Managing Pakistan's failure

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RajeshA
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 27 Aug 2011 16:15

Acharya wrote:
RajeshA wrote:
Next: How to Liberate!

What about the Hindu Temples in Pakistan. We need to liberate them so that Sanathan Dharam is established in the birth place.

Acharya garu,

Be it Hindu Temples or Sikh Gurdwaras, they would be liberated only if the whole region of Pakjab, Seraikistan is liberated from Pakislamists, and in fact the population reconverted to Dharmic path!

IMHO it would be far easier to inculcate into Pakjabis Sikhism, rather than Sanatan Dharam. There is some doctrinal overlap which can be helpful there, making the transition easier. There is a certain level of awe for the Sikhs in Pakjab still.

Sikhs have a long history of how to deal with the Islamists. That is why I am proposing that the charge to liberate the region should be in the hands of the Sikhs.

Under the overall control and protection of the Sikhs, of course Hindus too would be able to spread into Pakjab - as businessmen, as service-providers, etc. and take over the custody of all the Hindu temples there.

But if one has to spread into Pakjab, there are two criteria for the group:
  1. They have to conquer the region under the banner of their religion
  2. They would have to be brutal.
  3. They would have to be very cohesive, have a simple cohesive message - a very pure ideological breed.

That is why I think, Hindus should not be a part of the invasion force - the Khalsa Army. Hindus would of course be making their contribution through donations to the invasion force, increasing the strength of this irregular army.

Secondly whenever the Indian Army would be called upon to take up the bigger Islamic groups who stand in the path of the Khalsa Army, in those operations, of course Hindus would be very much involved.

Acharya wrote:Somebody will start working on the floor plans of the temples and put it in the internet.

Estimates are that 10 million Hindus will make pilgrimages to these Hindu Temples in the Indus valley initially and this number will grow to 100 million every year.

Pilgrimage visits will include the Sikh Temples and the restored Buddhist sites of the Lord Buddha.

These pilgrimages can only take place at that scale, when the region has been freed of Pakislamists. If these take place before that, then that would be considered a favor to Indians by the Pakistanis and no favor from them would be without cost, so it would basically be blackmail.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 28 Aug 2011 23:04

Reclaiming Pakistan Territory: Mohajirstan

Mohajirs, the Key to Indian Consolidation

We all are apprehensive that sooner or later, there will be blood spilled on the Indo-Pak border. We all "fear" that sooner or later Pakistan could go the Talibanic way, and Talibanism would come up to the Indian border. We all know that the shrinking of the world has made the Ummah very sensitive to any conflict between non-Muslims and Muslims in the world, especially where the non-Muslims are strong enough to give a jaw-breaking response to the Muslims.

All these developments are not apocalyptic and India can handle that. But what we will have a very hard time dealing with is when our conflict with Pakistan or with a Talibanized version of Pakistan starts having an effect on the Indian Muslims. We will have a hard time putting down any Muslim insurgencies that could crop up originating from the few pockets of Pakistan-pasand Indian Muslims. These could spread.

With a very highly Talibanized Pakistani society, there is also bound to be an effect on the Indian Muslim population. One could start seeing a gradual radicalization of Indian Muslims itself.

So whether it is due to our conflict with Pakistan, or due to radicalization of our Indian Muslim population itself, the development is undesirable. But how to avoid it?

Let's consider the model of a sandwich. We need to sandwich the Indian Muslim population between two ideologies, which are not harmful to the Indian nation. One extremity, one bread slice is the Hindu majority. What we don't have is the other slice! Without the other slice, the possibility is that the Indian Muslims would fall off our bread slice, as we may not be able to balance them.

If the above mentioned scenarios come to pass, the other slice would be offered by either a very anti-Indian TSPA ideology, or a very pro-Jihadist Talibanic ideology, and the Indian Muslim's worldview would range between almost Hindu to rabidly anti-Indian Talibanized Indian Muslims. We can't have that.

What we need is an anti-Pakistani and secular Muslim viewpoint, with which Indian Muslims can identify with and accept as their other extremity, as the other slice. Mohajirs offer that second slice. Many Mohajirs who went to Pakistan were actually the educated cream of the Indian Gangetic Valley Muslims. So there is still both an historical identification between the Indian Muslims and the Mohajirs as well as respect.

