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Can we covertly carry out a nuclear test , let us say in some remote corner of Indian or Pacific ocean?Ofcourse once the test has been carried out , it will be known to the whole world(Radiation signature etc).But is there any chance to carry out the preparations without being detected(in which case we can feign ignorance afterwards)?Let us think of it from a logistics point of view.shiv wrote:Since I am a guru here is my answer. It will be detected, unless there happens to be a huge earthquake somewhere nearby at the exact same moment.kumarn wrote:I have a question for the gurus: Is it possible to test, say a 200kt warhead underground, without anyone else knowing about it?
My personal view on trying to hide nuclear tests is like trying to make love to your girlfriend in your parents' bedroom when they have gone out shopping. The opportunities will be limited and results unpredictable. Repeat performances may or may not be possible.
If we must test we must test openly. We will not do that. I guarantee that. So we are going to have to make do with what we have.
Only a fearful mouse would entertain such things. A mouse has no business working with nuclear weapons. Declare the intent to test openly. Declare that no power on earth can stop us. Make it known to all concerned internal and external that secure ourselves, we must and in order to do so, test we must. That is what the BJP did. The intent to weaponize was in their election manifesto! The dark side of the moon or oceans are laughable options for a nation - a nation like India. Just stating my view.darshhan wrote: Just asking.
I wish international diplomacy was that simple?Philip wrote:
In our tests,we revalidate our TN warheads of our choice.If Uncle Sam protests,let him fly a kite and we would be very happy to scrap the N-deal with him that will allow us to sell N-tech to the highest bidder worldwide.If the US could allow Pak and China to secretly proliferate,surely India can officially sell its N-tech to anyone!
This was indeed discussed before he made this statement. He never said that we don't have a fusion device or that no fusion took place in Pok 2.. From this statement it is clear that fusion took place . He says so.He his merely saying that the yield was lower than the stated yield of 50 KT.That was in fact already known ..Most expert estimates were about 30 KT..
As I have said earlier, based on the seismic measurements and also the opinions from experts, there was a much lower yield in the thermonuclear device test. It was lesser than what had been claimed at that time.
......
Even the expert opinion from across the world makes it clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.
I have maintained and will always maintain that the test was not more than 60 per cent successful[/b] in terms of the yield it generated. I have made this assessment based on the report of the instrumentation data that is available and also the programme coordinator.
I agree with him . We are not going to sign the CTBT/NPT anytime soon. However if the US signs these we ll be forced to.
There is a change in the administration in the United States of America. They are bound to further pressurise India to sign the CTBT. In such an event it was necessary to make such a statement or speak the truth on the issue so that India does not rush into signing the CTBT.
Therefore, I say the timing of my statement was perfectly right.
I have no idea. It depends on what the testing team told the politicos. PVN Rao was warned by the US not to test and did not test. Deve Gowda is said to have ensured that the shafts were ready to test. The scientists had been wanting to test for years. And I recall the story that the scientists were told by Vajpayee that they would get this one chance to test. I do not recall reading anywhere that they were told that they would be able to test and keep on testing.negi wrote:Shiv ji this topic has been discussed before so I shall not argue for the sake for arguing; I just have one hypothetical question ; would India have conducted more tests before putting a self moratorium had there been no fear of global sanctions ?
Late? When did he die? Could it be that his demise is like the TN yield?gakakkad wrote:
Late Dr.K. Santhanan (I respect the late prof greatly) quoted the following....
Yes, even I was surprised by that. gakakkad ji: respectfully ask you to go through this, if you have not. All/most of the discussions are archived and the forum is quite sick of it now. http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewforum.php?f=8shiv wrote:Late? When did he die? Could it be that his demise is like the TN yield?gakakkad wrote:
Late Dr.K. Santhanan (I respect the late prof greatly) quoted the following....
Shiv ji,shiv wrote:One thing that has intrigued me is another thing that we have not discussed much. We were so full of triumph at the tests that we have never analysed the extent to which Vajpayee and Advani may have been plotting to provoke Pakistan to come out into the open. They had known for over a decade that Pakistan had nuclear weapons, but it was India that was generally accused of having a covert program because of the premature ejaculation of 1974. Advani made a provocative statement that would have caused deep anger in Pakistan. He said (If I recall right)- "Let them test if they have the capability". In retrospect this sounds like a deep understanding of Pakistani psyche. It was rubbing salt into a wound caused to Pakistan by Indian tests.
