Great. Safe travels. Will await the write-up.
We all can learn.
Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
Ramana – thanks for asking, here’s the historical perspective, drawing on well-documented scholarship.
By August 1945, Germany had already surrendered, but Japan was still fighting despite catastrophic losses. Battles like Okinawa and Iwo Jima had cost enormous casualties on both sides. The U.S. was preparing for Operation Downfall—a full-scale invasion of Japan—that was projected to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans and many times more Japanese. Against this backdrop, Truman was briefed on the Manhattan Project shortly after Roosevelt’s death and learned that the United States now possessed a radically new weapon.
It is important to note: at that time the U.S. had exactly two atomic bombs ready for use. One was the uranium device (Hiroshima, Aug. 6) which had never been tested before, and the other was the plutonium implosion device (Nagasaki, Aug. 9), of the same type that had been successfully tested in New Mexico in July. After those two, there was no immediate stockpile—fissile material was still months away from producing another bomb.
Truman and his administration considered several options. Top scientists —those who had built the weapon and knew the details—were polled and voiced strong views (recorded in sources like Robert Jungk’s Brighter Than a Thousand Suns). Overwhelmingly, they favored either a demonstration on a remote island, warning Japan in advance, or at least using a single bomb and giving time for surrender before dropping another. The administration ultimately rejected these alternatives. The bombs were dropped without prior warning, and within three days of each other—partly to give the impression that the U.S. possessed many such weapons and could continue raining them down.
Truman’s public announcement after Hiroshima spoke of a “new and revolutionary weapon.” In Japan, the government summoned Yoshio Nishina, the country’s most eminent nuclear physicist (who had worked with several leading U.S. scientists before the war), to determine whether this was real or simply an American bluff. Nishina immediately replied that it was not only possible, but almost certain. When pressed on whether Japan could develop such a bomb if given everything he needed, he was unequivocal: no, it would take years, and Japan had no access to fissile material. Asked if anything could be done to counter the weapon, his sober reply was: “Unless you could shoot down every enemy plane, the answer is no.”
Nishina and his colleagues later visited both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and much of the first reliable Japanese data on radiation and medical effects came from their surveys—work that was later incorporated into U.S. studies as well.
So the historical record shows clearly: Truman’s decision was shaped by military calculations, diplomatic considerations, and a deliberate choice to use both bombs quickly. Whether that was “wise” is a separate moral question; what is certain is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only ended the war but opened the nuclear age.
For further reading, in addition to standard histories, Robert Jungk’s Brighter Than a Thousand Suns remains a vivid contemporary account. Other excellent sources include Richard Rhodes’ The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy.
Re: Deterrence
Few points Scientific Community -
- Oppenheimer himself did not directly recommend against military use of the bomb.
(In late May 1945, the Interim Committee (a high-level civilian–military advisory group chaired by Secretary of War Henry Stimson) consulted a panel of scientists, including Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi).
- That panel recommended use of the bomb against Japan, without prior warning, on the grounds that it would shock Japan into surrender and demonstrate U.S. power. Oppenheimer went along with this recommendation.
-Another group of Manhattan Project scientists—led by James Franck at Chicago—submitted the Franck Report (June 1945), which urged a demonstration of the bomb on an uninhabited island first, warning that surprise use on a city could trigger an arms race and damage America’s moral standing. This was circulated but ultimately not adopted.
Many (poll IIRC >90%) rank-and-file scientists opposed the use without any warning but “top four” advising the Interim Committee (including Oppenheimer) did not press for alternatives.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally debate the morality—once Truman authorized use, the military implemented it. Targets were selected by the Target Committee (May 1945), which picked Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Kyoto (later spared after Stimson intervened).
- Some top generals—like Dwight Eisenhower and Admiral William Leahy—later wrote that they thought Japan was already defeated and the bomb was unnecessary - But this was expressed after the fact, not at the time of Truman’s decision.
- Oppenheimer himself did not directly recommend against military use of the bomb.
(In late May 1945, the Interim Committee (a high-level civilian–military advisory group chaired by Secretary of War Henry Stimson) consulted a panel of scientists, including Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi).
- That panel recommended use of the bomb against Japan, without prior warning, on the grounds that it would shock Japan into surrender and demonstrate U.S. power. Oppenheimer went along with this recommendation.
-Another group of Manhattan Project scientists—led by James Franck at Chicago—submitted the Franck Report (June 1945), which urged a demonstration of the bomb on an uninhabited island first, warning that surprise use on a city could trigger an arms race and damage America’s moral standing. This was circulated but ultimately not adopted.
Many (poll IIRC >90%) rank-and-file scientists opposed the use without any warning but “top four” advising the Interim Committee (including Oppenheimer) did not press for alternatives.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally debate the morality—once Truman authorized use, the military implemented it. Targets were selected by the Target Committee (May 1945), which picked Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Kyoto (later spared after Stimson intervened).
- Some top generals—like Dwight Eisenhower and Admiral William Leahy—later wrote that they thought Japan was already defeated and the bomb was unnecessary - But this was expressed after the fact, not at the time of Truman’s decision.
Re: Deterrence
Supposedly Stimson spared Kyoto because he and his wife had spent their honeymoon there.. 
Re: Deterrence
^^^ Yes..Kyoto was originally on the target list because of its industrial significance and population size. However, Secretary of War Henry Stimson strongly recommended sparing it, citing both personal and cultural reasons—he and his wife had visited Kyoto and valued its historic temples, shrines, and cultural heritage. Truman accepted this advice, and Kyoto was removed, leaving Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata as the primary targets. This decision shows how, even amid wartime strategy, cultural and ethical considerations influenced the selection of atomic targets.
Talking about Kyoto - Richard Feynman (who worked for those bombs) did visit Japan after World War II.. His visits were part of r efforts to help rebuild Japan’s physics community and foster international scientific collaboration...He talks about sparring Kyoto and tells a funny anecdote - Feynman dedicated himself to learning Japanese with a local tutor. He was amused by the subtleties of language—for example, the word for “see” changed depending on context: a casual term when showing someone your garden, but a more polite expression when asking to see someone else’s garden...
Anyway for Manhattan Project, one of my favorite source is “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!” In the book, he has a chapter titled “Los Alamos from Below”, where he recounts his personal experiences at the Manhattan Project, often in ground-level perspective and talks about Generals, scientists and bombs ... At the Trinity test in July 1945, Feynman famously chose not to wear the issued dark goggles—he sat in a jeep and watched through the windshield instead, convinced the glass would protect his eyes. When the bomb went off, he saw the searing flash directly, describing it later with a mix of awe and scientific curiosity as one of the most brilliant sights imaginable. It was a quintessential Feynman moment: equal parts boldness, mischief, and fascination with nature.
Talking about Kyoto - Richard Feynman (who worked for those bombs) did visit Japan after World War II.. His visits were part of r efforts to help rebuild Japan’s physics community and foster international scientific collaboration...He talks about sparring Kyoto and tells a funny anecdote - Feynman dedicated himself to learning Japanese with a local tutor. He was amused by the subtleties of language—for example, the word for “see” changed depending on context: a casual term when showing someone your garden, but a more polite expression when asking to see someone else’s garden...
