Talk by Bharat Karnad at IISc on 30 August 2011

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 10 Sep 2011 11:48

kumarn wrote:"When your enemy is making mistakes, do not interfere." -Napoleon Bonaparte”.

Pakhanastan is going down the tubes faster than we can manage by ourselves. Then why interfere? I would rollover and play dead, if it helps continue the tamasha that pakhanastan has become. The same thought has been expressed on this board by different gurus in different ways.

well said, I concur with you...

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 10 Sep 2011 21:17

tejas wrote: If someone like NaMo was the PM of India in 1970 instead of a high school graduate named Indira Gandhi, my dream would already be true.

With respect - what you are doing here is adding Modi's name to an idea that cannot work at all. Modi cannot do it because India does not have enough fissile material for that. You do know that every nuclear test requires this frigging stuff - either enriched Uranium or Plutonium. India's reactors just have not produced enough of the stuff to do all those numbers of tests.
Some of these things are forgotten when delusional stuff is written on this forum. You might as well ask for Lord Ganesh to become the next PM - he is more likely to do it than Modi simply because only divine intervention can produce weapons out of nothing.

India has a small, modest nuclear arsenal and its deterrence such as there may be, is based on that small, modest capability. If nuclear war starts we have to start nuking cities from the outset. We have enough to cause serious damage to dozens of cities provided the delivery mechanisms are sorted out. But if we do 100 tests we will have no bombs because that is all we have in terms of Plutonium. We have very little Uranium and that is reserved for the ATV reactor.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 10 Sep 2011 23:49

Has any one thought about the perception of both Chore and Whore that Indians have been given access to the data from both Bum Maharathis ? And we cant discount the French either , they have been favored by GOI to the point of being accused of lusting for Hasina Katrina/s.

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 11 Sep 2011 02:57

Err....yes. Almost certainly.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Sep 2011 03:49

gakakkad wrote: If you look at the growth data from 1999-2002 there were a tremendous slowdown during the period..By 02 most sanctions were lifted .. the superb growth acceleration thereafter is well known...

Good luck trying to prove that the 5.5% and 6% rates were out of line for the 90's and downturn from 2001-2002 was due to sanctions. You can post a dozen reports one way and I another proving nothing. There were two known impacts of the sanctions. The first was the effect on FDI/FII, nicely managed through the RIB and the effect on foreign reserves minimized. The other was the effect on military and space programs. It is only the effect on the latter that can be said to have costed us significantly. But, quite frankly if that is what it takes to build indigenous programs, I am all for it. I did almost give anything to get rid of these 51 DRDO labs down to 48 now to get them rid of government control. If sanctions can accelerate that then I am all for it. There was another issue, which was the hangover effect of the sanctions on the environment. It did not do much to dampen investment or business decisions but post 9/11 even that was history.

Moving on, please understand somethings. 1998 is not 2011. Neither is India a trillion rupee economy and nor is the US as cocky as they were, coming out as the only super / hyper power around. Sanctions on a large country like India destined to be a leading nation in the world, in this day and age will be an act of beyond stupidity for US lawmakers, But I am certain some of these are still around as they were during 1998.

The US was smart enough not to go down that route post Tianamen against China (military sales notwithstanding), they shall not do this mistake again with India.

PRC is destined to challenge the US and try to push them out of the pacific. They will do the same against India in the IOR, if India does not face up to her and compete at EVERY level. It will be a monumental mistake on the part of the US to get on the wrong side of India. Most foreign policy experts in the US understand this as did Kissinger, even in 1998.

A gov't that comes up with hideous policies like NREGA cannot be expected to manage sanctions effectively ...

In that, I could not agree with you more. We have a PM here, who trembled at the thought of sanctions on India post the Shakti series of tests. The answer is to elect leaders, who can manage this situation and make the US understand that a credible nuclear deterrent is not only a legitimate need for India to compete with China but in the interests of the US too. I do not think this message is far off. The US was willing to be convinced of this message in the 60's! Sometimes, we can be our worst enemy by being too clever by half!

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Sep 2011 04:01

Kanson wrote: From where this 'extrapolation' came?

From me! I said the 80KT device that KS mentions is an extrapolation of the fission design, anything wrong?

Statement from K. Subrahmanyam reiterates my point that BK assertion that we have only 20 KT weapon has no meaning.

For the nth time, BK has NOT said we only have 20 KT. Show me that is what he said and I will eat my words.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Sep 2011 04:13

shiv wrote:
tejas wrote: If someone like NaMo was the PM of India in 1970 instead of a high school graduate named Indira Gandhi, my dream would already be true.
With respect - what you are doing here is adding Modi's name to an idea that cannot work at all. Modi cannot do it because India does not have enough fissile material for that. You do know that every nuclear test requires this frigging stuff - either enriched Uranium or Plutonium. India's reactors just have not produced enough of the stuff to do all those numbers of tests.

With respect Shiv, what is poster tejas' dream?
India chose not to focus on weapons, even after getting an ability to enrich uranium before China. The decision to pursue a primarily civilian program was a policy decision of successive prime ministers, giving scant attention to strategic needs. The decision to have only Cirrus as the sole rector to produce WgPu was a policy decision contributing to the low levels of fissile material. Dhruva did not kick start much into the 90's. Cannot absolve policy makers for the choice they made. Are we saying that we could not have managed to do a reasonable number of tests to prove our weapons and designs, if the right policy choices would have been made?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 06:09

ShauryaT wrote: With respect Shiv, what is poster tejas' dream?
India chose not to focus on weapons, even after getting an ability to enrich uranium before China. The decision to pursue a primarily civilian program was a policy decision of successive prime ministers, giving scant attention to strategic needs. The decision to have only Cirrus as the sole rector to produce WgPu was a policy decision contributing to the low levels of fissile material. Dhruva did not kick start much into the 90's. Cannot absolve policy makers for the choice they made. Are we saying that we could not have managed to do a reasonable number of tests to prove our weapons and designs, if the right policy choices would have been made?

