Latest Chinese boast: should we shiver or die laughing?

[shiv]

1962 was indeed a fiasco and there was political failure contributing to military defeat apart from military bumbling by Kaul. Lack of acclimatization, cold weather clothing and logistics failures only added to poor tactics and bravado from the political brass. That aside the air force was never used in an era when we could have had solid air superiority. Humint was pretty much the only source of info - with no satellite or other photo recce and elint.

Even today war will never be easy for us - but imagining that it will be easy for the Chinese is also a mistake. The terrain and weather are too harsh to make things easy for anyone. Perhaps I exaggerate - but when a man gets life threatening altitude sickness at the Indian border, warmer temperatures and higher air pressures are just tens of km away. For a Chinese soldier - the nearest comfortable altitude may be 1000 km away. Managing these issues requires infrastructure and logistics issues that are an extra burden. I am sure the Chinese have put in all the extra effort and expenditure needed but it remains an uncomfortable logistical burden that can get worse in case of war.

[shiv]

https://www.google.ca/maps/place/Arunac ... 94.7277528

Weird. What is it?

[sanjaykumar]

Unfortunately I don't have access to isocontour lines. I am sure it can be layered onto google maps.

It does not seem to be the usual hairpin turns one finds in the mountains. There is a landing strip visible.

This might be a marshalling area which would accommodate hundreds of trucks to welcome the Chinese.

[ShauryaT]

By our metrics as long as China has an economy larger than ours we cannot win any war. If someone disagrees with this I would like to know why he disagrees in some detail because I am already equipped with a thousand arguments to prove that he is wrong.

This is a very important point and a great myth to bust. It is not that GDP is not important but there is only a limited equivalence of GDP to power and use of power. I think many do this false equivalence due to the result of the cold war but forget it was a "cold" war. There are many examples from history to show, it is not GDP that harnesses power but the other way around. Queen Elizabeth built her naval fleet, when queendom GDP was not the best in Europe, forget the world and could stave off the Spanish, eventually using the fleet to conquer the world. Bismark took a ragtag set of states, united Germany, fought wars and made Germany a pole of power in the midst of an economic depression to deal with. Mao was able to fight the much better funded Nationalist forces, occupied Tibet and Xinjiang, drew the US to a stalemate in Korea and taught a defeatist mentality led India a "lesson" all at GDP levels not very different from India's. Vietnam could stave off the Chinese for 100's of years, fought the French and then the Americans and finally kicked them out. Why, even the Taleban have not been "defeated" by the Americans.

Truth be told, we have not yet got a leadership that understand power, its uses. Many in our leadership have not fully thought through what war can be like, what will its opportunities and risks be. The little that some have, simply shudder and are not of the kshatriyas order (I do not mean this in the hereditary sense) but based on actions and the nature of these actions.

Anyways, a few points that came to my mind, but am sure there are many more.

[Atmavik]

Another thing to consider in the event of a Chinese attack is that the Pakis will jump in. They will not repeat the mistake made in 1962

How are you so sure?

Shiv ji,

we have heard this from many senior IA officers. i also do not doubt the same gents when they say we are prepared for a two front war. i said 'consider' as the discussion was moving to the time of year when the Chinese could attack and what that does to the Pakis planning. maybe i should have been more specific.

I have never been to Arunachal but have visited Ladhak. we took the manali-leh highway and before going showed my travel plans to my uncle's friend who spent most of his carrer in Ladhak working for BRO. he took a quick glance at my plan and asked with a smile 'is this your first trip to the Himalayas?' i had planned it by looking at google maps. he warned me about landslides closing the roads as it was the monsoon and sure enough it took a day and half to cross Rohtang pass and reach keylong. i was stuck for another day after crossing into ladhak because of landslides. met several BRO folks opening the roads. they had good TATA earth movers. i can only imagine monsoon in Arunacal wrecking greater havoc.is there a time of year that will suite both Pakis and the Chinese?

in 71 we chose December as the mountain passes along Indo-Tibet border are covered with snow and to avoid the monsoons in Bangladesh