Since the Mohajirs have tried to consolidate their community around their ethnic identity, they have in parallel tried to downplay their Islamic identity, because the latter has become more a signature of either a consolidation of the country around Islam itself, where the consolidation strengthens mostly the Pakjabis and their hold over the country; or it is a signature for those who will a full-scale takeover of Pakistan under the banner of an Islamic Theocracy, but most Mohajirs, who have a higher level of education in Pakistan are anathema to the idea, as people who formed the bureaucratic backbone of Pakistan, and thank their level of education for their prosperity and power, the Talibanization would mostly benefit those who are nearer to the West Asian ethnicity, as they can claim more piety.

After 64 years of experiencing Pakistan, Mohajirs are slowly becoming disillusioned. They wanted a competition with India on economy and military power. They wanted Pakistan to be the paradise for Subcontinental Muslims. They wanted to feel superior to the Hindus they left behind in India. They wanted that their act of leaving for Pakistan to be vindicated. None of that happened and in fact Pakistan has become a hell on earth.

They have seen how all sorts of Pakistanis - Pakjabis, Sindhis, Pushtun have put the Mohajirs under siege. They are afraid of losing their power in Karachi and Hyderabad. All this has made many Mohajirs rethink their decision to migrate to Pakistan. This has been all the more clear as they have seen that Indian Muslims have been treated fairly and with respect.

Now the Mohajirs have to be pushed still further on this train of thought and be made to wish a return to their "Motherland", of course with Karachi, and the surrounding region (Southern Sindh) in tow. Indians have to keep telling them that India is where they belong, so that they rise seriously against the Pakistani state and demand separation. One needs to show them an alternate destiny than Pakistan. If they believe in it, it is possible they will take the plunge and turn anti-Pakistan.

Mohajirs turning against Pakistan is the ultimate death of Two-Nation-Theory, for it would mean, that those who promulgated this theory, were also the ones to destroy it. It would indicate to all Pakistanis, that their country has no legitimacy to exist, no rationale for its creation. This too would serve as a snowball effect in the ethnic dynamic of Pakistan. More importantly, it would destroy the notion, which may still exist in some form or another, in strong or weak form, among Indian Muslims that they and Hindus are two different communities. It would tell the Indian Muslims in very clear terms that they belong to India, and that their connection to the Ummah is a mirage. The Mohajirs would have tried out the experiment for 70 years or so, and would be well-qualified to say, that the Ummah concept is simply stupid.

If Mohajirstan can be liberated from Pakistan, perhaps through an active intervention of India, or even US, one never knows, then we would be able to offer Indian Muslims the other slice, between which their ideological anchor can be fixed, two ideological slices between which they can be captured - a Hindu slice and a Modern Pro-Indian Moderate Muslim slice (Mohajirs). Since Mohajirs would have to be both anti-Pakistan and anti-Taliban, one can assume, that Indian Muslims too would have to follow this political and ideological line.

If after that India has to kick butt in the West or even in the East, at least we can be assured that Indian Muslims would stand for Indian interests. Indian Consolidation is necessary to weather the storms that await our nation.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Aug 2011 13:59

Reclaiming Pakistan Territory: Mohajirstan

Mohajirs favoring Destruction of Pakistan

Originally posted by Lilo

Press Conference on Aug 28, 2011
By Zulfiqar Mirza


@3:15 Zulfiqar Mirza says about what Altaf Hussain, MQM chief told him:
Altaf Hussain according to Zulfiqar Hussain wrote:jo mai baap hai, America, America ne yeh faisla kar liya hai, ki Pakistan todna hai. Main yahan baitha hoon. Main well-connected hoon. Itne saal se mere marasse men Europe men bhi, iss poore America men. Mujhe unhone bataaye ki humne faisla kar liya hai, ki Pakistan todna hai. Main aur meri Party iss faisle men unke saath shaamil hain. Is liye main to band nahin karoonga, main to Pathanon ko maaroonga.


Pir Mazhar, according to Zulfiqar Mirza was also in the meeting with Altaf Hussain.

Zulfiqar Mirza as per Wikipedia
Zulfiqar Mirza is a Pakistani politician affiliated with Pakistan Peoples Party. Zulfiqar Mirza hails from a Sindhi-speaking Shia political family in Sindh, the Qazis of Sindh. The Qazis of Hyderabad themselves are Sunni but have intermarraiges with the Sindhi Mirza Shia tribe.

