INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -2

[prahaar]

I fail to understand what credibility the IN would have in terms of delivering a design for a nuclear reactor to power the ATV. I mean IN - design a nuclear reactor!!!

As far as project delays go, i think it's more a management than technological issue really. But we seem to think technology is the big issue. For a country like India and it's tremendous human resource capability, technology will never be an issue. Funds and management issues have been chronic last few decades.

As per my understanding this is not true. Technology maturation is like making a baby, having multiple dads will not reduce ETA. Given a technology deficit country like India which is under a soup of technology sanctions, technical problems are a PITA. For high specialty and niche technology areas like precision engineering machinery, materials, nuclear propulsion, etc (It will be a long list) we are a new kid on the block. We might have a small number of bright people in these trades but the mass of people needed to deliver an operation nuclear submarine was in short supply. All the rona-dhona about LCA, Arjun (Arihant) is not about lazy DRDO incompetent DRDO, it is a journey of hardships in technology creation as a nation. In some other thread (I am unable to recall the exact name), Shivji has posted an interesting note about our (Indians) lack of awareness about the technical maturity of our industries. Biggest technical knowledge in any field in experience, which we are generating but it will take its own time.

Sorry if this is OT.

[harbans]

^ I agree that technology is a critical aspect, but when a large project like a submarine/ LCA/ MBT is undertaken there is cross industry experience too required. No one can say India has lesser nuclear, metallurgical expertize today than the Soviets or the Americans had in 1955 when they launched their first Nuclear submarines. So what did they do right what we didn't? First no constraints on funds. They had to develop those subs ASAP. Putting on top a project head that had cross industry specialization and ability to link up to requisite expertize across relevant Industry/ Universities and research institutions.

[member_20067]

^ I agree that technology is a critical aspect, but when a large project like a submarine/ LCA/ MBT is undertaken there is cross industry experience too required. No one can say India has lesser nuclear, metallurgical expertize today than the Soviets or the Americans had in 1955 when they launched their first Nuclear submarines. So what did they do right what we didn't? First no constraints on funds. They had to develop those subs ASAP. Putting on top a project head that had cross industry specialization and ability to link up to requisite expertize across relevant Industry/ Universities and research institutions.

lack of vast..talent pool on problem solving and coming up with unique solutions.. even tough we have now mastered the level of technology in nuclear and metallurgical... space compared to what US and Soviets had in 1955.. it is not innovation.. we had been follower and doing a catching up act... US and Soviets with its huge universities and labs had access to incredible talents .. we just don't have that level of integration between DRDO and any of the university labs... I graduated in Mechanical Engineering from Jadavpur University and we had a lab where profs and doctoral students worked on Prithvi missile.. valve systems... I was very proud of that neptune lab... but I don't think apart from top institutes .. which we don't have many.. hundreds other private engineering colleges who are churning out million engineers per annum.. has anything like that..compare that top 10 US universities where both american and non-american students are more that willing to share their knowledge or skill sets to outwit any possible challenges..

In addition nuclear sub was not born out of the blue moon.. many of the basic principles of submarine building was already in place thanks to WW1 and WW2... where thousands such were churned out by both the powers.. they had a momentum.. incredible german talent pool post WW2.. etc.. there were some great documentaries which captures the cold war defense projects during 50s-60s in the west...

[harbans]

Frankly there is much more expertise/ knowledge available in the nuclear and metallurgical streams in India today than in the US/ USSR mid 50's. Not only that but say hurling objects into outer space etc for example.They sent men into space using log tables and slide rules for instance. I have a few patents over the last decade some not related to my field of specialization. I did them roping in retired Professors/ students/ out of the box thinkers. So it can be done. The companies that challenged or referenced our 'garage' patents are the biggest names in the Industry (and we didn't lose a single claim at the patent office so far). So to say India does not have requisite talent is a no go with me. I have lived the last decade proving that notion false.

This is one thing i mentioned too even in the LCA thread a while back. Why build a small fighter. Miniaturization can be amongst the toughest challenges specifically when one wants the works in a 3.5G fighter aircraft. But someone felt that a small model is what is required to prove the concept. Then the IAF threw in ultra modern specs with changing timelines, and it proved a really big challenge.

