
Its from the Economist.
NEW DELHI: The Chinese 'string of pearls' could well choke India one day if it's not careful. After strategic projects in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, China is moving closer to establishing a direct rail-road link to Bangladesh's port city of Chittagong as well as in helping construct the Sonadia deep-sea port at Cox's Bazaar.
China-watchers in the Indian security establishment say there has been "a flurry of activity" between Beijing and Dhaka on the two projects over the last couple of months.
Late last month, for instance, China's Yunnan province governor Qin Guangrong met Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina to promise all support for the proposed 111-km-long road-rail link between the two countries, with Beijing keen to sew up the agreement with Dhaka as soon as possible.
The project envisages connecting Chittagong with Yunnan province, via Myanmar, with the link distance measuring a mere 111 km. China has already roped in Myanmar for the tri-lateral project, which will help reduce its huge dependence on the global trade route through the Malacca Strait.
"China already has transit facilities through the Chittagong port, apart from commercial interests. A strong Chinese presence in Chittagong is bound to have security implications for India. It is, after all, our strategic backyard," said a senior official.
What bad karma, Bade Mian?Bade wrote:There is a lot of bad Karma on India's side, that is unfolding.
Ramana,ramana wrote:Surinder,
I think UPA-2 has had its 1962 moment without firing a shot. And we haven't realised it all. People are arguing whether PRC is threat or which Indian political partynot in power is to blame.
Selecting, electing Tamas leadership , void of Rajogun and free roaming of PS 'southasian " pimps as well feeding milk to snakes.surinder wrote:What bad karma, Bade Mian?Bade wrote:There is a lot of bad Karma on India's side, that is unfolding.
The way to handle China is by raising the issue of Xinjiang every time China needles Kashmir or AP. Raise the issue in OIC of treatment of innocent muslims in Xinjiang and how China is not allowing Kashmiri muslims to travel their historical silk road to Xinjiang by stapling their visas. Try to get TSP and BD, apart from OIC and OPEC help in this issue.Rupesh wrote:China eyes rail link to Chittagong
The problem is not that there is threat, it is also not that it is not appreciated. It is that the leadership has accepted defeat without any shot being fired by the enemy.RajeshA wrote:
A State which sees itself under threat starts to prepare for war. Where is our preparation?
The problem with Pakistan is that its leaders don't have the courage to make course correction even when laws of nature require doing so. The problem with India is that our leaders will make painful course correction ONLY when laws of nature require us to do so instead of making a less painful course correction when the writing is on the wall. To deal with China we will have to take a bit more proactive course by ejecting our pacifist foreign policy while making sure that the economy is on right track.Nihat wrote: Few posts back I think it was Shiv Saar who said that roughly 10 years back there was similar paranoia wrt to developments in TSP and how India should react but over the period of time, they have been reduced to a laughing stock for us. Now, I don't suppose the Chinese will become a laughing stock anytime soon but one thing that will happen over the next decade is that our percieved Inferiority complex and sense of insecurity wrt to China will gradually vanish.
It means prolonging the India-Pak civil war long into the future. IMO, the Indian state cannot afford to fight this war as well as catch up to Chinese because of extant inefficiences in its state structures.Nihat wrote:For one, how does Chinese Army moving into GB in POK imply that India will soon Loose its own Kashmir region. If anything, a permanent Chinese presence in POK is a big risk for them, given the proximity to Xinjiang.
If this has potential, why wait for the Pakistanis to do something? Congress should hark back to '57, appoint a Muslim prime minister and kill two birds with one stone.Nihat wrote:It is entirely possible that the International Jihadis of Paki type will not take kindly to this development and may percieve them as oppresive occupiers and suppresers of Muslim brothers.
The portion in red shows a way how India can take on China but that will require Indians to seek International power for powers sake and not for the sake of being Mr Nice guy of the global order.Dhiman wrote:Sino-Indian Rivalry Heating Up
By Balaji Chandramohan
From http://atlanticsentinel.com/2010/09/sin ... eating-up/
SNIP......
India’s foreign policy by contrast has always flirted with moralistic notions. Only with the start of this century did it appreciate the importance of realpolitik. India’s politicians are well trained in this regard when it comes to domestic affairs. Now they need to show similar genius in the field of international relations. If they can, India may stand up to China’s rapid ascend.