Zulfiqar Mirza is currently member of Provincial Assembly of Sindh and was Home Minister of Sindh till June 2011. Later he was assigned the portfolio of Jails and prisons. Now he holds the portfolio of Senior Minister for Works, Services and Forest in Sindh Cabinet.

He is also the member of the board of directors of Mirza Sugar Mills located in District Badin, Sindh.


Published on Aug 29, 2011
Mirza’s statement beyond comprehension: US embassy: The News
ISLAMABAD: The US Embassy in Pakistan has said that the statement of senior minister of Sindh Zulfiqar Mirza about Altaf Hussain conspiring with the US to break up Pakistan is beyond comprehension. The embassy, while abstaining from issuing any comment or giving a reaction to Zulfiqar Mirza’s allegation regarding the disintegration of Pakistan by the US, said that his charge was beyond understanding and a reply would be given after detailed consideration.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 04 Sep 2011 12:44

Solving Pakistan: Solution 12

Instruments of Secession

Continuing from here.

Originally posted by menon s in TIRP Thread

Published on Aug 26, 2011
By Senge Sering
Could Occupied Hunza be the Next Bangladesh?: ExpertClick
Thousands of people have flocked to the streets in Pakistan controlled Hunza condemning state led terrorism and extra judicial killings.

Enforced disappearances continue in occupied Gilgit-Baltistan as on August 26, 2011, security forces arrested another eighteen political activists from Hunza at midnight and took them to unknown locations. The total number of local youth arrested has reached to forty including three journalists. Secret service agents also ransacked and damaged the offices of Karakoram Publishing Network and Daily K-2 newspaper.

According to Daily Baang-e-Sehar, one of the leading local newspapers of Gilgit-Baltistan, the detainees are being physically tortured as many of them continue to observe fasting to honor the Holy month of Ramadan. Security forces have established barricades and check posts at every few miles along the Karakoram Highway to intercept the vehicles carrying the local political activists and journalists who are escaping Gilgit-Baltistan to incognito.

Among the arrested is Sultan Madad who was trying to ride a bus to Islamabad. Among other detainees are Tahir Jan, Karim, Fida Ali, Mir Alam, Irfan Kareem, Mashghool Alam, Imran, Mir Aman, Gul Nawaz, Amir Khan, Ghulam Tahir, Nizam Khan and Afsar Jan.

The detainees have been charged for terrorism and sedition but their real crime is demanding food, shelter, medicines and schools for the flood victims who have been languishing in makeshift camps in Hunza since January of 2010.

Local activists are now demanding restoration of the former princely state of Hunza and regaining control over their land and resources. The situation is a reflection on lack of will and the capacity of Pakistani rulers and for failing to provide good governance. Hunza is a strategic region since it borders both Afghanistan and China and provides the land link for the Chinese to the Persian Gulf and Indian Oceanic Region.


Originally posted by chaanakya in "Pakistani Minorities - Should India Feel Responsible?" Thread

Published on Aug 29, 2011
By Senge Sering
When the Ruler of Hunza Regretted Joining Pakistan: ExpertClick
The former princely ruler of Hunza, Mir Ghazanfar Ali, has expressed regret over state-led terrorism and injustices in Pakistan controlled Hunza and announced a long march towards Gilgit city if the four dozen or so arrested IDPs were not immediately released. He said, ""We oppose the decision to establish seven security check posts between Karimabad and Aliabad. Hunza is the most peaceful area of Pakistan and these check posts are going to make it look like a war-zone".

On August 29, 2011 security forces arrested four more innocent residents from Hunza in connection with IDP protests. Sad enough that the security personnel, who are responsible for the extra judicial deaths of two innocent IDPs, still remain at large and enjoy freedom under government protection. Among the arrested is a 17 year old orphaned minor from Gulmit who was later released when his older brother presented himself to the police as his replacement.

Meanwhile, the president of the Hunza chapter of Pakistan Peoples' Party (the ruling party in Gilgit-Baltistan) has resigned protesting unwarranted detentions. He has accused the security personnel of barging into the houses in the Holy month of Ramadhan and violating religious sanctity as women have been harassed and manhandled.

