Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion

[Marten]

To effectively deploy Arjun, it would be first necessary to strengthen the road/bridge infrastructure in the district/state of deployment, the railway network, repair and maintenance workshops, etc. Are we seeing any sight of that happening? Perhaps the Army realises that such investment in infra may not happen and therefore it would be unwise to ramp up on Arjun numbers.

Another thought may be purely defensive, as to how such an excellent infra can assist the enemy if they breakthrough.

Of course better infra will anyway be of value to civilian life, agriculture, industry etc. but that may not be the focus.

Was the DGMF sleep walking when it issued the GSQR then? Or did it expect the Arjun to also levitate during trials?!? Did they not know about the load rating for railways and roads? Let's see the real PhDs answer that.

Three years ago, before vanishing, I had shared a link from a railways enthusiast forum, and the clearances from pole to tracks plus the extent to which an Arjun would overhang, with and without skirts (which were removed during transport to minimize damage),. Nor did anyone talk about how clearances are not reliable le because poles are not consistently laid (distance from pole to tracks) . I didn't see anyone else either post these numbers or actually contradict them before harrumphing about the low quality of posts and criticism of IA going too far.

Let's assume DRDO/CVRDE are as clueless as IA/DGMF has been saying/trying to prove. What stopped the same brilliant lot from identifying these issues earlier and simply asking for FMBT to be developed earlier (we already know that the Bhim track also was derailed, yes?). So, I admit my lack of knowledge. Request those harrumphing to post the Road rating and bridge rating maps to share their inputs on the distribution and current upgrade plans.

Indian Bridge Management System was launched last year and will be the primary source for load rating of bridges and roads... Without this information and the clearances of overhanging tank sides, no point cribbing about logistical issues regarding Arjun. This is now 80% complete and will be completed by December. Master plans will be released by next March. There will be no excuse for lack of information and bad infra then.

Here are a few relevant links:
clicky
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... 8758/lite/
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease. ... lid=151406
PS: Ramana sir, sorry about the comparison of maintenance information etc. This is someone who reports to our CEO and now knows my support for the Arjun. I can't treat him like a regular chaiwala. Shall ask him instead for links to folks who are in a position to share this info.

[ramana]

What is a 1200-1500 bhp modular engine mentioned in the Hindustan Times article?

Add two more cylinders?

Marten sure.

I think we should do a bridge mapping exercise for TSP, Gagan would you want to show the ropes?

Eg we do TSP province by province: POK, Pakjab, Sindh and Baluch.
Use the template of the IBMS that Gadkari articles give.
Location, picture, load capacity etc.

And even CPEC roads!

[ramana]

Marten wrote:

Was the DGMF sleep walking when it issued the GSQR then? Or did it expect the Arjun to also levitate during trials?!? Did they not know about the load rating for railways and roads? Let's see the real PhDs answer that.

Marten read the Military review article linked by Mihir. It shows how tank design effects warfare.
Especially read the part about the M4 Sherman vs. The German Tiger tanks. Where the Sherman was superior and where the Tiger was superior and the drawbacks of both.

I think the IA armored corps drew up the requirements based on their own experience and projected arms supply to TSP.
Lets talk experience.
IA experience is mostly with attrition warfare using British designed tanks in 1965 war and 1971 and maneuver warfare using Soviet light tanks in 1971 Bangla Desh. The AMX-13 tanks were death traps with their light armor and total weight of 15 tons. The tank gun was good and used to up-gun the old Shermans which were adequate during Asal Uttar.

We studied Asal Uttar but not Chawinda and Phillora both in 1965. Here the tank on tank warfare was harsh with many Centurions lost. I don't know the number but will read-up.
The other experience is the maneuver warfare in East Pakistan with PT-76s etc. this showed the need for a light tank in quantity.

If we note T-55s were up-gunned with the 105mm L7 gun which was used on Vijayanta.

Suddenly the game changed in late 70s. The Afghan jihad started and the talk was TSP would get M1 Abrams.
The TSP was supposed to get the US M1 Abrams as part of Afghan jihad support baksheesh.

The M1 Abrams design was revised to include the lesson learned from Asal Uttar is what I am inferring: large caliber gun, weight and use the new composite armor.

Now the answer for a heavy tank is a heavy tank.

Looking around there were the UK Chieftain, French Leclerc, and the German Leopard tanks.

Now all cost arm and leg and the Avadi tank factory was soon to become idle as the Vijayanta run was getting over.

In comes DRDO to propose the Arjun with parts from Germany and Leopard like characteristics. The GQSR are made with that in mind.

