INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -2

anjan · Post by **anjan** » 04 Dec 2010 03:35

negi wrote:^ You mean the part about it being a NFU only against NNWS ? Iirc SS posted on this in deterrence dhaga sometime back.

Isn't that somewhat contradictory since only a NWS is capable of a nuclear strike, first or otherwise. Or is it simply indicative of moving away from the original NFU posture?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Dec 2010 03:46

Negi, I haven't seen that in the deterrence thread. Maybe somewhere else?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 04 Dec 2010 04:37

ramana wrote:Negi, I haven't seen that in the deterrence thread. Maybe somewhere else?

I do not remember any such departure on NFU only on NNWS being reported???

OK, got it, there is a mention:

NSA advocates use of force to deter adversaries

Country's nuclear policy - with emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against nonnuclear weapon states and direct linkages to nuclear disarmament - was only an extension of defence security strategy, he said.

I think it is either typo or he mis spoke.

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 04 Dec 2010 04:40

the link is below. it was posted in the deterrence thread.

http://www.isria.com/RESTRICTED/D/2010/ ... 10_144.php

i even sent it to my coworkers. it is not accessible now...

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 04 Dec 2010 04:47

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament.

from a non-subscription link
http://www.indiablooms.com/NewsDetailsP ... 11010n.php

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Dec 2010 05:03

Thanks guys. Its a big change. Also means a lot of cobwebs have been cleared up. And means the Nofoo is more aggressive than PRC.
Wonder what happened and why NPA mullahs didnt have a stroke?

NSA advocates use of force to deter adversaries

Gautam DattExpress News Service

First Published : 22 Oct 2010

NEW DELHI: Turning defensive posturing of India's security policy upside down, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon advocated that use of force must be embedded in the statecraft to deter adversaries in a scenario where a limited war under nuclear cloud was a possibility.

Menon shared his views at 50th anniversary celebrations of National Defence College, country's premier strategic institute, where he was asked to speak on 'The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs'. "The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We, therefore, need to develop a new and different statecraft," he said elaborating how emerging challenges need new security architecture.

"What India seeks is a new architecture - an open, balanced and inclusive architecture to correspond to the new situation that is emerging," he said.

The National Security Adviser felt that traditional concepts of deterrence were irrelevant in today's technology driven world where lines between conventional and nonconventional warfare had blurred.

He said India's strategic positioning had always been defensive and cited a number of indicators of this policy. The defence budget has remained within three percent in last 60 years, use of force has been limited in internal situations barring Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir and the army was used only for defensive purposes even during the conflicts, he said. The troops were sent to foreign soils only under UN flag, except in Bangladesh and the Maldives, where it was done in response to a request and India has never retained territory taken by force in the wars and even areas held during 1965 and 1971 conflicts were returned to Pakistan.

Country's nuclear policy - with emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against nonnuclear weapon states and direct linkages to nuclear disarmament - was only an extension of defence security strategy, he said. "It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue," he said.

Full text of his speech from MEA website....

Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs”
October 21, 2010

Rashtrapathiji,
Your Majesty, the King of Bhutan,
Raksha Mantri,
Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
Lt-Gen. Prakash Menon, Commandant NDC,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.

In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.

The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.

This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.

• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World

The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.

We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

New Delhi
October 21, 2010

WOW!!! And with the King Of Bhutan as the Chief guest is very significant for he has borders with a challenger.

There is no update to his speech.

PS: I wonder if its the non-use of nukes on Non-Nuke Weapon states(NNWS) ie the negative security garuntee that he is talking about or is it as it reads!

Anyway means the cobwebs have been cleared.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 04 Dec 2010 05:04

^^ Do remember reading this address by SS Menon, but missed the reference to NFU for NNWS. Interesting. The official doctrine has not changed. Someone should bring it to his notice.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 04 Dec 2010 05:04

SaiK wrote:you are there..This site shows about 5 schematics
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... -schem.htm

The first two are my drawings that they have on there.
I posted that pic on BR when we were speculating what the ATV looked like from the people who had attended the launching ceremony. Shiv Aroor had compared the sail to the Borei class, and so I had sort of made that sail to look like the Borei.

Globalsecurity has displayed it without attribution and isn't it possibly copyright infringement???

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Dec 2010 08:55

Gagan Write to them and see what happens.

ashokpachori · Post by **ashokpachori** » 04 Dec 2010 17:52

Gagan wrote:
Globalsecurity has displayed it without attribution and isn't it possibly copyright infringement???