Shaurya. Please don't get me wrong. Everyone, myself included likes to call himself a "realist". The only quibble is what I think "being a realist " means. Would you be able to point out what Narendra Modi has to do with all you have posted? I am sorry, I am trying to be polite but frankly if Gandhi had been born instead of Mohammad in Arabia we would have had a different world.

The statement that "If Modi had been Indian PM in 1970 we would have had something different" falls in the category of a statement that attributes hypothetical powers in a hypothetical situation.

My primary objection to this is the continuous lamentation of what we don't have. In my opinion we have to look at what we need to do NOW to have a better future tomorrow. If those people in the past did not have the foresight to give us (in the future) what we want now (the future), we need to think about what to do now to give the future our vision. Cursing the past is like cursing one's karma. Very very Indian. I am sure those people in the 50s, 60s were doing exactly that. Cursing their karma and thinking that "If I had enough electricity in 1930 I would have grown more crops, studied more and would have been better off" That is why they took the route they did. The question of China being a nuclear threat did not even arise till the mid 1960s. By that time India was placed firmly on one side of the cold war and Pakistan on the other.

We need to ask now that if the policy of the 1950s and 1960s was a mistake, what was the mistake? What can be done now to correct that mistake? Can we ever avoid a situation in which the people of 2050 do not curse us for doing what we are doing now and saying "If I had been alive in 2011 I would have don bla bla"

I think this requires a serious analysis of what role nuclear weapons are playing today and what role they will play in the medium term. I have seen no such analysis on BRF anyway.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Sep 2011 06:59

OK, I get it. The literal reading of the posters lines are like your infamous, if my auntie had a ....

But, I did not read his words in a literal sense, hence my question on what did he exactly dream?

Moving on to where do we go from here. I can go on to describe, what IMO our nuclear policy ought to be and how do move on from the bindings of the IUNCA and NSG commitments. However, that is not where the problem lies. There are some fundamental issues in the minds of our policymakers, these questions have to be resolved first. Once these issues are resolved, some fundamental assumptions will have to be made (in context) that stand true, regardless of who is in power. The mechanics, tactics and tools can keep on changing but not the goals and the overall strategy should be consistent. Some of these assumptions IMO, need to be the following:

- Nuclear weapons and its means of delivery, shall continue to be seen as the epitome of a nations power for the foreseeable future
- Deterrence calculations with India's opponents shall continue to be a factor in all security and geo-political equations
- The strength of a country's nuclear arsenal along with delivery vehicles shall continue to a factor in strategic power equations - which will matter in geo-politics in the Indian region of interest
- India would have to be self sufficient and self reliant in these aspects

Once there is consensus on the above, the actual debate on policies, mechanics, tools and tactics flow more smoother. But if at the highest policy levels, there is a disconnect on vision and purpose the downstream debates become more muddled.

Added: I have specifically left out the larger questions of India's role and vision for herself and her role in the geographical region of interest. These larger questions of the role of hard power will also need resolution though. Until, we do not have these larger questions resolved, we shall continue to muddle. However, once there is sufficient clarity, our actions should seek to be towards this vision. A vision without actions to support them is empty and hollow.

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 11 Sep 2011 08:46

I disagree that the present NSG agreement can prevent us from building additional military reactors or our indigineous enrichment and reproc facility or additional military reactors as long as we don't sign CTBT or NPT... In fact civilian and military programmes have been completely separated now leaving the bomb makers to concentrate on their on their business...I am not sure how

We just started a new un-safeguarded plant this Jan

India starts new unsafeguarded reprocessing plant

The above was jan 011, which means that we can open as many reproc facilities and military reactors as needed. Some MORE are under construction.
India's reprocessing capacity

That we don't have enough Pu /HEU /EU for ATV and nuclear testing ,or that we cannot build more reactors or that our reactors are bad etc is not true.
In fact the NSG waiver frees desi U reserves for military purpose.. (a bum programme need far less U than electricity generation , so we are not even going to our natural reserves for bum..u don't need so much.)

US too has only a small number of unguarded reactors for its BUM program.. during the cold war it surely used civilian facility

US military reactors

Most of the above were built in 60s and are quite small...

tejas · Post by **tejas** » 11 Sep 2011 08:53

Shiv, garu. The point of my post was only to lament that economic illiteracy in the 60s-80s left us in the supine position where sanctions had to be feared and would dictate policy. My simple dream was/is suitable policies allowing growth making us immune to sanctions. if those policies were pursued in the early 70s we would be immune today. We all know who is responsible for that anemic growth and the hari-kari labor laws that persist today. With "leaders" like that who needs enemies?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 08:53

ShauryaT wrote: - Nuclear weapons and its means of delivery, shall continue to be seen as the epitome of a nations power for the foreseeable future
- Deterrence calculations with India's opponents shall continue to be a factor in all security and geo-political equations
- The strength of a country's nuclear arsenal along with delivery vehicles shall continue to a factor in strategic power equations - which will matter in geo-politics in the Indian region of interest

Shaurya - you have hit EXACTLY upon the topic I had in mind. I am fully aware as you are of the above postulates and it is my intention deliberately to question them. This is not about my disagreement or agreement with the above quoted postulates - but I want to "test" them for validity insofar as it is possible in an academic discussion such as this. I can go about doing this from many different angle because I see the topic as huge, but let me make a start and try and keep it simple an short.

One can do many "case studies" to ask "To what extent does nuclear weapon power translate into economic or geopolitical power?"

A very general answer to this would be that nuclear weapons power is directly related to economic and geopolitical power. But if you scratch beneath the surface of this answer you find that things are not so clear cut. of course - if you and I have a disgreement, and then we have a fight, ultimately, if push comes to shove - and you have the capacity to burn me up completely, you would win only if I was scared of you. If I refused to back down, you would actually have to put your nukes where your mouth is and actually burn me up to prove to me and to anyone else who is watching that you mean what you say with your nukes.

If you have the guts to actually use your nukes on me then yes you hold ultimate power over me.