The adjective used is debatable and in a very credible manner. A close look at the effects of sanctions after Shakti will provide the evidence. But, agree, that if not managed it can have a serious effect but if well managed it can be at best a minor nuisance to a non event.gakakkad wrote: The only point I wished to make is that effects of sanctions would be devastating ... And the benefits for testing are not much...
Absolutely Virupaksha. The only question to me is if such provocation could have been achieved without announcing a moratorium.Virupaksha wrote:Shiv ji,shiv wrote:One thing that has intrigued me is another thing that we have not discussed much. We were so full of triumph at the tests that we have never analysed the extent to which Vajpayee and Advani may have been plotting to provoke Pakistan to come out into the open. They had known for over a decade that Pakistan had nuclear weapons, but it was India that was generally accused of having a covert program because of the premature ejaculation of 1974. Advani made a provocative statement that would have caused deep anger in Pakistan. He said (If I recall right)- "Let them test if they have the capability". In retrospect this sounds like a deep understanding of Pakistani psyche. It was rubbing salt into a wound caused to Pakistan by Indian tests.
Yes, I read it long long ago, that Advani took a carefully calibrated role of agent provocateur for Pakistan and deliberately rubbed salt to Pakistan. It was calibrated by the BJP govt that it was better to bring Pak out into the open and get it sanctioned as well instead of just India being sanctioned. Also remember Clinton was trying to give billions to Pak for being a good munna. Pakistan didnt need to test as they are after all green painted China bombs. Advani made sure that Pak wasted few Chinese bombs, not get bonanza and actually get sanctioned.
And yet we keep hitting duds even in the user stock like A-II twice. So, can we rely only on lab results for far more complex nukes?India will simply be taking "random samples" for testing just as randoim missiles from the production lines of our arsenals are tested from time to time.We recently had the IA do live tests of our tactcial missiles ,randomly taken from stocks
Probably not but for simple fission device they can depend on simulation result , considering we have atleast 2 fission success (some would say boosted fission ) which is primary of TN plus the standalone fission device.sum wrote:And yet we keep hitting duds even in the user stock like A-II twice. So, can we rely only on lab results for far more complex nukes?
I don't know that Taiwan is necessarily higher return, lower risk for China.Kanson wrote:X-post: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7#p1160907
You argument is that, to monetize debt, war is a high return low risk option compared to other options for China. Based on that, I'm questioning, to have further high return with lower risk, is it not China should choose Taiwan than India for that? US and other powers can join India too if there is a conflict. What stops them? Already there are several joint exercises with US and other countries. Is it not Nehru requested US help during '62 war and US obliged? And if the luck turns other way, Tibet card can be played leading possibly to their liberation. And India is not a push over like Taiwan. So with such several more risks compared to attacking Taiwan and meager return, from your argument, why would China choose to attack India than Taiwan?Rudradev wrote:Now to Kanson's question about Taiwan. If PRC wanted a war, why would they pick India and not Taiwan? I think the answer is, they're still not sure (despite US' apparent weakness) that US and Japan will not rush to Taiwan's defense. However, they may calculate that this is not true of India. With Pakistan on their side, and US staying out of the conflict, the PRC Militarists may feel more confident of securing a military "victory" against India than one against Taiwan.
K Subrahmanyan was an enormously learned man with much depth and breadth of knowledge, but did he have his finger on the pulse of this specific aspect of nuke development to the same extent as BK? He had a very wide range of things to keep track of. BK is more of a specialist. But fair point, BK may be wrong and K Sub may be right on this.On Agni-III:Rudradev wrote:Also, Kanson, about Agni V testing this year. If it happens, it is a good thing. It is a sign that we are not idly waiting with the axe over our heads, that we are trying to close the window of opportunity for China to prosecute a two-front war against us. Still, for the present Agni V is untested and I don't know if Agni III is even deployed. IF what Bharat Karnad says is true, 20kT weapons is the most we have. So the assessment, that GOI is trying very hard to avoid war by courting certain factions within Pakistan, holds good.http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/scienc ... 073999.eceHe said that the 3,000-km range Agni-III missile has already been inducted into the armed forces. “Agni-III is already inducted. Its development has been completed and is under production,” he said.