The arrests of innocent IDPs are being made under sedition and anti-terror acts. The IDPs continue to agitate for immediate relief and rehabilitation. Majority of them became homeless after a massive landslide displaced thousands of residents of Hunza in January of 2009.


Image H.H. Mir of Hunza
Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 05 Sep 2011 10:21

X-Posting from TIRP Thread

SSridhar wrote:This debate on who was a bigger threat, whether it is China or Pakistan, has gon e on for many years. At different times, it has been either one or the other. In the last few years, PRC has once again been spoken of as a bigger threat. This threat perception has been waxing and waning like a moon.

We should make a difference between the two, IMHO. Pakistan is no match for us and the distance is increasing every day, as we all know. It was not like the 50s and 60s when Pakistan was inducting superior weapons and we were not. Besides, Pakistan has been on a free fall since its creation, though it has miraculously been able to survive even after loss of half its territory. But, it is internally much weakened than ever before with no big possibility of overcoming the weakness. So, Pakistan needs sustenance from somebody else. It was the US during Cold War days and it is becoming partly US and largely China today. It appears that the US will almost completely withdraw from Pakistan after some years. PRC will then become its sole benefactor. So, Pakistan cannot be a threat to us in the same way that suddenly China has become. We should have anticipated the Chinese threat since its rise in the 80s. China's political, economic and military clout places its threat in an entirely new class. It is too secretive in its plans and that makes it all the more difficult to decipher its actions and words. About Pakistan we know what it wants to do with us and how it wants to go about it.

Having said that, the situation today has become far more complex. Pakistan is totally abdicating itself to PRC. Just after 26/11, Pakistani FM Qureshi said that PRC can negotiate with India on its behalf ! Gilani goading Karzai to adopt Renminbi instead of USD, Zardari's dozen visits to PRC in the last couple of years thereby making his Presidency look like that of another provincial governor in PRC, the occupation of GB and the rest of POK by PLA, the extensive road & rail network PRC is planning within Pakistan etc. prove the abdication. Pakistan has concluded that only through PRC can it achieve its desire of destroying India. Pakistan is willing to be servile therefore to PRC.

Therefore, we may not confront Pakistan alone in the future because slowly Pakistan is becoming an extension of PRC. We have to plan for a combined operation and that is where the rub is. Like the Taliban being coached, trained and launched by the PA, Pakistan itself has come under the control of PRC.

I think that this is where an opportunity exists for India. The AQAM wants to grasp Pakistan because as a Muslim and a nuclear-weapon country, it is the perfect launch-pad for their global Caliphate ambitions. Large sections of the military at lower ranks and mid-level officers do support such an outcome. The society is getting more radicalized in their favour. The Ahl-e-Sunnat are being converted large scale into Wahhabi/Deobandi mode of thinking. So, the AQAM see a real prospect here. OTOH, there is the other type within Pakistani Establishment who are content with defeating India (but willing to use any tool such as Islamism, jihad, PRC etc). The latter type is increasingly moving towards PRC because the jihadi groups which they created have now turned against them. They feel naked and need PRC's support for their burning revenge against India. The former may not like that and we must therefore sharpen that difference to our advantage.

I therefore think that our planning should be to consider PRC-TSP as just one entity rather than splitting hair on which is a bigger threat because TSP is now subsumed by PRC.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 05 Sep 2011 11:34

Continuing from Managing Chinese Threat Thread
Samudragupta wrote:Not going into details about the internal divisions with the TSP the most probable scenario that is arising out of the actions of TSP is that it is trying to lure the IA into POK by alligning and changing dynamics of the POK...they know very well that we will react to the moves...already raising of strike corps in the East has eaten out the Rapidisation of the Western Front ...In as much they want to shift the thrust of the IA to the POK from the Sindh-Baluchistan axis....It needs to be seen wheather we will fall into the trap....

First we need to get the Thatta District, join up with Mohajirstan, and on to Baluchistan. PoK should come only after that.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 06 Sep 2011 02:46

The hold of the fauj has to be reduced. TSP is generally ready to forget the reason for Partition. Its the fauj with its mullahs that stokes the flames. And they do this with US-UK support via PRC.