Now, if I oppose you and you don't use your nukes, your nuke power over me means nothing as long as I refuse to back down to nuclear threats from you. If I tell you "OK go ahead. Nuke me." The ball is in your court. You must nuke me or continue to suffer me as a problem.

The US is by far the most powerful nuclear armed power in the world. How many times has their power in nuclear weapons helped them with countries who are not cowed down by US power? When you go into specific examples you find that the US nuclear arsenal scared no one except the Soviets. The US was unable to use nukes to solve any problem against any adversary. When the US won, it won by economic or conventional military means. When it did not win, the US nuclear arsenal did not help.

The only question that arises from this is "How far is the US willing to be pushed before it uses its much vaunted nuclear arsenal to achieve its geopolitical goals". Clearly the US is willing to be pushed quite far - to the extent of losing wars.

The same question can be asked of any other country "How far is Pakistan/China/North Korea willing to be pushed before the use their nukes". Imagine a country that challenges the US and is willing to be nuked. In fact if such a country has nukes it will be even more wiling to challenge someone else's nuclear hegemony simply because even if the US is pushed to the limit and the US "burns up" the offending country, the offending country may manage to lob one or more nukes back at the US, making it really costly for the US.

In real terms this means that the US must be willing to take at least one nuclear hit in exchange for burning up another nation with its nukes. If that is considered too costly, the US will never be a "first user" of nukes against a nuclear armed nation. So where does this leave the argument about "Nukes being th only currency of power".

Nukes were the biggest currency of power only when the US alone had them. That equation was lost the day the USSR acquired its nuclear arsenal. Once nukes get into multiple hands the idea that "X has more and bigger nukes and burn up Y" is less important than "Y is willing to risk nuclear war and willing to be burnt up in exchange for merely damaging X" This leaves X with a bigger problem than Y. Not only does X have to "burn up" Y with all the fallout and other consequences, but may have to suffer one or more nuke hits from Y's puny arsenal. If Y has enough balls - X, with its huge arsenal can be deterred forever.

Or else a "limited nuclear war" must occur. In "limited nuclear war", X does not "burn up" Y. X takes a few hits. Y takes more hits and the war ends. If X loses 3 cities to nukes and Y loses 10 cities, has X won? Why And how?

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 11 Sep 2011 09:21

Rudradev: Thanks for the detailed reply. I agree with your contentions as well. I think we can both agree that under the present circumstances the PLA MIC has a significant impetus to act militarily, but also that the burden of a very carefully balanced escalation approach is upon them, because the cost of miscalculation is far more for them than us.

As I previously indicated, one of the best means to prevent them from attacking is just to use our chaotic system beneficially - have one side speak placatorily while another throws out threats of a countervalue response targeted specifically at their economic supply chain. The goal is to not be predictable, and leave open the potential that we might lash out wildly - an approach that would be hard for their calculations to ever reconcile. However, this requires us to change our current approach.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 10:37

Just a little footnote:

It does not matter how many nukes another power has, or of what yield as long as I am not scared. If I don't give a damn about being destroyed I would do whatever I wanted and leave the responsibility of nuking me to oblivion on the other guy.

The other guy would then have to develop the balls to use his nukes on me. Since the use of nukes is such a serious issue the other guy is likely to give me some leeway to behave like a bhenchod so that he does not have to use his nukes for every provocation. That means I can provoke him and keep him off balance and prevent him from claiming absolute power by provoking him below his nuclear threshold. To that extent nukes are useless. They are useless in anyone's hands unless you are willing to use them readily.

If the other guy uses his nukes on you for the slightest provocation - it would be proof that he is serious about using his nukes. How do I find out? Simple. I provoke you. If you don't use your nukes it means that you are wiling to take that amount of provocation without using nukes. As long as i don't give a damn about being hit by your nukes, I can play this game of provocation to test your guts.

This game is being played out all the time in the world between every power that is at odds with a nuclear armed power.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 11 Sep 2011 18:24

kumarn wrote:I have a question for the gurus: Is it possible to test, say a 200kt warhead underground, without anyone else knowing about it?

Your question can be answered in different ways. There is a definite possibility that a low yield tests can be masked. May 13 Shakti test was reported as "not appeared on the radar", at that time.

The Shakti IV-V tests on 13 May are even more curious. India reported two shots being conducted with yield of 0.5 and 0.3 kt, but no outside seismic station has reported any evidence of tests on this day. The closest CTBT monitoring station was in Nilore, Pakistan 740 km to the north of Pokhran. This station is estimated to have sufficient sensitivity to detect a test at least down to 25 tons in Pokhran, yet no signal was detected. Wallace estimated that with standard seismic coupling, the test would have had to total no more than 10-15 tons to escape all detection.

World came to know only after we announced it. Noko tests are tagged as fizzle by west. Unless a site is properly calibrated, it is possible to mask the Sub kt tests as some chemical explosion. Becoz of difficulty in conducting such tests only those who developed high precise knowledge behind such explosion can do such tests. US in hey days of testing (and even in last phase) masked the exact yields of many tests. The public announcements of these are under rated. So as USSR. As the technology for detecting these explosions improved, so are technologies and devices to escape from detection.Check the quote below... The most challenging devices are smaller ones, where you have to be precise in engineering of every parts and a clear understanding that it gives just an explosion without going kaput.

Amber G. wrote:Shiv, Kansan, Gakakkad et el -

There has been lot of discussion about exact "yield" of the "bum" (Seriously guys some statements like "normal distribution then such percentages are meaningful. Otherwise its a shot in the dark" are some what silly, IMO)..

But to put the things in perspective.. here is a small item from the article posted in this thread...Posting without comments, but I think it is quite relevant..
[Caption of a photo] Yuri Trutnev of the RFNC-VNIIEF with me at the Russian Atomic Weapon Museum, in Sarov, next to the 100-megaton “Tsar Bomba” he co-designed with Andrei Sakharov. Over dinner that night at his house, I asked him to resolve an argument I had with one of my Los Alamos colleagues: When the bomb was detonated at half the design yield on 30 October 1961, did it produce 50 or 57 megatons? Yuri simply stated, “At that level it doesn’t matter.” He went on to explain that the bomb had no military utility and wasn’t particularly challenging; the most challenging designs were the small, peaceful nuclear devices that had to be particularly clean in terms of radioactive contamination.

