Historical Battles in Ancient & Medieval Bharat

[peter]

peter, what are the hypotheses you are trying to test? ... lets start from there before everyone boils the ocean of data

Simple one. What does baburnama say about this battle and is the interpretation of various scholars correct? Since it is a primary source it would be useful.

please be more precise, what specifically, e.g. babur won because of x, y, z or babur did not win comprehensively because of m, n, o

otherwise its a general chin wag and not analysis

I would not like to colour your reading with my POV. Would be awesome to have the discussion after you and perhaps others have read it. Here is an online link:
Baburnama

[Yagnasri]

romans actually changed their force composition quite a lot after getting beaten all ends up with infantry heavy armies. their later forces were much more cavalry heavy including armoured cavalry and even quite a number of armoured horse archer mercenaries. AFA I remember their successes against cavalry heavy armies with heavy infantry was in europe against germanic tribes where the temperature was much cooler.

Which period your are refering sir? As for as my knowledge goes the western roman armies were most of the time infentry heavy only up to the end of republic which is the major period of their expansion.

[peter]

Lalmohan>>peter, what are the hypotheses you are trying to test? ... lets start from there before everyone boils the ocean of data
Simple one. What does baburnama say about this battle and is the interpretation of various scholars correct? Since it is a primary source it would be useful.

please be more precise, what specifically, e.g. babur won because of x, y, z or babur did not win comprehensively because of m, n, o

Yes I would like to see, what your hypothesis on this matter is, too;

Here are some points which I jotted down earlier which seemed interesting to me.
a) Babur mentions Silhadi as Salahauddin in Baburnama though he records the correct name of other rajputs in Rana S's army. Some historians believe that Silhadi is just a corruption of Salahauddin and his Hindu name is lost in the annals.

b) In Baburnama, while describing Rana Sanga's forces, the first general that is mentioned is Silhadi! He is said to be a commander of 30,000.

c) After defeating Rana S, Babur advanced against Medni Rai at Chanderi who was also present at Khanua. Silhadi at Raisen which is not very far from Chanderi and a fellow tomar, did not come to the aid of Medini rai.

d) Silhadi converted to Islam to save himself from muslim ruler of Gujarat in early 1530's.

e) While passing through a village near Gwalior Babur comments in Baburnama that this was the village of Silhadi!

We know that Silhadi was not the most important general rather he was a chieftain in the army of Medini Rai. There is no way Babur would have been aware of Silhadi as a general unless Silhadi went and met Babur for negotiations as is asserted by James Tod. He would have been sent in the negotiating party because Rana S trusted him since Silhadi was his son in law. For Babur to comment on even Silhadi's village points to an acquaintance with Silhadi which is not adversarial. Lastly we should not forget that Babur never attacked Raisen where Silhadi resided.

As to the motives of Silhadi it seems rather obvious. Till Medini rai was alive Silhadi could not be an undisputed rajput leader of malwa. I would not be surprised if Silhadi came to an understanding with Babur that he would decamp on the day of the khanua battle from the vanguard so long babur attacks Medini rai if he wins which is what he did. Perhaps Silhadi changing his religion was part of the equation too since Babur refers to him as Salahuddin in Baburnama.

As far as Silhadi seeking help from Rana S's son it is not surprising either. Uday Singh father of Rana Pratap forgave Banbir even though Banbir almost succeded in assasinating Uday Singh.

An important question is what happens if a key general (say Silhadi) in the vanguard does not perform his duty and then decamps. Can the war be salvaged if that happens?

Lastly too much has been made of the superior artillery of Babur. If one observes battle of dharmat, which was fought almost 120 years later , the vanguard of Imperial forces demolished the artillery of aurangzeb and killed the general Murshid kuli khan who was leading aurangzeb's artillery. The technology had advanced much in 120 years from the time of Khanua. If 120 years later, at Dharmat, the artillery was ineffective against the charge of a cavalry how could artillery be the deciding factor at khanua?

if possible could you extend it to general "the invaders from 1033-1300 period" (ending with Babar?) "pin the victories on these particular and unique combination"

This is hard problem to tackle but would try to gather info on it.

I assume there would be common pattern (apart from the obvious one of getting the faith) since all the attacks are from various branches of Turko-Mongol nomadic barbarian tribes from same region of the world.

The common pattern thus far seems to be inequality of resources. In the second millenium AD, post Chauhan empire, other large Hindu empires were almost non-existent.

Was it same population explosion based numerical superiority which propelled tribes under Genghis Khan ? (or any other reason for tribes being forced to move out for survival due to weather patterns etc)

I have forgotten some details on mongols but what I remember is that attack on China and the Caliphate was largely an act of revenge on the part of Genghis Khan. And once he tasted the proverbial salt then nothing could stop mongols for many centuries. If Mamluks had not won who knows entire Egypt might have been Buddhist!

[ramana]

peter, Should we have a specifc thread on Baburnama discussion?

[Sanku]

Peter and Lalmohan, allow me to explain, yes the matter is certainly a issue of tactics and strategy. The question that I am asking however is that, what is the role of each in the overall picture.

Did the strategic compulsions of a outnumbered people facing a completely mobilized population desperately looking for a home land lead to a situation where the tactics were rendered eventually unimportant in the overall flow of events?

After all, if the Turko-Mongols had this "musket + mounted archers" combination which gave them victory against unprepared Indians, and who in turn lost the skill with time then the open questions remain

1) Why after Babar did any of the Turko-Mongols not succeed at this trick on their domesticated cousins?
2) How did Rajput's manage to destroy these tribes at Bharaich just a little after Masud of Gazani's victory? Did they learn the counter of the tactic so fast or did the invaders lose it too soon?
3) How did Rajputs not remember the lessons and develop counters (not necessarily based on horse archers)? All other societies assailed by these tactics learnt is very soon, 30-50 year period (if they survived) here we see the see-saw battles for three centuries?
4) Clearly we see numerous accounts of horses with Rajputs as well as archers, some even if they did not have horse archers a la Turko-Mongols, they had horsemen who could fire arrows and have had that for some time.

Based on the open questions that are not answered yet, combined with counter examples provided by Peter, it appears to me that the issue perhaps was not tactics at all.

Perhaps the conventional historians have been looking at wrong factors completely!!