Been to a three day gathering of US based TSP origin wedding.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Sep 2011 10:46

X-Posted from TIRP Thread

parsuram wrote:Shiv Ji:

Good to see you raising the same points, pointing to the same realities concerning the paki state - so called. Well, after all these years, I have the same raggid & beaten to death answer to all of paki's pakiness. Yes they delude over their green flag on Red Fort ramparts, yes they intend to die trying, yes, they consider it their religious duty to do all that they are doing and intend to do. So. War is no answer. what did Kargil do to dissuade the paki. no thing. not one thing.

What India needs is a massive level of covert ops within and among the pakis. from the mosques to the farms, villages, towns and cities. Covert operatives dedicated to kill pakiness in their respective little zones of the pakis. Send them thru afghanistan, iran, off shore, wherever except across the India-paki border. Operatives should join in every time sectarian terror strikes the pakis. prolong every incident. Cause new ones if a lull threatens. But escalate tearing apart the fabric of this miserable collection of sewer scum suckers called the paki state. Attack their miserable infrastructure. bridges, trains, dams power stations and on and on and on. just a constant effort without let up. Send in more operatives, rotate others out after an active tour, but keep up the pressure until the entire paki enterprise self destructs, while retaining full deniability. Call me an optimist, but I do believe the entire show will be over in 5-6 years of full press assault from within. There is not a great lot holding the place together in the first place. And for God's sake, stop encouraging their literati and pseudo intellectuals, chai-biskut types. they need to feel the pain of pakiness at home, not export it abroad for profit.

Well, there. I said it again. But I'm not holding any breath.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Sep 2011 15:06

X-Posting from TIRP Thread


Rudradev wrote:Shiv,

I have a guess as to what we all may have missed. Actually the fragments of the answer are all there in various threads of this forum; the problem is our insistence on opening a new thread for every seemingly tangential discussion, rather than attempting to connect the dots. Data are collected, good analysis is performed on each of the fragments in isolation... but threads being what they are, everything of value is soon tangled up in an impervious undergrowth of whines.

Briefly: the state of Pakistan, or at least those groups with the capacity to exercise any sort of central authority there, have lost confidence in their ability to preserve the identity and viability of Pakistan. Allah, Army and America were the pillars of the state, the guarantors of its survival through the previous century. Today Allah and Army are fighting each other in a purer-on-pure conflict, and America is repeatedly sticking bamboos in the upturned GUBO orifice of the Pakistani state. The present and potential ruling elite, the empowered classes, are in a state of panic, reaching out desperately to all sorts of potential benefactors to guarantee the continuance of their empowered status. These include:

A) Maha-Islampasand Pakis, including many within ISI and TSPA, who are still holding out in the hope that a pan-Ummah caliphate ("Khozestan?") can be established and subsume present-day Pakistan. However, this group is grappling with twin calamities that have publicly exposed and undermined the fantastic and unsustainable nature of their goals; firstly, the exhaustion of fighting a ten-year war against drones, airstrikes, ANA artillery and US special forces in the Northwest, and secondly, the crisis of credibility that has resulted from the decapitation strike against Bin Laden. Additionally, the increasing transformation of the Taliban into a Pashtun nationalist movement has undercut the legitimacy of the Maha-Islampasand Pakis' argument that being Purest of All is the solution to saving Pakistan.

B ) Chinipakis: the remaining portion of TSPA and ISI, plus many elements of the RAPE "political" class (such as Zardari) who are relying on the Chinese to save the day. They are the ones doing their damndest to mortgage the whole Pakistani state as the newest province of China. These, from the Indian point of view, may be the most dangerous... for reasons I will go into later. They are playing for a coup... a two-front war prosecuted by China and Pakistan against India, that will at once humiliate India, make America less relevant, and seize Kashmir in a move that will confer political legitimacy on the leadership claims of the Chinipaki group.

C) A very small number of Paki elite and TSPA who are still pro-America, and cling to the hope that America will not leave the used condom shredded in the garbage when it pulls out.

D) An even smaller number of Paki elite who are, not pro-India, but at some level hope that India can sort things out and save Pakistan's skin (since the alternatives are all worse.) These are your Chaighar type Paki liberals, who still hate India and Hindus, who still justify the creation of Pakistan, but all said and done feel more affinity for India than for China, Ummah or America.

