Managing Chinese Threat

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sanjeevpunj
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by sanjeevpunj »

China to launch satellite for Pakistan. Source:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 555398.cms
BEIJING: China announced on Wednesday it will launch a communications satellite for Pakistan at an "appropriate time" in the coming days. It will be carried by a Long March-3B carrier rocket.
Both the satellite and rocket are currently in good condition, the official media quoted a spokesman of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China's Sichuan Province, as saying.
The 30-transponder satellite will give Pakistan some strategic advantages in military and cross-border propaganda areas besides helping the country meet its communications needs, observers said.
Chinese are good at exploiting the situation and use it for marketing. Quite obviously Pakis need the sattelite and cannot get France to help them make one, or launch it for them, and China is cheaper.This sattelite would improve their comms, and can affect a lot of things for us.They might put their proxy jihadis on this sattelite and give them Sat-phones, thus keeping us from tracking their conversations on radio.Mention of cross border propoganda in the article strikes an off note. China and Pakistan both are definitely indulging in destabilising India,its just getting worse.
krisna
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by krisna »

PLA is increasingly calling the shots for the last decade in china. recall that the current top leaders are not from PLA. They have to give due weightage to PLA brass. They can easily assume leadership role. PLA has over 20% membership in the CCP structure. It pays to be in the good books of PLA.

CCP is still following the Deng Xiaoping principle- lie quietly sharpening the claws. However the PLA has no finite patience like the late Deng Xiaoping. hence the series of warmongering actions threatening the smaller countries and big ones alike.

Now this overt actions of china with TSP.

TSP loves this as it has no one to take on its pet hatred of India. PLA knows it is a different India than in the past. However by siding with TSP it hopes TSP makes the call of war . China will be in drivers seat as it is India fighting TSP. Hence though India wins it will be a economic setback. This will take sometime for India to bounce back. Meanwhile china will pull away further from India.

Recall to be a superpower it should control its own backyard- china thinks by boxing India in south asia (its backyard) it can pre empt India’s emergence.
It is easier to be inside south asia doing nothing but observing India is itself a win situation for china. India will be forever forced to look in south asia due to this.
TSP is a willing whore in this scheme as it keeps India preoccupied with TSP.

China-
china has been trying to keep its neighbours happy for it to become a superpower. it has settled disputes with all its neighbours barring India and rim countries around south china sea.
CCP wants to avoid war as it knows it will derail its economic progress, create massive unemployment and kick it out of power. It is unwilling to do create war hysteria. But PLA is doing otherwise. It wants to show it is the newest boy in town with shiny toys capable of taking on uncle.

Hence there are hot and cold moments wrt India on J&K, Arunachal Pradesh etc.

Between China TSP and India,

1) TSP is itching to fight against India. It is very focussed in it.This is the only thing to justify the actions of TSPA.
2) China would prefer to be in war mode without actually breaking hostilities against India. It would prefer trade imbalances to work in their favour. Also it would not hesitate to put India on the mat through TSP. It is cheaper for china. also shows who is the boss without lifting a gun.
3) India would also not like to be in war mode. Its priorities are entirely different to uplift its own population.

Presence of PLA in TSP will not increase the ever present dangers to India.
However it makes it easier for India to plan better with china-TSP axis. It becomes overt. This is easier for India to take corrective actions.Makes Indian diplomacy work harder to make Indian subcontinent truly Indian. It gives justification for it.
IMO India has already been galvanised into this diplomatic action for the last few years. Recall the manoevres in east asia, burma afghanisthan iran uncle etc. Some of them overlap with differing objectives but all for India’s sake.
India as a nation prefers to be straight and expects others also to do the same. These actions of china corrects it in Indian mind( we are like this onlee as we are fed stories about morals etc etc since childhood)

Overall there will be a tussle between China and India through proxies like TSP. It will be in favour of china till India takes the bull by its horns and turn tables on china. Again TSP is the major impediment. Destroy TSP it is India all the way as china has virtually no key ally to take on India.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Published on Aug 13, 2011
By Stephen Glain
The Pentagon's new China war plan: Salon
Despite budget woes, the military is preparing for a conflict with our biggest rival -- and we should be worried
According to the defense trade press, Pentagon officials are seeking ways to adapt a concept known as AirSea Battle specifically for China, debunking rote claims from Washington that it has no plans to thwart its emerging Asian rival. A recent article in Inside the Pentagon reported that a small group of U.S. Navy officers known as the China Integration Team "is hard at work applying the lessons of [AirSea Battle] to a potential conflict with China."

AirSea Battle, developed in the early 1990s and most recently codified in a 2009 Navy-Air Force classified memo, is a vehicle for conforming U.S. military power to address asymmetrical threats in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf -- code for China and Iran.
the nuclear energy cooperation deal signed by the U.S. and India in 2008 was an obvious containment maneuver aimed at Beijing. In late March, press reports detailed a major buildup of American forces in Asia, including increased naval deployments and expansive cooperation with partner countries. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is forging ahead with a multi-year effort to transform Guam into its primary hub in the Pacific, an initiative so vast that John Pike of the Washington, D.C.-based GlobalSecurity.org has speculated that Washington wants to "run the planet from Guam and Diego Garcia by 2015."
In its story about AirSea Battle and the China Integration Team, Inside the Pentagon revealed an oblique, if profound insight from Andrew Krepinevich, the highly regarded head of Washington’s Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. China, he said, is clearly jousting for control of the Western Pacific and "we have to decide whether we’re going to compete or not. If we’re not, then we have to be willing to accept the shift in the military balance." Otherwise, "the question is how to compete effectively."
RajeshA
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Published on Aug 15, 2011
By Michael Auslin
Build, Hold, and Clear: An American Strategy for Asia: American Enterprise Institute/National Review
America's next global era is dawning. As we scale down military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, our future prosperity, influence, and security will be determined by what happens in the rising Indo-Pacific region. If we play a leading role in the great area stretching from India to Japan, the coming decades will see the strengthening not only of American power, but also that of our liberal, democratic allies. Conversely, surrendering the high ground in Asia to China will likely result in the ebbing of the postwar liberal international system and the establishment of a region, and world, of greater insecurity and instability.
Of particular concern is China's military buildup. Beijing is actively developing military capabilities to reduce America's qualitative superiority and effectively target our bases and forces, in the hope of creating an environment in which U.S. forces will be challenged from accessing the region and operating freely within it.
The outer triangle should comprise Japan, South Korea, and Australia, all American allies, along with India, the next great rising power in the region.
Most important, each is influential among its neighbors, so all four might take leadership roles in their immediate neighborhoods, in partnership with U.S. military forces. Washington should aim at a permanent high-level forum with these four liberal nations to discuss region-wide security issues, identify common threats and challenges, and pursue a common voice when possible in regional and international institutions.

While it might be easier initially to work with America's three current allies, no realistic diplomatic and security initiative is possible without India's participation. U.S. policy should encourage all four nations to commit to shaping regional political institutions in a liberal vein and to committing resources to uphold regional security both broadly and, more specifically, in their immediate areas. Working with the U.S., each should slowly expand the range of its maritime patrols, conduct larger and more regular military exercises, enhance and share intelligence, and work with smaller nations to encourage liberal development.
While this outer triangle is focused on the grand strategy of the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. should also build an inner triangle, focused on Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam. This triangle is centered on the lower South China Sea and, particularly, crucial sea lanes including the Malacca Strait, through which over 50,000 vessels and one-quarter of global trade passes every year, not to mention half of global oil shipments. This area is the hinge between the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, linking together the two halves of the Indo-Pacific.
Going by this article, US should encourage India to take care of 'South Asia'! That would ultimately include dealing with Pakistan. Considering that Pakistan is a nuclear-weapons state, thanks to USA, perhaps it needs emphasizing, that India can be of assistance to USA in their Asia Strategy, if and only if USA takes care of Pakistan first, before turning over the responsibility of its management to India.
ramana
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by ramana »

Looks like a kid drawing triangles where ever he wants.

PRC has already drawn circles of evil around US!
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Published on Sep/Oct 2011
By Robert D. Kaplan
The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict: Foreign Policy
Because of the way geography illuminates and sets priorities, these physical contours of East Asia augur a naval century -- naval being defined here in the broad sense to include both sea and air battle formations now that they have become increasingly inextricable. Why? China, which, especially now that its land borders are more secure than at any time since the height of the Qing dynasty at the end of the 18th century, is engaged in an undeniable naval expansion. It is through sea power that China will psychologically erase two centuries of foreign transgressions on its territory -- forcing every country around it to react.