Copyright infringement is the unauthorized or prohibited use of works under copyright, infringing the copyright owner's exclusive rights.

Was your stuff copyrighted, was it mentioned anywhere that it is (copyrighted)?

Under the above scenario (lack of copyright claim), you may not have legal legs to stand on.

Lifting and shifiting of material from thousands of websites, under public domain (without copyrights) is normal/daily rutine.

Nonetheless your job is praiseworthy!

Neela · Post by **Neela** » 04 Dec 2010 18:34

Gagan wrote:
SaiK wrote:you are there..This site shows about 5 schematics
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... -schem.htm
The first two are my drawings that they have on there.
I posted that pic on BR when we were speculating what the ATV looked like from the people who had attended the launching ceremony. Shiv Aroor had compared the sail to the Borei class, and so I had sort of made that sail to look like the Borei.

Globalsecurity has displayed it without attribution and isn't it possibly copyright infringement???

Satnews did the same same thing to Arun's drawings which I pointed out. They have since mentioned Arun's name.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 07 Dec 2010 18:07

The Adm. must've said "going with the flow" and not "...with the float" as reported!

The NFU doctrine,only against non-WMD states if true,is a shift and warning to both the Pakis and the PRC and very welcome.However,what is th risk factor that either of them or even both together launch a pre-emptive strike aganst India? Have we taken that into account? India needs to have several hundreds of N-missiles,with at least 180+ as second strike to truly deter the two all-weather friends.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Dec 2010 03:29

Philip, Lets wait for clarification. It might be that very scenario required the doctrine to be adjusted. And uncle understands as he cant do anything.

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 08 Dec 2010 06:14

what about the next boat. How many are planed now. I remember 6 right? Any news on hunter killers?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 08 Dec 2010 07:37

It is very important to be belligerent in stating the doctrine at 50k feet, and create gandhian nuances dealing with it in details, and especially with non-nuclear power state and allies or those who subscribe to nofu or no use. For example the deterrent for soko is absolutely the solo super mad power taking aggressive stands, and while informing china that its game plan on triggering peaceful nations can not be tolerated is a fantastic example that can be applied for nofu stances as well. The nakko country has no other option now other than to submit to scale down its threatening attitude.

Since there exists always a chance with nakko-chin-paki terror agenda to destabilize when given a slight chance, such discussions adds a bigger deterrent value in the minds of our freedom loving nations. KX projection is very very important for this doctrine to succeed, and it does not matter it remains dormant and un-used., but ready in all aspects to destroy the enemy as a second strike not later than few milliseconds of detection of the first strike.

Our launch detection and ICBM warning surveillance system integrated with satellite monitoring capability is important to add real value to all these strategies.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 23 Dec 2010 09:05

Modernization of the Indian Submarine Fleet
http://gcreport.com/index.php/analysis/ ... rine-fleet

....
Apart from the diesel-electric submarines India also continues to expand its fleet of nuclear powered submarines. India now possesses its own SSBN submarine, the INS Arihant. The intent is to eventually have six of these SSBN submarines in service. Even though these SSBN submarines are mainly aimed to be used as a deterrent against Pakistan, the possibility exists for India to deploy them as far as the South Chinese Sea if the need therefore would ever arise. India also continues to build its fleet of nuclear powered attack submarines, the SSN’s. During 2011 the Indian navy will receive the Russian Akula II class SSN Nerpa. This submarine will be used to provide training and experience to Indian crews until India’s very own SSN submarines enter service.

Since India is capable of building her own SSBN and will soon be able to bring its very own SSN’s into production, it would be able to bridge the gap that currently exists due to China’s Type 091 Han class. These vessels were China’s first attempt at building SSN submarines, as a consequence the technology used was outdated and the submarines were very noisy compared to modern western SSN submarines. It could be assumed that India’s first class of SSN submarines will perform just as poorly as the Han class. As China hasn’t started work on a new version of the Han class India will be able to reach the same level as China when it comes to SSN submarines. This would even open an opportunity for India to field a better SSN sooner than China, making India’s submarine fleet more up to date and capable than China’s in the future.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 23 Dec 2010 12:09