E) A substantial number of Pakis who do NOT belong to the traditional echelons of power, i.e.TSPA/ISI Top-Brass or RAPE; and who still hold out the hope that Pakistan as they once knew it can survive all this. Of all the categories this is the ONLY social class which actually has a vested interest in the survival and success of Pakistan as an *independent* nation state when all is said and done. They consist of a petit-bourgeoise (not-exactly-middle) class, ranging from shopkeepers to professionals and bureaucrats to smaller landowners who are not quite big enough to be RAPE or "political class" in the Zardari/Sharif mould.

What India is trying to accomplish is not "strategy", at least not a Pakistan strategy that is viable in the long term. What India is trying to do is to make the best of a bad situation and strengthen Section D by drawing Pakis of Section E to it. We are playing to gain time, and avoid a two-front war with Pakistan+China; not to destroy Pakistan or redeem Pakistan or reclaim POK or any of those grand designs talked about on BRF. We are playing for time. That is all.

Section A is hopeless, and gives us entertainment value (IED mubaraks, Dronacharya strikes) at best while conducting terrorist attacks against Indian targets at worst.

Section B is very, very dangerous and their plans must be thwarted at ALL costs.

Section C is small enough to ignore entirely as a power bloc, but they may serve some limited purpose in advancing those few aspects of the Indian and American agendas that overlap.

However, there is still some hope for Section E (along with Section D) to create the sort of temporary respite that might postpone the inevitable collapse of Pakistan for a few decades, while neither engendering an overwhelmingly dangerous situation on our borders nor swamping us with a massive humanitarian disaster just as we are beginning to make economic progress.

Section E, it must be noted, does have considerable presence in the TSPA... the sons of petit-bourgeoise Pakistanis who joined the armed forces, and who have lost confidence in the RAPE-origin jernails to run the country after seeing the disaster perpetrated over the last ten years. Some of these Section E Pakis may even be as high up as Brigadier and Major General. These guys, as well as the Section C (pro-US) TSPA brass, are the intended audience of our dovishness that everyone from MMS to B Raman to Bharat Karnad have been prescribing ("non-threatening posture" et al.) Or at least, that's my guess.

India is hoping that these Section E TSPA officers will become a pro-Indian (or at least, "not-anti-Indian") constituency, and forestall the designs of either Section A Maha-Islampasand elements of TSPA, or Section B Chini-pasand elements of TSPA.

Make no mistake, the Section D/E Pakis do not love India, they do not necessarily favour forgive-and-forget with India, they do not necessarily see the Indian position on Kashmir as justified; but they DO see that India/Kashmir is far from the greatest problem that Pakistan faces right now, and they will take India's help in strengthening their position to ward off those other, bigger problems. For now. Or so India hopes.

So. Why do I say Section B are the MOST dangerous Pakis?

Because it may be that China really wants a war. Against India, with Pakistan as its ally.

China has been acting for the last several years, more aggressively than ever towards all its neighbours. Not ONE conciliatory move is made, but panga is taken with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines AND India at every opportunity. Why?

Because China needs a war. Or at least, one very powerful faction in the Chinese govt, including the PLA, is convinced that China needs a war.

Why does this faction think China needs a war?

It's like this. Throughout the '90s, the Chinese accumulated what they thought was going to be their greatest source and permanent guarantee of wealth; forex reserves of Western currencies, and more importantly, debt owed by Western governments. Mainly the US government.

That component... debt holdings, in the form of US treasury bonds and such, grew enormously through the '00s, as the US borrowed money to finance its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Chinese export markets in the US also grew enormously in the '00s... until things reached a point where Chinese industries relied on US consumer markets to absorb a very large portion of their output.

When the '08 financial crisis hit the Western world, especially the US, China's b@lls went into their mouth. It was a double-threat for China. On the one hand, all the US debt they held could become devalued in case of a depression. On the other hand, if US consumers stopped buying things, Chinese industries (which relied on US markets to absorb their output) would suffer. The resulting impact felt at home, by the Chinese economy, could have devastating consequences for a totalitarian regime.

So what option does a country have when so much of its wealth is in the form of debt? It must monetize the debt. It must turn the debt into something real, as soon as possible, before that wealth (in the form of treasury bonds) becomes more and more devalued as a result of its debtor's financial troubles.

How can China monetize the debt it holds? Here are some ways.

1) It can demand that the US pay up. But the US doesn't have money. If the US prints money, then China's own holdings become further devalued (as it happened with QE2, which further aggravated the situation.) Same for other Western countries, such as EU nations, which are also reeling financially.

