New Delhi will serve the region better if it shelves the threat of suspending dialogue every time there is a terrorist strike. The good news is that templates exist for many of the smaller conflicts in the Indo-Pakistan terrain. It is Kashmir and terrorism that loom large on the road map, while the conflict in Afghanistan also provokes responses that muddy the pool. Water in South Asia is a contentious issue {Slowly, Pakistan has been adding non-existent issues to its laundry list. First, it was a separate Muslim state to escape the tyranny of the majority, then, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh, then it was treatment meted out to Muslims in India, and now it is Afghanistan and water. The intentions are very clear. Pakistan simply does not want to resolve anything with India. It simply wants to perpetuate hostility because tha is the only way it can survive. If this hostility disappears, Pakistan may not have a reason to exist and may unravel quickly} and, if left unresolved, could spark conflict between riparian states of the Indus Water system. Where do we stand on all of the above?
On terrorism, Pakistan is facing a blitz. It is a capacity deficit, not a commitment lag. The question that needs addressing is a vexing one for New Delhi. How much power does it want to concede to terrorists? Democratic governments may be weak everywhere, perhaps more so in Pakistan, but they hedge their futures against war. They seek opportunities for peace and trade, not because they are nice but because they are accountable for losses. War with India is really not an option when more people die in Pakistan from acts of terror than in war-torn Iraq or, for that matter, anywhere in the world. New Delhi should, therefore, grasp the magnitude of the war roiling Pakistan before it makes dialogue hostage to the terror that rips through the region. {Ms. Rehman and the apologists for Pakistan make it sound as though Pakistan is not responsible for all this. And, then they engage in the circular argument that because of massive terror hitting Pakistan also, India must understand and be generous. Why do we care Madam about terrorism that you face ? That's for you to tackle. What we care is when terrorism is exported from you to us, we will still hold you responsible.It is difficult sometimes to even challenge the patently absurd. That's the case here.} This is not to say composite dialogue is some metric for success. Far from it.
In fact, in the last lap, it looked like an instrument that would lose all shine if not shot in the arm with some political will. After the fourth round of composite dialogue sorted out the fine print on many well-worn CBMs, the inertia of leaden intentions dragged movement at its usual pace. Then Mumbai, or 26/11, happened. Suddenly, the state became hostage to terrorists and their goals. {Oh, yes. Mumbai was such an insignificant issue both in terms of audacity and number of victims, that India must have continued with talks as though nothing happened} The dialogue screeched to a halt, and the power of setting the agenda landed in the terrorists’ laps. This is what has to change for all countries of the region to combat terrorism together. {No, that should not change. What should change is that Pakistan must act against terrorists. Pakistan cannot simply escape responsibility by saying it has a capacity deficit. Why is it unable and unwilling to rein in the ISI which the whole world accuses of collaborating with the terrorists? Why are the ISI and the Army not under effective civilian control ? That is a change that has to happen because then we can hold the Pakistani Government responsible for state actors colluding with non-state actors or even for failing to stop terrorism} We must seek to marginalise those who promote the terrorist cause. {You don't need to preach it to us Madam. This is what you and your country must do. Do not try to equate others with you}
The identity of most terrorists seeking to rob Pakistan’s citizens of their peace may not be trans-national at a glance but the sophisticated military resources and funds that drive them do not originate in Pakistan. {ISI is quite capable of supplying arms that appear to originate from elsewhere. Everybody knows how the jihadis and the Taliban generate the funds. Do not feign ignorance and try to insinuate others through your thinly veiled suggestions.} In the last two years alone, over 5,000 people have lost their lives to terrorism. Our children are afraid of going to school and our hospitals are bomb-sites. This is a war Pakistan expects its neighbours to help it with and, try as it may, Islamabad cannot possibly provide a guarantee against bombs in India if it cannot guarantee such a thing in its Military’s General Headquarters.
On this count, dialogue should lead to the construction of joint mechanisms for intelligence-sharing {No joint intelligence sharing is needed because all the intelligence should come from your side only}, best practices and optimal outcomes. Intelligence is the first line of defence in terrorist terrain, and we need to bolster our states with a formal architecture for interaction between India and Pakistan. Terrorism cannot be tackled alone, and while both states have skeletons in their unofficial closets, these and other mutual embarrassments should be discussed across the table, not on the airwaves, making our media combatants in a virtual war. Interrupting dialogue will only reify hardened positions, not create room for cooling off.
Second, structured talks on Kashmir will have to resurface, even if they inch forward. If New Delhi refuses to include Kashmir at a later stage on the formal table, the dialogue will lose momentum and political traction in Pakistan. Peace-making governments will increasingly become hostage to shrill nationalist voices {Madam, why do you assume that only Pakistan will have shrill voices and independent nations must listen to these shrill voices and concede everything they demand ?} and the project of Pax South Asia will again flounder on the rocks of gratuitous intransigence. Talks on Kashmir will also profit from a back channel, as well as the quiet inclusion of Kashmiri opinion in any dialogue for it to remain credible. Representation from Kashmir on both sides of the border is essential if the process is not to be seen as an exercise at appropriating real estate.