Thanks Amber G for the quote.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 19:41

I used Googal chacha to see if I could find the source document of AmberG's quote. I found it and found an intriguing statement along with great praise of Indian nuclear science. I quote the intriguing statement:
http://physicstoday.org/resource/1/phto ... ypassSSO=1

During my most recent visit to India earlier this year, I found an encouraging new interest in light-water reactors (LWRs) and a bit more caution about moving ahead aggressively with plutonium breeder reactors. Such moves would not only produce more electricity for that energy-starved nation but also reduce the potentially serious safety and security vulnerabilities of its nuclear program.

The meaning of this statement is exactly what Bharat Karnad has been complaining about. He says that India has no business to move away from the three stage fast breeder program because it will not only produce endless nuclear energy, but also limitless amounts of fissile material for enough bombs to frizzle the world.

To try and understand what that means we have to go back to what the "3 stage Fast Breeder program" is all about. Since I am no nuke expert (better archive this statement - I will never ever repeat it

) I had consulted unkal googal in 2006 to create a "layman's description" of India's Fast Breeder program. It is still archived on BR. I will cross post it below to explain what it means to the non expert in science and then try and say what Bharat Karnad is talking about in his lament about the choking of the fast breeder program.

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 11 Sep 2011 19:44

^^^ Actually India is looking at other designs too... Pebble bed reactors...because they are theoretically hazard free...

Besides how many warheads would we need... 1000-2000-5000? You don't need to have 50 fbrs to to get 5000 warheads.....

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 20:09

From 2006 edited slightly

shiv wrote:I guess everyone on here knows that atoms consist of a central core called a nucleus where the balls of the atom reside. Most atoms have more balls than any human, Pakis included. (The latter statement is debataball)

It so happens that some atoms with lots of balls tend to split apart without provocation into atoms with fewer balls. This is called fission. Each time this happens some energy is released and if you can tap that energy as electric power to power your toaster.

Out of sheer jealousy and spite - some atoms that split apart also spit out a couple of balls that go and hit other atoms and make their balls split apart and release energy for your toaster. If there is a runaway splitting apart of all atoms in a short time you get a nuclear bum and you will be toast along with your bread. However - if you keep new-clear traffic policemen to slow down the balls that are being spit out, then you can slow the reaction down to a manageable pace and use the energy to create electric power.

The most commonly used candidate for an atom that splits by itself to produce power is Uranium. Uranium occurs naturally as ore that contains a mixture two cousins of Uranium. One cousin has 235 balls and the other has 238 balls. These are affectionately referred to as U235 and U238.

Of the two cousins - it is U 235 who is trying to break up and get rid of his balls and we need to get him if we need to power our toasters. Unfortunately the bugger is elusive and in Uranium ore you get 99% of Uranium 238 and less than 1% U235.

So you need to use various processes, including Xerokhanism to increase the amount of U235 from less than 1% to about 5% for your nuclear reactor. If you increase the amount of U235 to 90%+ - you can have your bum.

This is what most of the world does. So what is India's problem?

India does not have too much Uranium, and if it wants to import Uranium everyone thinks we need it for bum. But India has a lot of Thorium. Thorium has 232 balls and is called Thorium 232. If Thorium is standing around when Uranium is throwing his balls around, he picks up one extra ball and gets 233 balls. he then becomes a cousin by marriage and is now called Uranium 233. Uranium 233 is as enthusiastic as naturally occurring U235 to get rid of balls and power your toaster.

There are other complexities involved. What does cousin U238 do when cousin U235 is splitting and spitting out his balls? He sometimes gets in the way and swallows a ball and gets 239 balls. He is then called Plutonium 239. The name Pu239 is no coincidence because Pu239 is continuously trying Pu-ke out his balls, just like U 235 (and U233). That is why Pu 239 is also good for bum or toaster.

Pu 239 forms within a reactor when the existing U238 gets in the way of ball-breaking U235. When the reactor fuel is spent - the Pu 239 can be extracted for bum or for "otherwise purpose" to paraphrase my fizzics teacher. If you design your reactor right (as the DAE in India probably have done) - you can get one heckuva lot of Pu out of your reactor.

So what is India's "grand plan" that has been going on since 1960 and is still going on and on onlee?

India said in 1960 that we would use thorium to produce power.

How?

First you need to convert Thorium232 to U 233

This has to be done in 3 stages - lasting several Kaveris (a Kaveri is a unit of time lasting decades) and this is the crux of Indian "Fast Breeder Reactor" (FBR) program. Note that the term "Fast" does not mean that the reactor is fast or that the process is fast. It only means that "Fast" Neutrons are needed and used to convert Thorium to U233. It's always the fast guys that get the gals right?

In the first stage a whole lot of Plutonium is extracted from spent Uranium fuel.

In the second stage, that Plutonium is packed with Thorium in a reactor that powers your toaster. And while your toaster is being powered - the Thorium232 is picking up Plutonium's balls and becoming U233. India is now in stage 2

When enough U233 collects you then pack it with more thorium and use it in a reactor, The reactor powers your toaster, and the Thorium232 picks up U233's extra balls and forms even more U233 that you can use for future reactors. This will be stage 3 of India's Fast Breeder Reactor program.

So do you see the link now?

First stage - use up enriched natural Uranium to make Plutonium 239 . Next stage use the Plutonium 239 to create Uranium 233 from Thorium 232. Third stage used the newly created Uranium 233 to power a reactor AND make even more Uranium 233 (from Thorium 232). The "fast neutrons" "breed" Uranium from Thorium in the reactor.