[Lalmohan]

sanku - picking up your points above

the huns came with a strategy of conquest, but were defeated by superior tactics (note - they were horse archers too) - the guptas did it by being more mobile than the huns and better armoured, as well as using infantry with cavalry

i repeat, the real deciding factor at panipat and khanua is musketry and light artillery dug in behind barricades which bring down murderous fire on cavalry attacks. it is the tactic of entrenching the firing parties with dominating arcs of fire in the battle zone that is the critical factor, not just one element

later battles did indeed incorporate these tactics, the afghans used the same against humayun shortly afterwards, and the rajputs stopped making frontal charges against defended guns

i am sure if you look up the terrain at bharaich, the turks probably had no room to manouever, and the rajputs hammered them doing what they do best. previously the light horse archers had worn down the rajput heavy cavalry with the constant feint attacks and retreats (tarain 1 i think)

the rajputs did learn the lessons, but slowly - since they also had to adapt their culture and ethos, which is harder

cavalry becomes a major component of rajput armies - but its heavy and with limited group manouver training - its all about the shock n awe factor

to me your questions and peters are not very open, sorry to respectfully disagree. i wish i had the time to read the texts, I don't - so you are welcome to comment from them, i will learn

[niran]

I have also seen another weapon (in my house) which was like a long wooden flattened shaft at the end of which a curved
dao type thing was fixed. since i was small, not sure what it was used for and where it appeared. never seen it in market so
must have been from 1920s my grandma's household

It is known as Daab with aa a wee bit longer
and sudden stop with b these were for special
Warriers with two swords fighting capability
These wore no armor fought with two swords
They were mostly used as raiders or inside
Palace gaurds.

[Lalmohan]

the ahom kings also used scorched earth tactics against the mughals, drew them into terrain of their choice and as singha says allowed the rivers and rain to take their toll and then annihilated them through ambush and encirclement tactics

[Singha]

having a hostile predominantly animist , tai and hindu pop also helped I suppose..as the mughals couldnt swell his number and gain local militias through religious indocrination. they had a river based supply chain stretching back to dhaka down the brahmaputra
and perhaps another chain back to koch behar.

long before vietnam the difficulty of large cavalry-heavy armies in fighting in the jungle and swamp had been illustrated

[Lalmohan]

does anyone know if IMA cadets or other officer training candidates are taken on study tours of major battlefields - to study terrain, tactics and perhaps wargame outcomes?

[Sanku]

i am sure if you look up the terrain at bharaich, the turks probably had no room to manouever, and the rajputs hammered them doing what they do best.

Lalmohan, Bharaich is a terai area, a little different from the area near Agra, or Panipat but by how much? They are both parts of river plain system, with similar geographies. So what tactic worked in Baharaich and did not at Khanua?

What worked at Khanua but not at Dharmat?

In fact if you look at the series of battles, we see a see saw pattern with one battle going in favor of the invaders with Indians forcing them back and then repeat.

If indeed the tactics were new or were significantly important, we would not see a see-saw pattern lasting of 300 years and remember the belligerents were not only A monolithic Rajput where the culture part could be ascribed too, different turko-mongol factions have lost to some Rajputs where as winning against others in close succession, Turko-Mongols have won and lost against other houses in quick succession.

And in all the victories, the Turko-Mongol victories are all linked to horse archer and guns but what about other victories of Rajputs?

And you may chose to disagree but that does not mean that the open questions cease to be any more open -- they shall remain open till material from primary sources is presented from both sides, till then we should keep them as vexingly open question but not jump to answers.

1) For example the tactical theory of horse archers and/or matchlock does not explain why 1030-1300 was the period of successful incursion and they ceased after that more or less.

2) The see-saw of power and battles in not explained by the "tactics" part of equation. If tactics were the key, we would expect to see a particular pattern repeated for some time till the tactic was neutralized and never later. Unfortunately that pattern is not seen.

3) If the Rajputs won because their heavy horse worked in some cases and Turks won where there hit and run worked in other cases, why did Rajputs not shown repeatedly trying to chose a terrain which is favorable for them? Why do Turks not chose battles at terrains which are favorable to them. Do primary sources talk about fevered preparation to chose a field of battle?

So while I am sure the individual tactics had some significant result on the outcome of battles, as a general "larger picture" I am afraid it makes no sense what so ever.

[Lalmohan]

sanku - i am no expert in this field, but i really dont see the questions as being quite so open; there are a combination of factors at work, not single individual ones, i do feel you are over simplifying to isolate single factors. even in fairly flat terrain, commanders can utilise forest, hillocks, brush, etc. to protect flanks, deny movement (see later)

tactics, terrain, motivation, troop strength, weapons, training, competence, command and control, communications, preparation, supply chain, etc., etc.
a good commander seeks to optimise these and work with the areas where he is strong and the enemy is weak, but clearly no one can pick ideally all the time

i would love to research in more detail, but will allow those with more time on their hands to do so, and i will happily absorb the results of their efforts

(later)
battle of blood river between boers and zulus around 1850. the boers heavily outnumbered and in open country, corralled their wagons into a circle facing the river and covering one flank. the other flank was seemingly open, but actually had a deceptive marshy depression. the zulus began their traditional 'horns of the bull' encirclement attack - one flank got stuck in the marsh, other impeded in the river crossing and the head of the bull butted up against the wagon laager. highly accurate rifle fire broke the zulu charges repeatedly until they gave up trying to breach the laager and fell back across open country in disorganised groups. the boers then pursued them on horseback (still vastly outnumbered) and managed to drive them into a shallow gulley and then poured heavy fire into their dense groups. ~4000 zulus killed, against 15 boers. the boers/afrikaners consider this to be a god sent victory given that they began the day expecting to end up mummified on stakes, like their predecessors who had fought the zulus

[Singha]

the word laager for a parking area of tanks presumably with the sharp ends pointing out seems to have come from the boer wagon circles.

[Sanku]

Lalmohan, with all due respects I am not in disagreement with you per se, I am trying two different things

1) Try and test the hypothesis of "tactics" actually used and helpful by looking for them over multiple battles and over a longer time period.

2) Try and test if over longer terms the whether *tactics* are important or different factors, i.e. motivational level of troops, overall strategic picture etc etc...

[jambudvipa]

Regarding the Battle of Bahriach,the entire narrative seems suspect.I went thru the translation of the Mir- ul -Masuri on the packhum site.
This work was written between 400-500 years after the purported event and mixes up a lot of different things.
There are different texts on the same site which chronicle the Ghazni family,having browsed thru them could find no reference to Masud ( Mohd Ghaznis sisters son) attacknig India and getting killed.