On Afghanistan, Pakistan is only one of the smaller elephants in the room. Islamabad’s fear of Indian encirclement will lighten if international strategies to build a nation out of that failing state succeed. Troop surges will likely tip the scales in the short run for the U.S.-NATO forces to negotiate with the Taliban but are unlikely to square the stability and governance circle on its own. International support for a broad-based ethnic mix in Afghanistan will be the only way forward if the region is not to lapse into a lawless buffer zone for extremists to build an infrastructure of dominance and pseudo-Shariah to terrorise the region with. Islamabad’s cavil about Baloch insurgents finding sanctuary in Indian consulates can be resolved if New Delhi provides transparency. {What kind of transparency ? Should India open up its embassy at Kabul and consulates at Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat & Mazar-e-Sharif ? We demand similar transparency from the Pakistani state supporting its non-state actors in terrorism directed against India. Just remember Madam that such demands can be reciprocal. India may want to have complete access to the ISI, PA, Pakistani Government and jihadi tanzeem headquarters at Muridke, Lahore and Karachi and whatever else that we may deem fit.} Indian protests about Pakistan sponsoring terrorist attacks on its embassy can be rationally resolved through mutual exchange and dialogue.
Four, the widespread anxiety in Pakistan over Indian dams on rivers that deplete the Indus downstream can actually be discussed in a permanent dialogue mechanism that can be established between the two countries, without prejudice to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The IWT has stood the test of time. But in case of violations, it depends ultimately on arbitration, which is not always to the satisfaction of either party, as was the case in Baglihar. {But, why Madam ? Your Water minister announced a great victory for Pakistan after the Baglihar verdict. he said that the Neutral Expert accepted 3 out of the 6 demands of Pakistan and he did not accept any demand from India. India certainly was not unhappy.} Pakistan is dangerously water-stressed {India is not water-endowed either. Besides, your water woes are because of your unbridled explosion of population, your wastage of water, your widespread cultivation of water-intensive crops, your low-productivity and unscientific management of water. Why do you want India to subsidize all these ? India has been far too generous already allowing you to get 142 Millio Acre Feet of water while taking for itself only 33 MAF in return. It has also never allowed water as a tool of coercive diplomacy in spite of wars, terrorism. Certainly, you cannot expect to re-negotiate the Indus Water Treaty and hope to get more water at the cost of India, can you ?}and its depleting rivers and reservoirs can benefit only from a joint working commission with India. There is scant awareness in India of Pakistan’s concerns over the potential damming of the Chenab {Are you aware, Madam, how Indians, especially Kashmiris feel about the IWT ?}. This is one conflict that can snowball as water is not always a renewable resource in South Asia. Urgent planning is needed by both countries for conservation that is both sustainable and mutually acceptable.
Shifting a state’s strategic calculus in a conflict is always a challenge. Giving dialogue a chance is critical for taking Pakistan and India out of a bilateral cold war time-warp. While the rest of the world forges ahead, meeting in Paris to re-think global nuclear stockpiles, South Asia’s two dinosaurs remain wedded to regimes that are based on mutual opacity, while their conventional arms race remains unfettered by nuclear deterrence {You are entitled to think that India's conventional arms acquisition is actually a race with Pakistan. You are also entitled to engage in an arms race with India if you think you are as big as India and do deserve an equally strong armed forces. India is not particularly bothered.} Giving China a role in a separate trilateral commission for nuclear and other talks can help ease that neuralgia.{Madam, you are dense, aren't you ?}
India’s military focus is still Pakistan, in terms of brigades and hardware. That forces the military in Pakistan to keep the troop strength balanced when all resources are needed on another, dispersed battlefield. Here, history for once, can show the way. In the 1960s, Islamabad withdrew its forces quietly when New Delhi was facing down China in Aksai Chin, as all responsible accounts from Washington will testify. (They should know, as they had asked General Ayub Khan to do that). {And they should also know that Ayub Khan refused to do that.} If one is looking for a game-changer, this will be it. For Pakistan, the potential theatre of conflict will shift where needed, and threat perceptions will slowly start shifting closer to the real ground zero at home. The trust deficit will move down multiple notches and a structured, monitored dialogue can cash in on the space afforded by such a seminal act of courage and statesmanship.{India might have gladly done that had Pakistan not been sending infiltrators under fire cover into India across LoC and IB. India would not have stationed forces in J&K had Pakistani-sponsored terrorists not been indulging in violence there for the last two decades}
The Indian leadership should strengthen its Prime Minister’s hand to fashion such a grand strategic bargain for South Asia. {Of course, all advice flows freely to india. Pakistan has absolutely no committments in anything} For, without one, dialogue will go round and round in vilified circles, becoming a low-intensity space for conflict prevention. We need to go beyond crisis management. We need to shift into conflict resolution and business momentum mode. But for all that to happen, we need to give dialogue a chance.
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