2) It can print money and inject it into its own economy to increase domestic consumption. But this will inevitably lead to inflation, and cause civil unrest. Very bad idea, beyond narrow limits. Keeping tight control over money supply is much healthier from a totalitarian regime's point of view.

3) It can invest money into tinpot countries and gain goodwill. To some extent China has been doing this. But sooner or later, some returns have to be there no? So far, what returns have been generated by China's magnanimous projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe etc.?

4) It can start a war. It can arm up, invest wholesale in defense R&D, in procurement of foreign weapons systems and manufacture of its own weapons systems. And it can use these weapons systems in the pursuit of other kinds of power... geostrategic power. An additional benefit to this method of monetizing its debt is that it does not lead to civil unrest (at least as long as China can claim victory) but rather, to an upsurge in jingoistic nationalism that strengthens the position of an authoritarian government.

There you have it. Starting a war is likely considered a good option, given the prevailing economic situation, by a powerful faction within the ruling establishment of China. The US and West do not care if China starts a war with India; it will damage two of their biggest competitors. And Pakistanis of Section B, above, very much want this to happen and want to participate on the Chinese side.

The ONLY thing that would make the Chinese hesitate in starting a war with India would be India's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. And what has Bharat Karnad told us, between the lines, about that?

In summary, I am guessing that the GOI has understood all this. It understands that the danger of a two-front aggression by China and Pakistan is not just real but imminent. It has calculated that we cannot win, and that we cannot count on external help to win. It may have calculated (ref: Karnad) that we do not even have a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent this from happening.

So in a sense, just as we are the only hope for Pakis of Sections D and E... Pakis of Sections D and E are our only hope to avert disaster. That's why we're seeing the policies we're seeing, IMHO.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Sep 2011 15:07

X-Posting from TIRP Thread

Rudradev ji,

My respect for you and your analysis is well justified!

I think, there is a little proxy war going on in Pakistan - between Saudi Arabia and Iran. TSPA is turning more and more radical Wahhabandi. So how do the Shi'as in Pakistan react, or for that matter even Sindhis who are somewhat Sufisticated. They need to retain some hold over TSPA!

So the question becomes how the 'Sufi' Sindhis and the Shi'a can exert their influence over the TSPA. What can they offer to TSPA? Before I come to that, a diversion.

Iran and China's Interests Converge
And here come the geopolitics of the region! There are two countries that absolutely want to keep American out of Central Asia - the Chinese and the Iranians. However Pakistan is allowing America a route into Afghanistan. So Pakistan needs to brought abroad. There is the Northern Distribution Route as well, but I will get to that later.

American fight is however with the Al Qaeda, with Taliban, who are hard-line Sunnis. Basically the Shi'a and the Sufis would not really mind if the Taliban get a thrashing, however the pretext of Global War on Terror allows America to sit tight in Afghanistan, thereby posing a threat to both the underbelly of China in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and to Iranian Baluchistan. East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) lives in the region, and then there is the threat of Jundallah in Iranian Southeast. So both Iran and China have reason to be suspicious.

Secondly it is the question of minerals of Central Asia. Why shouldn't China go for an iron grip over the minerals of Central Asia? China would love to block out India and USA from the region. Russia is just another big bear on which the lizard can sit and suck more minerals out, so Russia doesn't really bother the Chinese. Iran too had once a big influence over this region and this region formed part of its empire. So Iran as a power with potential is hoping to cash in on the mineral wealth of the region. Iran may not have the industry, but it would want control in order to sell those minerals as well. Just see the Iranians also bidding for mining iron ore in Afghanistan.

Thirdly China wants to develop its West as much as it can and get more Hans to migrate to the Wild West. That can be possible only if industry comes up in the region, with raw materials coming from Central Asia, and trade routes becoming possible through Karakoram. There too only Pakistan can help. But to develop the region, China would want to blunt the increasing threat from Wahhabization of Uyghurs, who form the support base for ETIM. Now it is really difficult to get Muslims to leave Islam. So here too China would be hoping that the Mullahs from Iran can proselytize the Uyghurs a bit and turn them into Shi'ites. We see how the Chinese played hosts to Zardari, a Shi'a, in Urumqi the other day, who celebrated Eid al-Fitr there with Uyghurs.