Anyway for Manhattan Project, one of my favorite source is “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!” In the book, he has a chapter titled “Los Alamos from Below”, where he recounts his personal experiences at the Manhattan Project, often in ground-level perspective and talks about Generals, scientists and bombs ... At the Trinity test in July 1945, Feynman famously chose not to wear the issued dark goggles—he sat in a jeep and watched through the windshield instead, convinced the glass would protect his eyes. When the bomb went off, he saw the searing flash directly, describing it later with a mix of awe and scientific curiosity as one of the most brilliant sights imaginable. It was a quintessential Feynman moment: equal parts boldness, mischief, and fascination with nature.
Re: Deterrence
Feynman was also conscious of building an image. But his brilliance is ample excuse.
Re: Deterrence
Didn't you work with rpf Gupta ji ? How was it ?
Re: Deterrence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_effect
The Matthew effect, sometimes called the Matthew principle or cumulative advantage,[1] is the tendency of individuals to accrue social or economic success in proportion to their initial level of popularity, friends, and wealth. It is sometimes summarized by the adage or platitude "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer".[2][3] Also termed the "Matthew effect of accumulated advantage", taking its name from the Parable of the Talents in the biblical Gospel of Matthew, it was coined by sociologists Robert K. Merton and Harriet Zuckerman in 1968.[4][5]
Etymology
The concept is named according to two of the parables of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels (Table 2, of the Eusebian Canons). The concept concludes both synoptic versions of the parable of the talents:
For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
— Matthew 25:29, RSV.The concept concludes two of the three synoptic versions of the parable of the lamp under a bushel (absent in the version of Matthew):I tell you, that to every one who has will more be given; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
— Luke 19:26, RSV.
For to him who has will more be given; and from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.
-- Mark 4:25, RSV.
Take heed then how you hear; for to him who has will more be given, and from him who has not, even what he thinks that he has will be taken away.
— Luke 8:18, RSV.
In fact this was quoted by a famous MIT physics professor whose theory was misattributed to RPF.Mitigation
Open Science is "the movement to make scientific research (including publications, data, physical samples, and software) and its dissemination accessible to all levels of society, amateur or professional". One of its key motivations is increasing equity in scientific endeavors. However, Ross-Hellauer, T. et. al. (2022) argue that Open Science's ambition to reduce inequalities in academia may inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate existing disparities caused by cumulative advantage.[40] As Open Science progresses, it faces the challenge of balancing its goals of openness and accessibility with the risk that its practices could reinforce the privileges of the more advantaged, particularly in terms of access to knowledge, technology, and funding. The authors make this critique to urge professionals to reflect "upon the ways in which implementation may run counter to ideals".[40]
Re: Deterrence
JvN also was of that type - building an image and persona of himself. But then it is not limited to recent examples either. Newton vs. Leibniz, Edison vs Tesla, etc are all very well known rivalries where they fought with no holds barred. Same with Richard Francis Burton and John Hanning Speke to find the source of the river Nile.
Re: Deterrence
The question of race being a factor in the decision making is something that has always bothered me. Ofcourse no one will state this openly and flat out deny such a consideration, however did race play an unconscious hand?Amber G. wrote: ↑09 Sep 2025 02:10 So the historical record shows clearly: Truman’s decision was shaped by military calculations, diplomatic considerations, and a deliberate choice to use both bombs quickly. Whether that was “wise” is a separate moral question; what is certain is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only ended the war but opened the nuclear age.
- Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 made the white man sit and take notice that an Asian power had defeated a white power, forcing a rethink of then prevalent racial theories
- At the treaty of Versailles, Japan's demand for racial equality clause was denied by the west
- The League of Nations did not accept a racial equality clause despite Japan’s push in 1919
- Anti-Japanese racism ran deep in the US then - for more than what it was for germans or Italians
- Naval limits (1922 Washington Naval Treaty): Japan was limited to a 5:5:3 battleship ratio against the U.S. and Britain. This was rationalized in part by Western powers as reflecting “global responsibilities,” but to Japan it echoed the racial hierarchy of Versailles.
- Immigration bans: The U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 barred Japanese immigrants. For Tokyo, this was a blatant racial insult.
- The League’s condemnation of the Manchurian invasion (1931–33) was seen as more hypocrisy: Japan was shut down while Western empires held colonies across Asia.
- Popular social media then, frequently termed the Japanese as subhuman, vermin - "enemy race". The incarceration of ethnic Japanese citizens is well known
- Japan was seen as a “different” enemy: culturally alien, racially othered, and viewed as fanatically resistant
- Historians like John Dower (War Without Mercy) and Ronald Takaki have shown how racial thinking saturated wartime discourse, shaping the willingness to accept mass civilian casualties in Japan.
- Against Germany, Nazi ideology was the enemy but for Japan it was its people
Re: Deterrence
@ShauryaT - Thank you for that perspective — the racial dimension is indeed an important and often under-acknowledged factor, and I appreciate you bringing in Dower and Takaki here.
Re: Deterrence
Few comments for few posts above:
Perplexed by this turn of the thread — the Matthew effect, Burton vs. Speke, etc., seem rather far afield. Whatever one thinks of anecdotes or “image,” I knew Feynman personally over many years — physics most of all, but also from hearing him at parties on other matters — and there is no doubt he was an extraordinarily gifted physicist, also a brilliant teacher, a natural storyteller, and a good thinker across many fields.That, at least, needs no embellishment. Perhaps more useful here would be to return to, or focus on the actual issue — Truman’s decision and the early atomic choices — which is a far richer topic in its own right. ..(If topic is too far from this thread - 'Deterrence' - may be move that to some other thread. thanks)
Perplexed by this turn of the thread — the Matthew effect, Burton vs. Speke, etc., seem rather far afield. Whatever one thinks of anecdotes or “image,” I knew Feynman personally over many years — physics most of all, but also from hearing him at parties on other matters — and there is no doubt he was an extraordinarily gifted physicist, also a brilliant teacher, a natural storyteller, and a good thinker across many fields.That, at least, needs no embellishment. Perhaps more useful here would be to return to, or focus on the actual issue — Truman’s decision and the early atomic choices — which is a far richer topic in its own right. ..(If topic is too far from this thread - 'Deterrence' - may be move that to some other thread. thanks)
Re: Deterrence
Little different take- it is all history done and dusted.
America was aware of Japan willing to surrender for few months-april-july 1945. It was well known in govt circles. But the americans wanted full and unconditonal surrender of Japan including the monarchy. Japan was willing to surrender everything minus monarchy role. It was a deeply sentimental and cultural issue.
Japan has been brutally pounded for several weeks before the bums were detonated. The Japanes fought man to man and did not give up despite heavy losses. But their morale was sagging and the leadership agreed for conditional surrender (everything minus monarchy)
What made truman go for nukes and obliterate japanese cities was to show the force of power of new found weapon and force uncontional surrender of Japan including monarchy.
Alos to show to Communist USSR then threatening to invade Japan and prevent the balance of power towards USSR.
For american potus truman it was more of power over Japan and control from ussr commie rule irrespective of killing 1000s and maiming millions for years to come with radiation effects.
Cold comfort that the nuke became operational after italy and germany surendered. it is well known that america would not have bumbed europe as it was their own kith and kin.