<snip>

Remember the main actors in this Bum Soap Opera

1) Uranium 235 (occurs in nature - and used in bum)
2) Uranium 238 (occurs in nature)
3) Plutonium 239 (created in reactors using a mixture of U235 and U238 and used in bum)
4) Thorium 232 (occurs in high levels among Mallus)
5) Uranium 233 (created in FBRs)

I do not recall Karnad mentioning this - but India's nuclear reactors will eventually run on U 233 unlike current reactors that use U 235. That U 233 will be created in large quantities from Thorium. I believe that weapons can be made from U 233 as well - so that the same U 233 can be sued for bombs if need be. That sems to be teh big takleef about th Fast Breeder program as far as I can tell.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 11 Sep 2011 20:20

Rudradev wrote:
Kanson wrote: You argument is that, to monetize debt, war is a high return low risk option compared to other options for China. Based on that, I'm questioning, to have further high return with lower risk, is it not China should choose Taiwan than India for that? US and other powers can join India too if there is a conflict. What stops them? Already there are several joint exercises with US and other countries. Is it not Nehru requested US help during '62 war and US obliged? And if the luck turns other way, Tibet card can be played leading possibly to their liberation. And India is not a push over like Taiwan. So with such several more risks compared to attacking Taiwan and meager return, from your argument, why would China choose to attack India than Taiwan?
I don't know that Taiwan is necessarily higher return, lower risk for China.

For one thing, Taiwan is already deeply integrated into the US Pacific alliance, along with Japan and Australia. I don't think the US would countenance an attack on Taiwan at all, even in its present relatively weak state. India has had some exercises with the US but is nowhere near that level of integration; we don't even have a mutual defence pact let alone full-blown alliance obligations.

Yes, Kennedy did send help against PRC in 1962 but that was in a totally different geopolitical context; China was a pariah, US didn't have any trade relationship with them, and US was still hoping that India could be brought into the anti-Soviet bloc. None of those things are relevant now. Today, the US sees both India and China as emerging competitors; it would be much more likely to let us slug it out and damage each other, and would get actively involved only if one of the sides was facing existential rout. By that time enough damage would have been done to both India and China that the US' geopolitical stakes in the fight would have been served. China may calculate that it can prosecute a limited war against India, attain certain geopolitical goals, minimize damage to itself, monetize its debt and reap the jingo-vadi benefits without there being time for the US to get involved.

Meanwhile Taiwan is US' primary ungli in the Chinese bum. As a fulcrum of geopolitical leverage against Beijing it is too valuable to Washington to let it go undefended. It is very close to the heartland of PRC (the East coast) and the China-Taiwan conflict goes to the very heart of Chinese nationhood.

The second thing is that China is already following a well-thought out Taiwan strategy that is even more low-risk and potentially high-return than trying to invade Taiwan. Economic integration between Taiwan and PRC has grown tremendously, there are always cultural and people-to-people feelers being put out. PRC calculates that as the old guard KMT leadership dies out, a pragmatic newer generation of Taiwanese will feel more cultural and national affinity for PRC and reject being used as an ungli by the US. Ultimately some sort of HK/Macau type assimilation will be worked out so that the Taiwanese elite can keep their privileges and ways of doing business. So, even the pressure from China's Mil-Ind Complex to start a war will likely not trump the potential to gain Taiwan without firing a shot.

Whatever may be formalities in engaging Taiwan or SEAN countries, Japan or India, when it comes to China, intentions of US is same. While it is true that US like to play India against China, its concern would be to not allow China as victorious, as China is an immediate and real threat to US status. India is much smaller in status to both China and US and if anything it is beyond immediate future. So if such an conflict happens US will be more than willing to be on the side of India. It is not what we thinks on the matter important but what China thinks. Already there is narrative that China's aggressive posture towards India is due to India's closeness with US with the commencement of US-Ind N deal. Suspicion was expressed by China in quadrilateral initiative involving US and India. So what matters is how China looks at India and US. That decides the outcome of Chinese calculation. US will be playing its role in both conflict. Compared to India which can match to China strength in a theatre, Taiwan will be just a pin prick. When look at risk options, taking Taiwan is less riskier. Becoz of geography, if China can keep US out of the area through such area denial weapon like Carrier killers, Taiwan is just a walkover for China. For mainlanders, it becomes a scoring point, much closer to heart than India.

The third thing is that the war China chooses to fight will be the one where it feels more in control of the escalation ladder, i.e. it feels more confident about defining the extent of the conflict to suit its own purposes. More on that in another post.

Sir, what constrains India to play by their rules? You can control the escalation only if you are in control and that control is possible if you much stronger than your opponent. Present India is not India of '62. What happens if, as Suraj mentions, India extends the conflict to different theatre.

In the end I cannot say if K Sub or K Santhanam or BK or even R Chidambaram is right. Maybe they are all wrong. What matters is how do our enemies perceive us, not just in terms of capabilities but the political will to deploy them?

There are many quotes, semi-official and official, in public domain to indicate the political will(Pls don't drag here MMS, here by political will, I meant the Gov will, MMS is not going to be there all along). Development of Agni-V/Angi-III are such indication. Some time back, before the news of China moving DF-21 missile near our border, there was a rare news of India deploying Agni in NE. If the news is true, and the deployment of DF-21 is a response to Agni missile deployment, it is clear indication China sees India as NWS.

Well of course it is a hypothesis! But it is a hypothesis based on real observations; I only raised the possibility in these posts-

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1159770
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1160104

because of a very curious fact that Shiv pointed out. Even the people whose views used to form the cornerstone of thinking in a national-security related forum like BRF, i.e. B Raman and Bharat Karnad, are now talking about the need to avoid showing a threatening posture to Pakistan. What is that about, if not GOI trying very hard to decrease the likelihood of a military conflict? Is there some other explanation, which still survives Occam's Razor?

The response from ShauryaT gave different meaning. Before we try our hand, what was actually the message from BK? Do we have the transcripts of his lecture?