Meantime I think there was a rethink on how to respond to TSP attack. The race to Indus in numbers was the preferred option. May be this was mid 1980s.

Here the IA went back for speed with a decent, inexpensive tank, large caliber gun and what was available was the Soviet T-series.

When this doctrine changed the Arjun requirements were not changed. And Arjun is long time in coming. Mostly prototype numbers.
I don't know why and would be speculation.

Maybe they could have proposed a new version of the Vijayanta type vehicle with a 120 mm gun.

T-90S is also welded turret. Don't know what prevented such a tank.

Maybe Vijayanta was dud as most British tanks during the WWII?

[negi]

Light vs Heavy is again a mindset issue ; you know some people claim using a thumb draw for shooting a bow is better then some believe the three finger technique is better sorry for digressing but that is what I am watching these days on youtube

Coming back to topic you know the best tank out there is the tank which you can count on in terms of being available ; lower silhouette, boxy turret versus angular one , auto-loader versus manual and 5% heavier or lighter won't matter and no I am not saying this because I believe in it I am saying that because that is what exactly Americans did when they chose Abrams over the Leopard back in the day when Americans were building their own tank ; they stuck to their own program even though Germans were offering a much better platform in every respect (Abrams to this day uses a gun that is based on the German design) . Abrams even to this day is powered by GT engines that guzzle fuel at a rate which will make it too expensive to operate for a country like ours however today it makes the top 5 tanks list .

This stupid argument about Arjun being wider and hence won't fit the wagons or flat beds for transportation and might be heavy for our bridges is absolute BS ; fact is most of our bridges date back to the British era in 70 years of independence we have done squat in this department however somehow we are to believe that these old bridges made by the British can somehow support the weight of a T-90 but will fail to support an Arjun , now coming to wagons or flat bed problem I mean whoever makes this argument is literally clutching on his paijama's nada I mean we are talking about a piece of machinery which not only costs crores per unit but is critical to our nation's security in the long term , are we to decide on future of a MBT platform based on our wagons/flat-beds which transport these tanks ? For fck's sake it is a flat platform with some wheels under it what does it take to build a new one around Arjun ?

Majority of the standard track gauge in Massa is 4ft 8 inches or so in India most of our tracks are broad gauge 5ft 6 inches (thanks to British they didn't screw up here unlike the case of bridges) ; if Americans can transport a M1 Abrams on their rail network what stops us from making wagons to transport an Arjun ?

[Mihir]

Negi, the Abrams makes it to Top 5 lists on the web, but so does the T-90. That says nothing about it's ability to fight within a given system. The Abrams works for the Americans because they can support its logistical footprint. Even then, they ran into cost and performance issues in deploying them long-term in Iraq. Armoured units were dismounted and sent on patrols in Humvees because (a) there was a severe shortage of infantry and (b) sending out Abrams simply cost too much.

Think of that in an Indian context. What happens if we cannot transport sufficient arty/infantry/IFVs to the theatre because supply lines were tasked with ferrying Arjun tanks or spare parts? Conversely, what happens if the Army is unable to transport enough heavy MBTs to the field because of the logistics penalty?

Costs matter. Logistics matter. You make light of arguments that an MBT design ought to take into consideration the state of existing transport infrastructure, but these are real things that staff planners worry about. I wish I had Chacko's old articles to post, but he explained the details rather well. From what I remember (as well as from what others have said), the width and height of the Arjun make rail transport a major problem. The wider tracks run the risk of colliding with railway station platforms; the turret does the same with signalling equipment. Therefore, it cannot transit through many cities. That shrinks the number of routes it can be carried on, limiting strategic mobility. Even in cases where transportation is possible, the Army has to obtain Over Dimensional Clearance from Indian Railways. The price for transporting ODC consignments is 1.5 times that of regular consignments, so there was a straight-up increase in transportation costs.

In peace time, these problems can be dealt with. But in war, when the enemy starts targeting this infrastructure and every route is overloaded with supplies, it would be a major headache.

[Marten]

Mihir, let me not call the width a bogus issue but please look up buffer height adjustment and let us know if the issue persists. If possible, please also look up rolling stock heights for Indian railways. The turret hitting signal posts is impossible to my understanding. I shall post these links tomorrow.

Regarding the weight, what different logistical issues are expected between a 50-56ton unit and a 60-65ton unit? I just don't get it. For an army that moves literally thousands of tons each day, why would these additional 10 tons per unit be a pain?
Finally, I'm sure you know there is a specific carriage that enables Arjun or any other future Heavy MBT to be carried. There is no report of any interference or collisions with existing infrastructure. Earlier issues were with poles that were incorrectly positioned, with lesser clearances. These arguments are still quite flimsy.

