C-17 crash? We haven't lost one of those have we god forbid.JayS wrote:The IAF C17 crash also was blamed on human error IIRC, despite there were reports of substandard parts.Indranil wrote:Hakim, and more recently the involuntary popping chairs on our Sukhois.
But I have rarely seen any Indians come up in support of HAL when it came to the Dhruv accidents in Ecuador. Across the board - including people on BRF were blaming HAL. Funny isn't it - I mean our attitudes.JayS wrote: This what OEMs always try to do to save their own skin as their reputation in on the line and the modifications are expensive. Every time some accident is blamed on human error, I take it with pinch of salt.
OT post /Indranil wrote:Hakim, and more recently the involuntary popping chairs on our Sukhois.
Ahh..My bad. C130 It is. My memory is sketchy. But I do remember to have read some articles about the sub-standard parts for the plane already. Anyway.shiv wrote:C-17 crash? We haven't lost one of those have we god forbid.JayS wrote: The IAF C17 crash also was blamed on human error IIRC, despite there were reports of substandard parts.
We had a C-130 accident that was due to wind shear from wake penetration
True. In general, we (Indians) first bash our own and then ask what was wrong rather than first asking what was wrong and then bashing only if needed. If the thing that happened with HAL had happened with say Boeing, USG would have arm-twisted Ecuador govt into hushing up the matter, whereas GOI did zilch, even though they own HAL. In addition US PR machinery would have sprung into action pointing how Ecuadorians are pathetic users.shiv wrote:But I have rarely seen any Indians come up in support of HAL when it came to the Dhruv accidents in Ecuador. Across the board - including people on BRF were blaming HAL. Funny isn't it - I mean our attitudes.JayS wrote: This what OEMs always try to do to save their own skin as their reputation in on the line and the modifications are expensive. Every time some accident is blamed on human error, I take it with pinch of salt.
Why should they come to the defence of HAL hair ji...the urban middle class is in a blissful stupor and has little sense of national pride....the rest are too busy making ends meet....shiv wrote:But I have rarely seen any Indians come up in support of HAL when it came to the Dhruv accidents in Ecuador. Across the board - including people on BRF were blaming HAL. Funny isn't it - I mean our attitudes.JayS wrote: This what OEMs always try to do to save their own skin as their reputation in on the line and the modifications are expensive. Every time some accident is blamed on human error, I take it with pinch of salt.
The sub-standard parts story was associated with the first BAe Hawk crash - built at HAL from BAe parts IIRCJayS wrote:Ahh..My bad. C130 It is. My memory is sketchy. But I do remember to have read some articles about the sub-standard parts for the plane already. Anyway.shiv wrote: C-17 crash? We haven't lost one of those have we god forbid.
We had a C-130 accident that was due to wind shear from wake penetration
I distinctly remember the debate around this point of sub-standard/fake parts and so much so that even the final outcome was expected, that it will be pushed to human error to hush up the matter (Not to say there was no pilot error, I do not know, but a probability that there was not, and indeed such doubtful cases are there as already pointed out).shiv wrote:The sub-standard parts story was associated with the first BAe Hawk crash - built at HAL from BAe parts IIRCJayS wrote:
Ahh..My bad. C130 It is. My memory is sketchy. But I do remember to have read some articles about the sub-standard parts for the plane already. Anyway.
+1Manish_Sharma wrote:OT post /Indranil wrote:Hakim, and more recently the involuntary popping chairs on our Sukhois.
There are two words, in persian :
हाकिम = Hakim (means authoriatian)
हकीम = Hakeem (Doctor)
So Hakeem would be better to use.
He was (Group Captain Suranjan Das) the greatest supporter of the HF-24 Mk IR with reheated Orpheus engines. It had the prospect of being earlier and better than the Jaguar. Its performance was less than it would have been if the rear fuselage had not simply been enlarged by HAL to house the larger engines and their nozzles. The nice area rule of the original design had been vitiated badly. All the same, the performance of the aircraft was impressive. All it needed was to get the right avionics. According to me, the other design work should have been for the addition of a second hydraulic system, and of course streamlining the fuselage a lot better than the fat end.
