Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center in Washinton, DC. He served in the White House under Ronald Reagan as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council.
Kemp sent me a copy of his readable 326-page book, published this year, titled,
"The East Moves West: India, China and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East" (Brookings Institution Press).
The book:
"Compares and contrasts Indian and Chinese involvement in the Middle East. He stresses an embedded historical dimension that gives India substantially more familiarity and interest in the region --
India was there first, and it has maintained that head start. Both nations, however, are clearly on the rise and leaving an indelible mark on the Middle East, and that enhanced influence has international raminfications for the United States and throughout the world."
Kemp believes "the United States will remain the dominant military power in the region but will have to share some security responsibilities with the Asians, especially in the Indian Ocean."
I am summarizing below the salient points emerging from Kemp’s book:
**While the need for energy may be the major reason for Asia’s interest in the Middle East, four other factors account for the growing economic, political and cultural ties between the two regions: immigrant labor, non-energy trade and investment, tourism and educational exchange.
**India has been very successful in nurturing good relations with all of the key Middle Eastern countries. India has been able to work closely with the Muslim nations while also developing important military connections with Israel.
**Approximately 4.5 million Indian citizens currently work in the GCC countries, making them the largest expatriate community in the region. Remittances from those workers are an important contribution to the economies of Indian states such as Kerala. Most important, however, the workers are essential to the economic growth and well-being of the Gulf states.
**India’s growing investment in the Gulf parallels its improved relations with the United States, the Gulf’s current guardian.
**By 2030 Indian oil consumption will reach 4.5 million barrels a day, while domestic production will be only 1.9 million barrels a day. Given that India already imports 45 percent of its oil from the Middle East, it is highly likely that India will remain dependent and even increase its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East.
**India’s trade with the six GCC states (excluding oil) totaled $86.9 billion in FY 2008-9, surpassing India’s trade with the EU ($80.6 billion), the ASEAN ($44.6 billion), and the US ($40.6 billion). Looking to the future, Indian leaders have expressed a desire to continue the rapid expansion of trade, Gulf investment for major infrastructure projects, and broaden their Gulf State relationships beyond economics.
**Indians account for 550,000 out of Oman’s 570,000 expatriate workers. Oman hosts India’s largest overseas joint venture -- the $969 million Oman India Fertilizer Company.
**Of Qatar’s population of under 1 million, roughly 300,000 are Indians. The two countries remain close partners in the hydro-carbon sector, especially LNG. In November 2008 a plan was announced for Qatar to invest $5 billion in India’s energy sector.
**As of year-ended March 2007, the UAE was the fifth largest exporter to India, supplying 8 percent of India’s petroleum imports and the second largest destination for India’s exports, behind the United States, with total imports one-third higher than those from China. India’s trade with the UAE accounts for one-third of India’s trade with the Middle East. More than 3,300 Indian companies have opened offices or manufacturing units in the UAE.
**With $626 million invested, UAE was the top direct investor in India among Middle Eastern countries from 2000 through February 2008. India has requested $92 billion for the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor. In March 2007 India and UAE firms signed a real estate deal worth more than $20 billion, which included plans to build two large townships in the booming outskirts of New Delhi.
**Currently 33 percent of UAE’s population and 50 percent of its work force are Indian -- about 1.4 million people. (Pakistani nationals number over 860,000). 25 percent of the Indian population consists of professionals and business people. There are some 100 cultural and literary associations in the UAE and more than 50 schools that follow an Indian curriculum.
**More than 500,000 Indians reside in Kuwait. Indo-Kuwaiti trade has grown three-fold since 2003 and reached $6.6 billion in 2007, of which petroleum constituted $5.7 billion. Kuwait has increased cooperation with Indian firms in the realm of information technology and biotechnology, as reflected in the number of Indian experts in those fields working in Kuwait.
**India is important to Bahrain’s economy because 290,000 Indian blue and white collar workers live there, making up nearly 30 percent of its total population. However, India does not rank among Bahrain’s top trading partners, as bilateral trade has not risen above 3 percent of Bahrain’s overall trade in the last five years.
**The energy sector is an important part of the India-Iranian relationship.
**India, Iran and Russia are cooperating on the North-South corrider project, the goal of which is to create a maritime-railway link between Mumbai and St. Petersburg through Bandar Abbas, Iran, that would shave more than 6000 miles off the current maritime route.
**There are uncertainties in India’s relationship with Iran, though American withdrawal from Afghanistan will probably bring the two countries closer. In April 2008 M K Narayanan, India’s then National Security Adviser, said that there is a "great deal taking place between India and Iran which is not on the public realm."
**Despite its low-key diplomacy, a number of issues could eventually force India to flex its muscles and become a more active player in Middle East geopolitics.