In all this the first and foremost is self confidence. Good project management skills. Then technology. None can do without one another, but a sure way to fail available technology skill sets is doing away with the former 2. Anyways we have come a long way and i am sure we have made steady and quantum gains in all the 3 above.

[member_20067]

Frankly there is much more expertise/ knowledge available in the nuclear and metallurgical streams in India today than in the US/ USSR mid 50's. Not only that but say hurling objects into outer space etc for example.They sent men into space using log tables and slide rules for instance. I have a few patents over the last decade some not related to my field of specialization. I did them roping in retired Professors/ students/ out of the box thinkers. So it can be done. The companies that challenged or referenced our 'garage' patents are the biggest names in the Industry (and we didn't lose a single claim at the patent office so far). So to say India does not have requisite talent is a no go with me. I have lived the last decade proving that notion false.

Yes there are talents but having a talent and properly harvesting it are not same may be... you might did the patent from a profiting stand point ( I don't know the circumstances so making an educated guess..)..but facing a roadblock and then bringing folks together on a drawing board ..trying out multiple options on the lab... having a competitive environment with multiple private companies investing in R&D to come up with a solution ...I don't think we have that culture yet... I will be glad to be proved wrong.. when I said lack of resources I meant lack of access to resources and properly managing it to a closure..

[Philip]

Harbans is spot on.We needed a Rickover or his Russian counterpart.These individuals were specially handpicked and they in turn handpicked their teams.There is a first person legendary account of how Rickover used to select his staff.These men could hire and fire.They also were fully accountable to their superiors.There was national will to succeed on both sides of the iron curtain.In the case of the US,local industry was heavily involved,whereas in India,local industry only in recent times has been made part of the process of design and development,L&T for example with the ATV.In India,from experience,committees usually pass the ball,few like taking hard decisions,preferring to postpone the issue and the most important decision taken is the date for the next committee meeting!

[Singha]

chinese seem to be pragmatic in sizing their fighters...generally big and capacious, with underpowered engines but the challenges of having to stuff an elephant into the fridge are not there....they can use trailing edge electrical and electronics of greater bulk and gradually improve as they innovate/clone/steal better kit.

on the +ve side their multiple products fly...though were not so competitive but lessons are always learnt and production quality and scale improves all the time. young engineers can be given side projects to improve such projects.

we tend to have fewer projects, lesser budgets, more demanding end user, shifting goal posts, less ability to steal/clone and more ambitious specs => end result being major delays and roadblocks.

[harbans]

Indeed. One aspect many who have not had operational and project experience, miss out on is the part of 'End user' experience. Project and product breakthroughs rarely come about because an 'End User' demands a particular function. Many end users do not have an idea what redundancies, equipment, structural strengthening, technical processes requirements are like and all these are the most prominent aspects in the design set up process. There are so many instances of the 'end user' inviting technologists to improve efficiencies, provide technology solutions to improve what and how they do things. More often than not, it is the end user that is taught usage and functionality.

The entire business of tech consultancy in a way depends on that aspect. Most famous products and inventions were made not at the behest of the end user but someone else who felt that the end user will be benefited. Good products sometimes have to be shoved to the end user. The Arjun debate is a typical example, despite the fact that all objective assessments point to it being a much superior tank to the T 90 series, the end user is more content with the operational familiarity with the Russian designs. For a few who've been in both and swear by the Arjun they make the minority of the end user opinion as we have seen.

I had been given 'charge' of a large project on the West coast by ONGC about 11 years ago. I had minimal financial liberty, had to take permissions all around ONGC Offices for importing necessary OEM spares, designs/ drawings were all a mess with no one knowing what went where..the technology part we had an extremely competent team, working 15 hours a day and they accomplished every possible deadline within their means. The end user more often than not specifically in a high tech break through kind of project gives a feedback that is the LCD of operational experience.