SNIP.......
Wails of Distress have two functions, with one of them productiveshiv wrote:I am simultaneously amused and irritated by the wails of distress about China on here and the calls for arming to defeat China in the naive calculation that a war with China will show them their place and solidify India's place in the order of things as they should be.
So what is worse - having the baddies destroy your kingdom or letting Sir Lancelot have some fun?shiv wrote:Once again let me point out that when King Arthur was out fighting baddies his trusted knight Sir Lancelot was doing hukku-pukku on Arthur's wife Queen Genevieve.
India is King Arthur. China is the baddies. USA is Sir Lancelot who gets to have the most fun.
Before 1971, USA also opposed Communist China. So if China had thought similarly (as noted above) there would have been no detente between the two, and China would not have been the economic and military power it is today.shiv wrote:I don't think people have any idea of the USA's strategy when we fall on the floor and roll with inconsolable grief about our status vis vis China. We should be crying doubly hard when we see the role of the US. Like the man who slept while the town was burning and woke up when his house caught fire - we are suddenly waking up to China without any insight into what has been happening in our neighborhood before China.
It was the USA that wanted to suck up to China in order to defeat the Soviet Union. A USA that was stuck in a pointless war in Vietnam with Nixon as President and Kissinger as Secretary of State struck upon th eidea of befriending China. The key, the condom for lifting the "bamboo curtain" and entering China was Pakistan's Gen Yahya Khan who later helped start the 1971 war.
And so, during the 1971 war it was
Later it was the USA under the Carter and Reagan administrations who
- The USA that encouraged China to put pressure on India by mobilizing troops at the border (which China did not do in 1971)
- The USA (Nixon) who said that he did not want any pressure to be put on Yahya Khan because he was a key figure in detente with China
The China Pakistan relationship is old. It started after the 1965 war at which time the US had put sanctions on Pakistan and went from strength to strength. But the US has gained from that relationship.
- Looked the other way when China transferred enriched Uranium and bombs to Pakistan
- A US President refused to speak up in Congress that Pakistan was making a bomb
- Ronald Reagan who spoke of "Freedom Fighters" in Kashmir in the same breath as the Taliban in Afghanistan
I think we can both agree, that India need not think of starting a war with China. But I don't agree with the corollary though.shiv wrote:If we make war against China deliberately - it is our economy that will suffer. If we don't make war - China will go about its business making friends and allies. If we cannot do the former, we cannot stop the latter.
Pakistan is just one of the cat's paw. India faces a whole slew of challenges from China. It is also important that we don't lose sight of forging the right policy w.r.t. to China because of our preoccupation with Pakistan, because in the end, that is the whole strategy of China, that India burns itself out with Pakistan, and they get a free ride. This in fact amounts to the same thing you noted about our positioning with America - burning ourselves out fighting America's war with China.shiv wrote:All that we can do is what is feasible and does the least damage to us in the short term and long term. We are starting with a handicap. We are starting from a position where the two most powerful powers in the world are supporting a country that is using Islam to hate India. In the long term we have to neutralise both the US and China.
Pakistan's failing status may give us the best opportunity to get Pakistanis to integrate their economy with the Indian economy. But that requires the defeat of the Pakistani army first. And not necessarily militarily. It is the akistani army that is supporting Chinese and US interests in the region and against India.
On top of that, to secure their access to Asia, and maintain their coveted preeminence over the region, the West has to pull one to its side to check and beat the other, and it bets on India. But the wise Indian government, walking on the tight rope between doves and hawks at home, is not so willing to place the China-India ties at stake, the time-honored bilateral relations entering its 60th anniversary, and keeping a far-reaching significance.
Masaru wrote:New Warning From Tokyo on China’s Military“China has been rather intensifying its maritime activities including those in waters near Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense policies and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan…”
Relations cooled earlier this year, in part because of various incidents in waters disputed by Tokyo and Beijing. In May, Japanese and Chinese diplomats also publicly sparred at a meeting in South Korea, after Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada pressed Beijing to shrink, or at least not increase, its nuclear-weapons arsenal.
Japan was also rattled by China’s refusal to condemn North Korea after a South Korean naval vessel was sunk in March, killing 46 South Korean servicemen, in an incident that Seoul blamed on Pyongyang. Japan considers North Korean one of its biggest security threats.