Military engagements on land and at sea are vastly different, with major implications for the grand strategies needed to win -- or avoid -- them. Those on land enmesh civilian populations, in effect making human rights a signal element of war studies. Those at sea approach conflict as a clinical and technocratic affair, in effect reducing war to math, in marked contrast with the intellectual battles that helped define previous conflicts.
The result is that all nine states that touch the South China Sea are more or less arrayed against China and therefore dependent on the United States for diplomatic and military support. These conflicting claims are likely to become even more acute as Asia's spiraling energy demands -- energy consumption is expected to double by 2030, with China accounting for half that growth -- make the South China Sea the ever more central guarantor of the region's economic strength. Already, the South China Sea has increasingly become an armed camp, as the claimants build up and modernize their navies, even as the scramble for islands and reefs in recent decades is mostly over. China has so far confiscated 12 geographical features, Taiwan one, Vietnam 25, the Philippines eight, and Malaysia five.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Published on Aug 13, 2011
By Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs, Justin Jones: Lowy Institute
Incidents, confrontation and crisis in Indo-Pacific Asia: VietNamNet
In recent years, India has moved to identify Chinese power as the principal reason
for its defence modernisation.
New Delhi is making maritime acquisitions specifically based on its concerns about China's expanding strategic weight and reach. Much of India's ambitious naval modernisation program has been based on a strategy of securing New Delhi's place as the principal maritime power in the Indian Ocean.

Apart from the United States, China is the only other conceivable long-run contender for this role, and Indian defence planners look with concern upon Chinese activities in strengthening its security relationship with Pakistan and supporting port developments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma and elsewhere that might be shifted to supporting a Chinese military presence in the future. New Delhi's acquisition of advanced warships, nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-armed submarines, and long-range surveillance aircraft appear explicitly designed to address future PLA-N capabilities.

Assuming that Beijing eventually expands its maritime security interests and presence in the Indian Ocean, there are obvious future possibilities for encounters and incidents at sea between Chinese and Indian forces. But several other paths to possible Sino-Indian maritime tensions warrant examination.

China is beginning to move beyond its apparent indifference about India as a security competitor, in large part because of the growing US-India strategic partnership, which involves close military to military ties between the two democracies, notably in advanced maritime exercises. The security dimension to India's 'Look East' policy of engagement with East Asian countries is expanding: for instance, India has held naval exercises with Singapore in the East Sea. Moreover, India's growing economic and energy links with East Asia give it a stake in that region's maritime security.

Finally, New Delhi's quest for a nuclear-armed submarine capability to deter Beijing could require it eventually to operate such vessels in waters within relatively short distance of China, unless the range of Indian submarine-launched missiles can be increased beyond what is currently estimated to be less than 1,000 km.52 This in turn could require Indian surveying of unfamiliar waters in China's nautical backyard.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Philip »

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011 ... power.html

Xcpt:
INSIGHT: Should we fear China’s growing naval power?
Rizal Sukma, Jakarta | Sat, 08/13/2011

China’s Navy is surely on the path toward building a modern fleet with forward projection capability. Last month, China announced that the refitting of an aircraft carrier bought from Ukraine in 1998 — to be used for training and research purposes — was approaching its final phase.

While the ex-Soviet Varyag — renamed Shilang — would be the first of China’s operational aircraft carriers, the production of two indigenous aircraft carriers is reportedly also underway at the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. And last week, Shilang was launched in Liaoning province to undertake its first maiden sail.

The Shilang is not yet a full-fledged aircraft carrier. Military analysts agree that the vessel is still not fully operational and needs further tests and work. As of today, the significance of the launch lies is symbolic. The Shilang, however, certainly marks the beginning of China’s road toward becoming a great naval power — a status any great power would like to acquire.

Despite immense challenges at home, it is beyond doubt that China is rapidly becoming a daguo (great power). As its economy continues to grow, the influence of China — which has already been felt across the globe and particularly in East Asia — can only grow further. It is also natural and logical that China’s military power will also grow. Indeed, military modernization itself has always been part of the si xian dai hua (the four modernizations) initiated by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978. The rapid transformation of its naval capability over the last ten years constitutes part and parcel of that process.

Since the adoption of a new strategy of active defense (jiji fangyu) in December 1985, China has consistently developed its naval capability from a costal defense force to a blue water navy. While still lagging behind the US, the Chinese Navy is now one of the most modern fleets in Asia Pacific, and the ongoing developments suggest the aim to become a force for the future, with the intent to boost global power projection capability by the 2020s. With a steady increase in its military spending, which would rise 12.7 percent to US$91.7 billion in 2012, such a plan is not without grounds.

The question for East Asia now is, should we then fear China’s naval power? The answer to this question would vary from one capital to the other. The US, for example, has long been curious about the nature of China’s military growth. Tokyo has also expressed its concerns and the recently released defense white paper warned that China’s Navy would increase its activities around its waters, an assessment criticized by Beijing as an exaggeration of China’s threat.

For Southeast Asian countries, the most important question is not what China has in its arsenal, but what it is going to do with it. There is no reason to fear China’s growing military power if it will be used for the benefit of regional public good. In this regard, China’s growing naval power — including the aircraft carrier — would boost China’s ability to participate in regional efforts to address non-traditional security threats such as combating piracy and conducting disaster relief operations. This is the area where many Southeast Asian countries would welcome China’s greater role.

The problem would arise if China’s growing naval power was used to challenge the US military presence in Asia Pacific. That would surely invite a US reaction. If this is the case, a rivalry between China and the US would not benefit anyone, and Southeast Asian countries would be the first to suffer. To prevent this scenario, it is absolutely necessary for China and the US to intensify strategic dialogue to alleviate any misperceptions of both sides’ intentions.

It would be a disaster also if China’s growing naval power was used to impose and assert its claims in the South China Sea. This area has also been described as a flashpoint in Southeast Asia and could become a source of friction between China and its neighbors. Fortunately, at the recent ASEAN meeting in Bali last month, China and ASEAN agreed the guidelines on the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

The agreement is a significant step toward designing a more legally binding conflict prevention mechanism, the Code of Conduct (CoC). China and ASEAN should soon start discussions on elements of the CoC. Once the CoC is firmly in place, there would be less to fear from China’s growing naval power.

The writer is the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta
RajeshA
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Published on Aug 17, 2011
By Phil Radford
Big boat, little punch in South China Sea: Asia Times
In the first week of June, an article in Vietnam's state newspaper, Nhan Dan, carried pictures of the world's fastest anti-ship missile, the Indo-Russian BrahMos, in a clear statement of procurement intentions and its navy's readiness to respond to incidents of Chinese aggression within waters it claims as its exclusive economic zone. With a speed of Mach 2.8, the missile is four times as fast as a US-made Tomahawk missile and would present a lethal threat to any vessel within its 300-kilometer range. (Even with exceptional anti-missile capabilities, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies would keep well out of range of this threat.)

BrahMos procurement requires joint Indian and Russian approval, and Vietnam is rapidly improving its relations with both nations. During a high profile defense cooperation visit to New Delhi by Vietnam's navy chief at the end of June, the Vietnamese government gave permission for Indian navy ships to drop anchor at Nha Trang, which has been off-limits to foreign navies since 2003.
Both Indonesia and the Philippines could also quickly develop powerful deterrent capabilities, and at relatively little cost by deploying anti-ship missiles to key outposts. Indonesia has already held discussions with India to acquire the BrahMos missile. The Philippines could either purchase US missiles off-the-shelf, or negotiate purchase of Taiwan's new ram-jet Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, unveiled with exquisite timing last week at the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition against a mural backdrop of a burning carrier. :rotfl:
ramana
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by ramana »

Next year is leadership change in PRC. Hu Jin Tao will be replaced by current Vice President.
Philip
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Philip »

How to mismanage the Chinese threat!

China speeds past India's slow train to Himalayas

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china ... as/833149/
Christopher Sidor
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Christopher Sidor »

Philip wrote:How to mismanage the Chinese threat!

China speeds past India's slow train to Himalayas

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china ... as/833149/
This article misses quite a few points.
1) The max speed on the current rail alignment will be around 100-130 kmph. Not even close to the rated 175/160 kmph speed of the konkan railway line.
2) This current rail alignment will not be able to support double stacked container trains.
3) The so the so called tallest bridge across chenab section is a disaster waiting to happen. There will be wind speed detectors installed on both of the ends of the bridge. And if the wind speed exceeds certain limit than the bridge will be shut down. So this rail link will not provide 24X7 connectivity between the valley and rest of India as it is assumed to be.