The ATV will perform vastly superior to a Han class SSN.This is because the technology of the day has come along way from that era when the PRC on their own built their own SSN.Here with the ATV,there has been considerable Russian help,acknowledged officially,and several reports have both from Russia and India indicated that there is a lot of content within the sub similar to that on Akula class SSGNs,of which we will get within a few months our first from Russia.The Akula series has been the best so far from Russian designers and comparabla to late model Los Angleles class.many moons ago I posted a link to a US graph showing the comparable acoustic quieting capabilities of US,Russian and Chinese N-subs.It must be somewhere in the archives and an admin could do well to dig it out and repost it.Given the ATV's missile silos size,it appears that the silos have been designed to carry two missiles of the K-series,the smaller K-15 (3 in each silo,range min. 750km) or a larger K-series missile (one in each silo with a range of at least 2500km).If later ATVs have 8-12 silos,they will be able to eprform primarily as SSBNs,while the first ATVs of Arihant size can switch roles from SSBN to SSGN as and when required.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 23 Dec 2010 12:16

The concern with Arihant that I have is that her weapons are too short ranged to be a deterrent against the PRC. So am eagerly awaiting the ATV 2 and the subsequent boats. To address that concern.

On the hunter killer front. I would prefer if the Navy looked at an all Nuke Sub fleet. by 2035-40 with 24 Nuke Attack boats. Instead of 24 SSKs as intended in the 30 year sub building plan.

But that is for the planners to decide.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 23 Dec 2010 12:23

Yes,both the range of the onboard missiles and the N-plant's size too.A larger boat would require larger N-plant too.Hopefully,some of the unmentioned agreements signed would relate to these two aspects,further N-tech/missile tech for N-subs.The second ATV should be close to completion as well,as three ATV components/hulls were supposedly ready when the first was launched.Perhaps the first three will be of same size with the second series larger.It would make sense with bulding the N-reactors too.

sum · Post by **sum** » 23 Dec 2010 13:52

he intent of this program includes the construction of twelve modern French Scorpene class submarines in two phases, each consisting of six submarines.

Is the 12 numbers of Scorpene been confirmed? Dont recollect the follow on order of 6 being mentioned as confirmed before..

koti · Post by **koti** » 23 Dec 2010 14:05

I am a little worried about the increased use of SSN's and they replacing SSK's.

It is highly likely that a skirmish involving attack subs can happen then that involving SSBN's.

Can anyone post a link that evaluates the effects of a possible effects that might appear on sinking a Nuclear sub?

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 23 Dec 2010 15:10

^^^

You may want to look up all the Nuke boats lost on patrol during the cold war. The environmental effect of those losses are well documented.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 23 Dec 2010 16:48

sum wrote:Is the 12 numbers of Scorpene been confirmed? Dont recollect the follow on order of 6 being mentioned as confirmed before..

^^^ This is wrong info. DCNS has offered to provided 6 more Scorpene as part of project-75I.. but it is hilgly unlikely that they will get to build more ..
As originally envisioned under 30 year program, 6 were to be of western design (DCNS Scorpene), 6 of Russian design and further 12 of indigenous design incorporating best of both western and Russian design
So despite RFI to all 4 major players .. in all likelyhood order for these 6 subs will be go to Russian Amurs Hybrid class (Amur 1650IN ?).. Indian order is sure to have vertical tubes for Brahmos and AIP

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 23 Dec 2010 17:09

I completely fail to understand the Indian penchant for creating a meusiam of designs at any point in time. Why have two contemperory designs from two sources. When they are equal in terms of performance. Why not build on the legacy of 209, Scorpean and the Arihant the experience and learning to do so exists today it self?

ashokpachori · Post by **ashokpachori** » 23 Dec 2010 18:34

Philip wrote:The ATV will perform vastly superior to a Han class SSN.This is because the technology of the day has come along way from that era when the PRC on their own built their own SSN.Here with the ATV,there has been considerable Russian help,acknowledged officially,and several reports have both from Russia and India indicated that there is a lot of content within the sub similar to that on Akula class SSGNs,of which we will get within a few months our first from Russia.The Akula series has been the best so far from Russian designers and comparabla to late model Los Angleles class.many moons ago I posted a link to a US graph showing the comparable acoustic quieting capabilities of US,Russian and Chinese N-subs.It must be somewhere in the archives and an admin could do well to dig it out and repost it.Given the ATV's missile silos size,it appears that the silos have been designed to carry two missiles of the K-series,the smaller K-15 (3 in each silo,range min. 750km) or a larger K-series missile (one in each silo with a range of at least 2500km).If later ATVs have 8-12 silos,they will be able to eprform primarily as SSBNs,while the first ATVs of Arihant size can switch roles from SSBN to SSGN as and when required.