---------------------------
In India , we defated dutch in the war of kolachel . This was one of the few wars whch ended dutch role as a colonial power. Also the first for a european power to lose to non euroepan power. latr Japan became the 2nd asian power to defat a european pwoer USSR( ussr has more land mass in asia than europe- but ussr thinsk itself as european power because it considers itself as descendants of european region novorussia and its surrounding regions)
America was aware of Japan willing to surrender for few months-april-july 1945. It was well known in govt circles. But the americans wanted full and unconditonal surrender of Japan including the monarchy. Japan was willing to surrender everything minus monarchy role. It was a deeply sentimental and cultural issue.
Japan has been brutally pounded for several weeks before the bums were detonated. The Japanes fought man to man and did not give up despite heavy losses. But their morale was sagging and the leadership agreed for conditional surrender (everything minus monarchy)
What made truman go for nukes and obliterate japanese cities was to show the force of power of new found weapon and force uncontional surrender of Japan including monarchy.
Alos to show to Communist USSR then threatening to invade Japan and prevent the balance of power towards USSR.
For american potus truman it was more of power over Japan and control from ussr commie rule irrespective of killing 1000s and maiming millions for years to come with radiation effects.
Cold comfort that the nuke became operational after italy and germany surendered. it is well known that america would not have bumbed europe as it was their own kith and kin.
---------------------------
In India , we defated dutch in the war of kolachel . This was one of the few wars whch ended dutch role as a colonial power. Also the first for a european power to lose to non euroepan power. latr Japan became the 2nd asian power to defat a european pwoer USSR( ussr has more land mass in asia than europe- but ussr thinsk itself as european power because it considers itself as descendants of european region novorussia and its surrounding regions)
Re: Deterrence
In fact after the Japanese unconditonal surrender inlcuding the monarchy-- what happened
monarchy is still present in Japan. This is was what Japan had asked before the bum detonation.
Uncle had to ask the monarchy to ask Japanese to accept their authority under his name even after the surrender-- so much for unconditonal surrender nonsense.
Only fact is there is heavy loss of lives and radiation effects of millions on Japanese.
IOW the usa did this to show its power over hapless citizens of other non white nation despite Japan pleading for conditonal surrender ( post bum dropping it is what it is monarchy still present)
In fact this atomic bum forced the Japan to surrender is another myth but powerful one similar to that of gandhi wining freedom to India by ahimsa .
monarchy is still present in Japan. This is was what Japan had asked before the bum detonation.
Uncle had to ask the monarchy to ask Japanese to accept their authority under his name even after the surrender-- so much for unconditonal surrender nonsense.
Only fact is there is heavy loss of lives and radiation effects of millions on Japanese.
IOW the usa did this to show its power over hapless citizens of other non white nation despite Japan pleading for conditonal surrender ( post bum dropping it is what it is monarchy still present)
In fact this atomic bum forced the Japan to surrender is another myth but powerful one similar to that of gandhi wining freedom to India by ahimsa .
Re: Deterrence
krisna very good summary.
I am disappointed that people let their personal affiliations cloud their values.
I am disappointed that people let their personal affiliations cloud their values.
Re: Deterrence
@Ramana — could you clarify what exactly you mean by “personal affiliations clouding values”? I’m not sure that’s a fair characterization here.
@Krishna — good summary, and you’ve captured some of the postwar ironies well. Still, a few points are worth noting for balance: by mid-1945, Japan’s leadership was divided — some were seeking a conditional surrender, others still believed they could fight on, even discussing whether a nuclear weapon could be built in a few months (Yoshio Nishina told them clearly it couldn’t).
After the Hiroshima bombing, physicist Yoshio Nishina was dispatched by the Japanese command to confirm whether the American claim of an “atomic bomb” was genuine or a bluff. He immediately confirmed it was real. A senior officer then asked him if Japan could build its own atomic bomb in three months, promising him all the resources he might need. Nishina’s answer was an instant and unequivocal “No.” While Japan possessed the theoretical knowledge, he explained, it lacked the one thing that truly mattered — a sufficient supply of fissile material, particularly uranium. That exchange underscored the fatal weakness in Japan’s own long-stalled nuclear program. (Nishina later prepared an account of his findings for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.)
Many of the scientists and military planners in the Manhattan Project were originally driven by the fear that Germany might get the bomb first. Even after Germany’s defeat, that momentum — combined with the wish to end the Pacific war quickly and to preempt Soviet moves — heavily shaped U.S. decision-making. (I may write some more about this later)
There were multiple layers — military, political, and psychological — and many “what-ifs.” It’s why treating the decision as a single-motive story rarely does justice to the complexity of that moment. For those of us who’ve studied this deeply — from the Manhattan Project archives to the physicists’ own internal discussions — it’s hard to reduce it to pure power projection or pure necessity. It was a tragic convergence of science, politics, and human limitation.
@Krishna — good summary, and you’ve captured some of the postwar ironies well. Still, a few points are worth noting for balance: by mid-1945, Japan’s leadership was divided — some were seeking a conditional surrender, others still believed they could fight on, even discussing whether a nuclear weapon could be built in a few months (Yoshio Nishina told them clearly it couldn’t).
After the Hiroshima bombing, physicist Yoshio Nishina was dispatched by the Japanese command to confirm whether the American claim of an “atomic bomb” was genuine or a bluff. He immediately confirmed it was real. A senior officer then asked him if Japan could build its own atomic bomb in three months, promising him all the resources he might need. Nishina’s answer was an instant and unequivocal “No.” While Japan possessed the theoretical knowledge, he explained, it lacked the one thing that truly mattered — a sufficient supply of fissile material, particularly uranium. That exchange underscored the fatal weakness in Japan’s own long-stalled nuclear program. (Nishina later prepared an account of his findings for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.)
Many of the scientists and military planners in the Manhattan Project were originally driven by the fear that Germany might get the bomb first. Even after Germany’s defeat, that momentum — combined with the wish to end the Pacific war quickly and to preempt Soviet moves — heavily shaped U.S. decision-making. (I may write some more about this later)
There were multiple layers — military, political, and psychological — and many “what-ifs.” It’s why treating the decision as a single-motive story rarely does justice to the complexity of that moment. For those of us who’ve studied this deeply — from the Manhattan Project archives to the physicists’ own internal discussions — it’s hard to reduce it to pure power projection or pure necessity. It was a tragic convergence of science, politics, and human limitation.
Re: Deterrence
Another substantive post for those who are interested...
On the point about “personal affiliations clouding values” — sometimes, it’s not affiliations but simply a commitment to factual accuracy that shapes how one views these events.
Just one example (there are others), Krishna’s quote:
After the first few months the long term effects - many narratives get it wrong..
Long-term effects have been studied in extraordinary detail by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) — a joint Japan–U.S. organization that has followed the health of survivors for decades.
Its Life Span Study (LSS), tracking about 94,000 survivors since 1950, remains one of the most comprehensive human radiation studies ever conducted. As of 2003, about 7% of all cancer deaths among the exposed group were attributable to atomic-bomb radiation. Among those with significant exposure (within roughly 2.5 km of the hypocenter), the estimated number of excess solid cancer deaths over 50 years is around 550 out of ~93,000 survivors.