Ok, If late K. Sub says, we have 80 KT weapon, then BK can't be true right? What is the premises of "most" here? If we go by the various statements/reports, these 20 KT most probably are air-droppable free falling bombs initially we have assembled. Missiles do have different warheads(again based on reports in public domain).
Well of course it is a hypothesis! But it is a hypothesis based on real observations; I only raised the possibility in these posts-I feel, this is mere a hypothesis. I couldn't see any substantiating facts to support this hypothesis. First you need establish it is GoI that is trying very hard and not Pak factions. Only if GoI is trying very hard then we have to find out why GoI is trying very hard. Of several reasons behind that, avoiding war is one possible ...possible reason. I couldn't agree with this angle of argument.that GOI is trying very hard to avoid war by courting certain factions within Pakistan, holds good
RajeshA-saar, providing a nuclear umbrella to Vietnam or basing nuclear capable weapons in Vietnam for mutual deterrent benefit with the full consent of the Vietnamese people can be thought of.RajeshA wrote:We should get the nuclear tests done in Vietnam. Nothing makes more sense. It will stop Chinese march into South China Sea, and India will get her designs tested.
Is there any thoughts on the lines of de-militarizing the pakistani nuclear program and transitioning to a civilian power program for the benefit of everyone (except maybe Chinese) in the world?Shiv-saar, I am a bit late regarding Shree Karnad's talks, but was there any whiff of an Indo-US version of a Nunn-Lugar Ver2.0 being contemplated? It will help out the PakTeahouse (Rudradev-saar's category D?) and not-yet-drowned Abduls (Cat E?) and the entire world tremendously, if US helps wind down Pak proliferation and we buy these stockpiles as reactor fuel.
K Subrahamanyam did know what he was talking about on matters nuclear. The 80 KT comment is an extrapolation of a plain old fission device.Rudradev wrote:
K Subrahmanyan was an enormously learned man with much depth and breadth of knowledge, but did he have his finger on the pulse of this specific aspect of nuke development to the same extent as BK? He had a very wide range of things to keep track of. BK is more of a specialist. But fair point, BK may be wrong and K Sub may be right on this.
In the end I cannot say if K Sub or K Santhanam or BK or even R Chidambaram is right. Maybe they are all wrong. What matters is how do our enemies perceive us, not just in terms of capabilities but the political will to deploy them?
I cannot speak to B Raman as he is far too, shall we say political and not as policy oriented. BK and B Raman are two different categories.Well of course it is a hypothesis! But it is a hypothesis based on real observations; I only raised the possibility in these posts-
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1159770
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1160104
because of a very curious fact that Shiv pointed out. Even the people whose views used to form the cornerstone of thinking in a national-security related forum like BRF, i.e. B Raman and Bharat Karnad, are now talking about the need to avoid showing a threatening posture to Pakistan. What is that about, if not GOI trying very hard to decrease the likelihood of a military conflict? Is there some other explanation, which still survives Occam's Razor?
I see. Kanson, please note... if K Sub's comment about 80kT is an extrapolation, that's not a tested device. So BK's claim about only 20kT being proved beyond all doubt is still valid.ShauryaT wrote: K Subrahamanyam did know what he was talking about on matters nuclear. The 80 KT comment is an extrapolation of a plain old fission device.
Shaurya, as I understand it, the "conventional threat posture" against TSP largely derives from the fact that a lot of war materiel (everything from water-canteens to Prithvis) was moved to the IB and LOC during Parakram. In the following 9 years, some of it has been moved back to original positions (at Babu speeds.) Another portion has been used up in a number of exercises, cold-start rehearsals etc. along the IB (that is one aspect of the "threat posture".) And a lot of it still remains at forward positions (that is the other aspect of the "threat posture.")I cannot speak to B Raman as he is far too, shall we say political and not as policy oriented. BK and B Raman are two different categories.Well of course it is a hypothesis! But it is a hypothesis based on real observations; I only raised the possibility in these posts-
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1159770
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1160104
because of a very curious fact that Shiv pointed out. Even the people whose views used to form the cornerstone of thinking in a national-security related forum like BRF, i.e. B Raman and Bharat Karnad, are now talking about the need to avoid showing a threatening posture to Pakistan. What is that about, if not GOI trying very hard to decrease the likelihood of a military conflict? Is there some other explanation, which still survives Occam's Razor?