I've always wondered whatever happened to this effort? And if the performance of the aircraft was better despite the area-rule being vitiated, why did we not see further development in this regard.Meanwhile, for the MkIR, and earlier MkIA, the aft fuselage had just been fattened to accommodate the larger diameter of the engines with reheat. The after body drag was very high. In a personal duel between HAL’s chief engine designer and Director GTRE, both accused each other of doing poor scientific work. HAL alleged that the engines were losing too much thrust in the installation while GTRE said the loss of performance was due to excessive drag resulting from the poor design of the after body. The project was in dire trouble and had been carrying on only because of the unwavering support of Groupie Das, His death killed the project.
for mentioning details about some development work done by GTRE, especially the GTX-37-14U engine. So, I went looking into this aspect and stumbled upon a book written by guess who? S N R Chaudhury 
- the person responsible for establishing and nurturing GTRE and under whose watch most of these developments happened.
It is a comment on competence of HAL to deliver result to its sole customer. It shows lack of faith of the customer in the OEM. To the extent that they would well do without the OEM involvement. It is no surprise that IAF wants to retain BRD to sort out as many issues as possible at their end and not go to HAL.nachiket wrote:<SNIP>Rohitvats, your comment on the excerpt is also interesting: "This is the kind of 'support' which IAF gets from HAL." From what I read, HAL never said they wouldn't fix the problem. The IAF decided that it would take too long so they came up with a solution to circumvent it. So how exactly did HAL not provide 'support'?
Even the author above confirms that Marut Mk-1R held great potential. But ended up going nowhere because HAL would not work to modify the tail section and restore area rule.Groupie Suranjan Das' crash was perhaps partially pilot error. He was the greatest supporter of the HF-24 Mk IR with reheated Orpheus engines. It had the prospect of being earlier and better than the Jaguar. Its performance was less than it would have been if the rear fuselage had not simply been enlarged by HAL to house the larger engines and their nozzles. The nice area rule of the original design had been vitiated badly. All the same, the performance of the aircraft was impressive. All it needed was to get the right avionics. According to me, the other design work should have been for the addition of a second hydraulic system, and of course streamlining the fuselage a lot better than the fat end.
While taxiing out to the take-off, Groupie Das used to keep the clam shell canopy unlocked and hold it up slightly to get some fresh air. There was no retaining lever. It seems that on the fateful day, he forgot to lock it prior to beginning the take-off run. The canopy opened during the ground roll. The hinges were too strong for it to fly off. Ejection through the canopy, as in all Maruts, would almost certainly have led to killing the pilot. Hence, the canopy had to be jettisoned. Ejection, till the canopy was not in the way, was prevented by a locking pin. This pin was pulled out by a lanyard which would be extracted during jettisoning of the canopy.
For Groupie Das, with the canopy already open, its jettisoning was no longer possible. Ejection was also impossible as the seat was not armed till the pin was pulled out. The drag from the canopy was large and the aircraft did not get airborne. There was a debatable possible failure of the reheat of one engine. In short Groupie Das had no options left and died in the crash.
Continuing on that. Chopie sir like Captain Bhargava was deputed to Egypt. Here is a picture of him after the first flight of the Marut with the modified engine.Indranil wrote:I feel Marut's were abandoned when they were finally starting to get it right. They had a few versions by then. Dr. Tank had left and the desis where ironing out the deficiencies.
