Raja Ram wrote:Gentle Rakshaks,
The "No-War Pact" buzzword is to be seen in the right context. The re-elected President of the USA is committed to get his troops back from Afghanistan. He however, has to ensure there are no chance of any regrouping on both sides of the Durand line to create a base from where an attack on the US mainland or Europe can be be organized. The US is not bothered about what happens to India from these jehadis. Period. The NATO allies also want to pack and leave. But overall none want to relinquish control. Rule by proxy establishments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan looks increasingly bleak unless they cut a deal. To cut a deal, Pakis have to be brought on board. The only difference this time, the carrot for Pakistan is allowing them to exist as a nation by providing just enough life line - economically and more than enough military hardware to deter India in the event, they want to finish the Pakistan problem for good.
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If at all there is one point agenda where all these needs converge it is in the continuation of the artificial entity called Pakistan. For that to happen, Pakistan should be seen to get something. Something substantial. As usual, when it comes to giving to Pakistan, it is always expected that India gives Pakistan something. At times, Indus water, at times a pipeline revenue, at times free power, and at times giving up territory, be it Siachen or Sir Creek.
That hinges on the "Two Myths" foundation. One there is a need for a stable and prosperous Pakistan, it is in India's interest and is vital for its ascension into great power status. Two there is no alternative but to talk and resolve all issues with Pakistan because it is our neighbour.
For this many a lemon will be sold - Aman ki Asha, Security Council Seat, No war pact, great economic investments, oil and energy, high technology.
Raja Ram ji, always a pleasure and an enlightening experience to read your "rambles"... I wish they came more often!
I do not disagree with anything you have said. But I'd like to raise an extension of your argument. You've very correctly pointed out that the US/West have no issue whatsoever with TSPA/ISI pointing the jihadi hose at India, as long as Islamabad can guarantee zero attacks on the West, once NATO leaves Afghanistan. However, I think the West has less reason than ever to expect Islamabad to deliver on such a guarantee.
Let us consider a situation where US/NATO pulls out in 2014. After that, TSPA/ISI starts up the J&K jihad, as well as nationwide Indian Mujahedin jihad again in full spate. US etc. will cluck their tongues and encourage India to "give more" to Pakistan in the interest of peace. In short it will be back to the 1990s (though perhaps a more bitter fight for India because the IM networks have penetrated deeply in many parts of the country.)
Yet, the very similarity to the 1990s begs the question: what happens next? Can Pakistan's jihadis be satiated with carte blanche to wage jihad against India? Unless India buckles before the assault... which we did not do during the 1990s... I think that's quite impossible. Of course we will lose lives, and of course there will be ill-effects to our economic development and so on; but the relative *advantage* of having a full-scale Paki jihadi pipeline turned on India is that it makes our electorate *less*, not more likely to tolerate any concession towards Pakistan. So, just as in the 1990s, we will stand firm, and we will kill the pigs in greater numbers than the rate at which they will be able to achieve any concrete result. The waves will dash against the sea-wall, break, recede, dash again... but the sea wall will remain standing.
Now we have to look at the effect of this on the Paki Jihadi establishment. After months and years of waging jihad against India with no concrete political benefit to show for it, they will be hard up for excuses when confronted by their "board of directors"... the Saudi, UAE, Qatari masters who finance their efforts and keep the Pakistani state itself alive through their largesse. The financiers will start demanding... "all that money we've given you, but there is no green flag over the red fort, and the Hindus still have Kashmir? What are you people doing? If you can't win in India, then at least fight the kaffirs elsewhere!"
Meanwhile the field leadership of jihadi organizations will start echoing similar thoughts. Continuously fighting and losing jihad in J&K will turn into a huge morale drain, and a recruitment catastrophe, if no victories can be claimed anywhere else. After all, it is hard to pretend that Allah is on your side if you never seem to achieve anything. The rank-and-file jihadis, too, will start clamouring to be sent against other regions of the world where "Islam is in danger"... and thanks to the recent, ongoing and emerging conflicts in West Asia there will be no dearth of opportunities.
This, too, is highly reminiscent of what happened with many AfPak jihadi groups, particularly the Deobandi ones, in the 1990s... India wasn't caving on J&K, and meanwhile the other "Islam in danger" zones, including West Asia, East Africa and the Balkans seemed to be greener pastures where at least some successes could be claimed against kaffirs. And that was at a time when the TSPA/ISI enjoyed high credibility with the pathan Jihadi groups thanks to their sponsorship of the Taliban! This time around, given the TSPA/ISI's recent history in AfPak, and the emergence of anti-Islamabad groups like TTP... the crisis point is likely to arrive much sooner.
This is the point at which the Pak Jihadi establishment (including TSPA and ISI) will find themselves unable to resist turning the jihadi hose back westwards. They will HAVE to begin operations against the West and Western interests once again because it will be absolutely necessary to justify their existence in the face of continuous, attritive failure against India. India will suffer no doubt, but I have no doubt she will stand firm in the 2014-plus era, just as she stood firm as a much weaker nation of the 1990-2001 era. That's all it will take; re-emergence of a Pakistan-based jihad against the West is absolutely inevitable.
I think the US realizes this. That is why, as you have said, the pressure is on India to give concessions to Pakistan ahead of time... especially on things like Siachen, "soft borders" and visas, that will make India even more vulnerable when the jihadi hose turns on us full spate after 2014. But even that won't change the inevitable. Once the jihad on India starts again in full strength, India will harden and refuse to give more, and the jihadis will find themselves taking losses while gaining nothing. The crisis point will come, in as few as three years after the US withdrawal... and then it's African Embassies, USS Cole, 9/11 part two.
India must prepare for the worst, not just in terms of defensive internal security measures against the coming jihad; but pro-actively, by cultivating lethal proxies in Afghanistan that will divert some of the jihadi attention to Pakistan's western border and also maximize the costs of jihad to the TSPA/ISI leadership. Then all we have to do is hang in there.
The only way we can lose this game is by playing Prithviraj Chauhan and showing what the jihadis can portray as "weakness" in political resolve; either now, or post 2014. This, by the way, is why ANY concrete concession to Pakistan on things like visas, J&K "soft-borders", and especially Siachen is absolutely unthinkable... such things will only maximize the pain that we are due to feel from 2014 onwards, and may end up accruing long-term strategic losses for us in their wake.