It seems more like a pasticshe of different battles at different times.
did Bahriach actually happen at all?
are there any references other than the above mentioned text?

we need to be careful lest we discredit our own narrative based on forgeries from the other side.

[Lalmohan]

sanku - fair enough. my concluding remark would be that in any battle, the guy with the better tactics for the place and time won. sandhu's consistent criticisms of rajput and other hindu armies are : playing by the rules, not seizing the initiative, wasting time allowing the enemy to regroup or build defences (khanua) and not learning or adapting to changing conditions fast enough. the climate and ambiance of hindustan appears to mollify invaders into more docility, so turks and afghans that once were vigourous become 'soft' - probably an indication of the richness and luxury of power in hindustan!

singha - afaik the word laager in german and old dutch (the progenitor of the afrikaans language) means storage space/cellar and is used to mean camp, e.g. konzentrazion lager, etc., or in your example i suppose panzer lager!. without a wagon laager, boers would refuse to engage with any zulu war parties, and rely on their horses to get away to safety. unlike the zulus who were happy to engage in frontal battles, other tribes, e.g. the Xhosa took up guerilla warfare from the hills against the white settlers - to capitalise on their own strengths. the british 24th foot (to perish at isandhlwana) had previously been fighting a vicious guerilla war with the Xhosa's in the eastern cape region and were an experienced unit

sorry, since we're on rivers - battle of the ice river: genghiz khan extinguishes the tangut empire. the mongols used structured feint attacks using their semi-wild unshod steppe ponies (mounted archers) across the ice to draw out the tangut cavalry (thorough bred, well fed and shoed horses carrying heavily armoured troopers) and incite a charge. soon enough the massed thundering of heavy horses cause the tanguts to slip and slide all over the place and eventually for the ice to break... i believe something like 300,000 tanguts are slain during the day. shortly afterwards genghiz turns all the tangut settlements to dust and returns them to the steppe. today only the beehive tombs of the tangut emperors remain somewhere in western china

[Sanku]

sandhu's consistent criticisms of rajput and other hindu armies are : playing by the rules, not seizing the initiative, wasting time allowing the enemy to regroup or build defences (khanua) and not learning or adapting to changing conditions fast enough.

Yes Lalmohan, but the issue with the understanding you have posted is the word "consistent" we have not seen any *consistency* what so ever in battles, tactics used, outcomes etc etc... So I believe Sandhu errs in looking for a consistency that does not exist.

Numerous counter examples have been posted which mention how time and again Rajputs adopted tactics like "night attack" or presence of scattered Turkish strongholds in West Punjab holding back Prithvi Raj Chauhan and not Chivalry etc etc...

Heck *Wiki* article on Khanua talks about how Rana Sanga made and broke pacts with the Mongol Babar as he saw fit and how the Rajputs harassed him by immediately recapturing the forts and lands that he won as he moved forward.

And I will repeat (for the third time) my objection of *docility* argument by reminding that external aggressions succeeded ONLY in the 1033-1300 period, where it played out repeatedly, after which no such large action was seen. (The continued battle of Islamic imperialist with Indian rulers continues, but is a *internal* story)

So while at Khanua a particular tactic may have succeeded, it may have been pure fluke of the flow of battle and/or superior numbers backed by superior logistics, or use of buying out generals from Rana Sanga's army or what not, because for sure, the mentioned reasons if useful does not guarantee Babar either *consistent* victories and hold of Hindusthan, nor does it guarantee any turko-mongols a generic series of victories.

[Sanku]

My theory is that the see-saw power structure and swinging battles are indicative of one thing and one thing alone, a settled people getting drained out by constant and total war waged on them by never ceasing waves and waves of completely mobilized population whose ONLY motive was to fight and win loot and use that resource to fight some more till exhaustion.

This stopped after the tribes destroyed a large resource base, and were left holding a large the country which was *depleted* of resources to fight from and RoI of winning a future battle much lower (since the remaining few resources were pushed into similarly mobilized populations from which easy picking was impossible)

Tactics et al are secondary details.

[Lalmohan]

at a very macro level your theory is reasonable
but merely showing up to fight doesnt guarantee anyone victory, nor does repeating a single tactic repeatedly guarantee victory - eventually everyone learned how to handle mongol feint attacks with horse archers. great civilisations and empires survive just fine as long as they are firmly and justly managed and can see off invasions for very long periods
khanua was not a fluke, it introduced a new tactic for which the opposition was unprepared - and paid the price

tactics in the very big scheme of things is secondary, but when you're standing on the field with a sharp pointy stick in your hand, its pretty crucial!

[Yagnasri]

I also agree with the Sankuji. Further the Indian kingdoms are mainly organised to ruling people and by and large justly. The whole purpose of the kings is never waging war. I think other than Vijayanagara, Rajputs and Maratas were such pushed people who could claim great sucess againt Muslims.

One more thing is even after Talikota defeat the Vijayanagara Kingdom servived in Penulonda and wages long war with Bahmanies and won many battles. Unfortunately no one writes about their efforts.

[Singha]

the hindu shahi kings of sindh and punjab also never gave up fighting inspite of many setbacks and lack of support from other nearby kingdoms.

[peter]

by the time of the rise of the marathas, jats, sikhs, would not musketry and artillery be quite dominant on the field, with staff weapons and swords required for the CQB finish? probably archery became the poor man's weapon? closely related to hunting?

Not at the time of their rise, only after their establishment as powers to be reckoned with. At the time of their rise, except for a few well-off sardars and personal followers, most of them were poor or had been reduced to poverty. It was only when they were well established that they could afford to buy firearms en masse, and/or hire European trained infantry from Carnatic Coast and UP/Bihar areas.

This is correct observation on Sikhs. It is recorded by many historians that Ranjit Singh tried unsuccessfully, multiple times, to buy muskets from the British. Singh wanted to buy in thousands but English always refused fearing that they might be the target. He had French/Italians for artillery as did the Marathas (Comte deBoigne).

[peter]

The other way of defeating it would have required heavily armored infantry, but it may not have been very practical for hot Indian plains (though Roman heavy infantry did fight quite successful campaigns in N Africa and W Asia against cavalry armies).

An interesting battle was fought between the mongols and European knights. Knights were in full battle gear on rather big and therefore slow armored horses.

Battle started with mongols discharging arrows which had no impact on either the knights because of the armor and nor the horses which were also protected well.

The plan of Europeans was to not charge the mongols and let them dissipate the arrows. Once that was done mongols would have no choice but to engage in hand to hand combat which the knights with their heavier weapons were confident of winning.

