The Philosophy of Air Power: Think Doctrine, not Hardware
Even after making allowances for the sensitivities of the IAF the answer lies, not in maintaining a stony silence on the issue of aviation roles & missions but, in discussing it in a professional and dispassionate manner; bi-laterally and even tri-laterally. Once they can arrive at an equitable and operationally viable formulation, the pall of suspicion that hangs over inter-Service relations will lift; with instant benefits for Jointness.
The Services must bear in mind that if they do not come to a mutually acceptable modus vivendi, for the optimal utilization, or sharing of precious air power, a bureaucratic decision may be thrust on them through political fiat. The recent offer of theRaksha Mantri to mediate in the Army-IAF dispute over tactical air power is a clear portent.
The IAF must takere assurance from the fact that it is the other two Services which need its support and not the other way round. The putative “Cold Start Doctrine” contemplated by the Indian Army is a good example. Apart from armour accompanied by self-propelled artillery for striking rapidly into enemy territory, the implementation of this doctrine would require large numbers of helicopters for mobility and the liberal availability of close air support by the IAF. Similarly, in the near future, the IN has to face the stark reality of the Chinese PLA Navy’s Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) strategy at sea. Essentially designed to counter the US Navy with a formidable ballistic and cruise-missile threat the A2AD strategy poses an equally menacing threat forthe IN.
With its force ofover 300 Sukhoi-30 and perhaps 200 MMRCAs supported by aerial tankers and AWACS the IAF is a powerful ally whose cooperation both the Indian Army and IN must actively seek. Instead of squabbling over hardware, the armed forces must rise to the doctrinal and strategic levels of thinking.
This is the time for the Indian armed forces to evolve Air-Land Battle and Air-Sea Battle Doctrines which will harness their synergy. The hardware “bun fights” might just vanish.
Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) is former Chief of Naval Staff
. As the Jag pilot, I would keep really low around 250 ft and relatively fast - between 280 - 350 knots. In this regime, the Jag still has great turn performance, and it is flying low enough to prevent a climbing dogfight. As the Mig 29 or M2K driver, I would have to dive into a low flying plane, shoot from above and pull out of the turn before I crash. Both the Mig 29 and M2K have much better climb performance, which is what they would use in such a dogfight. However, if the Jag declines a climbing dogfight and sticks close to the ground, the Mig 29 and M2K are forced into attacking in a dive. The scary part here is being the target of a fighter that is attacking in a dive - usually you get shot down by the attacker. However, if the Jag pilot keeps his wits about, he can weave during the dive attack and the Mig can't get too close to it because it can't pull out in time from the dive. If the Mig chooses to chase the Jaguar at this altitude in a turning dogfight, it will likely get shot down. Never get involved in a turning dogfight with a fundamentally slower plane at low altitude. The Jag has lower wing loading than either the 29 or the M2K. That said, I'd still prefer to be the Mig or M2K pilot, since I still hold the advantage - dive attack, if you miss, climb, rinse and repeat. As long as I have patience, I may win if the Jag makes a mistake. At least, I won't lose since the Jag can't chase me.