When BK talks about reducing the conventional threat posture against TSP, he is essentially asking, why is the IA wasting their time on capabilities and doctrines, which we are unlikely to use in the near term as there is no political stomach for it and has not been there - ever! All it does is emboldens the TSPA to keep itself relevant using our threat posture as an excuse.
Also, we have far bigger issues to worry about. A conventional response (empty threat) to an unconventional threat from TSP is a waste of time and resources and not efficient to tackle the menace. Under no circumstance, is TSP able to be a conventional threat to Indian forces. The question is what is the point of our conventional threat postures against TSP?
You still will try to increase the intelligence and take out all internal traitors.kumarn wrote:"When your enemy is making mistakes, do not interfere." -Napoleon Bonaparte”.
Pakhanastan is going down the tubes faster than we can manage by ourselves. Then why interfere? I would rollover and play dead, if it helps continue the tamasha that pakhanastan has become. The same thought has been expressed on this board by different gurus in different ways.
Shiv,shiv wrote: Absolutely Virupaksha. The only question to me is if such provocation could have been achieved without announcing a moratorium.
) moratorium by BJP is different from the moratorium of today signed by congress after the nuke deal. I read India's moratorium between 1998 and 2005 as "empty words" for the sake of media management and rhetoric - a sort of Paki promise but from BJP. That period clearly left an escape route with the max threat of another round of sanctions for a new round of tests. Pity MMS successfully ruined itThe answer may be that they intend to fight a limited war with a clearly defined strategic objective (most likely, the occupation of Arunachal Pradesh or at least Tawang.) Restricted to a specific geographical area, and declaring a ceasefire immediately after the objective is achieved. At that time India will be engaged with TSPA on the Western front, so a certain pressure to accept the ceasefire will exist. If India chooses not to accept then it must escalate... but China, with the far larger nuclear deterrent, controls the escalation ladder.Suraj wrote:How do the Chinese intend to prosecute war without catastrophic damage to their economic engine ? This isn't 1962, or even 1967 or 1985, when two essentially hermit nations started shooting. China is the world's largest trader today. It doesn't even have to be some 'flatten Beijing/Shanghai' capability on our part - the threat to disrupt their supply chains significantly and counter value retaliation that takes out the likes of Yangshan or Yantian port would make them pause.
Yes, they've significant benefits if they play the cards really right, but they also have exponentially greater potential for losses if we maintain an unpredictable placatory/antagonistic policy against them that always keeps them wondering just how violently we'll lash out in retaliation if they strike, because we don't have to reach out 3000kms to cause them grievous economic harm.
What I'm trying to indicate here is an asymmetric nature of this - it takes extraordinary planning and a huge dollop of fortune to do it in a beneficial way for them, but carries with it the risk of things going massively pear-shaped for them if things deviate from plan. By default, they're extremely meticulous and order driven, while our chaotic system provides us a straightforward means to blow hot and cold repeatedly, enough to make them fear just how wildly we might retaliate. A month of lost exports costs us $25 billion but costs them $130 billion...
hnair ji,hnair wrote:RajeshA-saar, providing a nuclear umbrella to Vietnam or basing nuclear capable weapons in Vietnam for mutual deterrent benefit with the full consent of the Vietnamese people can be thought of.RajeshA wrote:We should get the nuclear tests done in Vietnam. Nothing makes more sense. It will stop Chinese march into South China Sea, and India will get her designs tested.
But making them do our testing and go through the hardships caused by a pigheaded NPA regime? I disagree. We must not let the Vietnamese people undergo the abuse and hardships that the Chinese make the pakistani public (be it lal masjid massacre of Pashtun children or nuclear test related sanctions) go through. That is not something I would want for a friendly and capable country like Vietnam, that seem to have its act together.