[Gyan]

Centurion was 56 tons and Arjun Mark-1 was/is 58 tons.

[Mihir]

Marten, interesting points in both of your posts. I'm regurgitating second-hand info (mostly) and studies/results from a different age, so I'm not as knowledgeable as I appear, and certainly in no position to rebut it

But I definitely need to revisit some of my earlier arguments now.

In the meanwhile, this is being discussed on Twitter as well. A retired serviceman has some interesting insights to offer, much in line with what you are saying. See here: https://twitter.com/Sunnydee1981/status ... 6352382978

[vnms]

If transportation is an impediment during wartime, why don't we move the regiments to the forward areas during peacetime and base them there instead. That should take care of the issue.

I wonder what the new doctrine would be if US chooses to donate a few Abrams to the pakis..

Regarding the Sherman vs Tiger, one thing that gets forgotten is the fact that US built approximately 40k Sherman M4s. Germans built around 9k. If you throw in the soviet tanks, the way ratio of tigers to others was around 1:8 or so. Quantity has its own quality. I do not see pakis being able to field t-80s at that level. Given this scenario, Arjun is a better bet.

[nam]

Here is my 2 cents.

Arjun requires 25% more manpower for the same capability compared to T 72/90. There are advantages, but cannot change this fact.

Crew from T-72 will have the least learning curve to jump on to T-90. We have 2000 of T72. Going bulk in to Arjun would require major retraining effort... and cost. Thousands of trained crew in a inferior tank versus half trainer crews in superior tank? Which one would you pick

Logistics. Need to maintain two logistics lines. T Series crew need to be trained on managing say the German engine versus the Russian ones. T72 & T-90 have commonality. Major advantage, which Arjun just cannot beat.

The only source of Arjun. OFB. The only source of Arjun ammo: OFB .In an emergency, we can get the tanks from Russia, ammo from Israel & Russia for T 72/90. Tank commanders would prefer to stand in front of the tank cannon than trust OFB to deliver. We are always a week away from war with Pakis.

OFB produces Arjun at the best 50 tanks/year. Adding 1k tanks will take 20 years!

[ramana]

Kind of final words isn't it?
So what are the plans for future Arjun production?

[V_Raman]

@nam - if these are the reasons - why did we design/produce Arjun in the first place?! IA would have signed-off on the GSQRs right?!

[ParGha]

I believe some here (Rohit Vats?) proposed issuing the Arjun to holding corps in the desert. There aren't many bridges or culverts to traverse in the sector, and the Arjun's low ground pressure would open up many new axes for exploitation. And because it wouldn't be penetrating very far into enemy territory, reliability wouldn't be a huge issue. It would be at a reasonable distance from workshops and repair facilities. IMO, that's not a bad idea at all. It would be inefficient in terms of logistics, but that's a fair price to pay for inducting a domestically designed and developed system into service.

The desert sector is one area where there is operational opportunity for in-depth penetration, and strategic opportunity for exploitation (Jiyo Sind!) Arjun is better suited for North Punjab / Jammu sector, where neither side can afford to lose an inch of land because of the political sensitivity of the area. It will be tank-on-tank slugfest, and the heavier and hard-hitting brawlers stand the best chance of survival.

[Yagnasri]

We are going in circles on Arjun in our arguments. Just like LCA. Pity.

[niran]

The desert sector is one area where there is operational opportunity for in-depth penetration, and strategic opportunity for exploitation (Jiyo Sind!) Arjun is better suited for North Punjab / Jammu sector, where neither side can afford to lose an inch of land because of the political sensitivity of the area. It will be tank-on-tank slugfest, and the heavier able to absorb hits and hard-hitting brawlers stand the best chance of survival.

there, edited tte mistakes

[uddu]

@nam That 25 percent look huge when we are talking about such a tiny number of 3 and 4. Now tell me how much of this extra manpower we add if we induct 1600 tanks? 1600 more people? How much a percent is that of the total Indian Army?

Have you watched the video of Arjun that came on Discovery channel. It clearly mentions that crew picked up and trained on a simulator for very less time were able to perform amazingly and the Army top brass were astonished at the accuracy achieved by the crew. Now how much you try..even train the T-72 crew for years..what's that 16 years 20 years..you will never get Arjun's accuracy.

What commonality are you talking about..When We must have replaced the T-72's with Arjun. Imagine 3000 Arjun's of T-55, T-72, T-90, what next T-100? How much commonality is between these T variants.