After waiting patiently in the barrage of arrows the knights did charge, which was a mistake, and got slaughtered. (Ofcourse there is more to it then I wrote but ballpark this is what happened).

So in the worst circumstances nothing helps a looser!

As a contrast later mughal sources have recorded that marathas light cavalry wore almost no armour and they wore just dhoti and kurta on the battle field. Being light meant their horses had to bear less weight and thus could run faster and longer which is an important advantage.

[Pratyush]

This is correct observation on Sikhs. It is recorded by many historians that Ranjit Singh tried unsuccessfully, multiple times, to buy muskets from the British. Singh wanted to buy in thousands but English always refused fearing that they might be the target. He had French/Italians for artillery as did the Marathas (Comte deBoigne).

I dont understand. Why was he trying to buy from the british. Why the Sikhs could not develop the armanents at home using the skills present in India.

What was lacking, which prevented the development of Musket manufacturing in the Sikh empire.

[peter]

khanua was not a fluke, it introduced a new tactic for which the opposition was unprepared - and paid the price

I am still trying to figure out what you mean. How do we know Sandhu read Baburnama? How do we know he is not repeating the same assertions that historians have been saying since kingdom comes?

It seems that the way history is written is that some body reads the primary source, writes a peer reviewed paper or a history book, which becomes the standard reference and from that point on every one starts quoting/referencing this historian.

I am impressed by Dale because he went back to original sources and clearly saw artillery was not relevant and thus overturned a long held belief.

Do we know how many small guns did Babur have?

[Sanku]

khanua was not a fluke, it introduced a new tactic for which the opposition was unprepared - and paid the price

Well reading the descriptions from Babarnama itself, Babar was not sure of victory, heck he was almost ready to throw in the towel before he went out and broke the jars of wine and exhorted the troops repeatedly in the name of Islam and using the icons of militant Islam repeatedly before he could get the troops to fight.

Even on the day of the battle, the battle waged and went from one side to other and raged for 10 hours before the final outcome was reached.

It could have gone either way, perhaps the Rajputs had indeed destroyed a few of the fortified enclosures and then this would be yet of the many of the losses of Gazani before he finally won against the Chauhan's.

I some how dont find it a very compelling testimony of clear cut efficacy of a particular tactic or a particular fighting army.

tactics in the very big scheme of things is secondary, but when you're standing on the field with a sharp pointy stick in your hand, its pretty crucial!

Sure, but we are not there, isnt that so

[peter]

sandhu's consistent criticisms of rajput and other hindu armies are : playing by the rules, not seizing the initiative, wasting time allowing the enemy to regroup or build defences (khanua) and not learning or adapting to changing conditions fast enough.

If he says this then I will have to disagree with him. Unless he tabulates all the battles which were won and compare them with the ones that were lost above statement by Sandhu has no basis. Even a foreigner, Horace Hyman Wilson, whom I quoted earlier, rather easily and successfully contradicts Sandhu.

the climate and ambiance of hindustan appears to mollify invaders into more docility, so turks and afghans that once were vigourous become 'soft' - probably an indication of the richness and luxury of power in hindustan!

Well did they become as "weak as the emaciated Hindu" so then they were ripe for cherry picking by others?

[Lalmohan]

sankuji - as i said at the start, we need to separate the different issues - strategic - political, strategic - military, tactical, and so on. seen from each perspective, the other factors have less relevance. you are particularly interested in the macro picture, so you need to deal with the issues of the macro picture without tainting them with other factors. yes hindu civilisations were experiencing strategic fatigue, even romila thapar says that! but the inability to politically unite against the outsider, is also significant. it shows that each kingdom thought of the external menace as being minor or temporary - until it showed itself to be strong force

it is clear babur was terrified of the prospect of engaging with the rajputs, so he put his best efforts into trying to figure out winning tactics for where he found himself. if sanga had not waited for almost a month and gone straight into the attack, the mughal force might have been swept from hindustan in short order. but we are where we are. that delay allowed babur to build his defences and stockpile arms and ammunition as well as create doubt within the rajput ranks

peter - whilst i appreciate your earnestness, i repeat - i am not a scholar. if you doubt sandhu, read his book and determine for yourself. and if i may say so, you also need to give more thought to separating out and grouping similar issues. your arguement is that artillery was not relevant - and we have seen that heavy artillery was not, but others are saying that light artillery and muskets were. can you think of all the different ways that the rajputs could have suffered such large casualties and eliminate each until you find the one that works for you?

i have seen one route arrived at by sandhu and i am happy with his explanation, it makes sense to me. if it doesnt to you, you need to do the primary research and educate the rest of us.

[Sanku]

Thanks for the response, Lalmohan-ji.

Peter, I would echo Lalmohan-ji in one respect as well, we may not be able to match up to your expectation of reading and discussing with reference to primary texts themselves but that does not mean that you deny us a chance to learn from your reading and understanding of those.

I will eagerly look forward to your views and understanding in this context.

[peter]

I will eagerly look forward to your views and understanding in this context.

I am posting Babur nama's relevant portion here. Will post the opposing POV of Sanga a bit later.
Stuff in italics is my addition rest is as is from Baburnama. Few things to focus on:

a) Notice the placement of key generals on babur's side and their movements as they are attacked from sanga's side.
b) When is artillery fired from Babur's side? What is the impact? Could the artillery be shooting at its own men?
c) Did the flanks of babur loose?
d) When did matchlockers come into fray? How did they aim for only Sanga's men and miss the mughals in hand to hand combat that was raging?
e) Why did the battle last for 10 hours?
f) What was the role of archers?
g) How did the battle end?

Babur leaves Agra against Rana Sanga
(Feb. 11th 1527) On Monday the 9th of the first Jumada, we got out of the suburbs of Agra, on our journey (safar) for the Holy War, and dismounted in the open country, where we remained three or four days to collect our army and be its rallying-point

[Describes defeat of his two advance guards and demoralization in his camp, rallying his troops for a religious war etc.]

Last entry for February of 1527 is made on Feb 26th.
Next Entry is made on March of 13th 1527.

Guesstimate of Sanga’s forces:
Infidel standards dominated some 200 towns in the territories of Islam ; in them mosques and shrines fell into ruin ; from them the wives and children of the Faithful were carried away captive. So greatly had his forces grown that, according to the Hindu calculation by which one lak of revenue should yield 100 horsemen, and one krur of revenue, 10,000 horsemen, the territories subject to the Pagan (Sanga) yielding 10 krurs, should yield him 100,000 horse.