If i'm putting up an ABM system, i'm not looking at any 'End user' inputs. I'm putting up an operational system and training and educating the 'End user' on how the things work. Generals trained under older Infantry doctrines would certainly be unfamiliar with network centric warfare. While an end user perspective is a must and must be factored in, it must be that the end user be trained ultimately on the new products usage. The design and development can and never should be subservient to the End user. Development will fail or falter if and when that happens.

[jaladipc]

Chaiwallah reports that there is a long range ballistic missile to be tested from a submarine during the nov-dec period this year.

will report more detailed info soon once chiwallah gets his paan.

[Singha]

it can only mean they expect Arihant to be ready for missile trials by then and missile is the revered K4 - the katana.

[nash]

it can only mean they expect Arihant to be ready for missile trials by then and missile is the revered K4 - the katana.

But there might be other possibility like brahmos submerged launch from submarine or simply k-15 in place of k-4....

[Philip]

Long range BM? It has to be from the ATV.None of our other subs have missile silos and even if there has been a Kilo modified,it willonly be able to launch BMos,which is not a BM.There was a pic some time ago,showing a Chinese sub (in the dock) with a bulge below its hull,thus allowing to carry a missile longer than the dia of he hull.Interesting innovation even though it will certainly effect the HD signature.

PS:I thought that this was a launch other than a pontoon.

[Pratyush]

The launch could well take place from a submerged pontoon off Vishakpatnam.

[Austin]

The Russian Connection to India’s Nuclear Submarine Program
Moscow Defense Brief

Andrey Frolov

On December 5, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev lifted the veil off one of the worst kept secrets in the arms trade, by confirming that Russia was indeed at an advanced stage of negotiations with India for the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines. A few days later, Mikhail Dmitriev, Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, specified that the deal concerned the lease of Nerpa Project 971 (Improved Akula class) nuclear-powered attack submarine to India for a period of 10 years, beginning in 2009.

The lease of Russian SSN must be seen in the context of India’s indigenous nuclear-powered submarine program. India’s secretive current nuclear-powered submarine Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program was noted openly for the first time on December 8, 1994 by the former Chair of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, M.P. Srinivasan, who described it as a joint project of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Indian Navy1. For its part, the Indian Navy officially acknowledged the program only in December 2007, when Chief of the Naval Staff Suresh Mehta said the ATV was «at the final stages of development and would be launched within two years.» 2

Since then, however, the ATV has apparently not yet been transferred to the Navy for trials3. Moreover the stated trials period is rather long, at 18 months, and so the lead ship will probably not enter into service before 2010–2011 4. Once the lead ship is completed, another four submarines of the same class are planned for production, and the second submarine has already been laid down5. The entire series should enter into service sometime before 2025 6.

For India, then, the lease agreement with Russia serves as an interim measure to ensure uninterrupted training and infrastructure development while its indigenous nuclear-powered submarine program gets underway. Indeed, a precedent for this strategy was established some time ago, when India leased a nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union in the 1980s with the aim of providing a jump-start to the development of the ATV and to provide training for a new cadre of submarine sailors.

The Soviet Project 670 (Charlie class) K-43 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine was first shown to an India delegation in August 1982. Preparations for the transfer of the submarine included the built of a training center at the Bay of Uliss (Vladivostok) for Indian crewmen, including their own pier, a floating barracks for the Soviet crew, residential and training buildings for Indian sailors, a decontamination center and a radiation safety service.

The Obninsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur training centers provided all training equipment and materials. Two full crews with officers passed the training program in 1983, and Indian sailors began training on the K-43 from March 1985 to April 1986. After this, the submarine was mid-life repaired and upgraded at the Zvezda Shipyard. The contract for the lease was signed in July 1987, and on January 5, 1988 the submarine entered into service with the Indian Navy as the Chakra.

Although the submarine was in service with the Indian Navy, the contract provided for 30 Soviet instructors to maintain key posts on the submarine around the clock, and as many as forty Soviet industrial specialists were involved in servicing it. The submarine was based at the Visakhapatnam Naval Base. A special pier with a 60-ton crane, a covered berth and workshops were built to service the submarine.7

The submarine was used extensively by the Indian Navy. It traveled 72 thousand nautical miles (133 thousand kilometers), and the reactor was active for 430 days. Five Ametist-15 (SS-N-7) anti-ship missiles and 42 torpedoes were fired. An accident on board the vessel in 1989 was contained, there was no radioactive leakage to the submarine or the environment, and the submarine returned to base on its own power. Repairs supported by representatives of the Afrikantov design bureau took three months to complete.