OFB can produce 200 tanks a year if there is order given for 2000. And all that OFB ammo etc are outright foolish..I think OFB do better than the Russian Ammo which each year CAG points out in their reports to be faulty and need repairs and help from Russia. Field a fleet of 1600 Arjun's and see Israel make ammunition for that too.

[niran]

Here is my 2 cents.



1.Crew from T-72 will have the least learning curve to jump on to T-90. We have 2000 of T72. Going bulk in to Arjun would require major retraining effort... and cost. Thousands of trained crew in a inferior tank versus half trainer crews in superior tank? Which one would you pick

2.Logistics. Need to maintain two logistics lines. T Series crew need to be trained on managing say the German engine versus the Russian ones. T72 & T-90 have commonality. Major advantage, which Arjun just cannot beat.

3.The only source of Arjun. OFB. The only source of Arjun ammo: OFB .In an emergency, we can get the tanks from Russia, ammo from Israel & Russia for T 72/90. Tank commanders would prefer to stand in front of the tank cannon than trust OFB to deliver. We are always a week away from war with Pakis.

4.OFB produces Arjun at the best 50 tanks/year. Adding 1k tanks will take 20 years!

1. wrong T72 and T90 are as different as an apple and orange, the onlee common factor is the letter "T" in their names rest is different. hence the same length of conversion training from T72 to Arjun or T90.
2. Since Ramana guru and myself takes "Battle of Asal Uttar" as baseline therefore in that battle IA had, AMX13t(French), Shermons(Americans), Centurians(Britshits) along with jeep mounted Recoilless rifles, Pukes had 1 Tank Patton. so much for single supply lines, the thing is t is the men operating the machine which is important and this A is heavy T is light is bunkum so what a winner plays to their strength all tanks have strengths and weakness, a wise IA tankist will play to his Arjun MBT strength that is accurate rapid (4-5 seconds reload time) fire and will absorb punishments metted out to it.
3. please peruse point 2 above
4. agree production rate should be 50 tanks per week and not per year

[negi]

Mihir I do not want to argue for the sake of it we all have read chackos articles they are opinions he can have his I will have mine ; logistics are important who is denying that ? The bluff which I am calling out about logistics is it can never precede a new weapons platform it has never been the case unless one wants be stuck where one is ; one can then use logistics argument to always standardise on the venerable SLR why issue a RFP for a completely new rifle ? Of all the militaries in the world India is the last one that can clutch at this argument look at the IAF which aircraft acquisition was done with logistics in mind ? Even when second follow on order of M2K was to happen we bought the fulcrum , we operate the most diverse fighter AC fleet out there . Coming to the army we have operated tanks of various makes from various countries in the past just because we have a couple of thousand T72s does not mean we have a good logistics backup for the T-90 it is not as if their spare parts are interchangeable ; yes they can share the same wagon or flat bed but are we going to decide on a future MBT based on our transportation means ? Those 100 or so Arjuna have been ferried by rail that logistics is far more easier to scale than being stuck with multiple tank platforms whose critical components need to be imported ; most importantly if we look at the long term we can need to start looking at replacing Arjun's imported content in phases but that won't happen unless we induct it in numbers . Of course this is an opinion but that is the difference between those who can field their own tank versus those who will wait out for all things to fall in place before take that step ; American example is apt not because of what Abrams is today it is apt because until Abrams Americans always fielded a light-medium tank and more importantly they had an option to go for the Leo which was much more evolved and widely supported platform in the EU they did not get hung upon some stupid ppt talk around economy of scale or excuse of having to build a logistics chain ground up before going full steam behind the Abrams .

[negi]

Amazing arguments people talking about having to employ additional manpower on Arjun ; guys we have world's second largest army as for learning curve that is a laugh worthy argument by that logic IAF should stick to Mig-21s and Mi-8 only the infantry should stick to SLRs and the navy shouldn't even field nuclear subs something could go wrong there you see .

[Rahul M]

negi janab, line breaks. puhleeze !

[Mihir]

Negi, I don’t think you read my post. If you weren’t denying that logistics were important, what was all that rubbish about a wagon being a mere “platform with some wheels” or heavy Arjuns being unable to traverse bridges and culverts in aid of? Logistics are the number one driver of acquisitions. Sometimes, you can afford to make the investments necessary to procure equipment with a heavier logistical footprint – either to maintain adequate defensive power against a powerful adversary or to overmatch him. Other times, it’s not worth it. Given the constraints the Arjun’s heavier logistical footprint imposes on the Army, it is clearly not interested; medium weight tanks are considered good enough to do the job at hand. The “Tank Versus Tank” article is important to understanding why this might be the case.