A few months back, before the south-west monsoons set in, I had gone to Vashno Devi. All along the Jammu-Katra I could see tunnels, with water dripping and half completed bridges just lying vacant. Maybe if our former Railway minister had given the same importance to this project as she had given to winning Bengal, then we might have seen some progress. We can forget the Leh-Bilaspur and the Arunachal rail link if this rail link is going to be a template for other projects.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Originally posted by SSridhar in PRC Thread

Published on Aug 26. 2011
By Narayan Lakshman
China has strengthened nuclear missiles as deterrent against India: U.S.: Hindu
China has substituted liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable missiles with “more advanced and survivable solid-fuelled” rocket systems, and this has been explicitly aimed at “[strengthening] its deterrent posture relative to India,” according to an annual report on the developments within the Chinese military, authored by the United States Pentagon.

In its report to the U.S. Congress, the Pentagon warned that the People's Liberation Army had replaced the CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with its CSS-5 Medium Range Ballistic Missile systems. It also emphasised that China was further investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border that could “support PLA border defence operations.”

While the report was principally focused on the rapid step-up in Chinese military investments in recent years, including its aircraft carrier programme, cyber-warfare capabilities, anti-satellite missiles and the top-secret J-20 next-generation stealth fighter, the report also commented on India's concern at some of these regional developments.

Pointing out that India was also improving its infrastructure along its north-eastern border, the report said: “New Delhi remains concerned by China's close military relationship with Pakistan and Beijing's growing footprint in the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and Africa.”

The report also warned of maritime implications for regional powers like India.
Published on Aug 24, 2011
By Bill Gertz
Pentagon report: China closer to matching modern militaries: Washington Times
“The pace and scope of China’s sustained military investment have allowed China to pursue capabilities that we believe are potentially destabilizing to regional military balances, increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and may contribute to regional tensions and anxieties,” said Michael Schiffer, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, in releasing the report at the Pentagon.

Mr. Schiffer said China is on track to becoming a regional military power by 2020.
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Pg. 38)
India. China deepened its ties with India through increased trade and high-level dialogues in 2010, though border tensions remained an irritant in the bilateral relationship. Bilateral trade in 2010 reached nearly $60 billion. The two neighbors have held several rounds of dialogue over disputed territorial claims. Sino-Indian defense ties were institutionalized in 2007 with the establishment of an Annual Defense Dialogue. Though India cancelled high-level military exchanges following China’s denial of a visa to a senior Indian general in 2010, both sides agreed to resume exchanges in April 2011. During his December 2010 trip to New Delhi, Premier Wen Jiabao attempted to smooth over differences following a year of uneasy relations, but he did not address serious irritants. A high degree of mistrust continues to strain the bilateral relationship. To strengthen its deterrent posture relative to India, the PLA has replaced liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable CSS-2 IRBMs with more advanced and survivable solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBM systems. China is also investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border. Although this construction is primarily aimed at facilitating economic development in western China, improved roads could also support PLA border defense operations. India is also improving infrastructure along its northeastern border. New Delhi remains concerned by China’s close military relationship with Pakistan and Beijing’s growing footprint in the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and Africa.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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SSridhar garu,

one wonders why there are no protests from GoI. This is a direct threat, which can cause nuclear devastation in whole of India.

Is this like another building-up to 1962, where the Government first tries to keep the threat under wraps.

When signing the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, a provision was made for India to rethink its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing if the strategic environment warranted such a change.

What else can one consider as a change in that strategic environment? This is it! India is being directly threatened with nuclear annihilation by one of the P5 powers, something to be taken very seriously.

Isn't it time for India to break that unilateral moratorium? Isn't it time to let the Buddha smile again! What else would constitute a grave nuclear threat to India!

We speak often of how the United States sent the U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 as a threat to India! This deployment by China on our borders in not a one-time threat as was the case in 1971, this is a constant threat. We are in the cross-hairs of those nuclear missiles.

What we are looking for is an opportunity to test our nukes further and improve on what we already have! The world is at the moment busy with Syria and Iran, and they would not care in relative terms less about Indian testing. Besides most of the countries in East Asia have recently experienced some serious bullying by China, so they would be quite mute in their criticism of India and may even extend support to us. What else need we wait for?

In fact this could accelerate the process of nuclearization of East Asia - South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and even Vietnam, something that would give these countries extra strength to counter China. And we should continue to test, until testing becomes acceptable again, so that these countries have less of a difficulty changing their current stands on it. Today two countries point their nukes towards India. As things stand the current nuclear equilibrium is not in our interests. We need many more nuclear weapon states whose weapons are pointed towards our enemies - towards China.

In West Asia, we already know how things stand, and not much would change there. The West and GCC would continue to put pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear march regardless of how India acts, simply because it is in their interests and not because of some holistic international non-proliferation system.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Christopher Sidor »

In December 2010, Defense Tech ran an article which said China’s Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles are Operational. A misleading or eye-ball grabbing headline, but still incorrect. It should have been "China’s Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles are in early operational status"

But let us not split hairs over this. I am quoting from the article below
The rise of this type of anti-access technology has caused the Pentagon to beging reevaluating how it will fight a major war under the aegis of the Air-Sea Battle concept, which calls for the Air Force and Navy to figure out how they will work together to overcome such threats. That plan is being finalized right now, none too soon in light of these latest developments.
...
...
One aspect that will likely feature prominently in the Air-Sea Battle concept is the, so-called, family of long range strike systems being eyed by the DoD.
Well what are these so called long range strike systems ??
One of these is the so called "Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 or HTV-2", whose test allegedly failed this month.
Traditional ballistic missiles have speeds upto say 10 mach, I am specifically taking the assumed speed of DF-21 aka CSS-5 missile family. HTV-2 has a speed of say 20 Mach. So assume that a launcher of DF-21D launches its missile. Its location is captured by the american satellites or its intelligence planes. Before it can shift to safer location, HTV-2 takes it out. Or better still, if the Americans determine that DF-21 is going to launch, then they can unleash HTV-2.

But what got my interest really peaked was this statement from the above mentioned article
The family of systems idea was launched after Defense Secretary Robert Gates shelved the Air Force’s plan to build a new long range bomber by 2018. Instead, he told the service to look at what capabilities it could develop along with the other services to best overcome advanced enemy air defenses. While some sort of penetrating bomber/electronic attack/intelligence plane may be part of this family, it will also likely include stand-off cruise missiles launched by air or sea, and even land based ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets around the globe on very short notice.
The nearest missile which India has is the 290 kms range Brahmos. 290kms is thanks to MTCR restriction. But again it is not hypersonic. There are plans to develop a Hypersonic Brahmos, i.e Brahmos II, but well 290 kms range is not exactly what we require. This is the time that India should leapfrog the current supersonic and ballistic missiles and directly go for air-breathing hyper sonic cruise missiles. stationed in A&N island chain, our North-East and North-West these missiles will be potent deterrent against China.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by rajrang »

I am copying to this thread because it probably belongs here.
NRao wrote:
1) China has a very small window in which she can actually attack. IMVVHO that window will close around 2015-17 time frame
I think you have made some excellent points, but I am sorry, I am not sure I agree with the above comment. Both gakakkad and D Roy have made some excellent points as well.

Can you explain your statement that the small window for a Chinese attack will close around 2015-17? From an economic standpoint, one could argue that the potential for a Chinese attack will only increase in the next 10 to 20 years:

1) The economic growth of China (~ 10%/yr) is much faster than US, Europe and slightly faster than India. This means that the ability of the world opinion (i.e. US and Europe) to dissuade China from attacking India will only weaken with time. India will be left facing China (and TSP) alone beyond that time. (By 2020, based on current performance, China will have the largest GNP (PPP) in the world, the US number 2, India number 3, Japan number 4).

2) Further, in the next 20 years, the Chinese economic growth rate will max out (high standards of living) and the growth rate will inevitably slow down, while the Indian economy being relatively behind should continue to have high growth rates. This would tend to narrow the gap between India and China, creating insecurities in China.

3) It is also possible that in the 20-year time frame, the Taiwan and the South East Asia Sea problems have been sorted out, allowing China's military to focus primarily on India.

Therefore, one could argue that early in the second quarter of this century, China's economic power will be maximum relative to India, and at that time China will have the maximum ability to attack India. (This is all based on the logic that military strength is directly proportional to the size of an economy.) At that time the rest of the world may simply be by-standers watching India and China battle it out.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

Continuing from PRC Thread
Rony wrote:Debate on Times Now about INS Airavat incident in South China Sea. There was a Chinese analyst as well.

http://www.timesnow.tv/Debate-Open-Chin ... 382838.cms
Thanks for sharing the link! I hope there are more such incidents. I hope India really gets paranoid, paranoid enough to start testing again.