Atri wrote:People's Republic of China (PRC) and its rise have been an interesting story which is unfolding. The sheer pace with which China is expanding, makes one think whether this growth is healthy or is it cancerous. Is China expanding out of opportunity or is it expanding out of desperation.
The model of PRC economic growth is such that it has no option but to grow and expand. If PRC economy stops expanding, it will start collapsing even faster. There sustainability factor is slightly less in PRC economy which India has. The price of existence and expansion has to be paid by salvaging USA out. At all costs. PRC was very well placed until last october. It still is in great position, but the Simhasana has begun trembling.
Expansion of economy keeps the people quite because being quietly oppressed and earning a decent livelihood is profitable for common man. It is like a pressure-cooker situation. The virulently expanding economy is the safety valve which PRC cannot afford to loose. If this safety valve fails to work, the pressure will build up and the cooker will explode. PRC has to generate wealth and invest in US at all costs. Because, if dollar falls, the trillions of dollars in Chinese coffers will grow worthless. The people in US are democratic and decadent. They have had their share of prosperity and a robust social-security system of US will ensure that people in US won't die of hunger, this is for sure. China does not have such outlets like Social security system and democracy. There is Hunger-problem in PRC which is enormous. So, as days of recession linger, PRC's need to generate money will increase exponentially.
Even more alarming is the scenarion which can be seen when we compare the rise of India along with that of China. As these countries rise, their spheres of influence have begun to overlap and conflict of interests have ensued. Here is an account of understanding of China's interests in Asia, Indian subcontinent and rest of the world.
Interests of PRC in India's vicinity
1. To strengthen its grip in Tibet and Xinjiang
2. To suppress the separatist movements in these provinces at all costs.
3. Govt in Nepal favouring PRC, more importantly, not favouring India.
4. Contain the rise of Japan and stop from Japan and Taiwan cooperating with each other - antagonistic to PRC interests.
5. Support Pakistan enough to contain India but not to influence Xinjiang (one important possibility for India)
6. Energy routes from middle east to be secured, both land-based and sea based. Pipeline from Iran-Pakistan-China would be very helpful for China..
7. Huge consumer market in middle east hence, one potential importer of Chinese goods.
8. Vietnam - to ensure that Communist dictatorship remains incumbent in Vietnam. People are pissed but cannot revolt.
9. Same is the case with Myanmar.
10. The neighbourhood of China - Myanmar, Vietnam, Taiwan and Japan are opportunities for India, if utilized correctly. If democracy is facilitated in these two countries people will favour India. Vietnam can be a long shot, but Myanmar is an urgent necessity.
11. The major concern of PRC is Taiwan and Japan. India comes third. PRC's attention is more fixed towards first two..
12. Before going for Tibet, Myanmar should be India's numero-uno priority. Secondly Nepal. Thirdly, Baloochistan (this is tricky). Fourthly, friendship with Iran, Vietnam. Tibet will liberate itself on its own, if Myanmar, Nepal and Baloochistan become pro-Indian.
13. A big chunk of economy of PRC is based upon value addition and cheap labour. The market of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) depends upon PRC, irrespective its repressive policies for cheap labour. Many products of ASEAN are imported in PRC, added the value and exported to the West since labour is comparatively quite expensive in ASEAN. If India is able to convince ASEAN to prefer India over China, they will be more than happy. The Indian system is transparent than that of China and intentions nobler than China. If we could persuade ASEAN to deal with India and that too in Indian rupee, nothing like it...
Rest of the world
Given the meltdown in west, this safety valve of PRC is most prone for mal-function. If India can snatch one or two big markets from PRC, it will be helpful to us. USA has the backing of Europe for cultural reasons. India and China do not. They have to be self-motivated, when it comes to ideology and civilization. So, when looking at the global prospects for PRC to continue expanding, we have to look at potential markets.
IMO, there few such areas which can be the hotspots for investment and hence chance for aggressive growth.
1. First is Sub-Saharan Africa. Not all Africa is poor. Some nations like South-Africa, Kenya, Sudan can be promising. I guess, PRC has marked the presence in Sudan.