Also, Chacko explained in a good bit of detail how the Arjuns were transported to Punjab and Rajasthan. Those weren’t his “opinions”; they were facts based on his own research. But feel free to dismiss those as well...

most importantly if we look at the long term we can need to start looking at replacing Arjun's imported content in phases but that won't happen unless we induct it in numbers .

I agree, and that is the argument that should be made to buy 500+ Arjun, not it’s supposed superiority over the T-90. I said so myself on the last page.


ParGha, are in-depth penetrations even being considered anymore? Pakistan’s nuclear sabre-rattling put paid to any such ideas in 2002. Cold Start is all about salami slicing Pakistan and using those gains as bargaining chips in post-war negotiations. Even that strategy might not work out for very long after the introduction of the Nasr into the theatre.

[negi]

negi janab, line breaks. puhleeze !

Sorry man small phone

[Marten]

Just a few points:
Overhang: Going by the width of the BFAT (355cm), the Arjun must hang over the sides about 6 inches on both sides. However, in the following video, it does not appear to overhang.

Load: Note the capacity specified on the bogie itself is 75 Tons! Some rail bogies can be loaded up to 100t inc tolerances. BFAT bogies were developed specifically for MBTs including Arjun (in use since 2006/7?). If IR is using any such freight wagons on any route, that route can also haul Arjuns. I won't substantiate this because anyone is free to go check on IRFCA or refer RDSO reports.
BEML spec sheet for the BFAT

Here is the BFAT for your viewing pleasure:


Check the overhang and the Turrets here:


The best way to verify tolerances and issues related to signal posts etc. would be from an RDSO report. vsunder sir or sachin sir can perhaps help because I am unable to find one online.

Mihir, your points are fair enough and I am not informed enough to place an effective counter to several of the old hearsay accusations that we have been reading over the years. However, the plain questions would be:
1. Was the GSQR written by DGMF without knowledge of current logistics of own armoured units?
2. Were they written in isolation of other operational and logistical considerations? What other considerations applied? AFAIK, we have several superbly capable officers but no papers on design philosophy that would guide the scientific community. There is no joint think-tank that could be headed by a Lt Gen and guiding the DRDO as to where the IA sees its tank doctrine evolve over the next 20-25 years.

Like Ramana sir said, some of the opposition would have made sense until the AUCRT after which you see the logic go completely awry. You can also see staunch resistance from a few of the retd Armoured corps senior officers on Twitter even though their own units never operated the Arjun.

Change is difficult. No one doubts the IA's capabilities and expertise in the matter of war and war-making equipment. All we are trying to say is are a few dogmatic folks refusing to allow indigenous manufacturing from taking root? If Avadi is the real problem, all of our tanks would anyways be lower in both quality and operational efficiency. Lt Gen Panag clearly says drop of 25-30% efficiency. Is the source of this drop at Avadi or within the units themselves? We need a solution for the dependence on imports. Let's just say replace OFB so Ammo need not be imported at critical junctures, and let's find a way to use the Arjun expertise while it is still available to build the machine that we need 15 years from now!
PS: No more from me on this topic. Else, more harrumphing will ensue from the PhDs and really knowledgeable folks.

[negi]

Mihir I did read your post you want to believe that acquisitions are driven by logistics knowing how acquisitions are done in forces I know that logistics are never given so much of a thought I did post about that look at our inventory anyone knowing about logistics would know we have probably most diverse fleet of AC , submarines , munitions and even tanks .

Arjun having difficulties with transportation should not come as a surprise , just like Tejas being difficult to mass produce as compared to say a Jaguar simply because materials are different and more importantly with imports we get the assembly line from OEM. Not building new because of existing infrastructure is a lame excuse .

The small diameter bomb had to be conceived for the raptors and lightening , they both were made not around existing logistics because tha would put undesirable design constraints on these platforms . I have shown by quoting all our acquisitions how logistics aspect did not even figure there but somehow for Arjun we wish to give it much higher weightage . Look at the rifles which we operate with we have AKs , Tavor, Insas I am not including carbines and SMGs there is no logistics commonality between them . Even the side arms are not a standard . Our artillery is again very diverse with Russian , Swedish and Indian guns and with M777 add Americans into the mix . Someone wants to talk logistics please do but then use the same yardstick everywhere .