Is not a silo underground shelter for ICBM types? I have never heard this terminology of submarine silo before.
Dont you think it would be incongruous to link the sub with silo because they are two different things?

Example:

China also has silo-based weapons, but is now concentrating development on expanding its submarine and road mobile weapon capability.

Russia has downsized their own force to a handful of mobile and silo-based weapons and Delta IV submarines.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_facility_(ICBM)
If I am wrong let me know....but it is first time that I came across this.

srai · Post by **srai** » 24 Dec 2010 04:33

dinesha wrote:Modernization of the Indian Submarine Fleet
http://gcreport.com/index.php/analysis/ ... rine-fleet
....

Since India is capable of building her own SSBN and will soon be able to bring its very own SSN’s into production, it would be able to bridge the gap that currently exists due to China’s Type 091 Han class. These vessels were China’s first attempt at building SSN submarines, as a consequence the technology used was outdated and the submarines were very noisy compared to modern western SSN submarines. It could be assumed that India’s first class of SSN submarines will perform just as poorly as the Han class. As China hasn’t started work on a new version of the Han class India will be able to reach the same level as China when it comes to SSN submarines. This would even open an opportunity for India to field a better SSN sooner than China, making India’s submarine fleet more up to date and capable than China’s in the future.

Unlike the Chinese, India will have design inputs, TOT, and access to other parts from Western (Type 209, Scorpene) and Russian (Kilo, Amur, Akula) submarines. India's SSNs and SSBNs will incorporate these mix of best practices and technologies. It is most likely India will leapfrog the Chinese in building stealthy nuclear submarines in the coming decade.

rad · Post by **rad** » 24 Dec 2010 14:02

I think to conclude that Arihant is vastly superior to the chinese subs would be incorrect, The chinese have been building and operating nuke subs for a very long time and surely they know a thing or 2 more than us . Ok we have got asisitance from the soviets , so have they . One of the reasons they bought kilo subs and other variants was to get at the technology and update themselves which they did along with all the sonar , missiles,torpedoes , sound proofing tech etc. They started firing underwater launched missile even before the Arihant construction started . We have to also accept that they are technologically ahead of us and are very quick to learn form stolen tech. They also dont go public about their capability unlike us . Do remember that they can get the latest tech from Pakistan agosta subs .They could have even funded pakistan to buy submarine technology from France. France is not bothered much about tech being stolen unlike other countries. So its my guess they are up to date with tech from the latest Agosta and the Kilo subs.

rad

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 24 Dec 2010 17:27

Silos are what vertically placed missile tubes installed on subs are called,to differentiate them from tube launched missiles/torps.Same name wherever they are located.I feel that Indian subs will have superior features compared with PLAN subs,because of our past experience operating superior types,though the PLAN have managed to build their own hybrid designs based upon Kilos.Though the quieting performance of the ATV has to be ascertained,as the mechanicals and sub's acoustic signature has yet to be proven at sea,the sub has ahd considerable Russian assistance,reportedly Akula tech.,and should therefore be quieter than the PLAN's SSBNs.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 28 Dec 2010 12:29

X-post

DRDO readies underwater missile test-fire
Hemant Kumar RoutExpress News Service
First Published : 28 Dec 2010 02:58:14 AM ISTLast Updated : 28 Dec 2010 09:40:33 AM IST
http://expressbuzz.com/nation/drdo-read ... 34790.html

BALASORE: AFTER the success of Prithvi-II, the DRDO is planning to test-fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from an underwater platform off the Andhra Pradesh coast in January.

While no one would elaborate whether it would be K-4 or K-15 missile, sources at the Chandipur base said preparations were on for the test. The missile has been planned to be launched from a Pontoon (replica of a submarine) which is being readied.

Both the missiles are submarine launched and ready for a trial. While K-15 has a strike range of about 700 km, K-4 will hit the target 3,500 km away. Land version of the missile has been renamed as Shaurya which has already been tested once at Chandipur in 2008.

The Pontoon is, however, used to test the K missiles because India does not have an operational submarine capable to undertake firing of such missiles.

