At least some of China's current posturing sems to be a conflict between the PLA-pasand factions of the CPC and others.
In this connection I have been trying to find out more about the business interests of the PLA
http://www.spiked-online.com/articles/0000000CADB7.htm
China has said that the increases in spending are to improve the living conditions for the military and to improve military hardware in line with hardware improvements around the world (13). In the 1980s, defence spending represented a decreasing percentage of government expenditure, and the PLA was forced to become more self-sufficient (14). This led to the PLA becoming involved in a range of non-military industrial ventures, from aircraft production to pig farming (15).
These entrepreneurial activities were at their height in the 1990s - in 1992, profits of the Chinese 'military industrial complex' are estimated to have been about 10-15 percent of the total defence budget (16). In the mid-1990s there were estimated to be 20,000 different enterprises run by the PLA (17). The state realised that this was not in the interests of a professional defence force and curtailed these activities, but as a result has had to raise the defence budget.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s ... _interests
[img]Until the mid-1990s the PLA had extensive commercial enterprise holdings in non-military areas, particularly real estate. Almost all of these holdings were supposedly spun off in the mid-1990s. In most cases, the management of the companies remained unchanged, with the PLA officers running the companies simply retiring from the PLA to run the newly formed private holding companies.[citation needed]
The history of PLA involvement in commercial enterprises began in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the socialist state-owned system and from a desire for military self-sufficiency, the PLA created a network of enterprises such as farms, guest houses, and factories intended to financially support its own needs. One unintended side effect of the Deng-era economic reforms was that many of these enterprises became very profitable. For example, a military guest house intended for soldier recreation could be easily converted into a profitable hotel for civilian use. There were two main factors which increased PLA commercial involvement in the 1990s. One was that running profitable companies decreased the need for the state to fund the military from the government budget. The second was that in an environment where legal rules were unclear and political connections were important, PLA influence was very useful.[citation needed]
By the early 1990s party officials and high military officials were becoming increasingly alarmed at the military's commercial involvement for a number of reasons. The military's involvement in commerce was seen to adversely affect military readiness and spread corruption. Further, there was great concern that having an independent source of funding would lead to decreased loyalty to the party. The result of this was an effort to spin off the PLA's commercial enterprises into private companies managed by former PLA officers, and to reform military procurement from a system in which the PLA directly controls its sources of supply to a contracting system more akin to those of Western countries. The separation of the PLA from its commercial interests was largely complete by the year 2000. It was met with very little resistance, as the spinoff was arranged in such a way that few lost out.[citation needed][/img]
http://www.david-kilgour.com/2009/Nov_30_2009_04.php
People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department Responsible for Harvesting Organs from Living Falun Gong Practitioners
By Zhen Jun, Clearwisdom.net
November 29, 2009
http://www.clearwisdom.net/html/article ... 12703.html
(Clearwisdom.net) When former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin launched the persecution of Falun Gong in 1999, he controlled the Chinese military forces. Although the military did not use weapons, it played a key role in the illegal persecution: the General Logistics Department served as the leading institution for removing organs from living Falun Gong practitioners for profit.
Jiang Zemin Nurtures the Liberation Army
When Jiang Zemin was in power, he assigned his relatives to high-ranking official positions in the military. Corruption in China intensified as Jiang indulged his people and allowed the military to run business. Higher rank was associated with more money. The military-run business was mainly involved in smuggling. Former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced during a meeting that in the first half of 1998, the military shot and killed over 450 anti-contraband personnel, including public security guards, armed police, and judicial members, and injured approximately 2,200. During the military smuggling operations, they utilized services from the military weather bureau and communications technologies. They used the Premier's signature and seals of the Deputy Chair of the Military Commission without authorization.
In the middle of November 1998, the Central Military Commission and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held a meeting in Xishan, Beijing. Former Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian spoke at the meeting. According to Chi, 80 percent of the income and capital of the military-run business was embezzled by middle to high ranking officials for personal use.
<snip>
After the suppression of Falun Gong started, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission conducted six special meetings on "Handling Foreign Religious Issues." The Logistics Department followed Jiang's instructions for "Physically annihilating Falun Gong practitioners." The marketing of human organs became a highly profitable business for the military, approved and encouraged by Jiang.
The orders for removing organs from living practitioners came directly from the Chair of the Military Commission. The General Logistics Department ordered blood tests on practitioners, then arrested them all over the country and processed them. Practitioners were arrested and administered through an organized, systematic process by the Logistics Department. Utilizing military transportation, personnel and forced labor camps built on military facilities, the Logistics Department (LD) became the state live-organ bank. The LD decides which camps the practitioners are taken to, how practitioners are dispatched, transportation, shift procedures, guards, and the budgets. If an organ transplant procedure fails, the organ receivers' information and bodies are scheduled for destruction within 72 hours. This elimination procedure requires approval by a military supervisor. A military supervisor holds the authority to arrest, jail, and execute anyone leaking information regarding the transplant, including doctors, guards, police and researchers. Military advisors are appointed by the Central Military Commission.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/china ... 4d85b125a4
The PLA’s budget remains veiled and apparently does not include at least some major items found in many Western defense budgets. These include foreign weapons purchases; defense industry subsidies for research and development; certain retiree benefits; and extra-budgetary revenues and resources from a limited number of surviving military commercial enterprises (e.g. hotels and military hospitals) and unit-level production. Also excluded are paramilitary forces, such as the 660,000-strong People’s Armed Police (PAP), and substantial military contributions from regional and local governments. China has never released budgetary breakdowns for individual PLA services. The closest equivalent is Beijing’s annual submission to the UN via the Simplified Reporting Form, which only enumerates respective active forces, reserve forces and militia spending on personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment.
At the same time, the PLA budget may contain costs not included in those of its Western counterparts. It contributes to national economic and infrastructure development, social welfare, crisis management and disaster relief in ways often covered by non-military organizations in the U.S. and other Western countries.
Much remains uncertain: the precise extent to which the PLA, as opposed to local governments, should fund such areas, including reserve forces and militia training and organization, is apparently under debate. For example, it has sought to transfer its retirement homes to local communities for the past decade, with no resolution in sight.