A. N. Prasad
First Published : 26 Nov 2008 02:10:00 AM IST
Last Updated : 26 Nov 2008 09:02:48 AM IST
All seems quiet on the nuclear deal front after a virtual onslaught in media and political circles ever since it was mooted in 2005, with the signing of the Indo-US Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. That it has taken more than three years to conclude the agreement speaks volumes for the way the process has been handled. Now that it has been finalised, it is worth recollecting what we are in for. We have to realise that there is absolutely no correlation between the Joint Statement and the final shape of the deal. All the talk of India being eligible to treatment at par with other advanced countries like the US, and the offer of full civil nuclear co-operation is eyewash. It was summarily dumped even before the negotiations really got under way. India, by giving up on this, has committed a blunder that has changed the whole complexion of the deal. It has accepted terms and conditions that by no means are honourable.
The US, following a meticulous approach of engaging a number of think-tanks and interest groups with perfect coordination between the administration and Congress, has largely succeeded in achieving its threepronged objective of roping India into the global non-proliferation mainstream, capping capability to expand its strategic programme and exploit the lucrative commercial market for nuclear power, possibly with an eye on reviving its own moribund nuclear industry.
For its part, India set its priorities on access to global uranium supplies, securing global participation in nuclear power generation to supplement the domestic programme, getting rid of the embargoes through an unconditional waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and access to R&D on nuclear power as a technologically advanced global player on respectable terms.
India managed partial success, but the terms and conditions are too harsh to qualify the outcome as being in national interest. At no time did India, unlike the US, show willingness to have broader consultations with other than like-minded parties, and preferred to take unilateral decisions without attempting political consensus. Many retired senior scientists who contributed to the development of nuclear technology were kept out of the loop. A pity that India, in spite of its technological strength and the bait of an attractive nuclear power market, could not use them as leverage in negotiations.
In justification, spokesmen for the deal often talk about relief from isolation, access to uranium, accelerated power generation and high technology inflow as strong points.
Let us look at these in perspective.
Isolation began when we carried out the first nuclear test in 1974. We had not built a nuclear reactor on our own then. That did not deter us from facing the challenge of sanctions. The most comprehensive technological development, encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle as well as weapons capability, took place mostly during the period of isolation. It was considered the golden era of nuclear development! When we conducted the 1998 nuclear tests we were quite advanced, but the embargoes were made more stringent, denying supply of even dual use items. We took it in our stride. Between 1998 and now we have made more headway, taking major steps towards long-term energy independence through thorium utilisation. The world watched and realised that isolation was not working. So it is strange that we are getting cold feet and switching from independence mode to dependence, giving the impression that we have suffered under isolation. In fact, it is apt to say that world nuclear development suffered by isolating India.
That we lack adequate supplies of uranium and have an abundance of thorium is well known and was factored into the threestage power programme. Suddenly, it is being made out to be a revelation. It will, of course, hurt the power programme in the short term, but like other challenges can be overcome with will and determination. Only a very small part of the uranium available in the country has so far been mined. Someone should be held answerable for the lapse that created this crisis.
Power is an emotive issue, with the country reeling under shortages. To make the deal appealing, practically unrealisable projections, sounding like political slogans, were made even by those who are supposed to be responsible. For example, it has been repeatedly said that 20,000 MWe will be generated by 2020. If one looks at the breakup given by a senior member of the Department of Atomic Energy in an article published in the IANCAS Bulletin in April 2006, in addition to reactors operating and under construction with a total capacity of about 7,000 MWe, the balance of 13,000 MWe by 2020 has to come from eight pressurised heavy water reactors (700 MWe each), four fast breeder reactors (500 MWe each), six light water reactors (1,000 MWe each) and one advanced heavy water reactor (300 MWe).
All these reactor designs are still on the drawing board, except the LWRs of the Koodankulam type, which are to come from Russia under an arrangement to be worked out. So how realistic is it to expect all this to happen within the next 11 years? Projections are being made that by 2030 installed capacity for nuclear power will be stepped up to 40,000 MWe. These numbers are being rolled out to mislead the country.
Pragmatism seems to have no place.
Nuclear power generation is a serious business involving a whole lot of issues such as environmental, siting, safety, regulatory, economic, legal, technological, human resources, and so on. It is not like putting up conventional plants. One mishap caused by taking shortcuts could lead to a catastrophe with global repercussions. Even for one who has worked on nuclear development it is hard to visualise the nature of the high technology we get access to through this deal.
Such loose talk by responsible persons in government belittles the dedicated efforts of so many stalwarts over the years.
The founder of the Indian nuclear programme, Dr Homi J Bhabha, thought of nuclear power as a long-term option to be realised through predominantly indigenous efforts. Thorium holds the key. This deal could upset the rhythm and pace of development of the domestic programme, divert it to uranium dependence and make thorium utilisation a dream for the far future. It is hard to imagine how the tempo of the domestic programme could be maintained when the country’s resources are used to sustain an import regime.
One should perhaps see the writing on the wall. For the sake of about 40,000 MWe we seem to be mortgaging our future. Bhabha had dreamt of making India a world leader in thorium technology. One can only wonder at his reaction to the demeaning conditions of the present deal. We have let ourselves fall into a trap that will kill our hardearned initiative, keep us constantly looking for uranium supplies and spares, and hand over control to external agencies.
The author is a former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and member of the Atomic Energy Commission.