[symontk]

I saw the same discussion in other forums but didnt participate since the information is quite incomplete, it hides more than it reveals

If the argument from China is taken for face value, it cannot be that they are attempting to drive across Himalayas, but they may be trying to get to NDEL from Pakistan. However whether it is practical or not, is something that Pakistan and China need to find out. But from India's stand point it cannot be overlooked

But when Chinese say "Indian capital" it need not mean NDEL but it can be any capital in India like Itanagar of Arunachal pradesh or even Simla of HP or Dehradun of Uttrakhand or even Leh of Ladakh region. It is these possibilities that need to be thought thru. For me those seems really achievable by a decent army like Chinese

So lets not miss wood for trees. They way it has been communicated suggests something is hidden in the message, usual chinese tactic

[sanjayc]

By our metrics as long as China has an economy larger than ours we cannot win any war. If someone disagrees with this I would like to know why he disagrees in some detail because I am already equipped with a thousand arguments to prove that he is wrong.

What was the GDP of India and Britain when the Raj began in India? It is like saying that a street goon cannot mug a rich man because the latter has more money. Wealth does not mean strength at all. it is the ability to inflict pain on the other that gives power. "Soft power" is a delusion.

[arshyam]

Not a guru by any means, but let me try.

At this point of time the biggest threat to India from a power equation perspective is not the LAC but CPEC that transgresses Indian territory. We need moves to disable it and make it very clear, we are willing to fight both Pakistan and China to bring that link down.

Yes, the CPEC is the biggest threat right now, and I think the Army chief's words on cold start are aimed precisely at that. Given that the CPEC has stayed "safe" in conventional Pakistan, i.e. the Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi axis, our job is much more easier - it is much closer to our border now. The revival of cold start (in public discourse, at least) months after a surgical strike in PoK is a signal to China.

However, that is still a defensive strategy, as PoK is our territory anyway and throwing out the Chinese and Pakis from there will only be a swachch Bharat op. It will not threaten China as an entity - that entity's locus of power is far to the east. We could and should have a mountain strike corps (or more than one) to take territory in Tibet, but even that will at best be retaking areas under traditional Indian sphere of influence and will cause only limited H&D loss to the Chinese govt (sure, it will help the Tibetans fight the Chinese govt again, but that's different issue).

My long winded point is, if the Chinese for reason have a real and credible reason to attack Delhi, our response should not be on the attacking forces only. Sure, we should do what we should to defend ourselves, but going on the offense will be the better option. And given my above reasons, offense on CPEC or Tibet is not really offense. We will have to take it to their so-called mainland by taking some action on Hainan, Hong Kong, Shenzen, Macau and points north - something that will expose their govt's insecurities about significant loss of face. Based on my understanding, the Chinese govt fears its own people more than anybody else, as the latter have no pressure release mechanism like our elections. Hence the periodic rattling of sabres to propitiate them in the face of any troubles (economy, etc.). We should exploit this where possible, and one of the options is to cause them enough damage that they cannot propagandize their way out of it.

Training Vietnamese forces on ops, joint ops with them and Japan are all good things we should continue to do. I would also advocate setting up (after due talks with the Vietnamese, of course) permanent air and naval bases there, so we have a staging area right under China's soft underbelly. I would suggest Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong and Hanoi to begin with. In the event of hostilities, we don't have to fly around Malacca straits to avoid neutral countries' airspaces, nor worry too much about the so-called islands China has been creating on the Indo-China sea. From Haiphong, we can seriously threaten Hainan, for starters (it's only 300km from Haiphong), and the economic engine of Hong Kong/Shenzhen/Macau/Guangzhou (750km from Haiphong). Sure, the Chinese will try to attack us there as well, but that in itself will be a victory for us - we can retaliate on their homeland and force them to back off.