[Caption of a photo] Yuri Trutnev of the RFNC-VNIIEF with me at the Russian Atomic Weapon Museum, in Sarov, next to the 100-megaton “Tsar Bomba” he co-designed with Andrei Sakharov. Over dinner that night at his house, I asked him to resolve an argument I had with one of my Los Alamos colleagues: When the bomb was detonated at half the design yield on 30 October 1961, did it produce 50 or 57 megatons? Yuri simply stated, “At that level it doesn’t matter.” He went on to explain that the bomb had no military utility and wasn’t particularly challenging; the most challenging designs were the small, peaceful nuclear devices that had to be particularly clean in terms of radioactive contamination.
There is no way I can "argue" with this conclusion and claim that your viewpoint is wrong. But as a thought experiment if I try to get into the minds of Vajpayee et al it seems that a "moratorium" rather than an open ended plan to keep on testing and completely destroy the so called "world consensus" on testing was an attempt at damage limitation designed to reduce the pain of sanctions. But if a moratorium was announced even if test results were "unsatisfactory" it only means that the entire purpose of testing had been defeated. We would then have invited sanctions AND failed to achieve the (unstated) goals of testing.Virupaksha wrote: My read of the situation was moratorium has nothing to do with provocation.
Provocation was a very low level samson option.
There are very cogent arguements put forward by old-time gurus such as Rudradev and Shridhar regarding a Sino-Pakistani attack on India. However, perhaps they are missing one important element in this scenario, which is Russia. Russia has been:RajeshA wrote:brihaspati garu,brihaspati wrote:Its funny how we fall into the exclusivist trap - in looking at problems.
I fail to see why we have to do a lungi dance about BK ji raising apocalyptic fears "solely" about China, and B.Raman ji doing a matching "go soft" on Pakistaniat! Why do we have to look at onlee PRC or onlee Pakistaniat and not look at both of them simultaneously as a continuum of threat? People demanding that we look at onlee one of them while going soft on the other are deliberately or unknowingly pushing a view - as if these are two different "problems" altogether!
there is a hard connection between these two nodes. But around these nodes there are many things, which can help in weakening the connection, so that this connection does not take both the nodes together into a war between them and India.
Should we start to look at both of them as a homogeneous mass, we would lose the ability to exploit the fractures.
No, it is far more. Our entire force structure is largely Pakistan centric with three strike corp formations arrayed against TSP. We have three out of five commands arrayed against TSP (nitpick apart). Our entire mechanized forces is plains/desert centric. We still have Prithvi as a short range ballistic missile with at least some of it nuclear targeted at TSP. The disparity between TSP and Indian force structures is growing and will grow. With the two% that our defense effectively gets/spends, rational choices have to be made. If we are never going to use this massive force structure, due to a lack of a political strategy and other factors, the IA is better off investing in other urgent areas of need. Check the sticker shock the IA has given to arm a mountain corps. We just upgraded our doctrine against China from one of "aggressive defense" to "Deterrent Force". This will cost us. We cannot continue to do it all. It will bankrupt us or more likely it will leave gaping security holes - like a non bankable deterrent. Choices have to be made. This is what BK is saying. IMO.Rudradev wrote:
Shaurya, as I understand it, the "conventional threat posture" against TSP largely derives from the fact that a lot of war materiel (everything from water-canteens to Prithvis) was moved to the IB and LOC during Parakram.
The above sounds right except the bold part. The 1996 BJP government resigned after 13 days during the vote of confidence as they could not form a majority. Then the NDA was formed in 1998, and nuclear testing which was in the BJP's manifesto also became a part of the NDA manifesto. Even after the 1998 tests this remained part of their election manifesto for the 1999 elections which were held after the Kargil War:shiv wrote:Vajpayee was in a hurry. He wanted the test done soon. After all the BJP had just won the election (after the earlier Vajpayee government had been toppled after just 6 months).
Vajpayee's possible goals for testing would have beenIf these were the goals, then they were achieved admirably. A secondary goal of making Pakistan come out in the open was actually a master stroke.
- Public demonstration of Indian nuclear capability
- shaking the so called "world order" that was weighted against India before the FMCT came into force and CTBT ratified
- Quick testing before preparations were detected and sanctions/warnings came in
- Allowing the scientific team to acquire data they were so desperate to acquire
- Killing the Congress's chances of bringing down his coalition government again by gambling that the tests would make his govt popular, while passing the burden of sanctions to a Congress govt if they brought his government down. Testing was win-win for Vajpayee.
