Deterrence

[ramana]

@Ramana – I’m traveling right now, but I’ll do the write-up you’re interested in within a few days.

Great. Safe travels. Will await the write-up.
We all can learn.

[Amber G.]

If you want my perspective on Truman’s use of atomic weapons, let me know — I can share.

Please do.

Ramana – thanks for asking, here’s the historical perspective, drawing on well-documented scholarship.

By August 1945, Germany had already surrendered, but Japan was still fighting despite catastrophic losses. Battles like Okinawa and Iwo Jima had cost enormous casualties on both sides. The U.S. was preparing for Operation Downfall—a full-scale invasion of Japan—that was projected to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans and many times more Japanese. Against this backdrop, Truman was briefed on the Manhattan Project shortly after Roosevelt’s death and learned that the United States now possessed a radically new weapon.

It is important to note: at that time the U.S. had exactly two atomic bombs ready for use. One was the uranium device (Hiroshima, Aug. 6) which had never been tested before, and the other was the plutonium implosion device (Nagasaki, Aug. 9), of the same type that had been successfully tested in New Mexico in July. After those two, there was no immediate stockpile—fissile material was still months away from producing another bomb.

Truman and his administration considered several options. Top scientists —those who had built the weapon and knew the details—were polled and voiced strong views (recorded in sources like Robert Jungk’s Brighter Than a Thousand Suns). Overwhelmingly, they favored either a demonstration on a remote island, warning Japan in advance, or at least using a single bomb and giving time for surrender before dropping another. The administration ultimately rejected these alternatives. The bombs were dropped without prior warning, and within three days of each other—partly to give the impression that the U.S. possessed many such weapons and could continue raining them down.

Truman’s public announcement after Hiroshima spoke of a “new and revolutionary weapon.” In Japan, the government summoned Yoshio Nishina, the country’s most eminent nuclear physicist (who had worked with several leading U.S. scientists before the war), to determine whether this was real or simply an American bluff. Nishina immediately replied that it was not only possible, but almost certain. When pressed on whether Japan could develop such a bomb if given everything he needed, he was unequivocal: no, it would take years, and Japan had no access to fissile material. Asked if anything could be done to counter the weapon, his sober reply was: “Unless you could shoot down every enemy plane, the answer is no.”

Nishina and his colleagues later visited both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and much of the first reliable Japanese data on radiation and medical effects came from their surveys—work that was later incorporated into U.S. studies as well.

So the historical record shows clearly: Truman’s decision was shaped by military calculations, diplomatic considerations, and a deliberate choice to use both bombs quickly. Whether that was “wise” is a separate moral question; what is certain is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only ended the war but opened the nuclear age.

For further reading, in addition to standard histories, Robert Jungk’s Brighter Than a Thousand Suns remains a vivid contemporary account. Other excellent sources include Richard Rhodes’ The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy.

[Amber G.]

Few points Scientific Community -
- Oppenheimer himself did not directly recommend against military use of the bomb.

(In late May 1945, the Interim Committee (a high-level civilian–military advisory group chaired by Secretary of War Henry Stimson) consulted a panel of scientists, including Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi).

- That panel recommended use of the bomb against Japan, without prior warning, on the grounds that it would shock Japan into surrender and demonstrate U.S. power. Oppenheimer went along with this recommendation.

-Another group of Manhattan Project scientists—led by James Franck at Chicago—submitted the Franck Report (June 1945), which urged a demonstration of the bomb on an uninhabited island first, warning that surprise use on a city could trigger an arms race and damage America’s moral standing. This was circulated but ultimately not adopted.

Many (poll IIRC >90%) rank-and-file scientists opposed the use without any warning but “top four” advising the Interim Committee (including Oppenheimer) did not press for alternatives.

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally debate the morality—once Truman authorized use, the military implemented it. Targets were selected by the Target Committee (May 1945), which picked Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Kyoto (later spared after Stimson intervened).

- Some top generals—like Dwight Eisenhower and Admiral William Leahy—later wrote that they thought Japan was already defeated and the bomb was unnecessary - But this was expressed after the fact, not at the time of Truman’s decision.

[Tanaji]

Supposedly Stimson spared Kyoto because he and his wife had spent their honeymoon there..

[Amber G.]

^^^ Yes..Kyoto was originally on the target list because of its industrial significance and population size. However, Secretary of War Henry Stimson strongly recommended sparing it, citing both personal and cultural reasons—he and his wife had visited Kyoto and valued its historic temples, shrines, and cultural heritage. Truman accepted this advice, and Kyoto was removed, leaving Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata as the primary targets. This decision shows how, even amid wartime strategy, cultural and ethical considerations influenced the selection of atomic targets.