While GoI has been fairly consistent with our Vietnam policy, I think we should take it to the next level and up the ante and air some talks on setting up bases in Vietnam. We can see how China downhill skis after that - all their bravado seems to come from a reassurance that we will only "defend" our home and hearth, hence their seemingly confident manoeuvers in the subcontinent.

One could use a chess analogy for the above: when the knights of the opponent are threatening your king, defend your king to an extent, but send a flank to threaten their king. A stalemate might result, but a stalemate is a loss for the offensive party, not the defensive one. Maybe some chess gurus can expound on this better.

The image below shows the places I am talking about, along with the distances. To the bottom is Cam Ranh Bay. Hainan is the island in the centre, location approximated to their naval base. Around Brahmos and Nirbhay ranges only. But serious H&D issues for China.

Sorry for the long post, wanted to make a small point but went longer than I expected.

[shiv]

The Ladakh and Aksai Chin areas would be the least productive areas for the Chinese to attack but are the best places for them to create diversionary movements to tie down Indian forces while Arunachal Pradesh can be their main thrust. For the Chinese the Aksai Chin -Ladakh regions offers the longest logistics lines and the most hostile terrain

On the other hand, north of Arunachal pradesh - the altitudes are much lower - as low as 900 meters in some river valleys. There are multiple infiltration routes for spl forces. There is a Chinese highway that is as close as 15 km from the border at its closest. There is also a Chinese runway at this spot - with an Indian helipad just 50 km away. There are plenty of good roads - although some are mountain roads to bring in forces and off to the East the closest air base is Chengdu - 700 km away. Lhasa is closer but less likely to allow heavy take-offs.

In the West - in Ladakh - Pakis can be an irritant - but expect the Chinese to present themselves in strength in the north east of India. That is where we need to establish overwhelming firepower. And maybe that is also why Agni I also causes Agony as well as Sukhois that bring Chengdu within reach

[chola]

Put away all these jibber-jabber and pseudo-intellectual mental gymnastic on logistics and terrain along the border.

You can sum up the possible force on force with Cheen in three simple truths:

1. Tibet is a shitty environment for basing military assets from humans to armor vehicles to aircraft. Therefore PRC forces facing India are limited,

2. The balance of geo-politics sees the wealthiest parts of China facing the most powerful of China's foes on the coast facing Taiwan therebye dictating that the PRC keep the vast majority of its military far to the east and as far away from the Indian border as you can get. Again, it means available forces facing India are extremely limited,

3. The PLA had not fought a war since its debacle in Vietnam circa 1978. It not even a second-rate military by experience and certainly not one willing to risk its parade army in a fight. The US fought in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan during those years. A major power that hasn't fought in four decades means one thing only -- it is a nation that relies on threats but avoids fights , it is in short not a military power. Full stop. Period.

Any dhoti shiverer pointing to 1962, should know that was another chini army, the one that had fought WWII, the Civil War and Korea and was not yet destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. It was an experienced force. That force was broken by the Cultural Revolution. By the time, it fought again in Vietnam, the PLA had an army -- prepare to laugh -- with no officers and no ranks. It was exposed as shit and the PLA assidiously avoided sending this shit army into war ever since.

The three points above means that there is low to no real threat from the PRC along the Indian border.

And it means, for whatever Indian leader with enough testicular fortitude to see this reality, everything we lost in 1962 -- land, prestige, confidence -- can be retrieve in one fell swoop with very little consequences against a third rate military power, especially if Trump is turning the screws on them in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait.

[shiv]

Unfortunately I don't have access to isocontour lines. I am sure it can be layered onto google maps.

It does not seem to be the usual hairpin turns one finds in the mountains. There is a landing strip visible.

This might be a marshalling area which would accommodate hundreds of trucks to welcome the Chinese.