2. Second Region is South America. I do not know how much is Brazil's clout in South American continent, but lots of commies there, which can be beneficial for PRC to facilitate as growth sectors. Traditionally, it is US back-door. But, US is cash-strapped for investment. So USA might allow PRC's investment in Central and South Asian countries. Chinese anyways like dealing with commies, dictators and Military Junta, which are dozen a dime in South America.
3. Third Region is Eastern Europe. But, we have Russia sitting over there. Even if Russia is cash-strapped. But, I don't know how Russia will deal with the massive PRC investments in eastern europe.Once again, it has to be done with Unkil's blessings.
4. Fourth is Iran. USA cannot do anything here. But PRC is friend of Islamic countries, especially Sunni ones. Iran being a Shia muslim country, it will be tricky job. Practically, entire Islamic world can potentially be China's growth sector. China gels nicely with nations where democracy is weak which is the scenarion is most of the Islamic nations.
5. Fifth region is Oceania. However, Pacific is the region where two biggest pains in PRC's ass dwell - Taiwan and Japan.
6. Sixth is India. The areas of strategic and economic interest of both China and USA is India...
USA and PRC desperately want India to develop and empower her domestic market and abide to rules of WTO faithfully and buy their goods. They will control the demons created by them (Pakistani Army, Taliban and ISI) so that India spends more on development and defence. And India is doing that. But, it is frustratingly slow and also, India's efforts for total indegenisaton and hunger for Transfer of Technology is what is pinching them.
Within 15 years, If current growth rate continues, India will be powerful enough to assert her dominance over Indian Ocean and Indian subcontinent. That will be the time when the need of oil will start becoming dire and India is geopolitically well placed to extract the benefit. It is not long before India will remove this thorn in her leg, called Pakistan and start running.
Hence, they don't want India to become too powerful and start projecting her power beyond her boundaries. In other words, PRC and Unkil are looking for a decent girl who will become an ideal house-wife. Kaaryeshu Daasi, Karaneshu Mantri, Bhojyeshu Maata, Roopeshu Lakshmi, Shayaneshu Rambha, Kshamayeshu Dharitri, Satkarma Naari, Kuladharma Patni as described in Neetishaastram !!
Middle East is firmly under USA's grip and they won't tolerate anybody else's presence, especially of the one who is perceived as friend of Islamic nations due to Israel.
The love which blossomed between Manmohan Singh (MMS) and Bush was strictly business. The asset which dubya liked in Indya was her ecOnOmy and market. If India can work out her internal problems and develop the rural component, she will be able to project her Mohini Roop (economy and market) and Durga Roop (military) at will.
Mohini Roop of Bharati can deal with jolted asuras who were running for Amrita-Kumbha and are now distressed. It is this Mohini Roop that can potentially contribute significant;y in pulling the world out of recession. Beauty is, in strange manner, extremely powerful. Even Durga is described as so incredulously beautiful that Shumbha-Nishumbha fell in love with her. A beautiful intelligent woman with stable mind can achieve lot more than man. Her soft power is extremely potent. Just that, under UPA govt led by MMS, this Mohini became a dumb-blonde.
For people who listen to reason (PRC, USA et al), Mohini can persuade them to fall in line. For dick-heads like Shumbha-Nishumbha, Chanda-Munda and Mahishasura (Pakistani Army, ISI, Taliban et al), Durga-Roop is more than enough.
India can snatch at least one really huge market away from Chinese, that is Indian domestic market. Of course, its not that easy and there are WTO considerations and India cannot do like this because India will suffer too.. But, it can at least be used as leverage, which India is not doing.
What will happen if India declares that it will not import anything from a nation which helps Pakistan? Guess, who will suffer the most !!!
Alternatives:China’s heavy use of the Malacca and Lombok/Makassar straits in Southeast Asia is emblematic of this concern. The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway separating Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the strait is one of the world’s most important waterways. More than 60,000 vessels transit the strait each year, carrying 25 percent of global trade. The Lombok/Makassar Strait passes through the Indonesian archipelago and is used mainly by Very Large Crude Carriers. In terms of volume of oil shipped, this route is of near equivalent importance to the better known Malacca Strait.
For China, the strategic significance of these straits increases every year. At present, approximately 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originate in the Middle East, and this figure is expected to rise to 75 percent by 2015. Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to the PRC via the Malacca or Lombok/Makkasar straits. Over the past few years Chinese leaders have come to view the straits, especially the Malacca Strait, as a strategic vulnerability. In November 2003 President Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability. Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted considerable attention to the country’s “Malacca dilemma,” leading one newspaper to declare: “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China” (China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004).