As, for instance, Salahu'd-din had territory yielding 30,000 horse, Rawal Udai Singh of Bagar had 12,000, Medini Rai had 12,000, Hasan Khan of Mewat had 12,000, Bar-mal of Idar had 4,000, Narpat Hara had 7,000, Satrvi of Kach (Cutch) had 6,000, Dharm-deo had 4,000, Bir-sing-deo had 4,000, and Mahmud Khan, son of Sultan Sikandar, to whom, though he possessed neither district nor pargana 10,000 horse had gathered in hope of his attaining supremacy. Thus, according to the calculation of Hind, 201,000 was the total of those sundered from salvation.

(March 17th, 1527) On Saturday the 13th day of the second Jumada of the date 933, a day blessed by the words, God hath Blessed your Saturday, the army of Islam was encamped near the village of Kanwa, a dependency of Biana, hard by a hill which was 2 kurohs (4 miles) from the enemies of the Faith.

Organization of Babur’s Forces:
When those accursed infidel foes of Muhammad's religion heard the reverberation of the armies of Islam, they arrayed their ill-starred forces and moved forward with one heart, relying on heir mountain-like, demon-shaped elephants, as had relied the Lords of the Elephant who went to overthrow the sanctuary (kaba) of Islam.

Obeying the cautions of prudence, we imitated the ghazis of Rum by posting matchlockmen (tufanchian) and cannoneers (ra’d-andazan) along the line of carts which were chained to one another in front of us. To effect this arrangement and organization, Nizamu'd-din 'Ali Khalifa, the pillar of the Imperial fortune, exerted himself strenuously ; his efforts were in accord with Destiny, and were approved by his sovereign's luminous judgment.

Commanders of the Centre:
His Majesty's post was in the centre.

In the right-hand of the centre were stationed the illustrious and most upright brother, the beloved friend of Destiny, the favoured of Him whose aid is entreated (i.e. God), Chin-timur Sultan, (Chin-timur Chingiz-khanid Chaghatai is called Babur's brother because a (maternal-) cousin of Babur's own generation, their last common ancestor being Yunas Khan.), [..], Khwaja Kamalu'd-din (Perfect-in-the Faith) Dost-i-khawand, the trusted of the sultanate, the abider near the sublime threshold, the close companion, the cream of associates, Kamalu'd-din Yunas-i-'ali, the pillar of royal retainers, the perfect in friendship, Jalalu'd-din (Glory -of- the -Faith) Shah Mansur Barlas, the sincere in fidelity, Shihabu'd-dm (Meteor-of-the-Faith) 'Abdu'1-lah the librarian, and Nizamu'd-din Dost Lord-of-the-Gate.

In the left-hand of the centre took each his post, the reservoir of sovereignty, ally of the Khalifate, object of royal favour, Sultan 'Ala'u'd din 'Alam Khan son of Sultan Bahlul Lodi, the intimate of illustrious Majesty, the pillar of the nobility, Kamalu'd-din Muhibb-i-'ali, son of the intimate counsellor named above (i.e. Khalifa), [..] the wazir, greatest of wazirs amongst men, Khwaja Kamalu'd-din Husain, and a number of other attendants at Court (diwanian).

Commanders of the right wing:
In the right wing was the exalted son, honourable and fortunate, the befriended of Destiny, the Star of the Sign of sovereignty and success, Sun of the sphere of the Khalifate lauded of slave and free, Muhammad Humayun Bahadur. On that exalted prince's right hand there were, one whose ran approximates to royalty and who is distinguished by the favour of the royal giver of gifts, Qasim-i-husain Sultan, the pillar the nobility Nizamu'd-din Ahmad-i-yusuf Aughlaqchi, Qawam Beg Aurdu-shah, [..] the trusted of royalty, perfect in loyalty, Jalalu'din Khusrau Kukuldash, On the victory-crowned left of the fortunate son already name there were, the sayyid of lofty birth, of the family of Murtiz ('Ali), Mir Hama (or Hama), the pillar of royal retainers, the perfect in sincerity, Shamsu'd - din Muhammad Kukuldash and Nizamu'd-din Khwajagi Asad jan-dar*

Commanders of the left wing:
In the left wing of the armies of Islam there extended their ranks, the lord of lofty lineage,the refuge of those in authority, the ornament of the family of Ta Ha and Ya Sin, the model for the descendants of the prince of ambassadors (Muhammad), Sayyid Mahdi Khwaja, the exalted and fortunate brother, the well-regarded of his Majesty, Muhammad Sultan Mirza, [..] 'Abdu'l-'azlz Master of the Horse, the trusted in the -State, the pure in friendship, Shamsu'd-din Muhammad 'Ali Jang-jang, the pillar of royal retainers, Jalalu'd-din Qutluq-qadam qarawal (scout), the pillar of royal retainers, the perfect in sincerity, Jalalu'd-din Shah Husain yaragi Mughul Ghanchi and Nizamu'd-din Jan-I muhammad Beg Ataka.

Commanders of flank movement:
For the flank-movement (tulghama) of the right wing there were posted two of the most trusted of the household retaine Tardika and Malik Qasim the brother of Baba Qashqa, with a body of Mughuls; for the flank-movement of the left wing were the two trusted chiefs Mumin Ataka and Rustam Turkman leading a body of special troops.

The battle:
One watch (between 9-10 AM) of the afore-mentioned day had elapsed when the opposing forces approached each other and the battle began. As Light opposes Darkness, so did the centres of the two armies opposed one another. Fighting began on the right and left wings, such fighting as shook the Earth and filled highest Heaven with clangour. The left wing of the ill-fated pagans advanced against the right wing of the Faith-garbed troops of Islam and charged down on Khusrau Kukuldash and Baba Qashqa's brother Malik Qasim. The most glorious and most upright brother Chin-timur Sultan, obeying orders, went to reinforce them and, engaging in the conflict with bold attack, bore the pagans back almost to the rear of their centre.