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 11 Sep 2011 21:13

U 233 can be sued for bombs if need be. That sems to be teh big takleef about th Fast Breeder program as far as I can tell.

it is very difficult to separate 233 from the non-fissile 232.. so making 233 based bums are a lot more expensive and tougher than pu based ones...the takleef with FBR program besides weapons is safety... When Bhabha visulaised the 3 staged programme , India had little known u reserves... but now more are found.. and because of N-Deal we can import more uranium... FBR's are considered to be less economical than thermal reactors for elec generation ...

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 11 Sep 2011 21:20

Shiv saab,

One thing I never understood: the proponents of small nukes (i.e. < 100 KT) say that multiple smaller hits on a city are more destructive than a single big nuke. I seem to recall that you had also put up graphs that depicted the damage caused as a function of distance. It sounds very logical, until you get to the delivery systems. We dont seem to have any plans of MIRVs on the anvil, nor any tests of the same. So how does one deliver these multiple small nukes? I suppose multiple Agnis is the answer but that does not seem very cost efficient nor do we see Agnis being inducted in huge numbers..

Some commentators also point out that the bus used to launch multiple satellites is not a valid MIRV design. So, if we are going to be using smaller yield weapons, isnt it logical that we should see developments on the MIRV side?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 21:31

Tanaji wrote:Shiv saab,

One thing I never understood: the proponents of small nukes (i.e. < 100 KT) say that multiple smaller hits on a city are more destructive than a single big nuke. I seem to recall that you had also put up graphs that depicted the damage caused as a function of distance. It sounds very logical, until you get to the delivery systems. We dont seem to have any plans of MIRVs on the anvil, nor any tests of the same. So how does one deliver these multiple small nukes? I suppose multiple Agnis is the answer but that does not seem very cost efficient nor do we see Agnis being inducted in huge numbers..

Some commentators also point out that the bus used to launch multiple satellites is not a valid MIRV design. So, if we are going to be using smaller yield weapons, isnt it logical that we should see developments on the MIRV side?

I have no answers. I tend to conjure up stuff in my head and post. In fact Karnad had a very oddly interesting thing to say about simultaneously sending out several small warheads to explode within kilometers of each other over a city, He said that the electromagnetic pulse from the first explosion would render all others ineffective and that would be no good. I have no idea about this - but if it were true then MIRVs of any type should be similarly vulnerable. I need to look for more info on this. Not everything that Karnad said seemed accurate - although his innacuracy level was probably 1%. 99% was fine.

However I did mention the idea of several warheads on a city during the interaction period - but he did not comment on that.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 21:34

gakakkad wrote: and because of N-Deal we can import more uranium... FBR's are considered to be less economical than thermal reactors for elec generation ...

So import should cause more takleef and letting us do our SDRE program should cause less takleef. Why are people saying that the SDRE program is worse for nuclear security?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 21:45

gakakkad wrote:

U 233 can be sued for bombs if need be. That sems to be teh big takleef about th Fast Breeder program as far as I can tell.

it is very difficult to separate 233 from the non-fissile 232.. so making 233 based bums are a lot more expensive and tougher than pu based ones...the takleef with FBR program besides weapons is safety... When Bhabha visulaised the 3 staged programme , India had little known u reserves... but now more are found.. and because of N-Deal we can import more uranium... FBR's are considered to be less economical than thermal reactors for elec generation ...

Question: Could Pu 239 be created by putting U 238 in a U 233 reactor? Could that be a source of takleef for non prolotullahs?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Sep 2011 21:58

Sorry about this series of posts:

Tanaji, Wiki on MIRV only adds to my confusion. On the one hand, my multiple small warhead theory is corroborated:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_i ... ry_vehicle

The military purpose of a MIRV is threefold:

* Provides greater target damage for a given missile payload. Radiation (including radiated heat) from a nuclear warhead diminishes as the square of the distance (called the inverse-square law), and blast pressure diminishes as the cube of the distance. For example at a distance of 4 km from ground zero, the blast pressure is only 1/64th that of 1 km. Due to these effects several small warheads cause much more target damage area than a single large one. This in turn reduces the number of missiles and launch facilities required for a given destruction level - much the same as the purpose of a conventional submunition.
* With single warhead missiles, one missile must be launched for each target. By contrast with a MIRV warhead, the post-boost (or bus) stage can dispense the warheads against multiple targets across a broad area.
<snip>

On the other hand, the same page says:

The precise technical details are closely-guarded military secrets, to hinder any development of enemy counter-measures. The bus's on-board propellant limits the distances between targets of individual warheads to perhaps a few hundred km

Perhaps the way to use MIRVs is to launch 2-3 separate MIRV carrying missiles to hit the same series of targets. So one small nuke lands on a given city every 20 minutes three or four times (lovely!

) Wiki describes the MIRV process - although we can never tell if Wiki is right

Image caption:Minuteman III MIRV launch sequence: 1. The missile launches out of its silo by firing its first stage boost motor (A). 2. About 60 seconds after launch, the 1st stage drops off and the second stage motor (B) ignites. The missile shroud (E) is ejected. 3. About 120 seconds after launch, the third stage motor (C) ignites and separates from the 2nd stage. 4. About 180 seconds after launch, third stage thrust terminates and the Post-Boost Vehicle (D) separates from the rocket. 5. The Post-Boost Vehicle maneuvers itself and prepares for re-entry vehicle (RV) deployment. 6. While the Post-Boost Vehicle backs away, the RVs, decoys, and chaff are deployed (although the figure shows this happening during descent, this may occur during ascent instead). 7. The RVs and chaff re-enter the atmosphere at high speeds and are armed in flight. 8. The nuclear warheads detonate, either as air bursts or ground bursts.

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 11 Sep 2011 22:16

shiv wrote: On the other hand, the same page says:
The precise technical details are closely-guarded military secrets, to hinder any development of enemy counter-measures. The bus's on-board propellant limits the distances between targets of individual warheads to perhaps a few hundred km
Perhaps the way to use MIRVs is to launch 2-3 separate MIRV carrying missiles to hit the same series of targets. So one small nuke lands on a given city every 20 minutes three or four times (lovely! ) Wiki describes the MIRV process - although we can never tell if Wiki is right

The warheads themselves dont have an engine it looks like, so that may explain why the distance is a few hundred KM. I think what they mean that distance is the maximum that can be targetted. I wonder what the minimum is.