I posted the coordinates on Google Earth. The landing strip is just 250 meters long and overlooks a sheer drop. It almost looks like a tourist area/military training area with a hang-gliding take off point

[shiv]

Therefore PRC forces facing India are limited,

Absolute rubbish

Not opposite Arunachal Pradesh which they claim as their own and have enough clout over American owned Google to make the latter dhoti shiver to mark Arunachal as "disputed'

[chola]

Therefore PRC forces facing India are limited,

Absolute rubbish

Not opposite Arunachal Pradesh which they claim as their own and have enough clout over American owned Google to make the latter dhoti shiver to mark Arunachal as "disputed'

Bullshit. Cheen is the largest internet and ecommerce market in the world. That is what made Google do what it did.

The PLA in Tibet is limited. The nearest armor division is in Hotan, Xinjiang. The nearest air base where their clones can take off with full load is in Szechuan. These are places that are as away from the Indian border as Chennai is from Delhi.

[chola]

Unfortunately I don't have access to isocontour lines. I am sure it can be layered onto google maps.

It does not seem to be the usual hairpin turns one finds in the mountains. There is a landing strip visible.

This might be a marshalling area which would accommodate hundreds of trucks to welcome the Chinese.

I posted the coordinates on Google Earth. The landing strip is just 250 meters long and overlooks a sheer drop. It almost looks like a tourist area/military training area with a hang-gliding take off point

Stop overthinking it, my man. You already know this. There are no great numbers of PLA in Tibet because the thin air of the high plateau does not support them. There are no great numbers of armor or aircraft because Tibet cannot support them. Beyond all this, the vast majority of their military must be concentrated on their east coast facing Taiwan and the US bases in Japan and South Korea.

And top of that, while Cheen is a major economic power on par with the US as a market, it is a military non-power that can't fight and had avoided war for four decades because it knows it can't fight.

[shiv]

Stop overthinking it, my man..

Not sure why you find the need to instruct me on what I should be doing. Every interaction between you and me ends up with you trying to instruct me to do something. I admit it is my fault for reading your post and responding and then stimulating your urge to give me instructions yet again

I repeat what I have told you before.
1. You have your views, I have mine. I can't help it if you find my views disagreeable
2. Your instructions to me are directed to a traditionally private place close to you that is dark, moist and warm, if malodorous

[shiv]

Cheen is the largest internet and ecommerce market in the world. That is what made Google do what it did.

Yes and it is an American company taking instructions from the Chinese. Interesting world for people who think the US is number one power and China number two

[chola]

Stop overthinking it, my man..

Not sure why you find the need to instruct me on what I should be doing. Every interaction between you and me ends up with you trying to instruct me to do something. I admit it is my fault for reading your post and responding and then stimulating your urge to give me instructions yet again

I repeat what I have told you before.
1. You have your views, I have mine. I can't help it if you find my views disagreeable
2. Your instructions to me are directed to a traditionally private place close to you that is dark, moist and warm, if malodorous

Lol. It is a fault of mine. I cannot control the urge to challenge and, aye, to instruct stuffy ivory tower types who attempt to make complicated simple ideas that can be explained in simple bulletpoints.

[chola]

Yes and it is an American company taking instructions from the Chinese. Interesting world for people who think the US is number one power and China number two

There were probably American companies taking instructions and orders from Iraq just before and during the invasion. Companies do what companies do.

None of that changes the fact that the PLA can't fight its way out of a paper bag, its biggest and bestest military formations are far away from India and Tibet is a shitty place to base military assets.

There is no real military threat on that border. There IS a great opportunity to right some wrongs and bring up the status of Bharat with very low risk. As you said, we just need to move away from that defensive mindset.

[rohitvats]

I posted the coordinates on Google Earth. The landing strip is just 250 meters long and overlooks a sheer drop. It almost looks like a tourist area/military training area with a hang-gliding take off point

Shiv - 3D view of the coordinates show that road coming down from north gradually rises up to the ridge level through those hair-pin bends. As for the flat area, please remember such areas at times have one way traffic and open area is air-marked to park trucks till traffic from one side clears up.

BTW - a little bit of internet search reveals that this point is called 'Baro Golai' - 12 necked point. In case you already don't do it, please use Wikimapi.Org in conjunction with Google Earth. Many curious souls put names and details on obscure places which are interest of eager--beavers like us.