Importantly, no significant increase in birth defects, childhood cancers, or hereditary effects has been observed in the children (F1 generation) of survivors — a finding often overlooked in popular discussions of “genetic damage.”
As I have often said (starting with decades ago in Fukushima and other dhagas) Richard Muller, in his book (Physics for future Presidents - highly recommend that book), says , "Of those killed by the Hiroshima atomic bomb, the best estimate is that fewer than 2% died of radiation-induced cancer." This figure refers to long-term cancer deaths as a fraction of the total immediate deaths.
So while the suffering was immense and the moral questions remain, accurate numbers matter. Precision isn’t downplaying tragedy — it’s honoring it truthfully. Understanding what really happened helps separate science from sentiment — and history from mythology — when evaluating Truman’s decision. Some of this may come as a surprise to many — radiation myths die hard, even when the data have been patiently waiting for decades to tell their quieter, less cinematic truth.
And knowing Feynman — both formally and informal gatherings where talk drifted from science to art to human folly — I can almost hear his voice cutting through it all: amused, sharp, unwilling to let ideology get in the way of clarity. He was not just a gifted physicist, but a brilliant teacher, a storyteller, and a thinker who knew that truth — however uncomfortable — is the scientist’s only real loyalty.
On the point about “personal affiliations clouding values” — sometimes, it’s not affiliations but simply a commitment to factual accuracy that shapes how one views these events.
Just one example (there are others), Krishna’s quote:
....“maiming millions for years to come with radiation effects” is a striking image, but it doesn’t hold up under careful scientific scrutiny. The best-documented estimates — from Japanese and international studies — place total deaths from both Hiroshima and Nagasaki between 110,000 and 210,000, counting all causes (blast, burns, and radiation) in the first few months. (Of these, only about 5–15% were due to acute radiation sickness.)For american potus truman it was more of power over Japan and control from ussr commie rule irrespective of killing 1000s and maiming millions for years to come with radiation effects.
After the first few months the long term effects - many narratives get it wrong..
Long-term effects have been studied in extraordinary detail by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) — a joint Japan–U.S. organization that has followed the health of survivors for decades.
Its Life Span Study (LSS), tracking about 94,000 survivors since 1950, remains one of the most comprehensive human radiation studies ever conducted. As of 2003, about 7% of all cancer deaths among the exposed group were attributable to atomic-bomb radiation. Among those with significant exposure (within roughly 2.5 km of the hypocenter), the estimated number of excess solid cancer deaths over 50 years is around 550 out of ~93,000 survivors.
Importantly, no significant increase in birth defects, childhood cancers, or hereditary effects has been observed in the children (F1 generation) of survivors — a finding often overlooked in popular discussions of “genetic damage.”
As I have often said (starting with decades ago in Fukushima and other dhagas) Richard Muller, in his book (Physics for future Presidents - highly recommend that book), says , "Of those killed by the Hiroshima atomic bomb, the best estimate is that fewer than 2% died of radiation-induced cancer." This figure refers to long-term cancer deaths as a fraction of the total immediate deaths.
So while the suffering was immense and the moral questions remain, accurate numbers matter. Precision isn’t downplaying tragedy — it’s honoring it truthfully. Understanding what really happened helps separate science from sentiment — and history from mythology — when evaluating Truman’s decision. Some of this may come as a surprise to many — radiation myths die hard, even when the data have been patiently waiting for decades to tell their quieter, less cinematic truth.
And knowing Feynman — both formally and informal gatherings where talk drifted from science to art to human folly — I can almost hear his voice cutting through it all: amused, sharp, unwilling to let ideology get in the way of clarity. He was not just a gifted physicist, but a brilliant teacher, a storyteller, and a thinker who knew that truth — however uncomfortable — is the scientist’s only real loyalty.
Re: Deterrence
AmberGji
A Question :
What happens to the Leaves, foliage, Trees that would have absobed the radiantion/radioactive material?/ Also twisted metals and Concrete in the rubble.
The reason I ask is I watching aftermath of Chernobyl and Red Forest.
The wood and the trees have not undergone decay. The fallen leaves in the forest are still crisp as they were on the day they fell. And all contain a high dose of radiation!
In the documentary they were discussing about the radiation fall out elsewhere if Red Forest Catches fire!
Also watched an intersting take there that certain fish have the capacity to self heal Yaaniki, they can repair the DNA damages.
So the question is :
have the Technology evolved so much that the agressor can leave the earth scorched for decades to come??
Or Use a Dirty Bomb just to make certain areas uninhabitable??
A Question :
What happens to the Leaves, foliage, Trees that would have absobed the radiantion/radioactive material?/ Also twisted metals and Concrete in the rubble.
The reason I ask is I watching aftermath of Chernobyl and Red Forest.
The wood and the trees have not undergone decay. The fallen leaves in the forest are still crisp as they were on the day they fell. And all contain a high dose of radiation!
In the documentary they were discussing about the radiation fall out elsewhere if Red Forest Catches fire!
Also watched an intersting take there that certain fish have the capacity to self heal Yaaniki, they can repair the DNA damages.
So the question is :
have the Technology evolved so much that the agressor can leave the earth scorched for decades to come??
Or Use a Dirty Bomb just to make certain areas uninhabitable??
Re: Deterrence
^^^ @Srajesh:
Ah, yes — the Red Forest near Chernobyl — the eerie reminder that radiation doesn’t always look like danger. Trees still standing straight, leaves still crisp decades later, as if time politely stepped aside. The “immortality” of those pine needles is not some miracle of nature — the decay is dramatically slowed, and the primary mechanism is the destruction of soil decomposers (fungi, bacteria, insects) by high radiation doses, particularly in the initial fallout area. In other words While the forest is still alive (new growth continues), the dead organic matter is persisting The radioactivity sterilized the soil. So the trees and leaves persist, quietly glowing in their own toxic eternity.
When one of those radioactive trees burns, however, the smoke lifts cesium-137, strontium-90, and other long-lived isotopes skyward again — and the fallout can drift hundreds of kilometers. That’s why wildfires in Chernobyl’s zone make radiation monitors in Sweden twitch. The contamination never really “dies”; it just changes form.
Now, about your deeper question — could an aggressor deliberately scorch the earth, or seed a region with radioactive debris the way Chernobyl accidentally did?
Technically, yes — but it’s not a smart or efficient weapon. What you described — the “dirty bomb” — is exactly that: not nuclear fission, just conventional explosives used to scatter radioactive dust. Spread thin, it dilutes fast.
Enough to cause panic and long evacuations, - yes.
Enough to “poison the earth for decades,” - not.
Now, about your deeper question — could an aggressor deliberately scorch the earth, or seed a region with radioactive debris the way Chernobyl accidentally did? Technically, yes — but it’s a blunt, inefficient tool for scorched-earth strategy. As Richard Muller argues in “The Dirty-Bomb Distraction” (MIT Technology Review - Highly recommend to read it in full ), a dirty bomb is a poor way to inflict mass casualties: a simple conventional explosion or other crude method would do far more immediate physical damage, while the radiological device’s main weapon is panic. In short: the real danger is fear itself — the actual physical effect of a dirty bomb is MUCH MUCH less than that of a true nuclear detonation. Read Muller’s piece for the numbers and policy reasoning; experts point governments toward securing reactors and large radioactive stockpiles rather than overreacting to crude dispersal devices.
