Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
As per request of Ramana-ji, this thread has been created to do a holistic study of Operation Sindoor using the recently released citations and information released on the targets that the Indian Armed Forces successfully engaged.
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
For starters please upload copies of the citations of the awards. Thanks for the cooperation.
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
A Gupta posted this in the other thread.
After quite some search, I found this PDF on egazette.gov.in.
https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2025/266654.pdf
After quite some search, I found this PDF on egazette.gov.in.
https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2025/266654.pdf
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
When I read the citations for valor, some are quite specific about date and place. I'd guess that the ones that are not specific are Op Sindoor. Reading them, I don't think we have a good picture of what actually happened during those fateful days in May. One thing I do note is that as far as I read, none of the Op Sindoor citations are post-humous, so what we were told back in May is true, all the pilots made it home. But with only the very generic terms used in the citations, e.g., "presence of heavily networked Air Defence grid of adversaries, comprising of Air Defence ac and Surface to Air Guided Weapons (SAGWs) equipped with modern long range missiles", "a networked hostile threat environment in air and ground", etc., -- someone has to fill in the gaps at least for someone like me to analyze a future scenario.
To me, the key issue for a future battle is -- can Pakistan make up the delta - the gap - that resulted in their failures, or can India increase the delta and make this missions more assured of success? I'd file this under "simply not enough information".
To me, the key issue for a future battle is -- can Pakistan make up the delta - the gap - that resulted in their failures, or can India increase the delta and make this missions more assured of success? I'd file this under "simply not enough information".
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
Guptaji:
Pakistani’s problem are three fold:
1. Replacing damaged or newer better ones in the light of recent damage/conflict
2. If replaced integrating Chinese and Western, specifically US ones.
3. Trained Manpower
Replacing is big issue given that they are kangall state. Also takes time to bring to optimum levels. Even if they buy off the shelf(provided they can shell out money) needs time for optimisation and operationalise.
Then there is question of integrating them to the existing one and establishing a network centric one.
They need to make Chinese and US ones to talk to one another. And I think here Unkil will insist on US personell to man and integrate rather Chinese as they would be worried about Chinese stealing tech??
And I think this is where Trump keeps repeating claims Yada yada to not only downgrade our achievements but also stop us attempting anything further.
Sir Creek probably to deliberate attempt to gain time to build capabilities elsewhere
Pakistani’s problem are three fold:
1. Replacing damaged or newer better ones in the light of recent damage/conflict
2. If replaced integrating Chinese and Western, specifically US ones.
3. Trained Manpower
Replacing is big issue given that they are kangall state. Also takes time to bring to optimum levels. Even if they buy off the shelf(provided they can shell out money) needs time for optimisation and operationalise.
Then there is question of integrating them to the existing one and establishing a network centric one.
They need to make Chinese and US ones to talk to one another. And I think here Unkil will insist on US personell to man and integrate rather Chinese as they would be worried about Chinese stealing tech??
And I think this is where Trump keeps repeating claims Yada yada to not only downgrade our achievements but also stop us attempting anything further.
Sir Creek probably to deliberate attempt to gain time to build capabilities elsewhere
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
But this doesn’t mean paper over our gaps
We wait years for unobtanium
Always manage to loose the narrative and hand in advantage to outsiders
And still cling to the fetish of gora acknowledgment of our achievements
We wait years for unobtanium
Always manage to loose the narrative and hand in advantage to outsiders
And still cling to the fetish of gora acknowledgment of our achievements
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
https://x.com/TheLegateIN/status/198301 ... WiXZQ&s=19
https://grok.com/share/c2hhcmQtMi1jb3B5 ... ed5675f047
I asked Grok if it is true, it replied yes. Link below. I am yet to search exactly where it is mentioned. If anyone knows, please post the link.Indian Armed Forces have adopted a revised operational concept for Op SINDOOR 2.0 to compress the post casus-belli interval observed during Op SINDOOR 1.0 / Balakot (~14 days) to a 24–48 hour decision-to-action window with an aim to execute Op SINDOOR 2.0 with a significantly reduced political/operational pause to deny adversary reaction time.