For sake of the debate let us concede to the argument that Arjun has a logistics disadvantage compared to the T-90 but the issue remains the same which one is easier to overcome ? Enhancing logistics chain to support Arjun or Enhacing the platform to perform better ? That should be a no brainer . Cost of building new wagons or flat beds to transport Arjun is not as much as enhacing the T-90 fleet ; further T-90 is not some eternal tank tomorrow will we use the same logistics fig to buy a t-90+ ?

[nam]

1. wrong T72 and T90 are as different as an apple and orange, the onlee common factor is the letter "T" in their names rest is different. hence the same length of conversion training from T72 to Arjun or T90.

Ofcourse I could be wrong. Those are my opinions anyway. Have no clue what IA actually thinks. Training would not involve only able to fire rounds. One has Russian parts which IA crew would be familiar with and another has Germany & Indian parts, which they will be dealing for the first time.

On the topic of using multiple types in 65, may be we didn't have a choice. May be IA now wants to reduce the number of type to reduce log train. Given a choice, even IAF would like to reduce the types. Given that arms buying is political most of the time, I don't know if there ever be a solution of the number of types we operate.
One of the other lessons from Asal Uttar is how Pakis had brand new American tanks and did not know how to use it. So we definitely don't want to send in half trained troops.

From the IA command point of view, just like a typical corporate bosses, they deal with budgets and priority. They probably don't care if it the cannon is rifled or smooth, 125mm or 120mm.. They probably will leave this to Majors and Colonels.

In the 90s when Pakis bought T80, getting a improved tank was a priority. It was critical and IA did not want to divert it's budget in Arjun which was not ready. Now adding a new tank is not a priority over say attack helicopters. There will be arguments like cheaper to have a APS on T90 if Arjun gives better protection etc etc. Hence the wild goose chase with Arjun. After all it is about money.

My personal opinion, this has to be a strategic decision by MoD. Which means it provides the money to roll out a Indian solution over a Russian one. And IA does the plan to do this without effecting operational effectiveness. Typical system migration in the corporate world.

Hopefully we will have in FRCA what IA wants, build by private players and MoD money.

[nam]

The silver lining in the whole Arjun saga, with IA asking for all bells and whistles and numerous trials. We are a nation which can now design and produce a very capable armour solution.

We sort off nearly managed to catch the goose in this wild goose chase!

Just need to have a future vision and apply this with FRCA.

[tsarkar]

Mihir I did read your post you want to believe that acquisitions are driven by logistics knowing how acquisitions are done in forces I know that logistics are never given so much of a thought I did post about that look at our inventory anyone knowing about logistics would know we have probably most diverse fleet of AC , submarines , munitions and even tanks .

Logistics - and infrastructure - are important - the IAF wanted Mirage 2000-5 in mid-90s instead of Su-30MKI because they would fit in existing airfield infrastructure. The Su-30MKI is as large as an An-32 transport, and required the MAFI (Modernization of Air Field Infrastructure) project that cost more than the aircraft itself. Not just shelters and runways, but long range navigation aids were also required.

The Shin Maywa amphibious planes are required for long range SAR for overwater flights - that no helicopter has range to cover. Japanese seaplanes provide SAR for US flights from Hawaii to Japan over the Pacific. Historically submarines and destroyers were stationed en-route on plane guard duties during trans-pacific flights.

There are numerous reports of Su-30 parked & maintained in the open leading to higher than usual material deterioration because hangers and pens designed for smaller MiG series & Jaguar/Mirage 2000 could not accommodate them.

Same for INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant, that required Project Seabird at Karwar to accommodate as well as NSRY set up at Karwar with shiplift to maintain accompanying ships like Project 15A, B,

IN nuclear submarines require Project Varsha at Rambili to accommodate.

Project Seabird costs more than INS Vikrant & Vikramaditya. Same for Project Varsha costing more than INS Arihant.

[negi]

^Thank you for vindicating what I have been saying I.e logistics are important however they never came in way of procuring an asset ; in fact correct me if I am wrong but even before the MKI we were supposed to get more M2Ks much earlier but instead we bought the fulcrum .

Regarding costs you have chosen examples of seabird being expensive I have been there yes it is expensive but look at the facility compare that with Vizag and Ports in Mumbai it is bigger and entire suooort infrastructure be it accommodation for officers and men is at another level so yes it is expensive but why compare that with cost of Vikramaditya ? seabird is not meant to only house Vikramaditya it will house all our future carriers . Let me actually give examples of how logistics took a back seat when it comes to the IN ; we had IL-38s for the anti submarine role and instead of modernising it and buyiing the same platform we bought 8 bears there was no airfield in IN jurisdiction that could house the beast that is why Arakkonam came into being , now mind you later IN found the Bear so expensive to operate we bought the P8is and on the side even upgraded the IL-38s on the side .We bought a platform simply based on it's merit , availability , cost and geopolitics in no particular order . Logistics became an issue only when situation became so bad we couldn't sustain things ; with the bear when operations became expensive along with no inhouse overhauling facility the fleet was reduced to what 2 ACs with INAS 312 ? It is only then we decided to look elsewhere , if logistics were such a big deal IL-38 upgrade and follow on order would have pretty much been enough for our needs the IN never really could exploit the Bear's true capabilities .