Muhammad Humayun Bahadur this Mustafa of Rum had the carts (arabaha) brought forward and broke the ranks of pagans with matchlock and culverin dark like their hearts. In the thick of the fight, the most glorious brother Qasim-i-husain Sultan and the pillars of royal retainers, Nizamu’d-din Ahmad-i-yusuf and Qawam Beg, obeying orders, hastened to their help. And since band after band of pagan troops followed each other to help their -men, so we, in our turn, sent the trusted in the State, the glory of the Faith, Hindu Beg, and, after him, the pillars of the nobility, Muhammadi Kukuldash and Khwajagi Asad jan-dar, and, after them, the trusted in the State, the trustworthy in the resplendent Court, the most confided-in of nobles, the elect of confidential servants, Yunasi-' ali, together with the pillar of the nobility, the perfect in friendship, Shah Mansur Barlas and the pillar of the grandees, the pure in fidelity, Abdu'l-lah the librarian, and after these, the pillar of the nobles, Dost the Lord-of-the-Gate, and Muhammad Khalil the master-gelder (akhta-begi).

The pagan right wing made repeated and desperate attack on the left wing of the army of Islam, falling furiously on the holy warriors, possessors of salvation, but each time was made to turn back or, smitten with the arrows of victory, was made to descend into Hell, the house of perdition ; they shall be thrown to burn therein, and an unhappy dwelling shall it be. Then the trusty amongst the nobles, Mumin Ataka and Rustam Turkman betook themselves to the rears of the host of darkened pagans ; and to help them were sent the Commanders Khwaja Mahmud and 'Ali Ataka, servants of him who amongst the royal retainers is near the throne, the trusted of the Sultanate, Nizamu'd-din 'Ali Khalifa.

Our high - born brother Muhammad Sultan Mirza, and the representative of royal dignity, 'Adil Sultan, and the trusted in the State, the strengthener of the Faith, 'Abdu'l-'aziz, the Master of the Horse, and the glory of the Faith, Qutluq-qadam qarawl, and the meteor of the Faith, Muhammad 'Ali Jang-jang, and the pillar of royal retainers, Shah Husain yaragi Mughul Ghanchi stretched out the arm to fight and stood firm. To support them we sent the Dastur, the highest of wazirs, Khwaja Kamalu'd din Husain with a body of diwanis.

As the conflict and battle lasted long, an imperative order was issued that the special royal corps (tabinan-i-khasa-i-padshahi) who, heroes of one hue, were standing, like tigers enchained, behind the carts, should go out on the right and the left of the centre, leaving the matchlockmen's post in-between, and join battle on both sides. As the true dawn emerges from its cleft in the horizon they emerged from behind the carts ; they poured a ruddy crepuscule of the blood of those ill-fated pagans on the nadir of the Heavens, that battle-field ; they made fall from the firmament of existence many heads of the headstrong, as stars fall from the firmament of heaven. The marvel of the Age, Ustad 'Ali-quli, who with his own appurtenances stood in front of the centre, did deeds of valour, discharging against the iron-mantled forts (the cataphract elephants) of the infidels. Such stones Ustad 'Ali-quli discharged at the iron clad fortress of the pagan ranks and by this discharge of stones, and abundance of culverins and natchlocks destroyed many of the builded bodies of the pagans. The matchlockmen of the royal centre, in obedience to orders, going from behind the carts into the midst of the battle, each one of them made many a pagan taste of the poison of death. The foot-soldiers, going into a most dangerous place, made their names to be blazoned amongst those of the forest tigers (i.e. heroes) of valour and the champions in the field of manly deeds. Just at this time came an order from his Majesty the Khaqan that the carts of the centre should be advanced ; and the gracious royal soul (i.e. Babur) moved.towards the pagan soldiers[..].

At the moment when the holy warriors were heedlessly flinging away their lives, they heard a secret voice say, Be not dismayed, neither be grieved, for, if ye believe ye shall be exalted above the unbelievers? and from the infallible Informer heard the joyful words, Assistance is from God, and a speedy victory ! And do thou bear glad tidings to true believers?

Between the first and second Prayers, there was such blaze of combat that the flames thereof raised standards above the heavens, and the right and left of the army of Islam rolled back the left and right of the doomed infidels in one mass upon their centre.

When signs were manifest of the victory of the Strivers and of the up-rearing of the standards of Islam, those accursed infidels and wicked unbelievers remained for one hour confounded. At length, their hearts abandoning life, they fell upon the right and left of our centre. Their attack on the left was the more vigorous and there they approached furthest, but the holy warriors, their minds set on the reward, planted shoots (nihal) of arrows in the field of the breast of each one of them, and, such being their gloomy fate, overthrew them. In this state of affairs, the breezes of victory and fortune blew over the meadow of our happy Nawab, and brought the good news, Verily we have granted thee a manifest victory!

The absurd (batil) Hindus, knowing their position perilous, dispersed like carded wool before the wind, and like moths scattered abroad. Many fell dead on the field of battle ; others, desisting from fighting, fled to the desert of exile and became the food of crows and kites. Mounds were made of the bodies of the slain, pillars of their heads.
After the victory:
The foes beaten, we hurried them off, dismounting one after mother. The Pagan's encirclement may have been 2 kurohs from our camp (aurdu) ; when we reached his' camp (aurdu) we sent Muhammad 'Abdu'l-'aziz, 'Ali Khan and some other in pursuit of him. There was a little slackness ;I ought to have gone myself, and not have left the matter to what I expected from other people. When I had gone as much a kuroh (2 m.) beyond the Pagan's camp, I turned back because it was late in the day ; I came to our camp at the Bed-time Prayer.

Rewards to officers
Thinking," What good work Khusrau did in the battle !' I named him for Alur and gave him 50 laks for his support but. unluckily for himself, he put on airs and did not accept this. Later on it [khwud, itself] came to be known that Chin-timur must have done that work ; guerdon was made him for his renown Alur and an allowance of 1 5 laks was bestowed on Tardika who in the flanking-party of the right-hand had done better than the rest. The contents of the Alur treasury were bestowed on Humayun. When the oath before-mentioned was given to great and small before the Holy-battle with Rana Sanga, it had been mentioned that there would be nothing to hinder leave after this victory, and that leave would be given to anyone wishing to go away (from Hindustan). Most of Humayun's men were from Badakhshan or elsewhere on that side (of Hindu-kush); they had never before been of an army led out for even a month or two ; there had been weakness amongst them before the fight ; on these accounts and also because Kabul was empty of troops, it was now decided to give Humayun leave for Kabul. (April 11th) Leaving the matter at this, we marched from Alur on Thursday the 9th of Rajab, did 4 or 5 kurohs (8-10 m.) and dismounted on the bank of the Manas-water. Mahdi Khwaja also had many discomforts ; he too was given leave for Kabul. The military-collectorate of Blana [he held] was bestowed on Dost Lord-of-the-gate, and, as previously Etawa had been named for Mahdi Khwaja, Mahdi Khwaja's son Ja'far Khwaja was sent there in his father's place when (later) Qutb Khan abandoned it and went off.
[..]
Holy-war against Chanderi:
(Dec. 9th 1527) After returning from Sikri we started on Monday night the 14th of the first Rabi’, with the intention of making Holy-war against Chanderi, [..]