What would be interesting to find out (and there is little chance of that happening) is what is the cost vs benefit tradeoff between MIRVs and single warhead missiles. If I were to target a single city with 3 warheads, what is more cost effective (this includes development cost) using 3 x single warhead missile or a MIRV?

I would think MIRVs would stand a better chance against ABM defenses though, purely because we could employ dummy warheads.

Wasnt the MIRV a response to the limitations posed by START treaties that limited the number of missiles you could have?

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 11 Sep 2011 22:29

Question: Could Pu 239 be created by putting U 238 in a U 233 reactor? Could that be a source of takleef for non prolotullahs?

I am not sure about this.... Theoretically plausible ...

So import should cause more takleef and letting us do our SDRE program should cause less takleef. Why are people saying that the SDRE program is worse for nuclear security?

As far as weapons program is considered we don't need to import any uranium from outside... Even if we create an arsenal of 5000 bums and only a small fraction of indigenous reserves may be needed...we recently discovered A 160 kton mine of uranium ... India is largely unexplored so more may be found...

Importing uranium ore free's up indigenous reserves for bum purpose... Besides we have contracts with some african countries for this , Niger or Namibia IIRC...

So for BUM pu seems to be the way...

As far as energy is concerned thorium seems to be the way ahead...We are looking at a new design ...

http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/CPs/COOL/2nd_ ... -INDIA.pdf

If this succeeds we ll not need to rely on imports of LWR's ., which in any case will be unimportant after a while , once indigenous LWR's come up on a large scale...

only fear ...babu's or gov't messing up and destroying indigenous capacity .....

@ Tanaji A-5 is rumoured to have MIRV....

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 06:08

gakakkad wrote:
As far as weapons program is considered we don't need to import any uranium from outside... Even if we create an arsenal of 5000 bums and only a small fraction of indigenous reserves may be needed...we recently discovered A 160 kton mine of uranium ... India is largely unexplored so more may be found...

Karnad's angst revolves around the fact that India can barely create an arsenal of a few score bombs and this "thousands of bombs, hundreds of tests" are just dreams on internet jingo communities. India has just not been producing the fissile material required to do that, and not testing of course. He says that this kind of arsenal is not going to deter China because of the sort of ruthlessness that China's daddy, Mao Tse Tung showed when he thought it was OK (maybe fun even?) to lose 300 million Chinese.

But where I disagree with Karnad is that if you have a country that is willing to sacrifice 300 million people do you then plan an arsenal that will take out 301 million and hope it is deterred? It is a misinterpretation of Mao's words to imagine that any nuclear arsenal would have deterred Mao. Mao's statement falls into the category of attitude I described in an earlier post, that I will repeat below:

It does not matter how many nukes another power has, or of what yield as long as I am not scared. If I don't give a damn about being destroyed I would do whatever I wanted and leave the responsibility of nuking me to oblivion on the other guy.

The other guy would then have to develop the balls to use his nukes on me. Since the use of nukes is such a serious issue the other guy is likely to give me some leeway to behave like a bhenchod so that he does not have to use his nukes for every provocation. That means I can provoke him and keep him off balance and prevent him from claiming absolute power by provoking him below his nuclear threshold. To that extent nukes are useless. They are useless in anyone's hands unless you are willing to use them readily.

If the other guy uses his nukes on you for the slightest provocation - it would be proof that he is serious about using his nukes. How do I find out? Simple. I provoke you. If you don't use your nukes it means that you are wiling to take that amount of provocation without using nukes. As long as i don't give a damn about being hit by your nukes, I can play this game of provocation to test your guts.

This game is being played out all the time in the world between every power that is at odds with a nuclear armed power.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 12 Sep 2011 06:56

Shiv: There is new evidence to suggest that Mao's 300 million quote was a bluff. No one can be really sure though. But, the most scared from this statement were the Russians and other warsaw states. These type of statements at least partially convinced Kruschev to withdraw support for Russia's help to China on nuclear weapons, but by then it was too late.

It is true that our our numbers and quality of nuclear weapons will not deter China from a determined assault. What saves us is the lack of an ROI for PRC for such a venture. They are sitting pretty with Tibet in their hands and with enough failed near failed states around us to tie us down.

I will come back later to the "postulates".

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 07:08

For those who, like me, may be interested in some layman-level details of nuclear weapon design - there is a huge book called "weapons of mass destruction"

. Here is a 800 odd kb pdf of 6 pages whose content is relevant to a whole lot of discussions/arguments we have had on here in the past. Take FWIW

https://rapidshare.com/files/1076687760 ... s-book.pdf

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 07:11

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv: There is new evidence to suggest that Mao's 300 million quote was a bluff. No one can be really sure though. But, the most scared from this statement were the Russians and other warsaw states. These type of statements at least partially convinced Kruschev to withdraw support for Russia's help to China on nuclear weapons, but by then it was too late.

It is true that our our numbers and quality of nuclear weapons will not deter China from a determined assault.

Shaurya - as I see it, Karnad's entire theme fails on these very grounds. Deterrence should not exist. If it does, it exists for reasons not explainable by Karnad's contentions.

Incidentally I think the Mao statement was made to a US president or secretary of state - I need to look that up.

negi · Post by **negi** » 12 Sep 2011 07:13

Background of an individual often gives a nice idea of how he thinks for instance read up on the kind of violence Mao and his men unleashed when they went about implementing land reforms or even the cultural revolution. If he did not budge from killing his own people when it came to reaching his goal then there is little which would have deterred him from pulling the N trigger.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 12 Sep 2011 07:24

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:Shiv: There is new evidence to suggest that Mao's 300 million quote was a bluff. No one can be really sure though. But, the most scared from this statement were the Russians and other warsaw states. These type of statements at least partially convinced Kruschev to withdraw support for Russia's help to China on nuclear weapons, but by then it was too late.