More details here.He was on deputation from the IAF to Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Bangalore (HAL) form January 1961 to May 1966. During this period he was actively involved in prototype development of the Marut HF 24. He carried out the first flight of HF24 Mk 1A with Orpheus Engine Reheat. Marut HF 24 Mk 1BX was modified for fitment of the Egyptian E300 engine on the right side with normal Orpheus engine on the left. It was the first Marut with twin hydraulic systems with no manual reversion. The tail plane and elevator were split but both were hydraulically operated. It was initially flown in Bangalore with the Orpheus fitted on both sides. Chopie did the first flight. The aircraft was then sent to Egypt.
Chopie was deputed to the Egyptian Aero General Organisaton, Helwan for flight development of the E300 engine in June 1966. A HAL team of about 25 headed by Gp.Capt. C. S. Naik (Retired as Air Marshal) was also sent to maintain the aircraft. The first flight with E300 engine fitted was done on March 29, 1967. A total of about 180 flights were done with the E 300 engine on the right and Orpheus on the left. The project was closed in July 1969.
The IAF has every right to do as they wish. But using that particular incident to claim lack of support from HAL is wrong.rohitvats wrote:It is a comment on competence of HAL to deliver result to its sole customer. It shows lack of faith of the customer in the OEM. To the extent that they would well do without the OEM involvement. It is no surprise that IAF wants to retain BRD to sort out as many issues as possible at their end and not go to HAL.nachiket wrote:<SNIP>Rohitvats, your comment on the excerpt is also interesting: "This is the kind of 'support' which IAF gets from HAL." From what I read, HAL never said they wouldn't fix the problem. The IAF decided that it would take too long so they came up with a solution to circumvent it. So how exactly did HAL not provide 'support'?
I'm not attempting to arrive at a design solution here. I'm trying to show that Gp. Capt. Bhargava's understanding of the problem and of how material strength works is flawed. The canopy performed exactly how he wanted it to. If Das had designed it to fail at a higher stress level, it wouldn't have sheared off on a ground roll at 90 kt and some poor trainee would have probably lost his life when the ejection seat rocketed him into a closed canopy.rohitvats wrote:You're displaying exactly the same behavior as the designer(s). Before you made the above statement, do you think you exhausted all the options to answer the problem?
There was a fail safe - a canopy lock that would be engaged when the aircraft was parked. It was left unlocked on one of the aircraft, according to Bhargava's account.rohitvats wrote:And secondly, the problem seems to about the source of load leading to those pins shearing off. Could it have been possible to create a fail-safe mechanism? Something like arm the pins or lock the canopy movement when on ground? With lever/switch released when the pilot does his pre-flight safety checks?
This is a good point. The designers should have anticipated the problem and communicated an SOP to prevent its occurrence to the IAF.rohitvats wrote:One more thing - likely problem of pins shearing off due to other reasons that aircraft movement seems to have not even been communicated to the IAF. Something on the lines of HAL not telling IAF about 4-gun trials on Marut by them and issues faced.
Your assertion seems perfectly logical for someone looking at the situation in a holistic manner. But the problem is that our system is simply not set-up in this manner. 'Nation' seems to be an entity to be mentioned only in seminars and papers. On the ground reality is pretty divergent.Indranil wrote:Rohit, This lack of faith serves no one. The BRD (according to the last IAF chief) can design and build ab initio trainers better than HAL, but can't fix canopies of Kirans. Do you not see the fallacies. India currently does not have infrastructure, talent, and market for multiple institutions handling aeronautics problem.
The problem faced by ADA is a perfect example of how 'national importance' is only a buzz-word to be used at the right time. Otherwise, it is about individuals and individual entities and their own priorities.This was known earlier, and the reason why ADA was formed. While that looked like the only solution then, in hindsight we can all agree that this is not sustainable either.
In reply to above from ADA, CAG has this counter-argument:In reply, ADA stated (September 2014) that it had no authority/control on the working of work centres. ADA also admitted (October 2014) that the delay in development of WPs had affected the LCA programme schedule. ADA also stated (January 2015) that work packages/ project sanctions were continuously reviewed and monitored by ADA through participation in Project Review Committee (PRC) meetings. However, the priority accorded by these work centres was depending upon the production targets set by their management on which ADA had no authority.