2. Sittwe Myanmar
As a means to reduce strategic vulnerabilities, the PRC is diversifying its sources of energy imports away from the Middle East and is considering financing transit routes that would bypass the Malacca Strait altogether. Yet all of the proposals involve significant financial outlays, technical problems, and security concerns. The most fanciful proposal thus far has been to construct a canal across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. The idea of an “Asian Panama Canal” linking the Andaman Sea with the Gulf of Thailand, and hence the Indian and Pacific oceans, has been around for centuries. First suggested in 1677, the idea has been revisited at least a dozen times since then. Yet on each occasion the project has been shelved due to lack of financial resources, technical difficulties and security problems. The idea was most recently revisited in 2001. Proponents envisaged a two-lane canal, an east-west highway running parallel, and harbors, oil refineries and storage facilities at each end (Bangkok Post, July 6, 2003). The canal, it was argued, would create jobs, generate revenue in the form of transit fees and oil refining, and benefit the global economy because ships could save 3-4 days sailing time by avoiding the Malacca Strait.
Initially the idea seemed to arouse great interest in the PRC. Beijing, however, baulked at the estimated $20-25 billion price tag. In 2003 the government of Thaksin Shinawatra effectively killed the project when it declared it would not provide any financial support for the proposed canal. Instead, the Thaksin government championed the Strategic Energy Land Bridge (SELB), a 150-mile underground oil pipeline across southern Thailand. At an estimated cost of $600-800 million the SELB would cost a fraction of the Kra Canal. The PRC has expressed an interest in the project, although its enthusiasm seems to have waned somewhat because of cost concerns and escalating political violence in Thailand’s southern provinces (The Nation, February 14, 2005). Moreover, the SELB would not really lessen the vulnerability of seaborne energy imports into the PRC, as tankers would still have to sail to and from Thailand, therefore merely shifting the focus of the problem slightly
3.PakhanastanAs far as China is concerned, it would be far better if oil deliveries could be made closer to home. With this in mind, Beijing is giving serious consideration to two large infrastructure projects. The first is a 750-mile pipeline from Sittwe in Burma to Kunming in Yunnan province, with an estimated cost around $2 billion (Asia Times, September 23, 2004). A Burma-China pipeline is appealing to Beijing for two reasons. First, oil tankers from the Middle East and Africa would be able to bypass the Malacca Strait by sailing directly to Sittwe. Second, the project is politically appealing given the close links between Rangoon and Beijing. Talks between the Chinese and Burmese governments on the feasibility of the project began in mid-2004. Then in December 2005 the Burmese junta signed a deal with PetroChina to supply 6.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to the PRC over a 30 year period. It was reported that the gas would be transferred to China via a pipeline to Kunming (Straits Times, February 2). If a gas pipeline is constructed, it is likely that China would also build an oil pipeline running parallel.
Another proposal is to transfer oil and gas from Pakistan into China’s Xinjiang province. This route would involve oil tankers off-loading their cargoes at the Pakistani port of Gwadar, a facility heavily financed by the PRC government (China Brief, February 15, 2005). Energy resources would then be transported by road, or more likely rail or a pipeline, to Islamabad 900 miles to the north. From there, the energy supplies would be sent a further 750 miles to Kashi (Kashgar) in Xinjiang province along the Karakoram Highway that links Pakistan with China. Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has pushed the idea of a China-Pakistan “energy corridor” for several years now, arguing that the Pakistani economy would benefit from the construction of oil refineries and oil and gas storage and transshipment facilities, while China would gain an alternative to the Malacca Strait.
A China-Pakistan energy corridor would be an expensive proposition for Beijing given the long distances and rugged terrain involved. Gwadar’s Baluchistan province is also prone to separatist violence. At the geopolitical level, however, the proposal is attractive for two reasons. First, Gwadar is very close to the Persian Gulf and all maritime choke points save for the Strait of Hormuz would be effectively bypassed.
I am sorry ramana the post should have said reports and not report. But I have given the reports which led to the post belowramana wrote:Christopher Sidor, Can you name or link the report hee? Thanks, ramana
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 85#p942385
Please note that is a blog and not an official view of worldbank. There are various things that can go haywire with the scenario outlined in the blog. Basically we have yet to see America shift to a more balance economic structure. We have yet to see America closing or restricting its market for chinese manufactured goods..........