[rohitvats]

On this two front war thing - during 2002 mobilization under Operation Parakram, IA had moved 2.5 divisions worth of troops from North-East and a whole Corps HQ to western theater.

3 Corps HQ went from Dimapur to Jammu-Pathankot sector. In addition, 57 Mountain Division (ex-3 Corps), 27 and 20 Mountain Divisions (ex-33 corps) were also shifted westward. And this was done by mid-2002 in summers when the passes were open along the India Tibet border. Only 4 Corps (Tezpur) with its three mountain divisions was left intact.

You can expect same thing to happen if there is threat of balloon going up on eastern theater. IA can shift anywhere between 3-5 divisions to China front.

[shiv]

There were probably American companies taking instructions and orders from Iraq just before and during the invasion. .

And the war is still on, still not won by number 1. Amazing that the most powerful number one nation is down to this level. And the number 2 nation is a paper tiger in your assessment.

No wonder allies like Pakistan and Noko are 3 and 4 with vicarious power and are thumbing their noses at their sponsors. But that does not help India much being below all these great military nations.

[shiv]

Shiv - 3D view of the coordinates show that road coming down from north gradually rises up to the ridge level through those hair-pin bends. As for the flat area, please remember such areas at times have one way traffic and open area is air-marked to park trucks till traffic from one side clears up.

That makes sense

[g.sarkar]

Regarding Chinese aggression or war: I am sure the old timers in the forum remember Brig. RayC, who used to write occasionally in BRF. I do remember him writing that a repeat of the 1962 conflict with China when India lost hopelessly was no longer possible. The Indian army had learnt the hard lessons from 1962 and corrected the deficiencies and prepared itself. I no longer remember why he was completely sanguine about this matter or what his arguments were. Can someone access his postings? Could Dr. Shiv help in this matter, as he collects information?
Gautam

[UlanBatori]

The trouble with being over-sensitive about 1962 is that one may make a brand-new set of boo-boos in 2017 or 2020 by guarding against 1962. Think of the logic and history of Le Maginot Line. A fab defense system - to never repeat the mistakes of 1914. Unfortunately, in 1914 the invading forces were frontal-attack infantry/artillery combos, whereas in 1939 it was a super-mobile armored corps.
Similar issue here. Mountain warfare in 2020 may be completely different from 1962 because of advances in UAVs, sno-mobiles, individual location/guidance using Gee Pee Ess, thermal clothing, hang-gliders, and fuel-air explosives and bio/chemical weapons. Much lighter automatic weapons. Autonomous combat aircraft.
Think about it as Gen. Wi Dong would:
1. Legion vely inhospitabre fol humans.
2. Elgo! Use Lobots! PeeAllSee vely vely good at mass ploduction of lobots, even wolkels al rike lobots!

So the invading and occupying force may be entirely, or like 95% robotic until complete land and air supeliolity estabrished. No amount of heroics by humans is going to matter a falt in a thundelstolm. So can they do it today? Probably not, but if they want to, they can get ready to do it by 2020. So can India for that matter - India needs robots far more because of the high terrain on the Indian side, and the need to traverse a long distance over the Tibetan Plateau to reach the Yangtse valley.

[ShauryaT]

^I would not go as far as robotics et al being the most dominant but supplemental certainly. Mobility, special forces, air lift and light armor action along with technology enhancements with communications and surveillance is certainly part of the mix. Hence my post above, we have a capability mismatch and that worries me.

[ShauryaT]

You can expect same thing to happen if there is threat of balloon going up on eastern theater. IA can shift anywhere between 3-5 divisions to China front.

Not the strike divisions though, which have the most heavy assets. These are optimized for plains warfare not the mountains.

[shiv]

Hell. Blow me down.

Someone posted on Twitter that he spent 30 minutes looking at a map of India and its neighbours and got new perspectives

I spent 6 hours doing that and got unexpected perspectives and piles also as value addition..