I would say, we test in exactly one year's time, when US is about to go into elections, and all candidates are hopeful for support from the Indian Americans.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

X-Posting from TIRP Thread
SSridhar wrote:This debate on who was a bigger threat, whether it is China or Pakistan, has gon e on for many years. At different times, it has been either one or the other. In the last few years, PRC has once again been spoken of as a bigger threat. This threat perception has been waxing and waning like a moon.

We should make a difference between the two, IMHO. Pakistan is no match for us and the distance is increasing every day, as we all know. It was not like the 50s and 60s when Pakistan was inducting superior weapons and we were not. Besides, Pakistan has been on a free fall since its creation, though it has miraculously been able to survive even after loss of half its territory. But, it is internally much weakened than ever before with no big possibility of overcoming the weakness. So, Pakistan needs sustenance from somebody else. It was the US during Cold War days and it is becoming partly US and largely China today. It appears that the US will almost completely withdraw from Pakistan after some years. PRC will then become its sole benefactor. So, Pakistan cannot be a threat to us in the same way that suddenly China has become. We should have anticipated the Chinese threat since its rise in the 80s. China's political, economic and military clout places its threat in an entirely new class. It is too secretive in its plans and that makes it all the more difficult to decipher its actions and words. About Pakistan we know what it wants to do with us and how it wants to go about it.

Having said that, the situation today has become far more complex. Pakistan is totally abdicating itself to PRC. Just after 26/11, Pakistani FM Qureshi said that PRC can negotiate with India on its behalf ! Gilani goading Karzai to adopt Renminbi instead of USD, Zardari's dozen visits to PRC in the last couple of years thereby making his Presidency look like that of another provincial governor in PRC, the occupation of GB and the rest of POK by PLA, the extensive road & rail network PRC is planning within Pakistan etc. prove the abdication. Pakistan has concluded that only through PRC can it achieve its desire of destroying India. Pakistan is willing to be servile therefore to PRC.

Therefore, we may not confront Pakistan alone in the future because slowly Pakistan is becoming an extension of PRC. We have to plan for a combined operation and that is where the rub is. Like the Taliban being coached, trained and launched by the PA, Pakistan itself has come under the control of PRC.

I think that this is where an opportunity exists for India. The AQAM wants to grasp Pakistan because as a Muslim and a nuclear-weapon country, it is the perfect launch-pad for their global Caliphate ambitions. Large sections of the military at lower ranks and mid-level officers do support such an outcome. The society is getting more radicalized in their favour. The Ahl-e-Sunnat are being converted large scale into Wahhabi/Deobandi mode of thinking. So, the AQAM see a real prospect here. OTOH, there is the other type within Pakistani Establishment who are content with defeating India (but willing to use any tool such as Islamism, jihad, PRC etc). The latter type is increasingly moving towards PRC because the jihadi groups which they created have now turned against them. They feel naked and need PRC's support for their burning revenge against India. The former may not like that and we must therefore sharpen that difference to our advantage.

I therefore think that our planning should be to consider PRC-TSP as just one entity rather than splitting hair on which is a bigger threat because TSP is now subsumed by PRC.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Samudragupta »

Not going into details about the internal divisions with the TSP the most probable scenario that is arising out of the actions of TSP is that it is trying to lure the IA into POK by alligning and changing dynamics of the POK...they know very well that we will react to the moves...already raising of strike corps in the East has eaten out the Rapidisation of the Western Front ...In as much they want to shift the thrust of the IA to the POK from the Sindh-Baluchistan axis....It needs to be seen wheather we will fall into the trap....
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

X-Posting from PRC Thread
SSridhar wrote:
From the above, look at the dhimmi Indian behaviour.
The only issue which the Chinese side raised was the “strong” possibility of the Tibetan movement turning violent in the near future and they wanted India to take extra measures for security of Chinese assets. The Indian side gave details of the government going the extra mile to ensure the same.
Here is a China that vetoed thrice UNSC Resolution on including LeT and Hafeez Saeed in the Sanctions List. Here is a China that bluntly rejected Indian evidence on JeM & Maulana Masood Azhar as 'insufficient'. Here is a China that refuses to look into arms supply for the Naga insurgents. And, it demands that India take efforts to stem Tibetan movement becoming violent and dhimmi officials detail all the measures that they have taken against such an eventuality. India should have simply said that they do not see any evidence of the Tibetan movement going violent and asked the Chinese to present evidence. And, if thy did present such an evidence, reject it as 'insufficient' and 'not upto the standards' expected by India.

For how long are we going to pretend that such cowardly Indian behaviour is indeed chanakyan ?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by rajrang »

RajeshA wrote:X-Posting from TIRP Thread
SSridhar wrote:This debate on who was a bigger threat, whether it is China or Pakistan, has gon e on for many years. At different times, it has been either one or the other. In the last few years, PRC has once again been spoken of as a bigger threat. This threat perception has been waxing and waning like a moon.

We should make a difference between the two, IMHO. Pakistan is no match for us and the distance is increasing every day, as we all know. It was not like the 50s and 60s when Pakistan was inducting superior weapons and we were not. Besides, Pakistan has been on a free fall since its creation, though it has miraculously been able to survive even after loss of half its territory. But, it is internally much weakened than ever before with no big possibility of overcoming the weakness. So, Pakistan needs sustenance from somebody else. It was the US during Cold War days and it is becoming partly US and largely China today. It appears that the US will almost completely withdraw from Pakistan after some years. PRC will then become its sole benefactor. So, Pakistan cannot be a threat to us in the same way that suddenly China has become. We should have anticipated the Chinese threat since its rise in the 80s. China's political, economic and military clout places its threat in an entirely new class. It is too secretive in its plans and that makes it all the more difficult to decipher its actions and words. About Pakistan we know what it wants to do with us and how it wants to go about it.

Having said that, the situation today has become far more complex. Pakistan is totally abdicating itself to PRC. Just after 26/11, Pakistani FM Qureshi said that PRC can negotiate with India on its behalf ! Gilani goading Karzai to adopt Renminbi instead of USD, Zardari's dozen visits to PRC in the last couple of years thereby making his Presidency look like that of another provincial governor in PRC, the occupation of GB and the rest of POK by PLA, the extensive road & rail network PRC is planning within Pakistan etc. prove the abdication. Pakistan has concluded that only through PRC can it achieve its desire of destroying India. Pakistan is willing to be servile therefore to PRC.

Therefore, we may not confront Pakistan alone in the future because slowly Pakistan is becoming an extension of PRC. We have to plan for a combined operation and that is where the rub is. Like the Taliban being coached, trained and launched by the PA, Pakistan itself has come under the control of PRC.

I think that this is where an opportunity exists for India. The AQAM wants to grasp Pakistan because as a Muslim and a nuclear-weapon country, it is the perfect launch-pad for their global Caliphate ambitions. Large sections of the military at lower ranks and mid-level officers do support such an outcome. The society is getting more radicalized in their favour. The Ahl-e-Sunnat are being converted large scale into Wahhabi/Deobandi mode of thinking. So, the AQAM see a real prospect here. OTOH, there is the other type within Pakistani Establishment who are content with defeating India (but willing to use any tool such as Islamism, jihad, PRC etc). The latter type is increasingly moving towards PRC because the jihadi groups which they created have now turned against them. They feel naked and need PRC's support for their burning revenge against India. The former may not like that and we must therefore sharpen that difference to our advantage.

I therefore think that our planning should be to consider PRC-TSP as just one entity rather than splitting hair on which is a bigger threat because TSP is now subsumed by PRC.

One possible advantage of TSP becoming a province of PRC is that the actions and noises emanating from TSP will become more rational not some irrational jihadi nonsense.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

rajrang wrote:One possible advantage of TSP becoming a province of PRC is that the actions and noises emanating from TSP will become more rational not some irrational jihadi nonsense.
rajrang ji,

TSP is not irrational (their madness has a system to it) nor is PLA 'rational' (meaning negotiation-oriented).
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

I am posting the draft from an old post.

Published Oct 30, 2010
Azeri Defense Minister prepares China for war with Armenia?: News.am
Azerbaijani Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Safar Abiyev was on a working visit to China Oct. 25 to 29.

On the first day of his visit, the Azeri Minister of Defense met with General Chen Bingde, Chief of General Staff Department, People’s Liberation Army of China. The sides discussed bilateral politico-military relations and exchanged views on cooperation in military education.

Minister Abiev presented his view of the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He thanked China for recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, pointing out Azerbaijan’s support of China in the Taiwan problem.