In short, the strikes in Pakistan next time will begin within two days instead of two weeks earlier, as the long time gap gave sufficent preparation time to the adversary.
https://grok.com/share/c2hhcmQtMi1jb3B5 ... ed5675f047
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/ ... or?lang=en
While a conflict establishes thresholds, it also lays bare existing capabilities. Pakistan got a good glimpse of India’s existing strengths and weaknesses. It will now race to even the scales by sourcing more advanced weapons from China, which already accounts for a bulk of its military imports. There have been reports that Pakistan is looking to procure forty J-35 stealth fighter jets, HQ-19 air defense systems, and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft. Pakistan is likely to share their assessments of Indian capabilities to China as well, a bigger threat for India. For India, the challenge is twofold. First, to maintain an edge where there is one; and second, to make up for deficiencies that came to the fore.
India must streamline the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) to ensure that capability development is realized in a definitive time frame. The DAP 2020 is currently undergoing a comprehensive review with a stated aim to meet “operational requirements and modernisation” in a “timely manner.” From an operational perspective, networking and sensor fusion must be top priorities. The IAF operates a diverse fleet of aircraft and systems from various countries that need to communicate in real time for seamless operations. For instance, India was keen to integrate the Meteor BVR missile manufactured by MBDA with Tejas, India’s indigenous light combat aircraft. MBDA, however, stipulated that it could be done only if an Indian or European radar was used on the jet as integration would mean exchanging sensitive details. The project fell through after an Israeli radar was chosen instead for the aircraft in 2018.
Future conflicts will differ from those in the past as adversaries respond in their own way, warns Air Marshal Tiwari. Operation Sindoor has drawn a clear differential at the conventional level between India and Pakistan, but, as Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has noted, it would be unwise to assume it will put an end to cross border terrorism. The operation has established a much higher deterrence level, though it comes with uncertainty for how the next conflict will pan out.
Emergency Procurement to the Rescue
Emergency procurement (EP) emerged as a silver lining in this entire endeavor, along with enhanced financial powers at various levels in the military. The Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sanctioned the EP procedure in 2016 just after the Uri terror attack, while the established procurement process languished. EP powers were delegated to the service headquarters to address the “emergent operational needs for effectively responding to the operational situation in Eastern Ladakh/Northern Borders.”
As per EP provisions, the Indian armed forces can procure weapons systems, including entire systems, worth up to Rs 300 crore (approximately $36 million) on an urgent basis, meant to be delivered within one year of contract signing. Since 2016, six tranches of EPs have been sanctioned by the MoD to the armed forces—EP-2 was sanctioned after the 2019 Balakot airstrike, EP-3 during the standoff with China in 2020, and EP-4, approved in 2022, focused on China in what was termed to fill “critical capability voids.” EP-5 was sanctioned towards the end of 2024 and focused primarily on counter terrorism equipment and EP-6, sanctioned just days after all military action under Operation Sindoor ceased, focused on replenishing stocks up to Rs 40,000 crore (approximately $4.8 billion).
The armed forces procured systems that were stuck in the regular process for years, albeit in small volumes. For instance, a deal for Igla-S MANPADs selected in a larger deal from Russia was stuck for over a decade. The Army finally procured the Igla-S launchers and missiles first under EP-2 and then more Igla-S missiles under EP-4.
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
Copilot and Gemini say: “ The idea of a 24-48 hour response window stems from Pakistani reactions during the May 2025 conflict. After India's strikes, Pakistani officials and media warned that Pakistan was expected to retaliate within 24 to 48 hours. This was framed as a defensive response under the UN Charter following what Pakistan described as an "unprovoked act of aggression". ” “ India's actual approach to retaliation is not bound by a specific, short timeline. Its actions are guided by a different strategy that prioritizes a decisive and targeted response when intelligence and circumstances permit. ”
Re: Operation Sindoor - Analysis on Future Scenarios
Meanwhile: India tomorrow kicks off Exercise Trishul, a major tri-services drill along the Pakistan border. The 10-day exercise spans Rajasthan & Gujarat, focusing on high-intensity operations near Sir Creek, one of the region’s most sensitive zone