Though India has developed the advanced technology vehicle (ATV) INS Arihant, it is yet to begin sea trials or even fire up nuclear reactor. Missile tests will follow after the submarine completes the sea trials. So far, K-15 missile has been tested successfully six times. The K-4, though, has been tested only once in January this year and it was a secret mission.

It will go under at least six more tests before being deployed. “The name of the missile has been kept ‘K’ in the honour of former President A P J Abdul Kalam, father of Indian missiles,” said a source.

Developed by DRDO, K-15 is about 10 metres in length and about one metre in diameter with a launch weight of about 10 tonnes.This missile uses solid propellant.

It can carry a conventional payload of about 500 kg and also be fitted with tactical nuclear warhead.

sum · Post by **sum** » 28 Dec 2010 13:04

Damn, wasnt a news report of initial sea trials of Arihant posted on BR earlier?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Dec 2010 14:03

sum wrote:Damn, wasnt a news report of initial sea trials of Arihant posted on BR earlier?

That earlier report was unreliable. Some senior naval officer said it. This one is by the more reliable Hemant Kumar Rout of expressbuzz.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 28 Dec 2010 14:09

I would prefer if the SBC posts the progress report of the Arihant on the web it will end all confusion WRT its exact status. Just like it was done for the Tejas

Bloody secrecy is making the reporters go hyperactive and they report some thing new & diffrent every week. The net result of it is that my brain overheats trying to figure out just what is the accurate status of the damm ship.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 28 Dec 2010 15:14

^^^^
I second that, this bloody smokescreen of mirrors and misdirection is really maddening.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 28 Dec 2010 16:33

smoke screens are removed only after certain critical level of confidence and capability is proven...

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 28 Dec 2010 16:54

Sandeep/IT said the same thing some days back that the reactor has yet to go critical and trials has not yet started.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 28 Dec 2010 22:47

shiv wrote:
sum wrote:Damn, wasnt a news report of initial sea trials of Arihant posted on BR earlier?
That earlier report was unreliable. Some senior naval officer said it. This one is by the more reliable Hemant Kumar Rout of expressbuzz.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 28 Dec 2010 23:58

"fire up the nuclear reactor" sounds like a smoke screen reporting, perhaps intentionally told to the reporter.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 02 Jan 2011 12:27

JTull wrote:Let me just remark here that NPCIL doesn't design reactor cores. It constructs and operates the reactors. The final engineering drawings are though put together by NPCIL together with BARC. This is because they need to place order for equipment. The design work for 220/540/700 MWe reactors was done by BARC and that includes other future variants in the pipeline such as thorium reactors.

It would be plain wrong to claim that BARC doesn't design reactors but NPCIL does. Reality is just the oppposite. Trust me on this.

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/114 ... ional.html

The 700-MW PHWR is the latest state-of-the-art technology nuclear power reactor which has been designed by NPCIL by scaling up its 540 MW PHWRs (TAPS-3&4) that are under successful operation at Tarapur since 2005.

NPCIL has launched four indigenously designed 700-MW PHWRs, two each at Kakrapar in Gujarat and Rawatbhata in Rajasthan in January and August 2010, respectively. These reactors are slated for commercial operation in 2015 and 2016 respectively, NPCIL said.

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 02 Jan 2011 18:55

dinesha,

That DH report is factually incorrect on that point. NPCIL's job is exactly as stated by JTull. There are reasons to believe him rather than the report and I can independently confirm what he has said is correct.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 02 Jan 2011 20:07

I am no expert but I found some interesting stuff about how reactors should be made to go critical. (or keep them just subcritical).

In fact it is tricky business. I thought it was like adding coal to a furnace. It is not.

http://canteach.candu.org/library/20041207.pdf

Manual start up, i.e. adding reactivity using moderator purification and
monitoring power with start up instruments (SUI), is a risky processes. A
large reactivity insertion can be made by mistake when a small one is needed1
if you misjudge how subcritical the reactor is. This can cause a “premature
criticality event”, increasing the risk of an uncontrolled power excursion. It is,
or should be, a sobering thought that inserting enough positive reactivity to
make the reactor super prompt critical can result in a power increase of
several thousand per cent in seconds.

And:

One of the nicest features of this procedure is that the reactor cannot actually
go critical! As a nuclear submarine operator explained to me, it is a procedure
for approaching criticality, cautiously, while ensuring that the reactor,
necessarily, remains subcritical. As long as the reactor is subcritical and the
operator requests a power double the present power, RRS will add only half
of the reactivity required for criticality.