The Azeri Minister of Defense also held a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, General Liang Guanglie, who invited Safar Abiyev. The Azeri defense minister stated Azerbaijan is interested in bilateral cooperation. “Azerbaijan is constantly struggling against terrorist, separatist and extremist activities, and supports cooperation with all the states,” he said.

“Azerbaijan’s territory was occupied, but our lands will be liberated. If the peace talks fail to produce results, Azerbaijan will use all the means, including its army, to restore its territorial integrity. Serious preparations are under way in our Armed Forces,” he said.

Minister Abiyev also held a meeting with General Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The Azeri defense minister thanked China for its assistance to Azerbaijan in military education.

Interestingly, all the Chinese officials stated their “support of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity” during the Azeri defense minister’s visit.
This is very interesting. The Chinese are not pretending at all to be even handed like the Minsk Group of USA, Russia and France, who are trying to mediate a solution through negotiations. The Chinese, they are willing to give as much military requirements Azerbaijan needs to defeat Armenian forces and to throw out the native Armenian people out of the enclave.

Any American route that wants to bypass Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan to reach Central Asia has to pass through Azerbaijan. By giving it sufficient military support for it to change the ground situation in the enclave, Azerbaijan does not have any drive anymore to look for peaceful solutions with Armenia, and the Minsk group fails. By pulling Azerbaijan away from America, America loses its last independent way into Central Asia. Secondly China gets to win a few more brownie points with the Muslims, as Azerbaijan is a Muslim land. Thirdly even the Turkic group must be happy. When the Americans passed a Resolution condemning Turkey for the Armenian Genocide, it brought out more anger amongst the Turks. By finishing off the Armenian enclave, the Turks would also be happy. The Azeris are also Turkic people. May be support to Azerbaijan is part of China's outreach to Azerbaijan itself.

At the moment the Turks do not have any direct path to Azerbaijan. There is Georgia and Armenia in the way. By using the Azeris, the Turks and the Chinese seem determined to have an uninterrupted Turkish-Chinese Corridor from Mediterranean to Pacific, if need should arise, otherwise additionally going through Iran.

The Azeris would be doing the all the fighting and will use Chinese weapons for that, so the West cannot get mad at either Turkey or China - perfect plausible deniability. In fact the Turks would see their importance rise, as the Minsk Group would have to invite Turkey as NATO partner and the regional strongman with ethnic relations to the Azeris to soften the Azeri wrath, which gives Turkey the same type of leverage the Chinese have in the six-party talks with North Korea. The Turks would see to it that the ceasefire line freezes in such a way that there is a direct border between Turkey and Azerbaijan. After 5 years or so, one can make railroads pass through the area right through to China, a second route which is not dependent even on the Iranians.

The talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia are on the way to failure, and it is going to get very very bloody there indeed. I suppose, Azerbaijan is going to have so many weapons, it cannot lose. The more resistance the Armenians give, the bigger weapons Azerbaijan is going to be using. Azeris have Oil and the Chinese can sell them weapons.

Turkey is in NATO and is not going to leave it any time soon, despite the many differences that are going to crop up. It gets a lot of input from NATO, and can use its positioning for good bit of bargaining. So Turkey is not that keen to be seen pulling off another sort of Cyprus in Nagorno-Karabakh, and probably would not get its hands dirty or bloody. Turkey would leave it to Azeris. Through the blockade of Armenia, Turkey is already doing its part in choking off Armenia.

The Russians
The Armenians get their weapons from Russia, simply because that was the earlier equation - the US supported Azerbaijan for its Oil and geography, while Russia played patron to Armenia. Since however there is a strain on Russia-Georgia relations, Armenia has truly become landlocked. Armenia has tried a rapprochement with Turkey, but the blockade is still there.

The Russians were probably pushing for a solution where Russian soldiers could be deployed as peace-keeping troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, something Moscow would like because it would give them major leverage again in the region. IMO, they can forget that now, as there is a totally different game going on. With China's support to Azerbaijan, Azeris can be assured that they would win the war and take possession of the land, changing the geography for ever. The Russians are going to get sidelined here completely.

Iran
The Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have improved. Recently Iran gave Turkey and China the permission to go ahead with the air exercises Anatolia Eagle over Iranian airspace. Why? Is it normal that a country like Iran just gives somebody the opportunity to undertake air combat exercises in its airspace? It can't be money. It is strategic. Iran wants to pull Turkey away from USA and Israel, which does not necessarily mean that Turkey is leaving NATO. Also why allow Chinese military planes over its airspace? Obviously there has been a markable strategic shift in Iran, Turkey and China relations.

However an Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia with major land transfer to Azerbaijan cannot be in Iran's interests, because that gives Turkey unhindered access to all the Turkic regions. At the moment the transit route goes through Iran. Turkey cannot access the Turkic regions directly - it can do so only through Georgia, which is an American friend; or through Armenia; which is an historical ethnic enemy and in enmity with the region, Turkey might want to access - Azerbaijan. Khamenei the Supreme Leader is himself an Azeri. Of course, Iran would support Azerbaijan simply because Azerbaijan too is a Muslim country.

But it can still be that Iranians have received some assurance on this from Turkey and China and Iran would not be passed by. Turkey would be needing access through Iran to the Indian Ocean, and so would China, so Iran does stay in the picture.

The effort between Turkey and China is to develop a corridor independent of any other power. By bull-dozing a corridor through Armenia - China would have ensured two things - America would also lose control over Azerbaijan, and thereby its Northern Distribution Network bypassing Russia would also come a cropper.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

X-Posting from TIRP Thread

Rudradev wrote:Shiv,

I have a guess as to what we all may have missed. Actually the fragments of the answer are all there in various threads of this forum; the problem is our insistence on opening a new thread for every seemingly tangential discussion, rather than attempting to connect the dots. Data are collected, good analysis is performed on each of the fragments in isolation... but threads being what they are, everything of value is soon tangled up in an impervious undergrowth of whines.

Briefly: the state of Pakistan, or at least those groups with the capacity to exercise any sort of central authority there, have lost confidence in their ability to preserve the identity and viability of Pakistan. Allah, Army and America were the pillars of the state, the guarantors of its survival through the previous century. Today Allah and Army are fighting each other in a purer-on-pure conflict, and America is repeatedly sticking bamboos in the upturned GUBO orifice of the Pakistani state. The present and potential ruling elite, the empowered classes, are in a state of panic, reaching out desperately to all sorts of potential benefactors to guarantee the continuance of their empowered status. These include:

A) Maha-Islampasand Pakis, including many within ISI and TSPA, who are still holding out in the hope that a pan-Ummah caliphate ("Khozestan?") can be established and subsume present-day Pakistan. However, this group is grappling with twin calamities that have publicly exposed and undermined the fantastic and unsustainable nature of their goals; firstly, the exhaustion of fighting a ten-year war against drones, airstrikes, ANA artillery and US special forces in the Northwest, and secondly, the crisis of credibility that has resulted from the decapitation strike against Bin Laden. Additionally, the increasing transformation of the Taliban into a Pashtun nationalist movement has undercut the legitimacy of the Maha-Islampasand Pakis' argument that being Purest of All is the solution to saving Pakistan.

B ) Chinipakis: the remaining portion of TSPA and ISI, plus many elements of the RAPE "political" class (such as Zardari) who are relying on the Chinese to save the day. They are the ones doing their damndest to mortgage the whole Pakistani state as the newest province of China. These, from the Indian point of view, may be the most dangerous... for reasons I will go into later. They are playing for a coup... a two-front war prosecuted by China and Pakistan against India, that will at once humiliate India, make America less relevant, and seize Kashmir in a move that will confer political legitimacy on the leadership claims of the Chinipaki group.

C) A very small number of Paki elite and TSPA who are still pro-America, and cling to the hope that America will not leave the used condom shredded in the garbage when it pulls out.

D) An even smaller number of Paki elite who are, not pro-India, but at some level hope that India can sort things out and save Pakistan's skin (since the alternatives are all worse.) These are your Chaighar type Paki liberals, who still hate India and Hindus, who still justify the creation of Pakistan, but all said and done feel more affinity for India than for China, Ummah or America.

E) A substantial number of Pakis who do NOT belong to the traditional echelons of power, i.e.TSPA/ISI Top-Brass or RAPE; and who still hold out the hope that Pakistan as they once knew it can survive all this. Of all the categories this is the ONLY social class which actually has a vested interest in the survival and success of Pakistan as an *independent* nation state when all is said and done. They consist of a petit-bourgeoise (not-exactly-middle) class, ranging from shopkeepers to professionals and bureaucrats to smaller landowners who are not quite big enough to be RAPE or "political class" in the Zardari/Sharif mould.