We have constantly heard how the Chinese have built metalled roads right up to the border and can move in heavy equipment in a pinch. But kick me if you can find a single road from Tibet at the Arunachal Pradesh border. Oh of course if you zoom out you see a great Chinese highway that is 5 millimetres from the border on the map. But zoom in and it is 100 km from the border I have not been able to find one single road capable of carrying heavy vehicles to pour into India at the border with Arunachal Pradesh. OK I still need to look at Sikkim. Bhutan, Nepal and Himachal and Uttrarakhand. But duh. Where are those roads? I have not been able to see them

[shiv]

Regarding Chinese aggression or war: I am sure the old timers in the forum remember Brig. RayC, who used to write occasionally in BRF. I do remember him writing that a repeat of the 1962 conflict with China when India lost hopelessly was no longer possible. The Indian army had learnt the hard lessons from 1962 and corrected the deficiencies and prepared itself. I no longer remember why he was completely sanguine about this matter or what his arguments were. Can someone access his postings? Could Dr. Shiv help in this matter, as he collects information?
Gautam

Gautam - there are about 4000 posts from RayC on this forum - you may be able to find the one you want using the forum search function - but it will take some work

Posts by RayC
search.php?author_id=6025&sr=posts

[Atmavik]

Regarding Chinese aggression or war: I am sure the old timers in the forum remember Brig. RayC, who used to write occasionally in BRF. I do remember him writing that a repeat of the 1962 conflict with China when India lost hopelessly was no longer possible. The Indian army had learnt the hard lessons from 1962 and corrected the deficiencies and prepared itself. I no longer remember why he was completely sanguine about this matter or what his arguments were. Can someone access his postings? Could Dr. Shiv help in this matter, as he collects information?
Gautam

Gautam - there are about 4000 posts from RayC on this forum - you may be able to find the one you want using the forum search function - but it will take some work

Posts by RayC
search.php?author_id=6025&sr=posts

found a post related to the siliguri corridor.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=3732&p=842176#p842176


Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Postby RayC » 20 Mar 2010 23:44

VinodTK wrote:
The great game with China, India

Only a strip of sixteen miles of intervening Indian territory at one point in Bangladesh's northern borders prevents Bangladesh from having a direct border with China. If during any physical conflict between India and China, any push through by Chinese forces across this sixteen miles strip of territory occur, such a development will lead to complete geographical isolation of the seven north-eastern Indian states with the rest of India. In that case, Indian forces would be able to reach the theater of conflict if only Bangladesh allows Indian forces to travel directly through Bangladesh territories.


To take that 16 miles strip, China has to come through the Dolam Plateau or go through Bhutan.

I would not like to state more, but then this is more of a thesis encouraged by mere map gazing and without knowledge of the operational situation!

[Atmavik]

http://www.cassindia.com/inner_page.php ... =diplomacy


Though China and Bhutan are neighbors, they have not yet established diplomatic ties. Bhutan abstained from forming ties with China after Beijing took control of Tibet in 1951. Tibet shared a border with Bhutan. China’s control sparked the rise of refugees from Tibet to Bhutan, following which Bhutan closed the border. In addition, relations between the neighbors also remained strained due to their border dispute. They share about a 470 kilometers long border and over 4,500 sq km of patches of land in the Western and Northern parts of Bhutan remains disputed.

There are seven regions where both Bhutan and China’s claims overlap. The most disputed amongst these is the Dolam plateau in Western Bhutan, adjoining Yadung province of Tibet Autonomous Region.

China rejects the current border, claiming that it should actually run eight kilometers deeper inside Bhutan. Bhutan cannot take any decision on the matter alone because the Chumbi valley in the Dolam plateau is where the strategic interests of China, Bhutan and India overl
If China’s claim is accepted, a tense game will unfold. China’s territorial demands could bring it 500 kilometers closer to India’s narrow but extremely vital Siliguri corridor, which connects the North-Eastern region with mainland India. In addition, Bhutan’s imports pass from this corridor from the Kolkata port.