**China has productive and deepening relationships with many states in the Greater Middle East, including Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. Its voracious appetite for resources and its other economic needs match the economic profiles of the countries in the region. China’s growing physical links with the countries of Central Asia, and especially Pakistan, will open up new road, rail, and pipeline routes that will eventually directly influence trade, politics, and commerce in the Middle East.
**China is one of Iran’s top trading partners. Total trade between the two countries rose from $3.1 billion in 2001 to a staggering $27 billion in 2008. More than 100 Chinese firms operate in Iran, primarily in dam and ship construction, steel production, the energy sector, and seaport and airport development. However, Chinese infrastructure investment in Iran pales in comparison with its investment in Pakistan. Of the Pakistani projects, the development of the port of Gwadar is of particular interest to Iran because it has the potential to reduce the influence of Iran’s port at Chahbahar and displace Iran as a pathway to Central Asian markets.
**Iran has become the largest market for Chinese arms exports. China is Iran’s major source of missile guidance equipment. China has, however, been careful not to overplay its hand in challenging the United States on the key issues of nuclear activites, terrorism and antagonism toward Israel and efforts to derail the Arab-Israeli peace.
**Trade between Saudi Arabia and China has grown significantly. Saudi is a major investor in China.
**In addition to a bilateral military relationship between China and Saudi Arabia, there are reports that the Saudis have reached an agreement with Pakistan to station nuclear weapons on Saudi soil in the event that Iran develops a nuclear bomb.
**Although China’s relations with the small Gulf states are not as extensive or as intimate as India’s, China has made remarkable progress in developing business ties with them.
** The strategic basis of Sino-Pakistani relationship is a shared need to provide a check on India. The Sino-Pakistani engagement has limited India’s strategic options and forced it to occupy a defensive posture since 1962. Pakistan is "China’s Israel." No matter what action the Pakistani government takes, China will back it, because of China’s need to check India’s power. However, it is unlikely that China will directly challenge US power and influence.
The chapter on "Asia and Israel" focuses mainly on "India and Israel" and "China and Israel":
**Israel has one of the Middle East’s most robust economies, regulated by democratic institutions and a vigorously independent judiciary. It also has an advanced technology sector that is especially innovative in high-tech agriculture, medicine, information technology and, most important, aerospace and defense.
**The emerging India-Israeli relationship was codified in 2001 with the creation of the Joint Defense Cooperation Group which meets annually to solidify defense deals and military ties and coordinate the security relationship. Counter-terrorism efforts were formalized with the formation of an Indo-Israeli Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism.
**Economic ties between Israel and India have grown swiftly. India is Israel’s second largest trading partner in Asia in non-military goods. India and Isael have been cooperating on their respective space programs. Agricultural cooperation also has been important.
A quote from the section on "China and Israel’:
"The focus of Sino-Israeli cooperation has been military relations. Israel and China began to engage in extensive military cooperation as early as the 1980s .......and some estmate that Israel sold arms worth $4 billion to China during that period." (Page 139).
Again,
"By purchasing arms from Israel, China is able to circumvent the [US and EU arms] embargoes and secure advanced military technology that would be otherwise unavailable." (Page 139).
"[Notwithstanding US pressure which forced Israel to cancel a Chinese order for PHALCON airborne early warning systems in July 2000], "China’s market for high-tech Israeli military products is growing, and Israel sees China as a major customer. According to a report from the US-China Security Review Commission, "Israel ranks second only to Russia as a weapons provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology,.....". (Page 140).
Last quote:
"China has now become a vital market for Israel’s extensive military industries and arms manufacturers. Israel also has limited its cooperation with Taiwan in order to foster closer ties with China."
Recently, I had an opportunity to participate in a conference call with Israel’s ambassador to India Mark Sofer when I asked the following question:
In view of the close military cooperation being developed between Israel and India and in view of the fact that China may well turn out to be an enemy of both India and the US over the medium to longer term, is it proper for Israel to continue to supply advanced and sophisticated weapons and technology to China?
His unhesitating answer: Israel does NOT supply weapons to China.
Here are some more salient points emerging from Kemp’s book:
**The unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict manifests itself at three critical levels: Israel’s ongoing battles with the Palestinians, particularly in Gaza; the possibility of renewed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel; and Israel’s long-standing confrontation with Syria, including the occupation of the Golan Heights. The fact that Iran is deeply involved in arming and supporting Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas escalates the traditional Arab-Israeli conflict.
**Since most of the commerce between the Middle East and Asia goes by sea or air over long tracks of the Indian Ocean, the security of the maritime environmnent is a key factor in economic growth. Also, most of the communications between Asia and the Middle East are increasingly dependent on undersea cable networks.
**For the next two decades, and probably longer, the basic security of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean will depend on the United States. The costs of sustaining the US presence are huge especially if the US economy is in turmoil and Afghanistan commands major defense commitment.