The reply by ADA is the reality of our set-up while counter-reply by CAG assumes presence of an utopia where everyone works with same diligence on a project of NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.ADA’s contention that they had no authority/control on the working of the work centres is not tenable in audit as the LCA programme was being monitored by MoD and ADA had representation at all levels in the decision making of the Government. The work centres, majority of which were DRDO labs, PSUs and Government organizations, should have accorded due importance to the LCA development programme due to its national importance. As such, delays in completion of work packages which affected the LCA programme schedules indicates that coordination of efforts at various levels and monitoring of the programme by all the agencies involved, has not been as envisaged.
By the way, taking Capt. Bhargava's voice as the voice of IAF is also wrong.
As Group Captain Kapil Bhargava has already lamented, Group Captain Das was the only one holding together the development of HF-24 Mk1R with reheat engines. His position, and that of the aircraft, is not comparable to other test pilots and Tejas program. Remember that by 1970, two units of Marut Mk1 were already operational.As you know Marut went with the death of Groupie Das sir. What does it tell you? It is like saying Mao sir's, Suneet sir's, Ranga sir's, Tyagi sir's voice is the voice of IAF regarding LCA.
It seems there were multiple versions of Orpheus reheat engine.Also 884 is a Mk1A. Mk1Rs were 831 (first flight by Winco Inder Mohan Chopra (Chopie)) and possibly 832 and 833 (deputed to Egypt). I feel Marut's were abandoned when they were finally starting to get it right. They had a few versions by then. Dr. Tank had left and the desis where ironing out the deficiencies.
jays, he made the attitude because he and many others have got used to the caste stereotype against indians and we lazy as$ tribe that we are, let it slide, without explaining a counter POV. we've all done it.JayS wrote:Karan, while I do not counter your points, what I understood by that caste comment is that he was trying to point out tendency to look down at certain aspects of engineering once you become BTech or MTech or PhD, you feel those things to be beneath your level and not worthy of being done by yourself and in the process miss out of some crucial aspects of engineering - in particular the thing that he mentioned, drafting and how Indian engineers neglected drafting. I only took that point. And no I am not taking what he is saying at face value just because he is saying, but because it already confirms with my own observations through my own experiences and I have already pointed out precisely the same point elsewhere. Because of such attitude we are in a situation where we routinely see mechanical engineer who couldn't tell you which part is which in his automobile or SW engineer who understands zilch of computer HW or electronics engineer who don't understand basic electric circuit. This actually hampers one from becoming a more wholesome engineer and it shows up in his work
Interesting...looks like the IAF is hedging its bets. The ASRAAM with its high speed & range vs. the Python 5 with its high maneuverability. Perhaps the Jags will carry 1 of each if they're both being flight tested.Kartik wrote:
Jaguar with Python 5! Whatever happened to the ASRAAM deal with MBDA?
The Indian Navy’s professional decision not to induct the indigenous Tejas fighter aircraft has given armchair critics a new lease of life. Stand by for a lot of their ‘professional’ views against the Navy especially as the Indian Air Force (IAF) is now out of their cross hairs after its decision to induct 120 Tejas MK 1As — a decision which was born out of no other criterion but a professional assessment. It is time we become wise about how the defence forces go about buying aircraft and other equipment that cost millions of rupees per piece. There are operational pressures too which influence decision-making. In this misplaced assault of the ‘armchairists’, the case of the procurement of the Pilatus PC-7 Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA) by the IAF from Switzerland as against Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s indigenous HTT-40 stands out.
Procurement road map
Every procurement proposal has three basic constituents: the first is the Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR) of the item to be bought. The second is the ‘categorisation’ or the way the item is to be procured, and the last is the grant of ‘acceptance of necessity’ of the competent authority. Thereafter, the request for proposal (RFP) is floated to eligible firms to bid for the equipment. Thus the SQRs are the cornerstone of an acquisition proposal.