It is important to understand the current scenario. According to the Indian military, Chinese movements can be monitored by Indian troops stationed in Sikkim. China’s infrastructure build-up in the region is also within the range of Indian artillery. Therefore, China’s move in the area is defensive in nature. By trying to shield itself, it wants to give a strategic angle to the Chumbi valley. Reportedly, China has already laid motorable tracks in the area.

The way China has gone about it is an insight into its strategy for expansion. China has border disputes with almost all its neighbors but it has been rather secretive in the case of Bhutan, to allow careful and secretive diplomacy between Beijing and Thimpu.

Earlier Bhutan’s foreign policy was mainly guided by India. But, Bhutan began border talks with China in 1972 and continued until 1984, after which China insisted on making talks free of Indian presence.

Within the next five years, China began exercising authority over the Chumbi Valley. During the tenth round of border talks, China offered to exchange 495 sq km worth of land in Northern Bhutan for a mere 269 sq km land area in the Dolam Plateau of Western Bhutan. Interestingly, later in 2007, the Bhutan government published a revised map of the country excluding the Kula Kangri Mountain, the tallest mountain peak, after having generously gifted it to China. However, even this didn’t please China for as long as China cannot have the Dolam plateau region ceded to it, it wouldn’t rest. In the same year, a treaty from 1949 that enabled India to guide Bhutan’s foreign policy was revised so that Bhutan didn’t have to seek India’s guidance anymore.

Although in 1998, they signed an agreement promising to ‘Maintain Peace and Tranquility on the Sino-Bhutan Border’, the fact that Bhutan and China have held twenty talks to resolve the border dispute and still not reached an solution is troublesome. Bhutan is vulnerable because if it fails to contain China’s claims, Bhutan could lose about 4,500 sq kms of its land. With Indian backing, Bhutan has been able to hold off Chinese advancements but India may not be able to do so in the future.

[svinayak]

Only a strip of sixteen miles of intervening Indian territory at one point in Bangladesh's northern borders prevents Bangladesh from having a direct border with China. If during any physical conflict between India and China, any push through by Chinese forces across this sixteen miles strip of territory occur, such a development will lead to complete geographical isolation of the seven north-eastern Indian states with the rest of India. In that case, Indian forces would be able to reach the theater of conflict if only Bangladesh allows Indian forces to travel directly through Bangladesh territories.


To take that 16 miles strip, China has to come through the Dolam Plateau or go through Bhutan.

I would not like to state more, but then this is more of a thesis encouraged by mere map gazing and without knowledge of the operational situation!

India has provision agreement with BD that it will use BD territory for transport and logistic in the event of war and threat to Indian territorial integrity.

such incorrect observation above should be flagged.

[svinayak]

The way China has gone about it is an insight into its strategy for expansion. China has border disputes with almost all its neighbors but it has been rather secretive in the case of Bhutan, to allow careful and secretive diplomacy between Beijing and Thimpu.

China's main aim is to assimilate all chinese race regions in the world.
This clearly shows that China was recognized by UK to make sure that it expands and reduces the geography of India (Tibet) and also reduces the influence of India. This long term strategy of the British empire to make sure India would not be the same as it is now needs to be understood

All the UK policy in Asia can be understood by the policy of all the Indian neighbors in the last 70 years.
Even though Indian population has increased from 400M to 1.25B in the last 40 years Indian influence has eroded

China policy on Tibet and India from 1949
Pakistan policy on India and Kashmir

SriLanks policy
Nepal policy

This is well coordinated global policy to make India small and less infleuntial

[g.sarkar]

Regarding Chinese aggression or war: I am sure the old timers in the forum remember Brig. RayC, who used to write occasionally in BRF. I do remember him writing that a repeat of the 1962 conflict with China when India lost hopelessly was no longer possible. The Indian army had learnt the hard lessons from 1962 and corrected the deficiencies and prepared itself. I no longer remember why he was completely sanguine about this matter or what his arguments were. Can someone access his postings? Could Dr. Shiv help in this matter, as he collects information?
Gautam

Gautam - there are about 4000 posts from RayC on this forum - you may be able to find the one you want using the forum search function - but it will take some work
Posts by RayC
search.php?author_id=6025&sr=posts

Thanks Dr. S. I did try once and just found two posts. I will use your link to find more.
Gautam

[shiv]

http://www.cassindia.com/inner_page.php ... =diplomacy

Thanks for posting this interesting piece because it speak of Bhutan. It is obviously the opinion of some "strategeric" expert. Unfortunately the article has several contradictions within it that makes it difficult to take its recommendations, although the points presented are informative.