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For geopolitical reasons and out of confidence in its own innovation capacity and competitiveness in high value adding activities, the United States was willing to open its markets to imports from economies in Asia and Europe which were important allies in the Cold War. The vast, efficiently retailed and organized American market proved to be an elastic source of demand and U.S. companies were ready to vacate niches for low end labor intensive imports.
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The U.S., long the importer of last resort and the consumer driven economy par excellence, is now so indebted and its industry so hollowed that prolonged adjustment is inevitable. This will mean weaker demand for imports and greater competition from U.S. exporters. Other western countries with current account and public sector deficits and/or aging populations are unlikely to fill the gap and certainly China and the other BRICs cannot come close to rivaling the import demand of the U.S. – China’s share of global GDP is less than 9 percent.
Rising energy and resource costs could lead to a shrinkage of production networking, encourage more vertical integration in leading producers and dampen trade and growth. The costs associated with urbanization and climate change will also increase the capital coefficient of growth (ICORs).
Continue thinking. Find out if it is a hoax or a real thingrohitvats wrote:Gentlemen,
There is something about this energy security argument and String of Pearls strategy and NA gambit that does not make sense to me. May be I'm just too thick in the head to understand these things. But here goes.
So, what security has the Chinese achieved?
Why is Rajamohan so worried if there isn a worry as old timers here say? And note who he stands as responsible.
Drawn in at the borders
C. Raja Mohan Posted online: Sat Sep 18 2010, 02:53 hrs
Having squandered some of the best years in the history of India’s external relations, the UPA government’s defence policy is now condemned to deal with some of the worst. Through much of its first term in government, the UPA had a relatively peaceful Jammu and Kashmir, a ceasefire on the borders with Pakistan, a measure of stability in Afghanistan, tranquil borders with China, and improving relations with all the major powers.
That was the moment to undertake some comprehensive defence sector reforms, do the groundwork for rapid military modernisation, alter the internal dynamics of Kashmir, and catch up with China’s rising power potential.
Sadly, the UPA government did not. It now confronts the prospect of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, a breakdown in the peace process with Pakistan, a stalled boundary negotiation with China, internal turbulence in Kashmir, China’s questioning of India’s sovereignty over J&K, and deepening Sino-Pak cooperation across the board, including in Jammu and Kashmir.
Meanwhile, the government’s hand-wringing in face of a crisis in Kashmir and the serious internal discord in the Congress party raise questions about the political will of the Indian state under the UPA government. It will be no surprise if India’s adversaries want to take advantage of widely perceived fecklessness in Delhi.
As the idea of a two-front military tension gains ground — the thesis that has been argued not just by the former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra but also by General Deepak Kapoor, when he was the chief of army staff — amidst a worsening regional security environment, India’s military faces great challenges.
There is nothing in the publicly available excerpts from the remarks of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister A.K. Antony at the combined commanders meeting last Monday to suggest that Delhi is gearing up. The defence ministry continues to return money approved by Parliament for building arms year after year. The annual spending on defence as a percentage of GDP has fallen to one of its lowest levels since border clashes with China in 1962.
Although arms makers from around the recession-hit advanced world are queuing up in Delhi, our defence ministry seems unable to develop an acquisition process that can grasp the opportunity for a significant expansion of India’s defence industrial base. {batting for uS mfgs?}
While the Indian private sector is eager to build advanced arms manufacturing capabilities, the defence ministry seems to think that stuffing contracts down the throat of public sector units that are choking with orders they cannot execute is in the best national
interest.
Cynics would say we should forget the tall talk of a defence
industrial base when the UPA government cannot even build roads on our borders. The prime minister told the combined commanders that “border infrastructure” is an “integral part” of our defence preparedness and the task must be approached with some “urgency”. Well put. But is any one in the government responsible for getting this done?
On his part, Antony told the brass that India “cannot lose sight of
the fact that China has been improving its military and physical
infrastructure” on our borders. This probably is the understatement of the decade, for China’s transformation of the transport infrastructure in Yunnan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the provinces that border South Asia, has been nothing short of revolutionary. China’s decision to build road and rail networks across the borders of these provinces is bound to transform forever the geopolitics of our neighbourhood.