The recently established National Security Council will advise the government in this regard and also in the establishment of a credible nuclear deterrence. These are the minimum requirements in this recently inaugurated era of global inequality and increased vulnerability. The NDA will correct the imbalance and budgetary neglect of Defence needs during the last decades by successive governments thus ensuring adequacy of budgetary allocations. We will take effective measures for eliminating all pensionary anomalies. We will revamp the entire system of welfare of ex-servicemen as a tribute to those that laid down their lives for the country.
Remember do as I say not as I do. I still remember when the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists termed India a "rogue" nation for their massive testing regimen after the US tested more than the rest of the planet combined. I wish I live long enough to see those words shoved down the throats of those SOBs who think they have a divine right to nukes and that the laws of physics are written by them.Correction noted thanks.Airavat wrote: The above sounds right except the bold part. The 1996 BJP government resigned after 13 days during the vote of confidence as they could not form a majority. Then the NDA was formed in 1998, and nuclear testing which was in the BJP's manifesto also became a part of the NDA manifesto. [url=http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com ... Itemid=446]
Biggest bombs:tejas wrote: Nuclear tests: US- 1054
USSR- 715
France- 210
UQ- 45
PRC- 45
India- 6
Pukes-6
DPRK- 2
From where this 'extrapolation' came?Rudradev wrote:I see. Kanson, please note... if K Sub's comment about 80kT is an extrapolation, that's not a tested device. So BK's claim about only 20kT being proved beyond all doubt is still valid.ShauryaT wrote: K Subrahamanyam did know what he was talking about on matters nuclear. The 80 KT comment is an extrapolation of a plain old fission device.
Statement from K. Subrahmanyam reiterates my point that BK assertion that we have only 20 KT weapon has no meaning.K Subrahmanyam wrote:Fission weapons of 60-80 kilotons have been successfully fabricated and standard thermonuclear warheads of today are neither in megatons nor in hundreds of kilotons.
How is that mere one test(in PoK-2) shall make it as "proved beyond all doubt"? Pok-1, according to PKI is 8 - 12 KT device. This 20KT weapon is tested once in Pok-2, by the way of current argument.BK's claim about only 20kT being proved beyond all doubt is still valid
THE present controversy over the yield of Pokhran-2 nuclear tests is not the first such development in this country of argumentative Indians. Pokhran-1 also had its share of controversy on its explosive yield. Since it was not claimed to be a weapon test at that time and there was no talk of nuclear deterrence, that controversy was less fierce than the present one. Then, too, there were people who termed it a dud.
I have heard personally Prime Minister Morarji Desai saying that there was no nuclear test and the scientists set off an explosion of a large quantity of buried conventional explosives. Others contested the claimed yield of 12 kilotons and asserted that it was only 8 kilotons. The result of the Pokhran-1 controversy survives till today and contributes to the present one. Many foreign scientists concede that they arrive at a lower yield of the Pokhran-2 test by extrapolating the lower yield of Pokhran-1 as advanced by some Indian scientists.
Controversies and personality clashes among scientists are not unknown. In the West, one has heard of the Oppenheimer-Teller clash or the one between Oppenheimer and E.O.Lawrence. In India, too, we had Bhabha-Saha clash and the deep divide between Dr Raja Ramanna and H. N. Sethna. When Vikram Sarabhai was the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission the relations between him and the Trombay establishment were quite cold. Scientists by the very nature of their vocation are highly individualistic people and they prefer to be convinced about a fact personally on the basis of evidence.
Nuclear physics is an arcane subject and in that weapon designing is even more esoteric. There are, therefore, limits to transparency on it. Moreover, this is India’s second fission test and first thermonuclear test. With the exception of two — Dr P. K. Iyengar and the late Dr Ramanna — all other weapon designing talent was involved in the Pokhran-2 test. Of the two outside, Dr Iyengar is a sceptic while Dr Ramanna, when he was alive, accepted the claimed yield.