What India is trying to accomplish is not "strategy", at least not a Pakistan strategy that is viable in the long term. What India is trying to do is to make the best of a bad situation and strengthen Section D by drawing Pakis of Section E to it. We are playing to gain time, and avoid a two-front war with Pakistan+China; not to destroy Pakistan or redeem Pakistan or reclaim POK or any of those grand designs talked about on BRF. We are playing for time. That is all.

Section A is hopeless, and gives us entertainment value (IED mubaraks, Dronacharya strikes) at best while conducting terrorist attacks against Indian targets at worst.

Section B is very, very dangerous and their plans must be thwarted at ALL costs.

Section C is small enough to ignore entirely as a power bloc, but they may serve some limited purpose in advancing those few aspects of the Indian and American agendas that overlap.

However, there is still some hope for Section E (along with Section D) to create the sort of temporary respite that might postpone the inevitable collapse of Pakistan for a few decades, while neither engendering an overwhelmingly dangerous situation on our borders nor swamping us with a massive humanitarian disaster just as we are beginning to make economic progress.

Section E, it must be noted, does have considerable presence in the TSPA... the sons of petit-bourgeoise Pakistanis who joined the armed forces, and who have lost confidence in the RAPE-origin jernails to run the country after seeing the disaster perpetrated over the last ten years. Some of these Section E Pakis may even be as high up as Brigadier and Major General. These guys, as well as the Section C (pro-US) TSPA brass, are the intended audience of our dovishness that everyone from MMS to B Raman to Bharat Karnad have been prescribing ("non-threatening posture" et al.) Or at least, that's my guess.

India is hoping that these Section E TSPA officers will become a pro-Indian (or at least, "not-anti-Indian") constituency, and forestall the designs of either Section A Maha-Islampasand elements of TSPA, or Section B Chini-pasand elements of TSPA.

Make no mistake, the Section D/E Pakis do not love India, they do not necessarily favour forgive-and-forget with India, they do not necessarily see the Indian position on Kashmir as justified; but they DO see that India/Kashmir is far from the greatest problem that Pakistan faces right now, and they will take India's help in strengthening their position to ward off those other, bigger problems. For now. Or so India hopes.

So. Why do I say Section B are the MOST dangerous Pakis?

Because it may be that China really wants a war. Against India, with Pakistan as its ally.

China has been acting for the last several years, more aggressively than ever towards all its neighbours. Not ONE conciliatory move is made, but panga is taken with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines AND India at every opportunity. Why?

Because China needs a war. Or at least, one very powerful faction in the Chinese govt, including the PLA, is convinced that China needs a war.

Why does this faction think China needs a war?

It's like this. Throughout the '90s, the Chinese accumulated what they thought was going to be their greatest source and permanent guarantee of wealth; forex reserves of Western currencies, and more importantly, debt owed by Western governments. Mainly the US government.

That component... debt holdings, in the form of US treasury bonds and such, grew enormously through the '00s, as the US borrowed money to finance its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Chinese export markets in the US also grew enormously in the '00s... until things reached a point where Chinese industries relied on US consumer markets to absorb a very large portion of their output.

When the '08 financial crisis hit the Western world, especially the US, China's b@lls went into their mouth. It was a double-threat for China. On the one hand, all the US debt they held could become devalued in case of a depression. On the other hand, if US consumers stopped buying things, Chinese industries (which relied on US markets to absorb their output) would suffer. The resulting impact felt at home, by the Chinese economy, could have devastating consequences for a totalitarian regime.

So what option does a country have when so much of its wealth is in the form of debt? It must monetize the debt. It must turn the debt into something real, as soon as possible, before that wealth (in the form of treasury bonds) becomes more and more devalued as a result of its debtor's financial troubles.

How can China monetize the debt it holds? Here are some ways.

1) It can demand that the US pay up. But the US doesn't have money. If the US prints money, then China's own holdings become further devalued (as it happened with QE2, which further aggravated the situation.) Same for other Western countries, such as EU nations, which are also reeling financially.

2) It can print money and inject it into its own economy to increase domestic consumption. But this will inevitably lead to inflation, and cause civil unrest. Very bad idea, beyond narrow limits. Keeping tight control over money supply is much healthier from a totalitarian regime's point of view.

3) It can invest money into tinpot countries and gain goodwill. To some extent China has been doing this. But sooner or later, some returns have to be there no? So far, what returns have been generated by China's magnanimous projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe etc.?

4) It can start a war. It can arm up, invest wholesale in defense R&D, in procurement of foreign weapons systems and manufacture of its own weapons systems. And it can use these weapons systems in the pursuit of other kinds of power... geostrategic power. An additional benefit to this method of monetizing its debt is that it does not lead to civil unrest (at least as long as China can claim victory) but rather, to an upsurge in jingoistic nationalism that strengthens the position of an authoritarian government.

There you have it. Starting a war is likely considered a good option, given the prevailing economic situation, by a powerful faction within the ruling establishment of China. The US and West do not care if China starts a war with India; it will damage two of their biggest competitors. And Pakistanis of Section B, above, very much want this to happen and want to participate on the Chinese side.

The ONLY thing that would make the Chinese hesitate in starting a war with India would be India's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. And what has Bharat Karnad told us, between the lines, about that?

In summary, I am guessing that the GOI has understood all this. It understands that the danger of a two-front aggression by China and Pakistan is not just real but imminent. It has calculated that we cannot win, and that we cannot count on external help to win. It may have calculated (ref: Karnad) that we do not even have a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent this from happening.

So in a sense, just as we are the only hope for Pakis of Sections D and E... Pakis of Sections D and E are our only hope to avert disaster. That's why we're seeing the policies we're seeing, IMHO.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

X-Posting from TIRP Thread

Rudradev ji,

My respect for you and your analysis is well justified!

I think, there is a little proxy war going on in Pakistan - between Saudi Arabia and Iran. TSPA is turning more and more radical Wahhabandi. So how do the Shi'as in Pakistan react, or for that matter even Sindhis who are somewhat Sufisticated. They need to retain some hold over TSPA!

So the question becomes how the 'Sufi' Sindhis and the Shi'a can exert their influence over the TSPA. What can they offer to TSPA? Before I come to that, a diversion.

Iran and China's Interests Converge
And here come the geopolitics of the region! There are two countries that absolutely want to keep American out of Central Asia - the Chinese and the Iranians. However Pakistan is allowing America a route into Afghanistan. So Pakistan needs to brought abroad. There is the Northern Distribution Route as well, but I will get to that later.

American fight is however with the Al Qaeda, with Taliban, who are hard-line Sunnis. Basically the Shi'a and the Sufis would not really mind if the Taliban get a thrashing, however the pretext of Global War on Terror allows America to sit tight in Afghanistan, thereby posing a threat to both the underbelly of China in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and to Iranian Baluchistan. East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) lives in the region, and then there is the threat of Jundallah in Iranian Southeast. So both Iran and China have reason to be suspicious.

Secondly it is the question of minerals of Central Asia. Why shouldn't China go for an iron grip over the minerals of Central Asia? China would love to block out India and USA from the region. Russia is just another big bear on which the lizard can sit and suck more minerals out, so Russia doesn't really bother the Chinese. Iran too had once a big influence over this region and this region formed part of its empire. So Iran as a power with potential is hoping to cash in on the mineral wealth of the region. Iran may not have the industry, but it would want control in order to sell those minerals as well. Just see the Iranians also bidding for mining iron ore in Afghanistan.

Thirdly China wants to develop its West as much as it can and get more Hans to migrate to the Wild West. That can be possible only if industry comes up in the region, with raw materials coming from Central Asia, and trade routes becoming possible through Karakoram. There too only Pakistan can help. But to develop the region, China would want to blunt the increasing threat from Wahhabization of Uyghurs, who form the support base for ETIM. Now it is really difficult to get Muslims to leave Islam. So here too China would be hoping that the Mullahs from Iran can proselytize the Uyghurs a bit and turn them into Shi'ites. We see how the Chinese played hosts to Zardari, a Shi'a, in Urumqi the other day, who celebrated Eid al-Fitr there with Uyghurs.

Fourthly, we see Chinese troops walking in into Gilgit, etc. These are Shia regions, and Chinese need some Iranian support to keep the locals under control as well.