One wonders if Antony’s statement that we should not lose sight of the PLA’s new mobility along and across its border is an abstract philosophical statement or a commitment to respond.![]()
A recent report from the parliamentary standing committee on defence suggests the progress on road-building on our northern frontiers has been simply pathetic. According to the report, of the 277 roads that the UPA government decided to build a few years ago, only 29 have been completed to date. There is said to be progress of sorts (think Commonwealth Games) on another 168 roads, and work has not even started on 80 projects.![]()
The state of border road-building is symptomatic of the nation’s
larger defence paralysis. A national disaster like the 1962 debacle with China awaits the UPA government if it does not get its defence act together quickly. In 1962, it was Delhi’s failure to understand the significance of Chinese road-building in Ladakh that set off the crisis.
The debacle of 1962 was not really a military disaster. The Indian army lost only a few battles. The air force was barely used. There was not much of a navy to talk about. As China administered a limited amount of force to teach India a lesson, the war was lost in the mind of a Delhi that was utterly unprepared.
The tragedy of 1962 was in essence a failure of the civilian
leadership of our military. It was about the naive assumptions about the world that India’s political leadership had cherished. Delhi had then misread China’s interests, intentions and capabilities.
For many, a national disgrace of the kind seen in 1962 is unimaginable in the current environment. Has not India become a much stronger economy since the early 1990s? Is not its military much more capable than in 1962? The fact, however, is that India’s relative defence gains have been outstripped by the more rapid advances in Chinese military power.
As Chinese power today radiates at us not just from across the Himalayas but also the Indian Ocean, Delhi’s problem is neither the lack of financial resources nor the absence of military/ technical solutions. It is about the UPA government’s political will to address the defence challenges purposefully.
There are two ways in which nations cope with defence challenges. One is to mobilise the nation’s own resources and restructure the defence apparatus. The other is to leverage external opportunities. Any serious Indian defence strategy must do both, much like it did after 1962. But is there any one out there in charge of India’s defence policy?
[email protected]
Sir, the total distance betwen Great Nicobar Islands (India) and Banda Aceh (Indonesia) is around 180km. This is the corridor from where most of Chinese oil supplies and their European/African trade passes through. If I was GoI, I would 1) go and plant the Indian flag on the sea floor between Banda Aceh and Great Nicobar (just like China has planted its flat at the bottom of South China sea). Doesn't mean anything, but sends a strong symbolic message. Once I have done that, I would be 2) imposing all sorts of environment restrictions on Chinese oil tankers crossing this region and develop 3) excellent relationship with Indonesia. There are probably better ways to harass the Chinese here every time they raise temperatures in the North. GoI needs to be sending the Chinese the right signals and this one of the places to do so where Chinese are completely powerless.shiv wrote: Note that the distance to the Malacca strait from Car Nicobar is 1200 km - well within the MKI's unrefuelled range.
A&N Islands need to be turned into an offensive and defensive fortress before it is too late.While "string of pearls" is taken by us Indians to mean "shiver in your dhotis you sodding SDREs" - it can also mean "Shiver in your kimkoms" or whatever it is the Chinese like to shiver in. Those pearls are all within India's bench-oddgiri range.
Karanji....even if all BRFites listens to you and agree with you..will it have any effect? Its Corporates and GoI babus who drive these things with myopic vision...Karan Dixit wrote:I have been opposing the sale of Indian steel to China for a very long time but alas no one listens to me.
Looking at the Navy deployment during the tsunami, China hasn't achieved any security with its "string of Perls" that India can't take down in a day, but what it has achieved is "influence" at the expense of Indian influence around our neighborhood. China's peacetime strategic space has expanded in India's neighborhood while our peacetime strategic space has contracted in our own neighborhood.rohitvats wrote: Coming to String of Pearls theory - OK. What about it? Can China place whole of PLAN west of Malacca Straits to take on IN or USN and use these bases to sustain their effort? Unless, Hambantota starts flying Chinese flag, I don't think PLAN can look for logistical support in these areas on a large scale. And how will it prevent these ports from being taken out by India? Can GoSL take such an extreme step against India? Without repurcussions? And extreme ones at that?
So, what security has the Chinese achieved?
Thanx.