Aditya_V wrote:The PAF and Navy exercises are bit disturbing, with the snows beging to melt in March April, are the pakis preparing for brilliant miltary operation. Seems likely, we should be on alert.
Absolutely.
In fact, going by TSPA's historical tendencies and tactical brilliance, there are very good reasons why the Pakis might attempt to piggyback a military assault/ Kashmir grab on High Mark along the lines of Brasstacks in the '80s.
1) The TSPA has convinced itself, rightly or wrongly, that MMS is a napunsak PM. They see him as weak because he didn't retaliate after 26/11, keeps pushing the peace process, offers to walk the extra mile, and seems to adhere to everything the US wants. However there is dissension even within the ranks of MMS' own party so he may not be PM for very long.
TSPA may see his PM-ship as a window of opportunity, the way they saw Lal Bahadur Shastri's: an attack limited to the J&K theater might go unretaliated for just long enough to change the situation on the ground in J&K before international pressure forced a ceasefire. TSPA may calculate that in the aftermath, MMS would be more likely to make concessions at the negotiating table than any other Indian PM.
2) The TSPA knows that this is an opportune time. The US is desperate to get out of Afghanistan and has been showering praise on Pakistan's recent efforts at locking up Taliban leaders. Holbrooke has been all over the media trumpeting the improvement in US-Pak ties, and parroting such spinmeister phrases as "Pakistan's threat from
giant neighbour India" which haven't really been heard in the mainstream US media since the Cold War days. Petraeus too, recently, said something about how Pakistan is a "narrow country" and its strategic concerns must be kept in mind. All these things might convince the TSPA that the US would firmly take its side if it forced a limited military showdown in Kashmir (IOW, they now hold all the cards with Washington which they didn't during Kargil).
We don't know what kind of promises/half-promises/assurances Holbrooke, Raphael et al might have given the TSPA regarding India behind closed doors. We do know that the TSPA is likely to view anything held out to them with the most optimistic interpretation, in terms of support against India. So they might believe that the US would wink and nod at a limited military thrust in J&K, while putting the maximum pressure on India to go to the negotiating table and not to retaliate along a wider front (as in '65).
3) In terms of military strength, Mirza Aslam Beg and others have recently opined that TSPA is now strong conventionally, after massive infusions of US military aid, while India has been dithering in attempts to modernize its own armed forces. If this is the conventional wisdom in the TSPA, they may think this is their best and last chance to force a conventional victory in a limited engagement. After all, once the Americans leave the military aid might slow down or vanish, while India will eventually get around to acquiring its MMRCAs and other things.
The TSPA always becomes more aggressive with India when it is flush with newly acquired military hardware from the 3.5 friends. The US always pretends that it does not know about this tendency of TSPA, and that its supply of armaments to TSPA is for some legitimate purpose. However, the TSPA may take the fact of the US supplying them with armaments as tacit US approval of an aggressive military move against India (whether or not this is actually what the US intended).
4) The Indians so far had the disadvantage of taking a long time to mobilize in retaliation against a terrorist strike. The announcement of Cold Start has browned the Pakis pants, because they can no longer count on international pressure to build up over time and restrain India in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. So the only way they can keep the initiative against an India ready for Cold Start, is to be ready for a pre-emptive strike against IA immediately after a terrorist attack and before a Cold Start response begins.
An exercise like High Mark gives them an opportunity to do this.
5) Domestically the TSPA is on the back foot with the Islamists. If in fact "Punjabi Taliban" have started blowing up things in Lahore, their last line of Jihadi allies may be on the verge of abandoning them. TSPA knows that this alienation will get progressively worse as they continue arresting Talibs and helping the US; on the other hand, the alienation could be totally reversed by a quick and decisive victory over India... especially in Kore Issue Land.
6) Finally, it is typical of TSPA to try and seize the initiative. Right now there is no overt sign that the US will support them on Kashmir, but Holbrooke and others may have given them just enough jhol, to make them believe that if they took the initiative to seize Kashmir by force, the US would accept the new status quo as it did not during Kargil.
One way I see this possibly happening is:
a) A massive terrorist attack takes place while High Mark is in progress. It does not have to be at an IPL venue (that is where we are expecting it to be, after all). But something even worse and more high-profile than 26/11.
b) Immediately after, the Pakis will yell that India is preparing a Cold Start, and conduct airstrikes on IA Western Command positions in "pre-emptive" mode a-la 1971. After all TSPAF will already be mobilized for the "exercises", and TSPN will be standing ready to deny IN a Karachi blockade.
c) I am not sure if we will see a formal TSPA thrust in J&K or simply a huge force (upto a lakh) of Jihadis rushing the LoC/IB at multiple points, backed up by massive TSPA artillery and airstrikes. Something like the Chinese entering Korea in the '50s but backed up with F-16s carrying LGBs. Formal TSPA may come later as they did in '48, '65 and '99.
d) As this happens TSPA will arrest/hand over to the US LOTS of Taliban and Al-Qaeda figures... they may even arrest Mullah Omar.
What happens next is up to us.