The harsh truth is that dirty bombs are weapons of mass disruption, not destruction. They weaponize fear and policy, not physics. The contaminated area would eventually be cleaned or cordoned off. Cesium-137’s half-life is about 30 years — long enough to worry governments, short enough that nature begins reclaiming the zone, just as wolves and wild horses now prowl Chernobyl’s ghostly woods.
As for your note about the fish that “self-heal” — that’s true at a molecular level. Some organisms (certain fish, even tardigrades) have robust DNA-repair enzymes. Evolution didn’t give them immunity to radiation, just better cellular maintenance. Humans have it too, but not nearly as efficient.
So — could a modern aggressor “leave the earth scorched for decades”? Only with a true nuclear detonation or sabotage of a large reactor or waste facility. A dirty bomb, while capable of spreading panic and economic paralysis, wouldn’t physically destroy much.
In short:
The Red Forest remains because life itself was paused there.
A dirty bomb can make an area uninhabitable for bureaucratic reasons, not biological ones.
The fallout from fear lasts longer than the fallout from isotopes.
Or as one might say, half-smiling: beware not radiation — but radiophobia.
- Amber G. (essentially the same consistent post have been posted a few times over decades in these dhagas).
Ah, yes — the Red Forest near Chernobyl — the eerie reminder that radiation doesn’t always look like danger. Trees still standing straight, leaves still crisp decades later, as if time politely stepped aside. The “immortality” of those pine needles is not some miracle of nature — the decay is dramatically slowed, and the primary mechanism is the destruction of soil decomposers (fungi, bacteria, insects) by high radiation doses, particularly in the initial fallout area. In other words While the forest is still alive (new growth continues), the dead organic matter is persisting The radioactivity sterilized the soil. So the trees and leaves persist, quietly glowing in their own toxic eternity.
When one of those radioactive trees burns, however, the smoke lifts cesium-137, strontium-90, and other long-lived isotopes skyward again — and the fallout can drift hundreds of kilometers. That’s why wildfires in Chernobyl’s zone make radiation monitors in Sweden twitch. The contamination never really “dies”; it just changes form.
Now, about your deeper question — could an aggressor deliberately scorch the earth, or seed a region with radioactive debris the way Chernobyl accidentally did?
Technically, yes — but it’s not a smart or efficient weapon. What you described — the “dirty bomb” — is exactly that: not nuclear fission, just conventional explosives used to scatter radioactive dust. Spread thin, it dilutes fast.
Enough to cause panic and long evacuations, - yes.
Enough to “poison the earth for decades,” - not.
Now, about your deeper question — could an aggressor deliberately scorch the earth, or seed a region with radioactive debris the way Chernobyl accidentally did? Technically, yes — but it’s a blunt, inefficient tool for scorched-earth strategy. As Richard Muller argues in “The Dirty-Bomb Distraction” (MIT Technology Review - Highly recommend to read it in full ), a dirty bomb is a poor way to inflict mass casualties: a simple conventional explosion or other crude method would do far more immediate physical damage, while the radiological device’s main weapon is panic. In short: the real danger is fear itself — the actual physical effect of a dirty bomb is MUCH MUCH less than that of a true nuclear detonation. Read Muller’s piece for the numbers and policy reasoning; experts point governments toward securing reactors and large radioactive stockpiles rather than overreacting to crude dispersal devices.
The harsh truth is that dirty bombs are weapons of mass disruption, not destruction. They weaponize fear and policy, not physics. The contaminated area would eventually be cleaned or cordoned off. Cesium-137’s half-life is about 30 years — long enough to worry governments, short enough that nature begins reclaiming the zone, just as wolves and wild horses now prowl Chernobyl’s ghostly woods.
As for your note about the fish that “self-heal” — that’s true at a molecular level. Some organisms (certain fish, even tardigrades) have robust DNA-repair enzymes. Evolution didn’t give them immunity to radiation, just better cellular maintenance. Humans have it too, but not nearly as efficient.
So — could a modern aggressor “leave the earth scorched for decades”? Only with a true nuclear detonation or sabotage of a large reactor or waste facility. A dirty bomb, while capable of spreading panic and economic paralysis, wouldn’t physically destroy much.
In short:
The Red Forest remains because life itself was paused there.
A dirty bomb can make an area uninhabitable for bureaucratic reasons, not biological ones.
The fallout from fear lasts longer than the fallout from isotopes.
Or as one might say, half-smiling: beware not radiation — but radiophobia.
- Amber G. (essentially the same consistent post have been posted a few times over decades in these dhagas).
Re: Deterrence
Thanks Amber G,
Quite some interesting perspectives I have learnt from recent posts by yourself and other members in this thread
Im wondering if the huge stigma and "recoiling with horror" at the mention of N weapons usage just "radiophobia", which acts as a deterrent on N armed countries to prevent their usage (unleashing huge destructive power of N weapons) and proliferation? To keep the select club "select"... and not upset their geopolitical calculations. In which case, may be that is a good thing... ?!
Quite some interesting perspectives I have learnt from recent posts by yourself and other members in this thread
Im wondering if the huge stigma and "recoiling with horror" at the mention of N weapons usage just "radiophobia", which acts as a deterrent on N armed countries to prevent their usage (unleashing huge destructive power of N weapons) and proliferation? To keep the select club "select"... and not upset their geopolitical calculations. In which case, may be that is a good thing... ?!
Re: Deterrence
I'm glad the information resonated.Thanks Amber G,
Quite some interesting perspectives I have learnt from recent posts by yourself and other members in this thread
Im wondering if the huge stigma and "recoiling with horror" at the mention of N weapons usage just "radiophobia", which acts as a deterrent on N armed countries to prevent their usage (unleashing huge destructive power of N weapons) and proliferation? To keep the select club "select"... and not upset their geopolitical calculations. In which case, may be that is a good thing... ?!
My take to address point about the deterrent effect of fear:
- The core information I shared about the limited physical danger of "dirty bombs" is not new or revolutionary; it has been well-understood within the scientific, security, and medical communities across all nations for a long time. There is no secret or hidden science being selectively withheld by any particular nation or "club." (BRF itself had *many* posts about this over the decades - see below)
On the geopolitical angle - about the question of whether "radiophobia" is deliberately maintained to serve as a deterrent and check proliferation, keeping the "club select." My take - I don't think we need a conspiracy theory to explain the situation. Nuclear deterrence (Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD) is a well-documented and globally debated geopolitical reality, independent of "radiophobia." The fear of nuclear weapons is simply a rational response to the actual, overwhelming destructive power of a true nuclear detonation—a fact that is entirely distinct from the much smaller threat posed by a dirty bomb. Ignorance is simply the state of not knowing the distinction, and people can choose to remain ignorant on a technical matter if they wish.