[peter]

The opposing POV of Rana Sanga of Chittaur.

Source for this is James Tod who wrote Annals and antiquities in early 1800's and the sequence of events at Khanua represents a work influenced by Baburnama, work of rajasthani Charans (historiographers of kings in Rajasthan) and Bhaats. Do notice the chiefs slain on Sanga's side with the number of their clans and also the the gap in Baburnama from Feb26th 1527 - March 13th 1527 is touched on by chroniclers of Mewar.

Babur advanced from Agra and Sikri to oppose Rana Sanga, in full march to attack him at the head of almost all the princes of Rajasthan. Although the annals state some points which the imperial historian has not recorded, yet both accounts of the conflict correspond in all the essential details. On the 5th of Kartik, S. 1584 ^ (a.d. 1527), according to the annals, the Rana raised the siege of Bayana, and at Khanua encountered the advanced guard of the Tatars, amounting to fifteen hundred men, which was entirely destroyed ; the fugitives carrying to the main body the accounts of the disaster, which paralysed their energies, and made them entrench for security, instead of advancing with the confidence of victory. Reinforcements met the same fate, and were pursued to the camp. Accustomed to reverses, Babur met the check without dismay, and adopted every precaution [304] that a mind fertile in expedients could suggest to reassure the drooping spirits of his troops. He threw up entrenchments, in which he placed his artillery, connecting his guns by chains, and in the more exposed parts chevaux de frise, united by leather ropes : a precaution continued in every subsequent change of position. Everything seemed to aid the Hindu cause : even the Tatar astrologer asserted that as Mars was in the west, whoever should engage coming froni the opposite quarter should be defeated.
In this state of total inactivity, blockaded in his encampment, Babur remained near a fortnight, when he determined to renounce his besetting sin, and merit superior aid to extricate himself from his peril.[..] But the destruction of the wine flasks would appear only to have added to the existing consternation, and made him, as a last resort, appeal to their faith. Having addressed them in a speech of [305] manly courage, though bordering on despair, he seized the happy moment that his exhortation elicited, to swear them on the Koran to conquer or perish.^ Profiting by this excite-ment, he broke up his camp, to which he had been confined nearly a month, and marched in order of battle to a position two miles in advance, the Rajputs skirmishing up to his guns. With- out a regular circumvallation, his movable pallisadoes and guns chained, he felt no security. The inactivity of Sanga can scarcely escape censure, however we may incline to palliate it by supposing that he deemed his enemy in the toils, and that every day's delay brought with it increased danger to him.[..]

Delay was fatal to this last coalition against the foes of his race. Babur is silent on the point towhich the annals ascribe their discomfiture, a negotiation pending his blockade at Khanua ; but these have preserved it, with the name of the traitor who sold the cause of his country. The negotiation had reached this point, that on condition of Babur being left Delhi and its depend-encies, the Pilakhal at Bayana should be the boundary of their respective dominions, and even an annual tribute was offered to the Rana [306]. We can believe that in the position Babur then was, he would not scruple to promise anything. The chief of Raesen, by name Salehdi, of the Tuar tribe, was the medium of communication, and though the arrangement was negatived, treason had effected the salvation of Babur.

[..] While the battle was still doubtful, the Tuar traitor who led the van (harawal) went over to Babur, and Sanga was obliged to retreat from the field, which in the onset promised a glorious victory, himself severely wounded and the choicest of his chieftains slain: Rawal Udai Singh of Dungarpur. with two hundred of his clan ; Ratna of Salumbar, with three hundred of his Chondawat kin ; Raemall Rathor, son of the prince of Marwar, with the brave Mertia leaders Khetsi and Ratna ; Ramdas the Sonigira Rao ; Ajja the Jhala ; Gokul-das Pramara; Manikchand and Chandrbhan, Chauhan chiefs of the first rank in Mewar ; besides a host of inferior names.[..]

That Babur respected and dreaded his foe we have the best proof in his not risking another battle with him (Babur says that he intended to pursue Sanga to Chitor, but was prevented by the defeat
of his forces advancing on Lucknow (Elliot-Dowson iv. 277); and the blame which he bestows on himself for the slackness of his pursuit after victory is honourable to Sanga, who is always mentioned with respect in the commentaries of the conqueror : and although he generally styles him the Pagan, and dignifies the contest with the title of " the holy war," yet he freely acknowledges his merit when he says, " Rana Sanga attained his present high eminence by his own valour and his sword."

[Rahul M]

singha ji, for you

Moreover the cow refs could be form a period where the culture was more concentrated in the drier open spaces of GV. Buffaloes need more humid, muddy and watery environs. They are more comfortable and found in the lower delta regions. Indeed buffaloes were used as rides by certain groups in Bengal. The Kaivartas or now commonly associated as originally a fishing community [need not be the only profession or association in reality] are supposed to have developed a buffalo riding army that once removed the Palas from power in northern Bengal temporrarily.

So buffaloes could also have been associated with communities with which the Vedic of the text period were in competition with.

[Singha]

fits in with my visions of zulu warriors mounted on cape buffalo and two horned rhinos...

have the wild gaurs ever been domesticated in south india ? they seem to be quite reclusive and shy beasts...

[tarun]

What was lacking, which prevented the development of Musket manufacturing in the Sikh empire.

Hard pressed for time and always under siege perhaps.
-Tarun

[ramana]

This is correct observation on Sikhs. It is recorded by many historians that Ranjit Singh tried unsuccessfully, multiple times, to buy muskets from the British. Singh wanted to buy in thousands but English always refused fearing that they might be the target. He had French/Italians for artillery as did the Marathas (Comte deBoigne).

I dont understand. Why was he trying to buy from the British. Why the Sikhs could not develop the armanents at home using the skills present in India.

What was lacking, which prevented the development of Musket manufacturing in the Sikh empire.

One account says Kanoji Angre too tried to buy powder from the Portuguese but found that it always did not propel the shot to same range as in their guns.

I think the gap in musket mfg persisted from Mughal times. Dortmunder and Kuhlke say that there was a ban on private musket mfg during Mughal days. And all bandooks were made in state armories which stopped with collapse of the Mughal State. Total de-industrialization was in process.