Signs of Convergence
So Iranians and Chinese are on one page.

a) There is a pipeline between Turkmenistan and China pumping Gas. When Iran's South Pars Gas Fields come online, Iran too would be sending Gas all the way to China through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Along this pipeline there is quite a bit of cooperation between Iran and China, and it will only get better.

b) There is going to be some cooperation between Iran, Pakistan and China in Kashmir as well. One should again consider how Press TV of Iran has been active in inciting violence in Kashmir. It was Press TV's reportage that got the Valley burning again the last time, of course with full cooperation of Pakistan. There were also strong remarks from Ali Khamenei in favor of Kashmiri 'Azadi'.

c) During Anatolian Eagle Air Exercises between Turkey and China, Iran allowed the use of its airspace. This is a big deal and shows Iranian comfort in dealing with China. The Chinese jets flew to Iran probably over Pakistani air space.

Zardari Driving Iran-Pakistan-China Strategy
a) One only needs to look at the travel plans of Zardari to know which way the wind is blowing. In July, Zardari visited Iran twice within a month. How many times has Zardari been hopping off to China? After the Obama kill, he has visited China at least twice.

Zardari, who is a Shia, is more than willing to play the middleman, the man who brings Iran and China together, the man who provides Pakistani Army with the Chinese military umbrella.

b) We saw how Gilani went to Kabul and told Karzai that he should dump the Americans and join the Chinese, and start using RMB instead of Dollars for trading.

c) We read how PPP has made Chinese language compulsory in Sindh schools from Class VI onward.

d) We just saw how a Chinese company was given a contract to build a railway station just across Baimer District in Rajasthan, that means the Railway Station is going to come up in Sindh. I presume, that PPP Govt. in Sindh is actively pursuing this.

e) We saw how Zulfiqar Mirza, a PPP man, started accusing America of trying to break up Pakistan in conjunction with his local bete noire the MQM.

Of course the Chinese always counsel their best friends to be on very good talking terms with their enemies, be it Americans or Indians. This way their conquest is made easier. One would see Mahinda Rajapakse being friendly with Indians; Prachanda being asked by the Chinese to improve ties with Indians, after he visited Beijing as his first official visit; Zardari sending their ow so pretty Hina Rabba ni Kar to India, etc. etc. This is the traditional way of the Chinese to lull the opponents to sleep. Who knows when Begum Zia Khaleda comes to power, she too would get chummy with India.

Iranians too are more than willing to rope in Pakistan. They know they probably would never get much money from Pakistan for the gas they provide to it. Pakistan can't even pay its own energy bills. But the Iranians are more than willing to finance and build a Gas pipeline to Pakistan.

Iranians do not really gel well with TSPA, which has become more and more Wahhabi. So Iranians need Zardari, a Shi'a, as a go between.

Other Happenings
We also know that India's relations with Iran have dramatically cooled down, even as our relations with Saudi Arabia have improved. It is just USA putting pressure or does Delhi also see a pattern emerging of a Iran-Pakistan-China axis. If one may remember, the Iranians have since long not been asking Delhi about joining in the IPI Gas Pipeline.

When the Delaram-Zaranj Highway was taken over by the Taliban, India did not really make a big fuss about it, possibly because India knew that the equations in the region had changed, and India would not be using the highway anyway in any big strategic fashion.

Yes, that thing about the Northern Distribution Network. Well Chinese have Azerbaijanis in their pocket, and they can probably put the whole region aflame whenever they want, and most probably Ali Khamenei is using his Azerbaijani connections to make sure that Azerbaijan comes out of American grip.

Summary
On the one hand we see how Wahhabandis are pushing Pakistan into a war with India. Their propaganda is anti-India and they lead the charge in Pakistan against India.

On the other hand we are seeing their rivals, the PPP, using this dynamic of anti-Indianism in the Pakistani Army to build their axis with Iran and China by feeding TSPA what it needs - Kashmir and Military Strength. Basically Sindh has gotten on the Pakistani Horse in a big way.

With all this as backdrop, Indians are being forced to develop some policy towards Pakistan. It is just that Chinese, Iranians, TSPA, 'Moderate' Pakistanis, are all out to screw India. If Delhi increases tensions with TSPA, the Iranian-Pakistani-Chinese Axis profits from that. Delhi may know what is happening, but India which plays defensive strategy finds itself without any meaningful cards in hand. To create options, one has to leave house.
Prem
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Prem »

While talking about the convergance of Chor Desh and Whore Desh ,this Yindoo has different idea. Long Article , worth reading.

The Inevitable Superpower
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... superpower
During the 1956 Suez crisis, the United States threatened to withhold financing that the United Kingdom desperately needed unless British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal. Harold Macmillan, who, as the British chancellor of the exchequer, presided over the last, humiliating stages of the crisis, would later recall that it was "the last gasp of a declining power." He added, "perhaps in 200 years the United States would know how we felt."
Is that time already fast approaching, with China poised to take over from the United States? This is an essential question, and yet it has not yet been taken seriously enough in the United States. There, this central conceit still reigns: the United States' economic preeminence cannot be seriously threatened because it is the United States' to lose, and sooner or later, the United States will rise to the challenge of not losing it. China may be on its way to becoming an economic superpower, and the United States may have to share the global stage with it in the future. But, the argument goes, the threat from China is not so imminent, so great, or so multifaceted that it can push the United States out of the driver's seat.
Christopher Sidor
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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^^^^
There is a big difference. UK was dependent on USA post WWII not only Financially but also for its trade. USA is no way as dependent on China as UK was. It is the other way around. China needs US. Consider the amount of US treasury that China holds. It is over 1 trillion USD. Let us for argument sake say it is 2 trillion USD. As a portion of the total US debt of 14 trillion USD, it turns out be 11.7 % or just over 10%. Compare this with what Britain faced after WWII.

Britain needed American markets. Here China needs American markets.

America can shrug off its debt that it owes to China and tell China that all china holds are pieces of paper, worthy of being toilet paper. And oh in case anybody wonders, America has done this before, recall nixon shock of 1970s?? What America ended up doing was telling the world, that it would no longer give gold for a certain amount of US Dollars. Only thing that world would get would be, gasp, Dollars. And let us understand this, what happens when China sell these treasuries? What does it get? Yes US Dollars. Not gold not Swiss Franc, no diamonds, no pearls, but US Dollar printed in US.

China becoming the financier for US is break on China and not US. After all half of the country's wealth, as in GDP, is locked away in foreign treasuries and currencies. Money which if allowed to flow into China would stoke inflation and make the so called chinese miracle go kaput.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

Published on Sep 06, 2011
By Rory Medcalf
Does India need nuclear asymmetry?: Lowy Institute for International Policy (Sydney)
As for India's wider sense of insecurity about Chinese military power, I would still point to this speech, which contains one of the wisest arguments made by an Indian military thinker. It is pointless for New Delhi to engage in a direct military competition with China based on the narrow calculus of defence spending, or on sheer numbers of modern planes, ships and conventional weapons systems.

India's economy and defence budget is smaller, its other security challenges are many and of a different kind (terrorism, insurgency, separatism), and its human development needs should remain a major priority for New Delhi's stretched resources.

Instead, when it comes to defence, India needs to think asymmetrically. And, unpleasant as it sounds, the shortest cut to a stable security relationship between India and China may be a genuinely effective Indian nuclear deterrent — with submarine-launched second strike capabilities — unlike the old-fashioned and largely air-dropped arsenal India is currently said to possess.

Unless, of course, the limited range of Indian missiles means that India has to survey contested waters close to China's eastern periphery so that its nuclear-armed boats can one day patrol there. In which case, expect to see much more strife at sea between Asia's rising giants.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by RajeshA »

Published on Sep 07, 2011
By Jeffery W. Hornung
Shared regional interests draw Japan and India closer: The Japan Times
Historically, they do not share a territorial dispute or a record of hostilities. Culturally, they are linked by Buddhism and share a recent tradition of non-violence (India) or pacifism (Japan). Geopolitically, neither prefers to intervene in other countries' sovereign affairs. Additionally, while both support efforts promoting security, they cooperate with multilateral efforts in their own way. India defends its strategic autonomy, choosing to closely support multilateral initiatives but not as a member.

Japan joins multilateral efforts, but due to constitutional restrictions on its military, its participation differs from others. None of these offers an explanation for recent cooperation. Instead, they are possible explanations for why cooperation has been smooth.

The often cited reason has been shared values. As seen in their growing number of joint declarations and joint statements, the two countries strongly promote a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, open society, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy. Regardless of how it is worded, the underlying argument is that Japan and India pursue deeper cooperation because they share common values.

As important as shared values may be, it is too nebulous a concept to explain the recent surge in bilateral cooperation. If this were true, why then are Japan and India not pursuing security agreements with other like-minded states, such as Norway, Canada, or New Zealand? Conversely, China ranks as the top trading partner for both countries, yet China does not share similar values as India and Japan. Finally, while their values have remained unchanged, why have Japan and India not enjoyed much in the way of cooperation until just a few years ago?