On the real-world lessons: The distinction between true nuclear danger and radiophobia is not just theoretical. We have real-world incidents that illustrate the bureaucratic and psychological challenges. For example, the Mayapuri Radiation Incident in Delhi, India, in 2010 -- considered the most severe or significant radiological accident in India to date. This involved a mismanaged source of Cobalt-60. While tragically, one person died and several were injured from direct, localized exposure, the wider panic and disruption were immense. The incident caused a major decontamination effort, a public scare, and significant bureaucratic fallout, and more than 100 posts in BRF dedicated to that incident
The fact that the contamination was contained to a very small area and was nowhere near the level of a full-scale radiological or nuclear disaster. The response clearly demonstrated how the economic and social paralysis can be far more widespread than the physical damage, reinforcing the idea that it is often the fear that travels further and faster than the radiation itself.
Re: Deterrence
Thanks, I didn't imply that there is a conscious international conspiracy that is actively maintaining radiophobia. But when some journalists or commentators speak about N winters or irreparable damage for centuries, there is no active rebuttal from the scientific community or govt organisations, and media always loves fear mongering.
When Chernobyl happened, French govt simply said something like the radioactive clouds didn't cross into France and stopped at the German border and the people bought it, because nuclear power plants were a huge national initiative for decades. IIRC the govt discourse and public sentiment just across the border in Germany was quite the opposite.
The Ukraine war and constant N fear rhetoric by EU countries to demonise Putin and all things Russian has further muddled public understanding and has increased Radiophobia. Keeping the populations m(d)isinformed for (geo) political narratives is rife in this domain.
When Chernobyl happened, French govt simply said something like the radioactive clouds didn't cross into France and stopped at the German border and the people bought it, because nuclear power plants were a huge national initiative for decades. IIRC the govt discourse and public sentiment just across the border in Germany was quite the opposite.
The Ukraine war and constant N fear rhetoric by EU countries to demonise Putin and all things Russian has further muddled public understanding and has increased Radiophobia. Keeping the populations m(d)isinformed for (geo) political narratives is rife in this domain.
Re: Deterrence
Terrorism itself is based on the creation of fear. Nothing unique about radiophobia in that sense.
Terrorism ranks as one of the rarest causes of death.
https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism
Terrorism ranks as one of the rarest causes of death.
https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism
Re: Deterrence
We as Indians who have faced umpteen terrorist attacks should never mix the two saar or draw any kind of comparison.
Re: Deterrence
That is why don’t dismiss a dirty bomb lightly as “radiophobia”. Neither terrorism nor dirty bombs may pose an existential threat, but are nonetheless very horrific.
Re: Deterrence
You are misreading my post it seems to me.
Re: Deterrence
My apologies, if I have misread it. Anyway, these are headlines in the Jakarta Post - the main story requires a subscription.
Scrap metal import in spotlight after recent radioactive cases The presence of Cesium-137 in food products exported from Indonesia is believed to come from imported scrap metal recycled as raw material for steel processing industries. More than 450,000 tonnes of scrap metal have been imported to Indonesia this year, according to UN Comtrade data.
https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesi ... cases.html.
Scrap metal import in spotlight after recent radioactive cases The presence of Cesium-137 in food products exported from Indonesia is believed to come from imported scrap metal recycled as raw material for steel processing industries. More than 450,000 tonnes of scrap metal have been imported to Indonesia this year, according to UN Comtrade data.
https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesi ... cases.html.
Re: Deterrence
I am glad to see this great discussion. Please keep it coming. Having focused on this subject—and the science behind it—in an educational capacity for various audiences, including policy makers, I'd like to contribute a few thoughts..(separate posts)
----
-I recently posted an update on Re: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of Co-60 in Delhi Scrap Iron shop please read it.
- Here’s a summary of the Jakarta Post (and related news story) about the recent Caesium-137 contamination near Jakarta, plus how it compares with the Goiânia (Brazil) and Mayapuri (India) incidents.
What Happened in Indonesia (Modern Cikande, near Jakarta)
A contaminated batch of shrimp sent from PT Bahari Makmur Sejahtera in the Modern Cikande Industrial Estate (Serang, Banten) tested positive for Caesium-137.
Following that, sweeping radiation scans of the industrial estate found evidence of Cs-137 contamination in multiple facilities. The scrap metal plant PT PMT (Peter Metal Technology) is suspected to be the epicenter, importing scrap metal contaminated with Cs-137.
At least 10 contamination points (and in some reports 22 plants) have been identified in the estate.
Authorities have begun decontamination efforts. The government has declared this a “special radioactive contamination event” to accelerate cleanup.
There’s been a substantial impact on the shrimp industry: exports have dropped (30-35%) because of concern from foreign buyers.
Measures are being taken: restricting scrap metal imports, designating scrap metal factories as isolation or containment facilities, screening people, limiting movement around affected areas, and checking vehicles leaving contaminated sites.
As. I have done 15 years ago in the other dhaga, I compared with the most known incident in Brazil. Let us again comparison this with Goiânia (1987) and Mayapuri (2010)
Here’s how the Indonesia case aligns with or differs from the earlier incidents:
- Overview
Location / Year -- Isotope -- Source / Cause -- Impact Summary
Goiânia (Brazil, 1987) Cs-137 Abandoned teletherapy unit 4 deaths, ~249 exposed; widespread panic and contamination.
Mayapuri (India, 2010) Co-60 Disused university irradiator sold as scrap 1 death, 8 injured; localized exposure; regulatory reform in India.
Cikande (Indonesia, 2025) Cs-137 Imported contaminated scrap metal Industrial estate contamination; no deaths; export panic, economic loss.
-- Common Patterns
“Orphan sources” — poor tracking and disposal after institutional use.
Scrap trade as contamination vector — globalized, poorly screened.
Fear > Dose — panic and stigma outlast the radiation hazard.
Detection lag shrinking — Goiânia: weeks → Mayapuri: days → Cikande: hours via trade testing.
- Key Policy Lessons
Source Accountability
Cradle-to-grave tracking and licensing enforcement.
Financial/operational responsibility for decommissioning.
Scrap Metal Oversight
Portal radiation monitors at scrapyards, foundries, and ports.
Certification for imported scrap; joint regional tracking networks.
Public Communication
Clear, early updates prevent fear cascades.
Emphasize context: “detectable ≠ dangerous.”
Emergency Readiness
Train radiological response teams at local level.
Integrate with HAZMAT protocols, not just nuclear regulators.
- Broader Insight
The atom decays predictably; fear does not.
Each case shows how trust, detection, and communication determine impact far more than isotope half-life.
Each case reaffirms that radiological risk is as much social as physical.
The radioactive atoms decay predictably — but rumor, mistrust, and economic shock do not.
In a connected world where scrap and seafood cross borders faster than regulations can follow, the challenge is no longer only technical control but institutional vigilance and communication clarity.
…and as the counters click softly again, the lesson remains steady
Amber G
(three half-lives later, still slightly active )
----
Thanks.
-I recently posted an update on Re: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of Co-60 in Delhi Scrap Iron shop please read it.
- Here’s a summary of the Jakarta Post (and related news story) about the recent Caesium-137 contamination near Jakarta, plus how it compares with the Goiânia (Brazil) and Mayapuri (India) incidents.
What Happened in Indonesia (Modern Cikande, near Jakarta)
A contaminated batch of shrimp sent from PT Bahari Makmur Sejahtera in the Modern Cikande Industrial Estate (Serang, Banten) tested positive for Caesium-137.