During the third and final year of the lease (1990), India requested an extension, but the Soviet leadership refused. The submarine returned to Vladivostok in January 1991, where it was taken into service with the Pacific Fleet.

The next time the issue of a lease was raised again was probably in 1999, between Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kuroyedov and Chief of Naval Staff Sushil Kumar8. In December 2000 India said it would negotiate a lease of a Russian nuclear powered submarine with the aim of preserving the know-how gained from the Chakra. 9 Within a year, international media reported that about 40 Indian sailors were off to Russia to inspect an unspecified type of Russian nuclear-powered submarine10.

In Russia, Vladimir Kuroyedov was the first to discuss the lease, in January 2002 during a visit to the Amur Shipyard. He said that India would finance the completion of two submarines being built at Amur, with the first to be delivered in 2004. Meanwhile, four Indian crews would be trained in Russia. 12 The lease would be for no less than three, and likely between five and ten years. 13 According to foreign estimates, the yearly cost of the lease would be between ten and 25 million dollars. 14

The precise terms of the agreement for at least two submarines were probably reached in January 2004, at the time of the signing of the contract for the refitting of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier. That year, work on the Project 971 Nerpa (submarine Yard No. 518) accelerated, and an Indian delegation visited the Vostok plant of the Amur Shipyard11 and its submarine testing range. 15 In October 2004 the Federal Agency for Industry and the Amur Shipyard signed an MOU on the completion of built of two nuclear-power attack submarines, just when the Nerpa was estimated to be 85% complete, and «Yard No. 519,» the second submarine, to be 60% complete. 16 According to Russian press reports, India at this time paid an advance of $100 million to Russia. 17

Official data on the value of the contract was not available at that time, though the press quoted a source from Russian industry putting the cost of completing both submarines at $400 million. 18 Unofficial Indian sources estimated the cost of the entire contract at $650 million. 19 The figure of 26 billion rupees was also cited, which at 2004 rates would have been about $600 million. 20

The India media hazarded a few more guesses as to the content and cost of the contract. One report suggested that India would lease two Project 971 submarines for five years for $350 million ($35 million per sub per year), and that the contract was signed in January 2007 during President Putin’s visit to India. 21 However, this was denied at the time by the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. 22 Another report said the contract was signed in November 2007 during Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Moscow. 23

The total cost of the contract probably includes expenses for the training of the crew. According to Russian media, a special training complex was built in the Russian Navy nuclear-powered submarine trainig center at Sosnovy Bor near St. Petersburg, where three crews (a total of about 300 people) were trained between 2006 and 2008. In the future, this facility will be used to train the crews for Indian-made nuclear powered submarines. 24 This center, which the Russian media describes as a Russian-Indian center for nuclear cooperation in the military sphere, was built right next to a similar complex for the training of Russian sailors, which likely began operations in 2006. 25

Meanwhile, «Yard No. 518» submarine was completed as Project 971I (Irbis), and was launched on 24 June, 2006. The transfer to the Indian Navy was initially planned for August 2007, but there were delays at the Amur Shipyard, and Rosoboroneksport tried to raise the price of the contract to $785 million, due to domestic price increases and rising value of the ruble. 26 The Indians refused to increase the price but agreed to postpone the transfer date. 27

Yard trials of the submarine began on June 11, 2008, with the intention of transferring the Nerpa to the Indian Navy in September 2009. 28 Initial trials began at the Vostok Plant in August 2008. Yard sea trials began on 27 October, after which the Nerpa should have been transferred to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s State Commission. 29 However, the State sea trials are stopped due to an accident on the submarine in November 2008, which killed 20 people (all Russian citizens, including 17 representatives of the shipbuilding industry and three sailors). Sea trials was to resume in February-March 2009, but this date was postponed in January. 30

The second SSN was to be delivered to the Indians in 2010, 31 but in view of the delays affecting the completion of the Nerpa, this deadline will not likely be met. Either the transfer will be postponed, or a similar ship in use by the Russian Navy will be offered instead.