It is true that our our numbers and quality of nuclear weapons will not deter China from a determined assault.
Shaurya - as I see it, Karnad's entire theme fails on these very grounds. Deterrence should not exist. If it does, it exists for reasons not explainable by Karnad's contentions.

Incidentally I think the Mao statement was made to a US president or secretary of state - I need to look that up.

I think you may be misreading what Karnad is saying. The Mao quote was made at a communist conference - definitely not to a US President/Secretary as at the time it was made, US did not have relations with PRC.

Added: Found a link to the quote. 300 million

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 12 Sep 2011 08:16

shiv wrote: In fact Karnad had a very oddly interesting thing to say about simultaneously sending out several small warheads to explode within kilometers of each other over a city, He said that the electromagnetic pulse from the first explosion would render all others ineffective and that would be no good. I have no idea about this - but if it were true then MIRVs of any type should be similarly vulnerable.

Electromagnetic pulse from explosion depends on altitude of burst and affects a large area only if its above atmosphere. E1 component of pulse is the intense one that can knock out electronics and E2+E3 are low intensity secondary effects that can be protected against. For air bursts the E1 energy gets absorbed by air, causing it to burning and the E1 effect is limited to severe burn area near explosion.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 08:17

ShauryaT wrote: I think you may be misreading what Karnad is saying. The Mao quote was made at a communist conference - definitely not to a US President/Secretary as at the time it was made, US did not have relations with PRC.

Added: Found a link to the quote. 300 million

Thanks for the link. But we get back to the postulates.

If Pakistan tells India (as it is doing) "We will continue to sponsor terrorism. Let's see you nuke us" the only way we can prove our seriousness is to actually nuke them.

Apply the same rules to India. If India tells China "We hold on to what is our territory, point out that your claims are illegal, and we continue to support a government in exile of Tibetans. Lets see you nuke us for that" - China has to nuke us to prove that it is serious about using nukes to further its power dominance.

There are a huge number of international provocations that are conducted in situations where nuclear weapons are totally useless until actually used. Ultimately nuclear weapons become weapons of "last resort" where diplomacy fails, conventional war fails and the nuclear weapons come into play as the final arbiter.

How much effort and emphasis needs to be placed on weapons of last resort when they cannot really be used for the commonest day to day problems between nations? Surely there is a case for using nuclear weapons more frequently and more liberally to reach satisfactory conclusions sooner rather than reserving a huge sophisticated arsenal for some hypothetical future crisis and date when there is no other resort.

In other words a the development of a huge and expensive to maintain arsenal should be accompanied by a robust willingness to settle almost any dispute with nuclear weapons. In the absence of that nuclear weapons are of little use. Nobody needs to be scared of them.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 08:20

sivab wrote:
shiv wrote: In fact Karnad had a very oddly interesting thing to say about simultaneously sending out several small warheads to explode within kilometers of each other over a city, He said that the electromagnetic pulse from the first explosion would render all others ineffective and that would be no good. I have no idea about this - but if it were true then MIRVs of any type should be similarly vulnerable.
Electromagnetic pulse from explosion depends on altitude of burst and affects a large area only if its above atmosphere. E1 component of pulse is the intense one that can knock out electronics and E2+E3 are low intensity secondary effects that can be protected against. For air bursts the E1 energy gets absorbed by air, causing it to burning and the E1 effect is limited to severe burn area near explosion.

Excellent information. Thank you. Can you expand on, or point me to links about this E1, 2 and 3 business?

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 12 Sep 2011 08:40

India has just not been producing the fissile material required to do that, and not testing of course.

Not sure where he got the data from... its not available in the public domain... our large pu based breeder will start functioning soon enough... it is unsafeguarded ... we added a 100 TONNE'S /year reproc .plant this jan..we ll keep adding the capacity... ball park estimates of 60-100 warheads by fas etc are all shot in the dark.. heavy water , tritiated water production is at an all time high ..India is the worlds largest producer... what else do we need....

The first Plutonium Plant at Trombay reprocesses research reactor
spent fuel with a capacity of 60 tons per year. The second and
third plants are located at Tarapur and Kalpakkam and reprocess
spent fuel from power reactors. Each of these plants has an
operating capacity of 100 tons per year. Reprocessing capacities
are being augmented in a phased manner to match the Pu
requirement

From BARC website

http://www.barc.ernet.in/publications/e ... %206/6.pdf

We may need 5-20 kg pu /warhead ....

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 08:46

gakakkad wrote:
India has just not been producing the fissile material required to do that, and not testing of course.
Not sure where he got the data from... its not available in the public domain... our large pu based breeder will start functioning soon enough... it is unsafeguarded ... we added a 100 kg /year reproc .plant this jan..we ll keep adding the capacity... ball park estimates of 60-100 warheads by fas etc are all shot in the dark.. heavy water , tritiated water production is at an all time high ..India is the worlds largest producer... what else do we need....

In fact I was wondering about this.

Suppose India has X tons stocks of Pu. Either it can be used for weapons, or it can be used for the second stage of our fast breeder reactor program (FBR) to create U233 out of Thorium. It's a toss up as far as I know.

But after that U233 is created reactors will run on that fuel and used to create even more U233 by irradiating Thorium in stage 3 of FBR

So where do we actually get all that extra fissile material for bums?

Would I be wrong is saying that the Pu that would be needed for FBR could go into bums if we imported LWR and safeguarded Uranium from other countries? Isn't this Pakhanastan's objection?

gakakkad · Post by **gakakkad** » 12 Sep 2011 08:48

^^ Edited mine again ... the reproc capacity be read as 100 tonne/year..

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 08:52

gakakkad wrote:
We may need 5-20 kg pu /warhead ....

Kakkadji - 20 kg is too high. The critical mass of very pure (maybe more than 90%) is just 3 kg and the usually quoted number is 9kg Pu. About 6 kg Pu per bum is what is usually quoted for SDRE nations. TFTA's may manage with just 3