Anyways we have digressed from the topic by comparing cost of setting up an entire base which involves lot of contractual work aside from land acquisition cost to cost of procuring a monolithic platform . T-90 VS Arjun debate even if based on logistics aspect does not deal with this level of infrastructure , yes supply chain and transportation logistics are involved but these are relatively smaller I mean remember one argument used to be t-90 can perhaps be airlifted for we only had IL-76 in our fleet but with C-17s that equation is completely changed .

[Philip]

Deleted

[Austin]

With Aircraft and Ships the logistics is limited to say 1 or 2 bases or dozen air bases in India expensive it may be I wont dispute but when it comes to Armoured vehical you will need logistics at multiple dozens of places say you need 70 T bridge or road or rail capability across India or western theatre , unless we dont plan to cross sacrosanct LOC like during Kargil , we would need similar capability across the border or bridges in hundreds to get deep thrust into Pakistan mainland ....

Not that heavy tanks in Urban and Open warfare do any well as Iraq and Yemen experience has shown and there are tons on videos on that.

One of the key reason why Pak did not go for Abrams was its logistical inablity to handle such heavy tanks inside their own country much less if they planned to cross into India.

[Marten]

So Austin, who decided to give CVRDE a magical GSQR with specifications for a heavy tank?

[negi]

With Aircraft and Ships the logistics is limited to say 1 or 2 bases or dozen air bases in India expensive it may be I wont dispute but when it comes to Armoured vehical you will need logistics at multiple dozens of places say you need 70 T bridge or road or rail capability across India or western theatre , unless we dont plan to cross sacrosanct LOC like during Kargil

Baba all that is again part of acquisition of new platform currently our BLTs are based on T-55 and T-72 chasis their numbers are at most in couple of hundreds ; Sarvatra is a BLT in 70 tonne load class so it is not like we do not have bridge layers that can support Arjun; karne wale bano right now this is getting like a excuse finding exercise.

There was some old article too claiming how old bridges in Punjab will crumble with anything over 50 tonnes of weight ; seriously we are going to now count on British era bridges being untouched during times of war ? Let us not build scenarios to suit a POV ; in real war there won't be much of the bridges and rail network left for any of these two tanks to use . Rail network is primarily required to deploy them initially after that tanks will remain mobile on their own ; tactical scenarios may need an airlift or two but otherwise this rail road infra talk is putting me to sleep.

[Indranil]

I have to agree with Negi sir here. If we want a modern tank with all the bells and whistles, we have to set up the logistics for it, don't we. There is of course work to be done. Things won't happen magically!

[Mihir]

otherwise this rail road infra talk is putting me to sleep.

https://www.livefistdefence.com/2017/03 ... -tank.html

Even if all goes well, it is now clear that the Arjun Mk.II will only be fully deployable if the government beefs up road/bridge infrastructure to able to handle the tank’s heft. That alone is an alarming development that adds pressure on a system beyond the Army’s direct control. The Arjun family of tanks are principally for a potential war with Pakistan. The tanks are too heavy to be airlifted to any of the sectors India currently shares with China. And the new deployability concerns rule out moving them there by rail either.

http://www.claws.in/1421/the-arjun-a-bl ... atoch.html

In 1983 an year before the first prototype of the Arjun was made, Stage I of the canal reached North of Bikaner.The canal led to a Black Swan event in the 32 years that the Arjun Mark I took to enter service. The deserts where tanks could have unrestrained mobility started becoming restricted. A latticework of canals snaked all over especially parallel to the border and are planned to go upto Gadra Road in Barmer district.An area which was classic tank country has gradually changed into a populated area with restricted employability especially for heavy tanks. A majority of the numerous canals that exist there don’t have bridges/culverts to take over 60-ton behemoths.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 886392.cms

According to Defence Research Development Organization (DRDO), during trials the heavyweight Arjun tank was found unsuitable for Punjab terrain as there are chances that the bridges over canals in the state may collapse with the tank's weight. It was revealed by director general, DRDO, V K Saraswat on Friday during his visit to DRDO's Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) near Chandigarh. In reply to a question related to shortcomings of Arjun tank, Saraswat said that during trials the tank was found better in mobility and accuracy in comparison to Army's mainstay T-90 tanks. "During the trials it was found that canal bridges in Punjab were incapable of carrying its weight," he said.