Scattered reports suggest that even more nuclear-powered submarines may be leased to India in the future. In late 2008, the Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Mikhail Dmitriev said it was quite possible that Russia would lease «a few nuclear-powered submarines of the same class and Project as the Nerpa.»32 This fits with reported plans of the Indian Navy to acquire or build 10–12 nuclear-powered submarines by 2018. 33

As distinct from the single-purpose SSNs of the Russian Navy, the Indian Nerpas will be equipped with the Club-S (SS-N-27) missile system, similar to those on India’s upgraded Project 877EKM (Kilo class) conventional submarines and its Project 11356 (Talvar class) frigates. In addition, the Indian Navy and the Defense Research Development Organization is developing a cruise missile with a range of about 1 thousand km that will give the Nerpa (and the ATV) substrategic capability. 34

With the transfer of the first Project 971 SSN, the Indian Navy is acquiring more than just hardware, but the knowledge and experience necessary to operate a submarine. These two submarines will in all likelihood be used as training stations for crews destined to man the ATVs currently under construction.

And since the ATVs have been designed to serve mainly as a nuclear deterrent, the Indian Navy will still lack a attack SSN; at least, there have been no reports of any program to develop one. In this case, further leases or purchases of Russian nuclear-powered submarines would appear to be a logical way to fill in this «tactical niche,» allowing for efforts to focus on completing the development and construction of the five ATV submarines.

Source: various news reports

1 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... _2884.html.

2 Indigenous Nuclear Submarine in Two Years: Navy Chief // IANS, 03.12.2007.

3 Sawhney P., Wahab G. Real Transformation // Force, December 2008. P. 6.

4 Ibid.

5 Indian Navy’s ATV Submarine Project to be Headed by Vice-Admiral A.K. Singh // http://www.indiadefense.com/reports/3219, 18.05.2007.

6 Pandit R. N-submarine May be Operational by 2012 // Times of India, 18.03.2007.

7 Pavlov A. Sub for India// http://www.milparade.com/2000/37a/05_03.shtml.

8 Frolov, A. Put’ Indii k obladaniu atomnym flotom // Yaderny kontrol, No. 2, 2003, p. 112.

9 http://www.indiadefence.com/specificati ... marines/60.

10 India Settles Nuclear Sub Lease Terms with Russia // http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Nov-15/page02.htm.

11 India to Lease Two Russian Nuclear Submarines // http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/e ... ukedev.htm.

12 Ibid.

13 Urban, V. «Nerpa vsplyvaet po komande khindi // Novye izvestia, 26.01.2002.

14 Vajpayee to Visit Moscow Before Washington – Indo-Russian Strategic Relations Set to Rise higher? // http://www.indiadefense.com/indo_rus1.htm; Indian Navy to Get Akula-class Nuclear Submarines Soon // http://www.india-defence.com/reports/1590, 23.03.2006.

15 ravchenko, M., Lantratov, K. «Boris Aleshin raskonserviroval atomnye submariny» // Kommersant, 11.10.2004.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Nikolsky, A. «Nerpa – Indii, Varshavyanka – Algiru,» Vedomosti, 30.06.2006.

19 India to Get Russian Nuke Submarine Next Year // PTI, 03.07.2008

20 To Complete Nuclear Triad, Navy to Lease Russian Sub // Times of India, 04.07.2008.

21 Raghuvanshi V. Leased Akulas Advance India’s Blue-water Plans // Defense News, 03.05.2007.

22 V federal’noj sluzhbe po VTS nazvali ne sootvetstvuyushey destvitel’nosti informatsiu o sdache Indii v lizing dvukh atomnykh podlodok // Itar-Tass, 06.03.2007.

23 Bedi R. India Poised to Complete Russian SSN Leasing Deal // Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17.11.2007.