All nuclear scientists are not necessarily familiar with the intricacies of weapon design. There is a popular tendency in the country to accept that all people associated with the Department of Atomic Energy are knowledgeable in the intricacies of nuclear weapons. This is not the case.
It has been widely propagated that many foreign scientists have questioned the yield of Pokhran-2. Usually when seismic stations monitored a nuclear test they used to announce the magnitude of the explosion in terms of ranges of yields as, for instance, a low- yield explosion of 5-15 kilotons or a medium-yield explosion of 15-60 kilotons. Very rarely was a precise yield reported. The ease with which many foreign assessments were made about precise yields made them suspect, especially when they were not familiar with geological structures and soil conditions at the test site.
The very first report from the West termed the test an earthquake. There could also be some resonance between the domestic scepticism and foreign assessments.
Dr Chidambaram, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and head of the weapon designing team in 1998, writing in “Atoms for Peace” (Vol. 2 No. 1, 2008), cites an article in New Scientist (Mackenzie 1998) where it said, “Roger Clark, a seismologist of the Leeds University found that when data from 125 stations — closer to the number required by the treaty (CTBT) monitoring network — are taken into account the estimate is nearer 60(kilotons)”. He also refers to the finding of a world-renowned seismologist, Jack Evernden, being consistent with the official claim.
The issue was examined in a review by then National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra. If the weapon designers had doubts about the yield they could have conducted one more test within the first few days after the May 11 test since one more shaft was available, before any commitment was made on voluntary moratorium.
Apparently, the weapon design team did not have any doubts on the result. But on the very first day the sceptics had doubts. There was a popular view that the thermonuclear test should be of 100 kilotons and above and, therefore, this could not be a thermonuclear explosion. In any case, the shaft could not have withstood any explosion higher than 60 kilotons.
Do we conduct some more tests to satisfy the sceptics? This cannot be publicly debated just as conducting the nuclear tests was not debated. The nuclear tests of 1998 were not to pre-empt any Pakistani move but were a response to the provocative Pakistani Ghauri missile test and also to declare India a nuclear weapon state in the early days of the new BJP-led NDA government before the Americans started applying pressure on India. At that time it was expected that the CTBT would come into force in 1999.
The late P. V. Narasimha Rao had urged Mr Vajpayee to conduct the test early in 1996. It could not be done in the 13 days the BJP was in office and was carried out in May 1998. Pakistan’s tests were in response to the Indian tests and the interaction between Pakistan and the US on the issue is a matter of public record. But Pakistan had its nuclear weapon tested by China at the Lop Nor test site on May 26, 1990, according to the disclosure in the book “The Nuclear Express” by two US scientists, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman. India lived in a state of unfavourable deterrent asymmetry in the nineties till the Shakti tests were carried out.
As Prime Ministers V.P. Singh and I.K. Gujral explained after the tests, the file to test was always on their table. Narasimha Rao came close to conducting the test. But only Vajpayee could do it by taking the world by surprise. During all that time there were no TV debates or newspaper editorials or strategists screaming about India’s vulnerability.
India became a nuclear weapon power and in the next eight years its strategic arsenal has been accepted by the international community. India has also the NSG waiver. All that happened in spite of opposition from sections of our people who preferred a confrontationist strategy with the international community.
The government leadership is satisfied with the state of our deterrent posture and so also the armed forces. In the US and Russia, too, there are people dissatisfied with the readiness of their arsenals and would like to resume testing. But the majority public opinion in those countries is opposed to it. Fission weapons of 60-80 kilotons have been successfully fabricated and standard thermonuclear warheads of today are neither in megatons nor in hundreds of kilotons. Our fission weapon capabilities are not under question. So long as the adversary believes that the nuclear explosions in his cities will cause him unacceptable damage he will be deterred.
Whether it is the CTBT, the FMCT or conducting nuclear tests, it is counter-productive to look at these issues in a narcissistic manner. We should try to exploit the opportunities as they arise. This country is just learning to do it and we have a long way to go. The need of the moment is to avoid chauvinism and steadily improve the capacity of the country to grow and deliver without demagoguery.
The adjective used is debatable and in a very credible manner. A close look at the effects of sanctions after Shakti will provide the evidence. But, agree, that if not managed it can have a serious effect but if well managed it can be at best a minor nuisance to a non event.