On the one hand the author speaks of how Bhutan as a sovereign nation can have its own relations with China. On the other hand he says that Bhutan has managed to get on because of Indian support. It is inevitable that Bhutan will be under pressure from India if it succumbs to Chinese pressure.

Nevertheless thanks again for ferreting this out - it gives some valuable geographic pointers

[Singha]

northern bhutan is pretty much impassable - its mountaineering country not exactly a well developed place with roads and plateaus.

there is a epic 31 day snow man trek route therein ... one of the longest and hardest treks on earth .. very costly as well



now let me crawl back into my shack and shiver at the thought of hordes of these kamandus sweeping over bhutan down to new jalpaiguri



shiver you yindus shiver....

[nirav]

For all those shivering experts, 62 redux and all that...

Let the Chinese first try and come across army guys in the vid.

Dilli bahooot door hai saars.

[Atmavik]

http://www.cassindia.com/inner_page.php ... =diplomacy

China offered to exchange 495 sq km worth of land in Northern Bhutan for a mere 269 sq km land area in the Dolam Plateau of Western Bhutan.

This line made me look in google earth at the disputed area between Bhutan and China in Chumbi valley. looks like Bhutan has the ridge line that dominates the road going down from Nathu la towards the tibetean plateau.

[shiv]

Where are those roads? I have not been able to see them

Answering my own question.

At one point at the western tip of Arunachal Pradesh at the Bhutan border but inside China occupied Tibet - 20 km north of Tawang is a spot that was strange. There is a China map and Chinese lettering on the ground and some buildings, but two helipads with "H" marked on them. Only Indian helipads have H marked on them. Turns out that this is a "meeting spot" for India and China officials. It is very close to the Bum La pass. This is one area where
1. Good Chinese roads come right up to the border
2. China holds the heights on a plateau and India sits on the edge of that - with Tawang in the lower regions - 1500 meters below.

Geolocation: 27°46'2.91"N 91°53'33.96"E

[rohitvats]

On the Bhutan front, I remember reading this article - it shows IA keeps its ears and eyes open when it comes to Chinese as well.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/bhutan-t ... ront-line/

In late October, on the dirt road that winds north from the Bhutanese town of Paro in the direction of the border with Chinese-controlled Tibet, I pass an Indian army base of more than 600 soldiers. They are packing up to return to India for the duration of Bhutan’s harsh winter months. On the same road just after sunrise, I encounter an Indian Army squad of special forces soldiers with Himalayan features running in formation (Now, who could they be ), sandbags roped to their backs, with the squad’s commander shouting “No photos, sir!”

[kit]

On the Bhutan front, I remember reading this article - it shows IA keeps its ears and eyes open when it comes to Chinese as well.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/bhutan-t ... ront-line/

In late October, on the dirt road that winds north from the Bhutanese town of Paro in the direction of the border with Chinese-controlled Tibet, I pass an Indian army base of more than 600 soldiers. They are packing up to return to India for the duration of Bhutan’s harsh winter months. On the same road just after sunrise, I encounter an Indian Army squad of special forces soldiers with Himalayan features running in formation (Now, who could they be ), sandbags roped to their backs, with the squad’s commander shouting “No photos, sir!”

The IA can do its job well sir .. given the right political support they will fight the Chinese back to Beijing ..

Btw there is a psychology to a threat .. when China 's mouth piece threatened Delhi. .they were just scared .. very .. but ..modi is not done ..yet