Saraswat who is also the secretary, department of defence, R&D, added that the problem in Punjab can be tackled with the use of large iron bridges developed by DRDO for smooth transportation of troops in hostile terrain.

So the only way for the Arjun to traverse rivers and canals would be to unload them from tank transporters and have them ford the water body, or to deploy BLTs in every case; adding time and complexity to the task.

But it's good to know that rail infra has been modified to make Arjun transport easier (thanks Marten! Would you mind if I put this info up in a blog post sometime? There's some seriously good info in this thread that needs dissemination beyond BRF).

[Austin]

With Aircraft and Ships the logistics is limited to say 1 or 2 bases or dozen air bases in India expensive it may be I wont dispute but when it comes to Armoured vehical you will need logistics at multiple dozens of places say you need 70 T bridge or road or rail capability across India or western theatre , unless we dont plan to cross sacrosanct LOC like during Kargil

Baba all that is again part of acquisition of new platform currently our BLTs are based on T-55 and T-72 chasis their numbers are at most in couple of hundreds ; Sarvatra is a BLT in 70 tonne load class so it is not like we do not have bridge layers that can support Arjun; karne wale bano right now this is getting like a excuse finding exercise.

There was some old article too claiming how old bridges in Punjab will crumble with anything over 50 tonnes of weight ; seriously we are going to now count on British era bridges being untouched during times of war ? Let us not build scenarios to suit a POV ; in real war there won't be much of the bridges and rail network left for any of these two tanks to use . Rail network is primarily required to deploy them initially after that tanks will remain mobile on their own ; tactical scenarios may need an airlift or two but otherwise this rail road infra talk is putting me to sleep.

Like I said it can be done over time even though it would be very expensive to build infra bridges blt etc on our side many things in there are beyond army control too and in state/civilian domain with its on beaucratic babu dum to go by.

Once you cross LoC all bets are off either you have a long chain of logistics supporting your thrust beyond LoC under intense enemy fire some glimpse of logistics we have seen when us army invaded Baghdad or you use a under 50 T tanks that even paki uses secure in ur thoughts atleast the bridges and roads on other side will support and you don't have to depends on your own long tail to support very nook and corner.

All in all logistics is not an easy game even on side where you can control it much less on a hostile enemy territory

[Marten]

Clutching at straws now? A heavy tank with proven Armour is not good but enemy bridges will be kept standing so your 50t tank can roll over and continue the good fight where it is magically better than evading the same dense fire that a proven heavier Armour won't? Really?

PS: I will control terrain with my BLT that takes gasp ten minutes to lay out. That allows me to take the off chance that my supposedly immobile heavier tank with lower ground pressure can also outflank enemies quicker and afford better protection than what happened to the tincans.

[negi]

I don't know about others man but whatever little bending moment problems and point of contraflexure problems I solved in first year of Engg tell me the weight bearing rating of a bridge is a function of time; now it has been more than a decade when jokers started with this line of argument that bridges in India and punjab have a max rating of 50 tonnes (look at my joining date) ; something tells me after a decade this number might have come down to at least 45 tonnes so now should we go ahead and buy a T-34 ? Hain jee ?

[Katare]

Where there is will there always exists a way to do it!

[Mihir]

I don't know about others man but whatever little bending moment problems and point of contraflexure problems I solved in first year of Engg tell me the weight bearing rating of a bridge is a function of time; now it has been more than a decade when jokers started with this line of argument that bridges in India and punjab have a max rating of 50 tonnes (look at my joining date) ; something tells me after a decade this number might have come down to at least 45 tonnes so now should we go ahead and buy a T-34 ? Hain jee ?

Either your engineering college taught you wrong, or the discussion on bridge loading put you to sleep, just like it does now. Bridge fatigue is a very involved field of study; assessing the life and load capacity of a bridge over time isn't as simple as claiming that it would reduce over time. The corrective actions required to address these issues are well understood.

[negi]

^ Ah nice so we have been correcting these bridges to support 50 tonnes onlee for all these years ; the British too were clairvoyant to have made them for T-90 weight class onlee , how convenient .

By the way please to post the details of this field of study since you seem to post about it with so much authority , before you respond make a list of bridges their age and then tell me how did you conclude they can only support 50 tonnes not more not less in all these years