. There was an enormous amount of sympathy for him in those parts even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11....he could have lived with the Bedouins for years and nobody would have been wiser.

As a refuge it would have been infinitely safer. The only answer I can think off is that as a base to carry on his jihad in terms of communication and direction, the Afghanistan-Pakistan base was superior.

[surinder]

Just got done watching 60 Minutes. Anybody else watchi it?

BO deftly ducked questions on Pakistan. Even after an event of such magnitude, he refused to say that he does not trust the Pakis. This indicates a reluctance to publicly implicate the Pakis, hence it indicates the continuance of the same old policies.

Anybody have any views?

[Rudradev]

Johann, thanks for some illuminating details.

One thing I don't understand is why it took until 1995 (Bojinka and Addisababa) for the CTC to wake up to the Salafist jihadi threat in general, when people linked to Bin Laden: El-Sayyed Nosair and Ali Mohammed, had been implicated in the 1993 WTC bombing?

[surinder]

OBL was a Mujahid (in his mind) and running a wild war. But he is running a family of 3 wives like a settled man. How can such a man (with 3 wives and 8 kids) have the mobility needed for a guiralla warrior as he perhaps thought of himself. This is a stark contradicition. Man in his situation should have been unmarried and untethered to any attachments. He should have been mobile, and lithe and close to weapons.

But the reality of his life style indicates a life a settled relaxed tired man.

[ramana]

OBL thought he had TSPA backing. In Yemen he would have been tracked much earlier.

RD, You should hear some of the US Senators speaking fondly of how they fought the FSU with ISI handling the Mujahdeen. They are now astonished that TSP could harbor OBL. So in all likelihood mis-perception of the nature of TSP.

[ldev]

Just got done watching 60 Minutes. Anybody else watchi it?

BO deftly ducked questions on Pakistan. Even after an event of such magnitude, he refused to say that he does not trust the Pakis. This indicates a reluctance to publicly implicate the Pakis, hence it indicates the continuance of the same old policies.

Anybody have any views?

The word "strategic" is bandied about quite a lot when US policymakers talk about the US-Pakistani relationship. The word strategic denotes that which impacts US "national security" interests. In the 10 years since 9/11, enhanced security and surveillance on a global basis have ensured that beyond random acts of individual terrorism, most large scale plots are caught in the net. The only joker in the pack is nuclear terrorism. And the only country which has the ability to provide the raw materials for that on a plausible deniable basis is Pakistan. Hence Pakistan is treated with kid gloves by the US.

[surinder]

Irony is that uncle is unwilling to impliate TSP because it "helps" in the war against terror and is an ally. But this war is necessitated in the first place *DUE* to TSP itself.

What an irony.

[Rudradev]

Ramana, thanks. I concur. Misperception in the wider GOTUS, deliberately fed by a group (Brzezinski-Wilsonians) in the GOTUS for whom it is an article of faith that TSP must remain a lynchpin ally of the US for geopolitical reasons.

Surinder: In answer to your question, watch this if you haven't already.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline ... bin-laden/

At around 19-20 mins, the reporter asks Steve Coll the very question on all our minds: why is the GOTUS, even after May 2nd, unwilling to confront TSP on its duplicity? The answer Coll gives, I think, is close to the right one for the majority of the US government. The right answer for the Brzezinski types is of course something else altogether.

[Johann]

Johann, thanks for some illuminating details.

One thing I don't understand is why it took until 1995 (Bojinka and Addisababa) for the CTC to wake up to the Salafist jihadi threat in general, when people linked to Bin Laden: El-Sayyed Nosair and Ali Mohammed, had been implicated in the 1993 WTC bombing?

Rudradev,

The CTC's framework from the 1980s was that all non-state terrorist groups were
a) directed by top down hierarchies
b) directed in their campaigns by states

This was based on experience in the 1980s with Abu Nidal directed by Libya, Islamic Jihad/Hezballah, directed by Iran.

The Salafi Jihadi milieu did not *really* fit either category. In the early 1990s it was a lot loose ties, a lot of proto groups, and no single state dominated. 'Extremism' was spoken of as a general background problem, rather than a clustered set of ideologies and movements.

What was the most confusing was that a number of Armed Muslim Brotherhood movements were also active, like Hamas, the FIS/AIS in Algeria, etc. These armed Ikhwani movements at the time used much of the same rhetoric as the Salafis, and were often in touch with / operating side by side with Salafis, but were only interested in attacking the West ideologically and rhetorically, which was acceptable. Ikhwanis and Salafis despite differences often tended to put on a joint public front.

The Egyptians and Jordanians were way ahead in understanding the divergences and intersections phenomenon, but also tended to deliberately conflate the Ikhwanis and Salafis in order to win US support against the Ikhwanis. However, US political assessments at the time were that the Ikhwanis enjoyed very strong Arab public support, were bound to take over, and should not be antagonised unduly. Salafis were not recognised as a separate phenomena but rather as disorganised mini-networks or individuals on the fringe of the wider Ikhwani phenomena.

It wasn't until the mid 1990s that the Ikhwanis and the Salafis openly and publicly acknowledged that they were distinct movements that could not work together, and even began killing each other in places like Algeria during that civil war. Same thing happened in Egypt as the Salafi campaign became more and more violent, especially against tourism which many Egyptians depended on for their jobs.

[ldev]

Irony is that uncle is unwilling to impliate TSP because it "helps" in the war against terror and is an ally. But this war is necessitated in the first place *DUE* to TSP itself.

What an irony.

No, I would say that Uncle is unwilling to implicate TSP because that could risk a public breakdown in the dialogue between the US and Pakistan. After such a breakdown it is entirely possible that Pakistan will say that "We are very sorry.. but we have lost a few nuclear warheads and some fissile material". Now those warheads could turn up anywhere....at any economic chokepoint in the world....within the continental US....or the oilfields in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. That will lead to human and economic catastrophe.

Hence Pakistan is engaged in subtle nuclear blackmail vis a vis the US and open nuclear blackmail vis a vis India. And nobody in the USG or GOI has the ba**s to do anything about it. Every one is kicking the can down the road.