**In different ways, both India and China are expanding their maritime reach and both have reasons to be concerned about each other’s long term strategic objectives. Japan’s future maritime role also could be an important factor in the emerging Asian balance of power.
**Over the longer run, as road, rail and pipeline projects expand in Central Asia and beyond, perhaps into the Middle East, the security of the land routes will become more significant especially for China. Would the Indian Ocean then become less important for China’s commerce with the Middle East?
**Meantime, while aircraft carriers and advanced submarines of the United States will ensure that Washington retains the ability to exert sea control in the long term, the modernization plans of the Indian and Chinese navies could lead to a multipolar balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Both the Indian and Chinese navies are conducting exchange and outreach programs beyond their normal areas of operation. Chinese forces have worked with Pakistan in the Arabian Sea, and India has participated with the United States and Japan in tri-nation naval exercises as far away as the Sea of Japan. This combination of rising naval powers with overlapping areas of interest will not necessarily lead to conflict.
**Rather their overlapping interests could lead to further cooperation between navies beset by a variety of low-intensity conflicts and potential nonconventional challenges , such as piracy, maritime terrorism, and disasters requiring humanitarian relief.
**It would be many years, if not decades, before any of the Asian powers will be able to duplicate the magnitude of current US maritime forces in the Indian Ocean and west Pacific.That could happen if the US unilaterally decides to downgrade its maritime presence. Or, if China, India or Japan or any combination of the three decide to dramatically upgrade their current maritime expansion programs and seek and obtain the access rights to port facilities and air bases necessary for power projection and sea-lane protection missions.
**The US and India have been expanding their cooperation on defense and security since the mid-1990s, and it has resolved into what could be a durable defense partnership. This has important ramifications for the long-term security of the Gulf and Indian Ocean, including broadening the range of US naval operations and increasing cooperation in securing sea-lanes. Military-to-military interactions between India and the US, including air, land and sea exercises, have also increased in recent years. The DOD has stated that it is the goal of the US to help India meet its defense needs, including by providing assistance with important capabilities and technologies that India seeks.
**Military relations between China and the United States have displayed the greatest volatility of those between the US and any other foreign nation, alternating between periods of intense engagement and increasing tension.
**India considers the security of the entire Indian Ocean region -- from the Cape of Good Hope to the Horn of Africa and the Straits of Malacca and as far South as Antarctica -- to be of interest, with the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Gulf having primary importance. While the Indian navy has consciously and publicly stated its will to be the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, it has taken care to demonstrate its increasing capability in a manner that neither challenges the other powers operating in the region nor threatens the smaller states of the Indian Ocean littoral. Its strategy is to build its capability to provide regional security in cooperation with other regional navies.
**In the long run, India probably will play the role of integrator in the Indian Ocean region, helping to bring widely separated littoral nations together through trade and diplomacy.
**While US support will facilitate India’s drive to become the dominant Asian power in the Indian Ocean, it also is likely to serve as a catalyst for China’s continued expansion of its offensive naval capabilities.
As for the future, Kemp presents four different scenarios that could influence the development of Middle East-Asia relations:
(a) Growth and Prosperity, the best-case analysis, assumes strong economic growth in Asia with China and India leading the way.
(b) Mayhem and Chaos, the second scenario, the opposite of the first, will arise if the world economic situation weakens, and India, China and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates. In this scenario major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
(c) Asian Balance of Power, the third scenario, assumes that while economic growth on a global level resumes and India, China and Japan continue to show economc strength, the overall prosperity of the western world -- especially the US -- weakens. In all probability, India would then play a key role, particularly in the Gulf. Indeed, India would be more assertive if it felt that China was encroaching on a region in which India believes that it should have hegemonic control.
(d) International Cooperation, the fourth scenario, assumes that while the world economic situation may not be as rosy as in scenario one, there nevertheless remains a strong interest on the part of all the major industrial powers to secure energy supplies. The US will continue to play a responsible and significant role in the maritime peackeeping operations in the region.
There could, of course, be any number of potential wild cards that could be disruptive.
Reviewing the book for the Indian Express, Raja Mohan says (
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-o ... s/676985/0):
"Whichever scenario might eventually prevail, the case for questioning the conventional wisdom in Delhi about the Middle East is apparent. The Indian debate on the Middle East has been a hostage to slogans about the United States. India must now confront the impact of Chinese power on the Gulf and India’s own opportunities in the region."
Are the policymakers in New Delhi listening?
Notwithstanding the surprisingly incorrect information about the Kashmir issue furnished on page 104, the book on the whole presents a lucid and well balanced picture of Asia-Middle East relations, especially the role of India and China.
It’s a book that must be read, analyzed and used as background material by foreign policy experts in and outside governments.
Cheers,
Ram Narayanan
US-India Friendship
http://www.usindiafriendship.net/
means it likes to keep good relations with all its neighbours, and beyond. Hence its good relations with Iran. AD on the other hand is much more pro US. 