[peter]

Khanua Analysis

Organization of Babur's forces:

---------------------------------------------------Matchlock + special royal corps (tabinan-i-khasa-i-padshahi)----------------------
=[chained carts] = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
-------------------------------------------------------------------Babur [Centre]-------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------Ustad Ali Quli Artillery---------------------
----------------------------------------------[Right of Centre]-------------------[Left of Centre]------------
----------------------------------------------Chin Timur Sultan------------------Ala'u'd din 'Alam Khan
----------------------------------------------Khwaja Kamaluddin----------------Kamalu'd-din Muhibb-i-'ali
----------------------------------------------Dost-i-Khwand----------------------Khwaja Kamalu'd-din Husain
----------------------------------------------Kamalu'd-din Yunas-i-'ali----------[Others too but omitted by me]
----------------------------------------------Shah Mansur Barlas
----------------------------------------------Shihabu'd-din
----------------------------------------------Abdu'1-lah the librarian
----------------------------------------------Nizamu'd-din Dost

-----------------------------[Right Wing]----------------------------------------------------------------[Left Wing]-------------------------
--------------------------------Matchlockers----------------
=[Chained carts] = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
---------------------------------Humayun---------------------------------------------------|---Muhammad Sultan Mirza--------
--------Qasim-i-husain Sultan---------Shamsu'd - din Muhammad Kukuldash---|----'Abdu'l-'azlz Master of the Horse
--------Qawam Beg Aurdu-shah------Nizamu'd-din Khwajagi Asad jan-dar-----|---Shamsu'd-din Muhammad 'Ali Jang-jang
--------Jalalu'din Khusrau Kukuldash --------------------------------------------------|---Jalalu'd-din Qutluq-qadam qarawal
--------Nizamu'd-din Ahmad-i-yusuf Aughlaqchi ------------------------------------|---Jalalu'd-din Shah Husain yaragi Mughul Ghanchi
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---Nizamu'd-din Jan-I muhammad Beg Ataka.

---[Right Flankers]-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[Left Flankers]
------Tardika-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Mumin Ataka
------Malik Qasim------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Rustam Turkman

Battle:
1 Between 9-10 AM on March 17, 1527 the left wing of Sanga's forces attacked the right flankers of Babur (Malik Qasim) and the right half of the right wing under Khusrau Kukuldash.

2 Matchlock of Humayun and artillery/Archers of Babur could not stem this attack.

3 To stem this attack by the left wing of Sanga, entire right wing under Humayun (Qasim-i-husain Sultan, Nizamu’d-din Ahmad-i-yusuf, Qawam Beg, Muhammadi Kukuldash, Khwajagi Asad jan-dar) and the Right half of centre (Chin-timur Sultan, Yunasi-' ali, Shah Mansur Barlas, Abdu'l-lah the librarian) mobilized and fought against rajputs.

Notice the archers/artillery and matchlock has no impact and hand to hand fighting at close quarters is underway.

4 On the left flank of Babur under the cover of archers an outflanking movement is attempted by Mumin Ataka and Rustam Turkman assisted by some troops of the left wing namely Nizamu'd-din Jan-I muhammad Beg Ataka. This seems un-successful and soon the right wing of Sanga attacks the left wing of Babur and engages with Muhammad Sultan Mirza , 'Abdu'l-'aziz, the Master of the Horse, Qutluq-qadam qarawl, Muhammad 'Ali Jang-jang, Shah Husain yaragi Mughul Ghanchi. They seem to waiver and more help arrives from the left of the centre under Khwaja Kamalu'd din Husain with a body of diwanis.

5 It seems at this point Babur's centre is really in peril and he has to bring out his special royal corps (tabinan-i-khasa-i-padshahi), which are infantry from behind the carts, to attack Sanga's cavalry. Now this battle has raged on for hours and at this point the knockout punch by Sanga's vanguard ought to have been delievered but Silahadi decamps.

6. Sanga is now exposed because his vanguard is gone and he attempts an elephant attack on Babur's centre. Ustad Ali quli fires artillery at Sanga's elephants. Notice this is the first time artillery fires and that too many hours after the start of the battle and that too against elephants and not against cavalry!

7. Perhaps to protect Sanga, the remaining troops of Left and Right wing of Sanga which were pressing Babur's centre hard, retreat and while retreating some of them are picked by matchlock infantry of Babur. Note while hand to hand fighting is going on matchlockers could not fire because they could never be sure whether they will hit one of their own or the enemy.

8 At this point Baburnama records the prayers have been granted and infidels are rolled back in one mass upon the centre.

9 Defection of Silhadi gave the numerical advantage to Babur. Harawal (Vanguard) usually had twice the number of cavalry as was present in the two flanks put together. Thinned by their earlier attack on Babur Sanga's wings were depleted and made one last charge and perhaps perished to a man. Says Babur "The absurd (batil) Hindus, knowing their position perilous, dispersed like carded wool before the wind, and like moths scattered abroad. Many fell dead on the field of battle ; others, desisting from fighting, fled to the desert of exile and became the food of crows and kites.".

All in all it does not seem that musketry/archery or artillery played any significant role.

[Sanku]

Wonderful analysis. Thank you peter.

[Lalmohan]

peter - not sure you can come to that conclusion quite so easily. i urge you to obtain and read sandhu's book

[Pratyush]

Ramana,

I remain unconvinced by the reasoning provided by you. For a simple reason that the Mughal Empire had been gone for over a hundred years by the time of Ranjit Singh. Numerous Indian kingdoms had risen to fill the vacuum left behind by its collapse. It is clear that those kingdoms needed to have domestic supply of critical war materials such as muskets and Artillery. Yet we see that a premier kingdom renowned for its fighting prowess is seeking to purchase one of the most important elements with which to wage wars.

It did not take the time and effort to develop the same at home. Why was that? If it was constantly under siege and at war, then that is all the more baffling, why it was not developed and designed by the Sikhs at home. As their lives depended on it.

De-industrialization could be an explanation but once de industrialized, they could also have re-industrialized if sufficient stress was placed. The metallurgy dose not seem to be a problem as they still seem to be building good quality swords and armor plus canons in different parts of India at the time.

[Lalmohan]

its quite possible that the machine tools required to mass produce items such as muskets were not in place, and hand building such complex items could not produce sufficient volume and quality. this is where the europeans had started to get ahead of the game (machine tools)