The answer is shared interests. Over the past decade a convergence of interests has emerged. Both countries share an interest in sustained economic growth through new trade and investment opportunities, new or reformed multilateral institutional structures that reflect the realities of today's distribution of power, and regional stability and protection of sea lanes. Cooperation enables both countries to be stronger, more prosperous and secure, and better equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century. Shared values may help grease the wheels of this relationship, but it is not the reason why they are cooperating.

Acknowledging shared interests involves being honest that their main mutual concern is managing the consequences of the rise of China.
Published on Sep 07, 2011
By Yong Kwon
Crouching dragon, rising sun: Asia Times
Responding to the new political, economic and military realities in the west Pacific, Japan will have an increasingly pivotal role in diplomacy and security in East Asia. Three reasons already make Japan a natural counterweight to the growing influence of China. First, Japan maintains significant diplomatic relations with all the regional players and can act as a regional arbiter; second, upholding Japan's territorial integrity will contain China's surface fleet; third, Japan is militarily capable of contributing to regional security.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Christopher Sidor »

^^^^
We cannot base our relationship with Japan on anti-china foundations. What we need to base it on is inter-linkages and mutual-dependencies. China may or may not remain a threat to Japan. While China will remain a perennial threat to India.

We need to have a economic alliance with Japan. We are complimentary and this alliance will help each of our nations economies. We can collaborate on ship building, not necessarily naval ships, outer space, material research and most important of all ecological studies. We can invite Japanese finance into India. We can study their planned tokyo-osaka maglev trains. The list is endless.

Let us not make the mistake that we did with Indo-US relationship. Which is based on all show and empty slogans. Let us build a solid relationship with Japan, something which is beneficial to all of us. We will not be able to help Japan directly in case of any conflict in North-East Asia. A look at the Asian political map should dispel any thoughts that we have in this regard. Japan has territorial conflicts with all of its neighbors. From Russia in the north to Korea in the west.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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Asia's Great Naval Rivalry

The Wall Street Journal

SEPTEMBER 5, 2011, 4:18 P.M. ET
Asia's Great Naval Rivalry

To avoid a future clash between China and India, a maritime conference is needed to set some rules.



By MOHAN MALIK

Media reports last week of a Chinese warship confronting an Indian navy vessel in the South China Sea come as that part of the world is the scene of diplomatic tussling. In recent months, the Philippines and Vietnam objected to Chinese harassment of oil exploration vessels and fishermen. Last year, Beijing let it be known that it would not tolerate another maritime power operating in the South China Sea—which its officials have described as a "core interest."

It is clearer by the day that this trend will lead to some kind of showdown. China's growing economic strength, military might and hypernationalism at home are spurring actions abroad that bring it into increasingly dangerous conflicts. The best solution to defuse tension would be to get the biggest naval powers in the region together and draw up general rules for sea navigation and commerce.

The Indian ship in question, INS Airavat, was completing a port call in Vietnam, a country that often clashes with China. The two fought a war over unresolved territorial and maritime boundaries in 1979. Vietnam perceives China as an irredentist and expansionist power. It recently has increased coordination, military and diplomatic, with nations that also see China as a threat, to hedge against its neighbor.

India certainly shares Vietnam's views on China, and has been receptive to Hanoi's outreach. New Delhi's relationship with Beijing is scarred by a border war it fought in 1962 and by other unresolved territorial troubles in the Indian northeast. The two also compete for geopolitical influence, especially as they scramble for energy resources. In 2007, Beijing strongly protested a Vietnamese-Indian energy exploration project in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

India is maneuvering for advantage in those spheres of influence that overlap with China. Vietnam could be to India what Pakistan is to China—a friend because it could be the enemy of its enemy.


The geopolitical chess game intensifies as Chinese and Indian navies show off their flags in the Indian and Pacific oceans with greater frequency. India, for one, is wary of leaving its trade and energy supply routes in the Pacific Ocean to the goodwill of China's navy.

India's total trade volume with East Asian economies now exceeds that with the European Union or the United States, while more than half of India's trade now goes through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. This economic reality drives strategy. As part of its "Look East" strategy, India has concluded over a dozen defense cooperation agreements over the last decade with Southeast and East Asian countries.


In particular, the Indian Navy places energy security and sea-lane protection as priorities. In December 2006, then-Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta expanded the conceptual construct of India's "greater strategic neighborhood" to include potential sources of oil and gas imports located across the globe—from Venezuela to the Sakhalin Islands.

Not surprisingly, Beijing casts a wary eye on its neighbor's "Look East" policy. It has protested India's joint naval exercises with the United States, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore in the East China and South China Seas. Beijing believes all this has been encouraged by Japan and the U.S. to contain China.

Beijing is plainly uncomfortable with the prospect of India's rise. It has derided U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's calls to India, made most recently in Chennai this year, to play a greater role in East Asia. The Chinese took umbrage at the 2010 "Quadrennial Defense Review," published by the Pentagon, which described India "as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." Much to China's chagrin, India's naval activism has encouraged countries ranging from South Korea and Japan to Vietnam and Indonesia to "view India as a possible counterweight to future China in Southeast Asia.”


So China is clawing for influence, just as India is. For Beijing, this means presence in the Indian Ocean; for New Delhi, naval presence in the Pacific Ocean becomes critical for strategic deterrence against Beijing.

On current trends, their maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two, when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean. The ostensible reason will be to safeguard each other's sea lanes of communication.

But, in the absence of rules of engagement and mutual trust, trouble could easily brew. Unresolved disputes, competition for scarce resources, and status and prestige considerations one day can precipitate an armed conflict the next. Since all maritime trading powers have a common interest in the freedom of navigation across the global seas, there is an urgent need to frame rules as well as boost confidence-building measures among regional navies. The Indian Ocean can't be treated as India's ocean and the South China Sea as China's sea.

At the bilateral level, avoiding accidental provocations ought to be accorded high priority. A good starting point could be an agreement such as the 1972 Incidents at Sea agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that set out basic protocols to minimize the risk of conflicts and prevent escalation of any problems. Naval cooperation—joint exercises, exchanges and interoperability—between the two countries can alleviate tension, and maneuver-space agreements can help avoid needless confrontations.

India isn't the only country that needs such a bilateral understanding with China. Japan does too. Last year, a dispute over the Senkaku Islands broke out when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese coast guard ship.

Multiple bilateral treaties could work, but the time is right for strong multilateral action, as China and India have themselves hinted. A naval conference of major stakeholders in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is sorely needed—attended mainly by navy chiefs from the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, Indonesia and India—to devise common approaches to challenges.

Such an inclusive forum would bring together all major economies and energy consumers with an interest in ensuring secure sea lanes and stable, affordable energy supplies. If such broad multilateralism doesn't work, a smaller, four-party naval conference involving the United States, China, India and Japan—the countries possessing the four most powerful navies in the Asia-Pacific—would be in order.

Wider action is needed from the international community. Otherwise, growing ambitions, competing interests and the scramble for scarce resources may well spoil Asia's march to prosperity.

Mr. Malik is professor in Asian Security at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu and author of "China and India: Great Power Rivals" (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011).
aditya
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by aditya »

China troops enter Indian territory; dismantle bunkers


Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chin ... 51259.html
Pratyush
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Pratyush »

^^^

This is too much. The overt Machogiri needs to be dealt with in the most firm manner. But knowing this GOI, they will just express a hope that the PRC will see the light and we will have piss in our times.
Jarita
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by Jarita »

aditya wrote:China troops enter Indian territory; dismantle bunkers


Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chin ... 51259.html

How much territory have we lost under the enemy government aka UPA
rohitvats
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by rohitvats »

The excellent and in-depth details of Nathu La incident from someone who was present there.

This has been taken from the website of CLAWS (http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=de ... 56&u_id=26).

Written by: Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd), commanded the Nathu La Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Ladakh Sector

Article:
The Nathu La skirmish: when Chinese were given a bloody nose

After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October 1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander.

I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer’s course, it was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10 and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear.

Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border and the border remains undemacrated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and Camel’s back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC.

The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone, commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trek to Bhutan through Nathu La and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had gone to Gangtok together on “liberty” to see a movie. Little did I know that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr.

In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967.

That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire.

Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present on the Pass.

Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary.

The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again.

No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Post by kumarn »

When I visited Nathu La a few years back a soldier pointed me to the Chinese barracks and told me that was ours, but we lost it in 1967.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

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