Alarm bells about China continue to sound in South Korea.
Editorial: Expanding 'China Outside of China' Shrinks Korea's Global Footprint
Logistics dominance, digital networks, and resource control challenge South Korea's economic autonomy
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion- ... LO52NNQJA/
The “empire on which the sun never sets” was the British Empire in the 18th century, a phrase reflecting its global colonial reach. In the 21st century, Chinese industry is forging a genuine “empire on which the sun never sets” through capital, resources, and technology. There are even claims that “China outside of China” is more formidable. Maps marking mines in Africa and South America, ports and factories in Europe, prove the term “global empire” is no exaggeration. Add “digital territories” like undersea cables and satellite networks, and the world is no longer just “the factory of the world” but “the world as China’s factory.” This also means the ground we stand on is shrinking.
China is redefining global logistics. The port of Piraeus in Greece is a prime example. Cargo from Asia once arrived at Rotterdam Port in the Netherlands via the Suez Canal and Mediterranean, then shipped to Central and Eastern Europe. After transforming Piraeus into a high-tech smart port, China unloaded Suez Canal-bound ships there. Goods were then transported via the “China-Europe International Train”—built with Chinese capital—to inland European markets like Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic, cutting logistics time by over a week. On land, the “Iron Silk Road” (railway) penetrates Eurasia, serving as a conduit for Chinese goods and a lifeline integrating Central Asia and Europe into the “China economic zone.”
The origins of China’s logistics dominance trace back 20 years. It secured and linked “pearl” ports at key maritime chokepoints (SLOCs) from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to Africa and Europe—a “String of Pearls” strategy. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is a critical Indian Ocean outlet beyond U.S. influence, while Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu Port handles energy transport bypassing the Malacca Strait. Sri Lanka, overwhelmed by debt, handed Hambantota Port’s operations to China for 99 years, and Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, permitted China’s first overseas military base after failing to resist investment.
The power of “China outside of China” extends to the “Digital Silk Road.” Its core is undersea cables and satellite communications. Over 99% of global communication traffic flows through undersea cables. While Western nations exclude China from these networks, Chinese firms are deeply involved in major projects connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. The PEACE Cable, owned by Hengtong and constructed by a Huawei subsidiary, spans 15,000 km from Pakistan through Kenya and Djibouti to France via Egypt, linking all Belt and Road key countries. The South Atlantic Cable, the first direct undersea link between South America and Africa, is also built by a Huawei subsidiary with funding from the China Export-Import Bank. Under the guise of “digital inclusion,” China installs cables in developing nations, placing their data flows under its control. Communication networks are the lifelines of information and data.
“China outside of China” now reaches space via the “Guowang (National Network)” satellite project—a high-speed network covering Earth with over 13,000 low-orbit satellites, poised to rival Musk’s “Starlink.” Satellite communication is key future infrastructure, connecting remote areas, oceans, and airspace beyond existing networks. China will evolve its GPS alternative, “BeiDou,” alongside Guowang into a force controlling precision military weapons, autonomous systems, and global military-civilian information.
Resource acquisition is even more alarming. In exchange for roads, dams, and railways in Africa and South America, China has swept up resource mining rights. For cobalt, a battery essential, 15 of 19 mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—holding 70% of global reserves—are Chinese-owned. Lithium, the “white petroleum,” has long been controlled in the “Lithium Triangle” of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia. As Belt and Road countries accumulate debt, they increasingly hand over ports and resources to China. Now, even if the U.S. and Europe shift to electric vehicles, core component supply depends on China. While U.S. sanctions may temporarily affect semiconductors, excising China—integrated into the global system like capillaries—is difficult.
Spain exemplifies this. It hesitated when the U.S. and Europe sanctioned Chinese electric vehicles. When China offered to make Spain a European EV hub, it defected from the Western bloc. Germany’s automakers depend on China for 30–40% of sales, with Volkswagen calling it its largest market. French luxury brands’ biggest customers are Chinese. Europe’s pride industries effectively bet their fate on China. The nation has entered a phase where it can move the world.
We once claimed our economic territory spanned 85% of the globe, having built an FTA network covering 85% of global GDP. That was our limit. We focused only on selling goods, lacking a national strategy to cultivate that territory. This mirrored national energy drained by internal political strife. Meanwhile, China wove factories, ports, railways, resources, and communications into an industrial empire where the sun never sets.
We are a trade-dependent nation. A “Korea outside of Korea” is more vital than ever. We must string our own “String of Pearls” within existing FTA networks. A control tower to direct global strategy—and bipartisan support—is needed. Hope fades if each new administration sells off previous governments’ overseas resources cheaply and investigates them as political fodder. Core industries overlap; as China expands, we shrink. Time is short.