24 Kramnik I., Reinkarnatsia Chakry // RIA Novosti, 01.07.2008; Bedi R. Indian Navy Moves a Step Closer to Acquiring Akula-class Submarine // Jane’s Navy International, 08.07.2008.

25 Yaderny Tazh-Makhal // Baltiisky vestnik, 01.12.2005 (http://greenworld.org.ru/?q=bv87).

26 K-152 Nerpa proekta 971, 971I // http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files ... /K-152.htm; Bedi R. Indin Navy Moves a Step Closer to Acquiring Akula-class Submarine // Jane’s Navy International, 08.07.2008.

27 Konovalov, I., Filippovskiy E. Zavod Vostok nafarshiruet Shuku // Kommersant (),14.08.2008.

28 India to Get Russian Nuke Submarine Next Year // PTI, 03.07.2008.

29So sdatochnoy bazy OAO Amurskiy sudostroitel’ny zavod vyshla v otkrytoe more atomnaya podvodnaya lodka 971-ogo proekta Nerpa // Vostok-Media, 27.10.2008.

30Chernyshev, A., Shcherbakov, D. Nerpa zastriala u prichala // Kommersant (), 21.01.2009.

31Bedi R. India Poised to Complete Russian SSN Leasing Deal // Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17.11.2007.

32 Konovalov, I. Rossiyskie APL vse-taki otpraviatsia v Indiu // Kommersant,16.12.2008.

33 Russia to Lease Shchuka-B Class Submarines to India // http://www.indiadefense.com/reports/4110, 16.12.2008.

34 Bedi R. Indian Navy Moves a Step Closer to Acquiring Akula-class Submarine // Jane’s Navy International, 08.07.2008.

[sum]

The second SSN was to be delivered to the Indians in 2010, 31 but in view of the delays affecting the completion of the Nerpa, this deadline will not likely be met. Either the transfer will be postponed, or a similar ship in use by the Russian Navy will be offered instead.

AAAAAAAAAAAoAAAAAAAA

In addition, the Indian Navy and the Defense Research Development Organization is developing a cruise missile with a range of about 1 thousand km that will give the Nerpa (and the ATV) substrategic capability. 34

[Philip]

Leasing of more nuclear attack subs/SSGNs,will be the fastest and most cost-effective way in which to bolster the IN's sub force,as all SSBNs will come under control of the strategic forces command.First,they will be delivered within a short time and inducted into IN service,as we have seen how long it is taking us to build a few small French (non-AIP) diesel subs! Secondly,the firepower and capability that one of these subs possesses,will be almost three times than that of any one of our conventional subs.They will also be able to protect our SSBNs when they go out on active patrol if needed.We saw in the Falklands War how just one RN nuclear sub changed the entire shape of the conflict when it sank the Gen.Belgrano,sending the entire Argentinian fleet back into port.Argentinia's small German U-boats did make attacks on the British task force,but faulty torpedo settings saw their attacks go astray. The speed with which the nuclear sub reached the conflict zone,inserting special forces onto the Argentinian mainland,where they reportedly monitored Super Etendard Exocet equipped ops against the task force,some say even indulged in sabotage, was invaluable to the British aiding them in winning the war.Given our fledgling capability in building N-boats,leasing a few Russian SSGNs like the Akula class is a great idea that should be finalised asap.Since Russia is now going to modernise all its 7 Oscars into more lethal SSGNs,carrying upto 72 supersonic BMos type missiles,there may indeed be a few Akulas on offer/available.

[Singha]

what is the fate of the 2 incomplete Oscar's we saw pictured lying in drydock? were they completed or left to the elements to rot away?

[Austin]

Uncompleted Oscar is being converted to special purpose platform , perhaps similar to the 6th Delta 4 which was converted similarly.

[Singha]

there were two of them. the BELGOROD is the one being referred to in news reports. the rumor of lease to india was picked up from a brf rant thread no doubt where we had strongly pitched for it. the fate of the VOLGOGRAD is unknown?