Following that, sweeping radiation scans of the industrial estate found evidence of Cs-137 contamination in multiple facilities. The scrap metal plant PT PMT (Peter Metal Technology) is suspected to be the epicenter, importing scrap metal contaminated with Cs-137.
At least 10 contamination points (and in some reports 22 plants) have been identified in the estate.
Authorities have begun decontamination efforts. The government has declared this a “special radioactive contamination event” to accelerate cleanup.
There’s been a substantial impact on the shrimp industry: exports have dropped (30-35%) because of concern from foreign buyers.
Measures are being taken: restricting scrap metal imports, designating scrap metal factories as isolation or containment facilities, screening people, limiting movement around affected areas, and checking vehicles leaving contaminated sites.
As. I have done 15 years ago in the other dhaga, I compared with the most known incident in Brazil. Let us again comparison this with Goiânia (1987) and Mayapuri (2010)
Here’s how the Indonesia case aligns with or differs from the earlier incidents:
- Overview
Location / Year -- Isotope -- Source / Cause -- Impact Summary
Goiânia (Brazil, 1987) Cs-137 Abandoned teletherapy unit 4 deaths, ~249 exposed; widespread panic and contamination.
Mayapuri (India, 2010) Co-60 Disused university irradiator sold as scrap 1 death, 8 injured; localized exposure; regulatory reform in India.
Cikande (Indonesia, 2025) Cs-137 Imported contaminated scrap metal Industrial estate contamination; no deaths; export panic, economic loss.
-- Common Patterns
“Orphan sources” — poor tracking and disposal after institutional use.
Scrap trade as contamination vector — globalized, poorly screened.
Fear > Dose — panic and stigma outlast the radiation hazard.
Detection lag shrinking — Goiânia: weeks → Mayapuri: days → Cikande: hours via trade testing.
- Key Policy Lessons
Source Accountability
Cradle-to-grave tracking and licensing enforcement.
Financial/operational responsibility for decommissioning.
Scrap Metal Oversight
Portal radiation monitors at scrapyards, foundries, and ports.
Certification for imported scrap; joint regional tracking networks.
Public Communication
Clear, early updates prevent fear cascades.
Emphasize context: “detectable ≠ dangerous.”
Emergency Readiness
Train radiological response teams at local level.
Integrate with HAZMAT protocols, not just nuclear regulators.
- Broader Insight
The atom decays predictably; fear does not.
Each case shows how trust, detection, and communication determine impact far more than isotope half-life.
Each case reaffirms that radiological risk is as much social as physical.
The radioactive atoms decay predictably — but rumor, mistrust, and economic shock do not.
In a connected world where scrap and seafood cross borders faster than regulations can follow, the challenge is no longer only technical control but institutional vigilance and communication clarity.
…and as the counters click softly again, the lesson remains steady
Amber G
(three half-lives later, still slightly active )
Re: Deterrence
That’s a fair observation — yes, media narratives often emphasize the dramatic, and stories about radiation or nuclear events sell fear far more readily than they sell proportion.Cyrano wrote: ↑12 Oct 2025 14:40 Thanks, I didn't imply that there is a conscious international conspiracy that is actively maintaining radiophobia. But when some journalists or commentators speak about N winters or irreparable damage for centuries, there is no active rebuttal from the scientific community or govt organisations, and media always loves fear mongering.
<snip>
But the responsibility doesn’t rest with “the media” alone. It also lies with the broader public — and with us scientists — to understand the physics and distinguish between vastly different magnitudes of risk.
Because not everything with the word “nuclear” in it belongs in the same danger class.
Real vs. imagined scale
Nuclear weapons are indeed catastrophic — there is no minimizing that. The thermal and blast energy alone dwarf anything else humanity can unleash.
Fallout (radiation causing) from even a “small” regional nuclear exchange could inject tens of teragrams of soot into the stratosphere. The nuclear winter models — from the 1980s work by Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack, and Sagan, updated by Robock et al. (PNAS 2007, Science 2019) — remain scientifically robust: such soot could reduce global temperatures by 1–7 °C for years, collapse agriculture, and cause famine.
So yes, this is a real physical mechanism, not journalistic exaggeration.
But the same physics shows that “radiation” is not a single, monolithic threat.
Compare magnitudes: (
Hiroshima / Nagasaki (1945) ~200 000 total; - from blast/thermal but *thousands* from radiation exposure and subsequent illness — True nuclear devastation; not comparable to civilian radiation accidents.
Chernobyl (1986) ~30 acute radiation deaths; ~4 000 possible long-term cancer fatalities (UNSCEAR, WHO) — Severe reactor explosion, open-core fire, massive release of isotopes.
Fukushima Daiichi (2011) 0 direct radiation deaths, ~1 600 deaths from evacuation stress, disrupted healthcare, tsunami, and trauma (WHO, UNSCEAR 2020).
(Tsunami caused ~18 000 deaths Even though three reactor cores melted, containment worked; radiation exposures to the public averaged <10 mSv — below annual natural background in some areas... see BRF archive and my messages.. even after 14 years of studies - No of deaths (or illness, or cancer caused, directly related to radiation is ZERO (statistically not significant))
Mayapuri (2010) 1 death — Localized exposure from scrap cobalt; confined to a few meters radius.
So yes — radiation is dangerous, but context is everything.
The inverse-square law and containment matter. A sealed cobalt or cesium source in a scrapyard is not a reactor. And a reactor meltdown is not a nuclear explosion.
Radiophobia: the danger of disproportionate fear
Radiophobia — fear of radiation far beyond its actual risk — can itself cause measurable harm.
Fukushima is a case in point:
Over 100 000 people were evacuated unnecessarily from areas with exposure <20 mSv/year (roughly equal to a few CT scans).
Many elderly evacuees died from stress, isolation, or disruption of medical care.
Meanwhile, long-term epidemiological follow-up has found no statistically significant increase in cancers attributable to radiation (UNSCEAR 2020; IAEA 2021).
So the fear caused more harm than the radiation.
-- The takeaway
It’s true that journalists like to emphasize “irreparable for centuries,” and that’s often misleading. But it’s equally misleading to dismiss genuine large-scale nuclear or radiological risks as mere “media hype.”
In science, we quantify risk:
Weapons and reactor explosions: catastrophic scale, multi-sigma tail risk — real and existential.
Industrial radiological sources or fallout traces: manageable with proper regulation, education, and monitoring.
Public fear and poor communication: sometimes, ironically, the largest source of real human suffering.
So yes — media could do better, but so could public science literacy. The laws of physics have not changed; it’s our understanding and proportionality that often need calibration.
Amber G
…and the Geiger counter ticks — softly, predictably —
while rumor, as always, multiplies faster than decay.
Re: Deterrence
FWIW, Here is K S Pradeepkumar, (then head of emergency preparedness for India's main nuclear laboratory BARC in NDTV..media could do better, but so could public science literacy. The laws of physics have not changed; it’s our understanding and proportionality that often need calibration.
Consistent to my posts here..
.. good job by media..Excerpts from an Interview:
As I have done before, very good material for details references are:Q: These days there is a lot of fear of something called a 'dirty-bomb'. What is a dirty bomb?