Qualitative Requirements are of two types, depending on the categorisation of the case. If the project is under the ‘Make’ (in India) category, since the equipment is being indigenously designed a Preliminary SQR (PSQR) is generated. For all other categorisations an Air SQR, NSQR (for the Navy) or GSQR (Army) is made. The reason lies in the basic dissimilarity between a ‘Make’ project and the other categorisations. Considering that indigenous design capability is not sufficiently developed, procurement rules permit an incremental approach in the ‘Make’ process till the fruition of the prototype. Thus, PSQRs are jointly framed by the IAF and the development agency, taking into account the operational capability required by the former and the designing capability of the latter. As development progresses, PSQRs are fine-tuned till the prototype takes shape and its performance meets the requirements of the PSQRs. The PSQRs are then converted to ASQR (or its equivalent for the other services) and frozen. Therefore, a PSQR is futuristic in character, because inherent in it is the element of technology that is still under development.
On the other hand, an ASQR resides more ‘in the present’ and is indicative of the technology that is on offer by arms manufacturing firms. In most cases, an ASQR is less demanding than a PSQR since the developing Indian entity (in a PSQR case) could be researching and designing a capability that foreign firms are unable to offer, either because they do not posses it or because their governments have not cleared its sale.
A case study
So, what transpired in the BTA project under which the Pilatus was procured? PSQRs were generated in early 2009 for the development of the HTT-40 basic trainer aircraft to replace the HAL-built HPT-32. These PSQRs were a joint effort of the IAF and HAL. However, in May 2009, following a number of crashes of the HPT-32, the aircraft was prematurely grounded by the IAF; this writer was part of the decision- making and recalls the enormity of the repercussions that weighed on everyone present. But there was no way out. The IAF’s training schedule was totally disrupted; HJT-16 Kiran intermediate trainers had to be withdrawn from the Surya Kiran aerobatic team and the Flying Instructors School to put in place an ad hoc basic training profile for rookie trainees. The flying syllabus was drastically curtailed to manage the available flying hours on the Kiran. A basic trainer had to be urgently bought from abroad to tide over the crisis and put the flying training profile back on track. With the HTT-40 nowhere on the horizon, ASQRs were generated to enable worldwide competition. These ASQRs may have been different than the PSQRs for the HTT-40 due the fact that an aircraft had to be found as soon as possible to train pilots for operational squadrons. Of the companies that responded to the RFP, six were shortlisted in the technical evaluation, of which three subsequently qualified in the flight evaluation. The Pilatus PC-7 emerged as the lowest bidder in the evaluation of commercial bids.
As has become the norm in defence procurements nearing fruition, there were insinuations that the ASQRs had been diluted in the selection of the Pilatus. Critics overlooked the fact that in any acquisition a group of IAF professionals, on whose training the country has spent a fortune, goes about the selection process diligently. In the event, the HTT-40 is still at least four years away from gaining operational status and for production to start. Meanwhile, the Pilatus has been going great guns for the past three years at the Air Force Academy, and the IAF’s training profile is back on track, converting rookie youngsters to operational pilots for frontline squadrons. These young pilots are guarding our skies day in and day out.
So, is it a dead end for development of a modern fighter in the country? Far from it as the technologies developed in the Tejas programme should come handy in the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme of the country. Meanwhile, one hopes that the Indian Navy’s non-acceptance of the Tejas is accepted as born out of an evaluation by specialists
I think those are Python-4. It's impossible to tell the difference, though.Kartik wrote:Jaguar with Python 5! Whatever happened to the ASRAAM deal with MBDA?
shiv wrote:Air Marshal (retd) Tyagi, former CAS arrested by CBI
good.Why use Persian/Arabic words for Dr. Sahib?'Hakim' is person of authority over an area.
'Hakeem' is the Doctor. We have been addressing Hakeem Shiv Saheb incorrectly.