K 139 BELGOROD Sevmash pending pending

Laid: 24.07.1992(3)? 06.04.93 renamed to Belgorod. 16.05.94 construction halted. 09.2000 – construction start again in lieu of lost K-141 Kursk. 03.2006 stopped at readiness 75%. Scheduled in 2007. Probably will be armed with SS-NX-26 Onyks/Yakhont missiles instead of Shipwreck. 07.2006 according to MoD minister S.Ivanov construction halted. 2007: upon rumors- after missiles refit planned for lease to India. 2009 construction maybe restarted with modernization for new AShM.

K 145 VOLGOGRAD Sevmash pending pending

Laid: 02.09.1993. 07.02.1995 renamed to Volgograd. 22.01.98 construction suspended. construction maybe restarted with modernization for new AShM.

[Singha]

what if the '2nd Akula' we lease turns out to be a big daddy BELGOROD with 60-72 brahmos.
Nerpa is useful as a hunter killer but will never take brahmos. belgorod has ample room to fit any ASM of our choice.

I know that will please rakshaks no end!

[Austin]

I think if the 2nd SSN lease is true and hope it is , then we are better off investing in another Nerpa class submarine over Oscar.

Oscar are far bigger subs 19 thousand submerged displacement , it has little commonality with Akula so we need to retrain the crew a new for this new class of submarine , different reactor ,perhaps even need different logistics at land , it has a very limited role of hunting CBG in atlantic thats what it was designed for not much use to us.

A fleet of 2 Nerpa will provide one SSN for our each of CBG fleet ( Vikram and IAC ) , is a more versatile submarine and is a good sub hunter which is the greatest threat for our CBG fleet when confronted with prowling Chinese SSN in Arabian sea or Bay of Bengal.

In peace time one submarine can always be on patrol , exercise , training with one set of crew while the other sub can be on routine maintenance or just be at docks doing their usual task when they are not at sea. We do not have to retrain our crew and logistics at base will be identical for the 2 SSN.

So i think though Oscar 2 with 72 Brahmos might be cool but in terms of Naval Task Force revolved around CBG which is the case of IN a SSN like Akula 2 will be far more useful bang for buck ,JMT.

[SNaik]

Belgorod is being modified into deep sea "research" vehicle carrier.
Volgograd and Barnaul have been moved to the basin next to the Workshop 55, probably indicating that they will be utilized for construction of more Boreys.

[Austin]

Belgorod is being modified into deep sea "research" vehicle carrier.

Sounds like Green Peace type research vessel to do marine time research and track whales.

Volgograd and Barnaul have been moved to the basin next to the Workshop 55, probably indicating that they will be utilized for construction of more Boreys.

Not surprising since the first borey was made from parts of unfinished akula , infact there is hardly any difference with the sonar dome and TT arrangement of Borei and Akula.

[SNaik]

Belgorod is being modified into deep sea "research" vehicle carrier.

Sounds like Green Peace type research vessel to do marine time research and track whales.

And cut into occasional cable.

[Singha]

imo a small lean nuke sub made if titanium is best for that role...like a new alfa class with a light water reactor....the oscar would have a tough time in areas of east asia under green water belt

[debm]

Any news, on when the second sub is getting delivered to us?

[SaiK]

going by certain fire accidents with russkie subs, I expect us to focus on fire proof silicone rubbers for those smooth joints, bushings, washers, mounts, vibration control and other sound proof requirements.

[harbans]

^ If you are referring to the recent fire in Murmansk, it's the workers from the yard that are at times careless. While yards have good safety practices, it is not unusual amongst thousands of workers some to be careless and be a cause for a fire. It would not be an operational sub they would be working in a dry dock. Power would be from the yard, Multiple gangs doing hot and cold steel work on the hull and tanks..safety coordination in such matters is quite dependent on the yard than on the operational and safety features built into the sub.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^ harbans,

I agree with you 400%.

I also think we must keep in mind that the hulls of these subs are clad in rubber, actually an engineered form (I mean chemically and morphologically engineered) form of rubber that holds flowing pockets of water against the metal hull of the sub. The outter surface is essentially smooth, and it wouldn't take more than one hot, flying spark to ignite that, particularly if it were a little greasy too and there was a steady wind blowing across the point of contact. Once such a fire gets going, depending on the kind of rubber, it may leach oils while burning, making the fire impossible to extinguish with water. This means chemical fire fighting materials must be used, but those loose a lot of pressure when used in cold environments.