A: Dirty means it is dirty, that is it will not really harm you but it makes you uncomfortable. See it is like getting dirt on your dress that does not mean you are going to die or that your health is in trouble but definitely, you have to go and change your dress.
Same way, a dirty bomb, which normally like any other explosive has some effect, but since it is integrated with radioactive material and after an explosion that radioactivity could spread out. Therefore, there is a chance of contamination on your body, even contamination on your dress, so definitely it calls for a decontamination of the people who are nearby. It also calls for a decontamination of the area.
Therefore, it is not in terms of a casualty or a serious injury we are worried about a dirty bomb, or what is called a radiological dispersal device. The concern is about the fear it may inject into the people because very large number of people will believe that they are all affected because they are all contaminated. It causes disruption.
Q: But what are the materials, which can be used to make a dirty bomb?
A: First of all a dirty bomb has never been used anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, it is mentioned that there were attempts made where people have tried to make one using radioactive Cesium-137 and explosives like RDX. It has never been used in India.
What is feared is that since the use of radioactive sources and radioisotopes is increasing in a very significant way world over. Moreover, in some places the security of sources is not fully ensured. Hence, there are cases of lost sources, misplaced sources etc.
Q: In India, do we have the capability to detect hidden dirty bombs?
A: BARC has developed many systems. We have developed many systems like aerial gamma spectrometry systems, which can be used for searching such types of sources. It can be detected easily by BARC's equipment, even if it is shielded or kept hidden inside some building.
Q: There are some stories going around which say that if an explosive device like a dirty bomb is exploded let's say, in the heart of Delhi then all of Connaught Place will be obliterated and radiation will spread up to the Parliament Building, and all around several kilometers would get affected. In your assessment in the worst-case scenario what would be the situation?
A: Let me explain, the word 'affected' has to be used very carefully. See, we have highly sensitive radiation monitors. With this, even extremely small quantity of radioactivity can be detected. See for example, let me take the Fukushima accident, people detected extremely small doses of radioactivity as far away as in Europe and USA, and people started predicting everybody will be affected and there will be cancer.
It was wrong, okay, so what I want to tell is the radioactivity in the environment was extremely small, nevertheless, the scientists could detect it. Same way, if there is an explosion of a dirty bomb, what you have called it; there can be presence of radioactivity slightly above the natural background, even in 3-4 kilometers because it can be transported by the wind. Nevertheless, if you ask me the question, even that radiation level will not be even one thousandth of the radiation level of what you are having in the high background dose area of Kerala where people are living for many-many generations.
So I will not like to use the word, people will be 'affected', but definitely nearby area may be around 30-50 meters from where a dirty bomb is exploded it can have high level of contamination, beyond that there can be a cigar shaped area where spread of contamination will take place. That also may be 80 meters or slightly more than that, but it all depends upon what is the source you are using. I can tell you, more than 1.5 kilometer one need not bother at all. Again, I am telling, it may be possible to detect even up to 3 kilometer etc but that is not a concern.
Q: So, in case of a dirty bomb, what I understand is that the possibility of people dying is because of the thermal part of the bomb, and not because of the radiation. Is that what you are suggesting?
A: Yes, I think I have to make it very specific, when you talk of a 'dirty bomb'; we are talking about an explosive mixed with a radioactive material. When we use the word radiological dispersal device, it is of two types. One is a dirty bomb, where there is an explosive involved.
Another is just a dispersal of the radioactive powder in the public domain. However, in any case, if we are talking about a dirty bomb, it will have the same effect like any other explosive, blast effect, thermal effect, etc and added to it there will be a radioactive fallout.
What I want to tell is, any death or serious injury to the people will be limited due to the blast and thermal effect because of the explosive power. Radioactive fallout and radiation exposure is not going to cause serious health effects.
Richard A. Muller, Physics for Future Presidents (and related public commentary) — accessible, skeptical appraisal of dirty-bomb risk and emphasis on practical priorities.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission — “Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs” (fact sheet explaining why RDDs usually pose limited direct radiation fatalities but large disruption).
Re: Deterrence
I totally agree with Amber G that collectively we have more fear than is necessary of dirty bombs, and other weapons of terrorism.
Information and education may alleviate the fears of some of the people. But the "stampede" instinct cannot be quelled. Why terrorism is effective is because of the unreasonable fears it gives rise to. Case in point, after 9/11, I heard on call-in radio shows, people from tiny towns in upstate New York calling in about their fear that al Qaeda was going to strike them. Or six years after 9/11, Congressman Rush Holt (also a physicist) telling the audience in his town hall that he gets so many calls from fearful people, willing to sign away civil rights for safety. These fears were exploited to get the US into ruinous wars.
So one remedy might be to put people in charge who are level-headed and knowledgeable. But as Amber G well knows, there is a war on expertise in the government (in the US at least) that has been going on for years, and that has reached a new peak now. I don't know about how things are in India, do people trust experts?
Most of the damage of a dirty bomb might come from the subsequent behavior of frightened people. If you can't persuade people that the measles vaccine is safe and such, how are you going to handle the aftermath of a dirty bomb? Take off the physics/technical hat for once, and put on the mass behavior of people hat. Unless you can saturate twitter and tiktok and such - make it go viral - with this message "What I want to tell is, any death or serious injury to the people will be limited due to the blast and thermal effect because of the explosive power. Radioactive fallout and radiation exposure is not going to cause serious health effects", you cannot contain the damage of a dirty bomb.
Information and education may alleviate the fears of some of the people. But the "stampede" instinct cannot be quelled. Why terrorism is effective is because of the unreasonable fears it gives rise to. Case in point, after 9/11, I heard on call-in radio shows, people from tiny towns in upstate New York calling in about their fear that al Qaeda was going to strike them. Or six years after 9/11, Congressman Rush Holt (also a physicist) telling the audience in his town hall that he gets so many calls from fearful people, willing to sign away civil rights for safety. These fears were exploited to get the US into ruinous wars.
So one remedy might be to put people in charge who are level-headed and knowledgeable. But as Amber G well knows, there is a war on expertise in the government (in the US at least) that has been going on for years, and that has reached a new peak now. I don't know about how things are in India, do people trust experts?
Most of the damage of a dirty bomb might come from the subsequent behavior of frightened people. If you can't persuade people that the measles vaccine is safe and such, how are you going to handle the aftermath of a dirty bomb? Take off the physics/technical hat for once, and put on the mass behavior of people hat. Unless you can saturate twitter and tiktok and such - make it go viral - with this message "What I want to tell is, any death or serious injury to the people will be limited due to the blast and thermal effect because of the explosive power. Radioactive fallout and radiation exposure is not going to cause serious health effects", you cannot contain the damage of a dirty bomb.
Re: Deterrence
We are only speaking about direct effects on humans. What about animals, livestock, trees and plants, soil microbes, runoff into rivers and lakes etc ? Just like heavy metals concentrate up the food chain, the radioactive elements and isotopes will also concentrate up, no? Have there been any studies in this regard from Chernobyl etc.? I remember reading about children born with malformations with pictures to support in some mag like Time or Scientific American (not sure where exactly) many years ago, and those images stuck in my head.