Talking about Kyoto - Richard Feynman (who worked for those bombs) did visit Japan after World War II.. His visits were part of r efforts to help rebuild Japan’s physics community and foster international scientific collaboration...He talks about sparring Kyoto and tells a funny anecdote - Feynman dedicated himself to learning Japanese with a local tutor. He was amused by the subtleties of language—for example, the word for “see” changed depending on context: a casual term when showing someone your garden, but a more polite expression when asking to see someone else’s garden...

Anyway for Manhattan Project, one of my favorite source is “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!” In the book, he has a chapter titled “Los Alamos from Below”, where he recounts his personal experiences at the Manhattan Project, often in ground-level perspective and talks about Generals, scientists and bombs ... At the Trinity test in July 1945, Feynman famously chose not to wear the issued dark goggles—he sat in a jeep and watched through the windshield instead, convinced the glass would protect his eyes. When the bomb went off, he saw the searing flash directly, describing it later with a mix of awe and scientific curiosity as one of the most brilliant sights imaginable. It was a quintessential Feynman moment: equal parts boldness, mischief, and fascination with nature.

[A_Gupta]

Feynman was also conscious of building an image. But his brilliance is ample excuse.

[gakakkad]

Didn't you work with rpf Gupta ji ? How was it ?

[Vayutuvan]

Didn't you work with rpf Gupta ji ? How was it ?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_effect

The Matthew effect, sometimes called the Matthew principle or cumulative advantage,[1] is the tendency of individuals to accrue social or economic success in proportion to their initial level of popularity, friends, and wealth. It is sometimes summarized by the adage or platitude "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer".[2][3] Also termed the "Matthew effect of accumulated advantage", taking its name from the Parable of the Talents in the biblical Gospel of Matthew, it was coined by sociologists Robert K. Merton and Harriet Zuckerman in 1968.[4][5]

Etymology
The concept is named according to two of the parables of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels (Table 2, of the Eusebian Canons). The concept concludes both synoptic versions of the parable of the talents:

For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
— Matthew 25:29, RSV.

I tell you, that to every one who has will more be given; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
— Luke 19:26, RSV.

The concept concludes two of the three synoptic versions of the parable of the lamp under a bushel (absent in the version of Matthew):

For to him who has will more be given; and from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
-- Mark 4:25, RSV.

 

Take heed then how you hear; for to him who has will more be given, and from him who has not, even what he thinks that he has will be taken away.
— Luke 8:18, RSV.

Mitigation
Open Science is "the movement to make scientific research (including publications, data, physical samples, and software) and its dissemination accessible to all levels of society, amateur or professional". One of its key motivations is increasing equity in scientific endeavors. However, Ross-Hellauer, T. et. al. (2022) argue that Open Science's ambition to reduce inequalities in academia may inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate existing disparities caused by cumulative advantage.[40] As Open Science progresses, it faces the challenge of balancing its goals of openness and accessibility with the risk that its practices could reinforce the privileges of the more advantaged, particularly in terms of access to knowledge, technology, and funding. The authors make this critique to urge professionals to reflect "upon the ways in which implementation may run counter to ideals".[40]

In fact this was quoted by a famous MIT physics professor whose theory was misattributed to RPF.

[Vayutuvan]

JvN also was of that type - building an image and persona of himself. But then it is not limited to recent examples either. Newton vs. Leibniz, Edison vs Tesla, etc are all very well known rivalries where they fought with no holds barred. Same with Richard Francis Burton and John Hanning Speke to find the source of the river Nile.

[ShauryaT]

So the historical record shows clearly: Truman’s decision was shaped by military calculations, diplomatic considerations, and a deliberate choice to use both bombs quickly. Whether that was “wise” is a separate moral question; what is certain is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only ended the war but opened the nuclear age.

The question of race being a factor in the decision making is something that has always bothered me. Ofcourse no one will state this openly and flat out deny such a consideration, however did race play an unconscious hand?

• Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 made the white man sit and take notice that an Asian power had defeated a white power, forcing a rethink of then prevalent racial theories
• At the treaty of Versailles, Japan's demand for racial equality clause was denied by the west
• The League of Nations did not accept a racial equality clause despite Japan’s push in 1919
• Anti-Japanese racism ran deep in the US then - for more than what it was for germans or Italians
• Naval limits (1922 Washington Naval Treaty): Japan was limited to a 5:5:3 battleship ratio against the U.S. and Britain. This was rationalized in part by Western powers as reflecting “global responsibilities,” but to Japan it echoed the racial hierarchy of Versailles.
• Immigration bans: The U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 barred Japanese immigrants. For Tokyo, this was a blatant racial insult.
• The League’s condemnation of the Manchurian invasion (1931–33) was seen as more hypocrisy: Japan was shut down while Western empires held colonies across Asia.
• Popular social media then, frequently termed the Japanese as subhuman, vermin - "enemy race". The incarceration of ethnic Japanese citizens is well known
• Japan was seen as a “different” enemy: culturally alien, racially othered, and viewed as fanatically resistant
• Historians like John Dower (War Without Mercy) and Ronald Takaki have shown how racial thinking saturated wartime discourse, shaping the willingness to accept mass civilian casualties in Japan.
• Against Germany, Nazi ideology was the enemy but for Japan it was its people

So at the very least racial prejudice made the seemingly "logical" military decision easy to accept. One can even argue it was the League’s failure to acknowledge racial equality was one of several reinforcing experiences that taught Japan the Western order was built on racial hierarchy. That perception became a powerful undercurrent in Japan’s turn to unilateralism and militarism, culminating in World War II.

[Amber G.]

@ShauryaT - Thank you for that perspective — the racial dimension is indeed an important and often under-acknowledged factor, and I appreciate you bringing in Dower and Takaki here.

[Amber G.]

Few comments for few posts above:

Perplexed by this turn of the thread — the Matthew effect, Burton vs. Speke, etc., seem rather far afield. Whatever one thinks of anecdotes or “image,” I knew Feynman personally over many years — physics most of all, but also from hearing him at parties on other matters — and there is no doubt he was an extraordinarily gifted physicist, also a brilliant teacher, a natural storyteller, and a good thinker across many fields.That, at least, needs no embellishment. Perhaps more useful here would be to return to, or focus on the actual issue — Truman’s decision and the early atomic choices — which is a far richer topic in its own right. ..(If topic is too far from this thread - 'Deterrence' - may be move that to some other thread. thanks)

[Vayutuvan]

Didn't you work with rpf Gupta ji ? How was it ?

gakkad ji, in light of the above, we can take it elsewhere. I don't have much more to say in any case.

[krisna]

Little different take- it is all history done and dusted.

America was aware of Japan willing to surrender for few months-april-july 1945. It was well known in govt circles. But the americans wanted full and unconditonal surrender of Japan including the monarchy. Japan was willing to surrender everything minus monarchy role. It was a deeply sentimental and cultural issue.

Japan has been brutally pounded for several weeks before the bums were detonated. The Japanes fought man to man and did not give up despite heavy losses. But their morale was sagging and the leadership agreed for conditional surrender (everything minus monarchy)

What made truman go for nukes and obliterate japanese cities was to show the force of power of new found weapon and force uncontional surrender of Japan including monarchy.

Alos to show to Communist USSR then threatening to invade Japan and prevent the balance of power towards USSR.

For american potus truman it was more of power over Japan and control from ussr commie rule irrespective of killing 1000s and maiming millions for years to come with radiation effects.


Cold comfort that the nuke became operational after italy and germany surendered. it is well known that america would not have bumbed europe as it was their own kith and kin.

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In India , we defated dutch in the war of kolachel . This was one of the few wars whch ended dutch role as a colonial power. Also the first for a european power to lose to non euroepan power. latr Japan became the 2nd asian power to defat a european pwoer USSR( ussr has more land mass in asia than europe- but ussr thinsk itself as european power because it considers itself as descendants of european region novorussia and its surrounding regions)

[krisna]

In fact after the Japanese unconditonal surrender inlcuding the monarchy-- what happened

monarchy is still present in Japan. This is was what Japan had asked before the bum detonation.

Uncle had to ask the monarchy to ask Japanese to accept their authority under his name even after the surrender-- so much for unconditonal surrender nonsense.

Only fact is there is heavy loss of lives and radiation effects of millions on Japanese.

IOW the usa did this to show its power over hapless citizens of other non white nation despite Japan pleading for conditonal surrender ( post bum dropping it is what it is monarchy still present)

In fact this atomic bum forced the Japan to surrender is another myth but powerful one similar to that of gandhi wining freedom to India by ahimsa .