Folks, I know it looks bad, but current military technologies are very demanding. The average observer looks at something like this and immediately thinks of careless smoking (which happens everywhere) and wonders why they couldn't be more competent in a military shipyard. Well, there's more to it than that......

........ there always is.

Wait for the official report.

[Singha]

I am thinking if we can build a line of smallish N-boats like the Alfa class 3200t submerged with a single small reactor (max submerged speed can be 30knots rather than a record breaking figure to keep the reactor and steam gear smaller) that could be a nice improvement to the AIP proposal.

essentially the same crew and armament as a kilo and able to visit the yellow sea and south china sea where big clumsy 7500t SSNs have difficulty

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfa_class_submarine

[koti]

They may not have the endurance needed for an N-sub in that case sir.

[shiv]

I am thinking if we can build a line of smallish N-boats like the Alfa class 3200t submerged with a single small reactor (max submerged speed can be 30knots rather than a record breaking figure to keep the reactor and steam gear smaller) that could be a nice improvement to the AIP proposal.

Doesn't a low submerged speed have more to do with reduced turbulence and stealth?

[Austin]

Doesn't a low submerged speed have more to do with reduced turbulence and stealth?

Yes it does but modern submarine like US Virginia , Akula-3 ,SeaWolf maintain something called as silent tactical speed where the submarine is fast enough yet it can maintain a good stealth and sonar working at those speed. That was actually one of the key innovation of US Sea Wolf class SSN which credited for fast search rates at high tactical speed maintaining stealth.

Just as an example older nuclear submarine for eg you really had to do 4-5 knots to get those stealth capbility while Sea Wolf was credited to achieve the same stealth at 18-20 knots and Akula-2/3 at 12 knots.

[Singha]

high sprint speed is useful to relocate after firing shots and then drift or escaping from hostile torpedoes. obviously silence is not a concern there.

[Christopher Sidor]

Correct me if I am wrong, after firing of torpedoes or in case of a SSBN, its nuclear tipped missiles, dont the subs run as silent as possible, so as to remain undetected. And running silent implies running slowly. One would not want to create a ruckus while escape, and the best way to do is via slow speed.

[shiv]

The other point is who tells the truth about max depth reachable and max speeds?

[Singha]

the wiki entry for Alfa class (42 knot top speed) claims the appearance of this class the likelihood of similar follow on classes made the western allies develop faster torpedoes like mk48cap and spearfish, and asroc type missiles. ofcourse the ussr discarded the idea later and went for quietness over speed in victor and akula class...but still the retained the 35knot top speed .... perhaps to be better escape torpedoes in the water and so on...if not to run away after firing a salvo.

[Christopher Sidor]

The high speed of these Subs, i.e. Alfa, was so that they could do a quick sprint out of their harbors to neutralize any ships/submarines lying outside soviet ports. Due to the nature of naval aviation, the US CBG, had to approach close to soviet ports to enforce a blockade. Alfa were primarily meant to neutralize such threats. Consider Alfa's armaments, less than 150 km range nuclear missiles or torpedoes. These submarines were not meant to serve as SSBN.

Alfa primarily made a choice of speed over silence. Unless we plan to factor in a war with USN, we will not face any threat which will attempt to blockade our ports using naval aviation or naval surface ships. At least not until this decade is over. What we need right now is not speed. But quietness. And off course bigger displacement and bigger reactor.

[member_20317]

Correct me if I am wrong, after firing of torpedoes or in case of a SSBN, its nuclear tipped missiles, dont the subs run as silent as possible, so as to remain undetected. And running silent implies running slowly. One would not want to create a ruckus while escape, and the best way to do is via slow speed.

In which case the faster speeds are for reaching someplace fast, instead of escaping from some place fast.

[Kersi D]

The other point is who tells the truth about max depth reachable and max speeds?

NOBODY

Even today USN official statement is that the N subs do excess of some 12 - 15 knots !!!!!!

K