Fourthly, we see Chinese troops walking in into Gilgit, etc. These are Shia regions, and Chinese need some Iranian support to keep the locals under control as well.

Signs of Convergence
So Iranians and Chinese are on one page.

a) There is a pipeline between Turkmenistan and China pumping Gas. When Iran's South Pars Gas Fields come online, Iran too would be sending Gas all the way to China through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Along this pipeline there is quite a bit of cooperation between Iran and China, and it will only get better.

b) There is going to be some cooperation between Iran, Pakistan and China in Kashmir as well. One should again consider how Press TV of Iran has been active in inciting violence in Kashmir. It was Press TV's reportage that got the Valley burning again the last time, of course with full cooperation of Pakistan. There were also strong remarks from Ali Khamenei in favor of Kashmiri 'Azadi'.

c) During Anatolian Eagle Air Exercises between Turkey and China, Iran allowed the use of its airspace. This is a big deal and shows Iranian comfort in dealing with China. The Chinese jets flew to Iran probably over Pakistani air space.

Zardari Driving Iran-Pakistan-China Strategy
a) One only needs to look at the travel plans of Zardari to know which way the wind is blowing. In July, Zardari visited Iran twice within a month. How many times has Zardari been hopping off to China? After the Obama kill, he has visited China at least twice.

Zardari, who is a Shia, is more than willing to play the middleman, the man who brings Iran and China together, the man who provides Pakistani Army with the Chinese military umbrella.

b) We saw how Gilani went to Kabul and told Karzai that he should dump the Americans and join the Chinese, and start using RMB instead of Dollars for trading.

c) We read how PPP has made Chinese language compulsory in Sindh schools from Class VI onward.

d) We just saw how a Chinese company was given a contract to build a railway station just across Baimer District in Rajasthan, that means the Railway Station is going to come up in Sindh. I presume, that PPP Govt. in Sindh is actively pursuing this.

e) We saw how Zulfiqar Mirza, a PPP man, started accusing America of trying to break up Pakistan in conjunction with his local bete noire the MQM.

Of course the Chinese always counsel their best friends to be on very good talking terms with their enemies, be it Americans or Indians. This way their conquest is made easier. One would see Mahinda Rajapakse being friendly with Indians; Prachanda being asked by the Chinese to improve ties with Indians, after he visited Beijing as his first official visit; Zardari sending their ow so pretty Hina Rabba ni Kar to India, etc. etc. This is the traditional way of the Chinese to lull the opponents to sleep. Who knows when Begum Zia Khaleda comes to power, she too would get chummy with India.

Iranians too are more than willing to rope in Pakistan. They know they probably would never get much money from Pakistan for the gas they provide to it. Pakistan can't even pay its own energy bills. But the Iranians are more than willing to finance and build a Gas pipeline to Pakistan.

Iranians do not really gel well with TSPA, which has become more and more Wahhabi. So Iranians need Zardari, a Shi'a, as a go between.

Other Happenings
We also know that India's relations with Iran have dramatically cooled down, even as our relations with Saudi Arabia have improved. It is just USA putting pressure or does Delhi also see a pattern emerging of a Iran-Pakistan-China axis. If one may remember, the Iranians have since long not been asking Delhi about joining in the IPI Gas Pipeline.

When the Delaram-Zaranj Highway was taken over by the Taliban, India did not really make a big fuss about it, possibly because India knew that the equations in the region had changed, and India would not be using the highway anyway in any big strategic fashion.

Yes, that thing about the Northern Distribution Network. Well Chinese have Azerbaijanis in their pocket, and they can probably put the whole region aflame whenever they want, and most probably Ali Khamenei is using his Azerbaijani connections to make sure that Azerbaijan comes out of American grip.

Summary
On the one hand we see how Wahhabandis are pushing Pakistan into a war with India. Their propaganda is anti-India and they lead the charge in Pakistan against India.

On the other hand we are seeing their rivals, the PPP, using this dynamic of anti-Indianism in the Pakistani Army to build their axis with Iran and China by feeding TSPA what it needs - Kashmir and Military Strength. Basically Sindh has gotten on the Pakistani Horse in a big way.

With all this as backdrop, Indians are being forced to develop some policy towards Pakistan. It is just that Chinese, Iranians, TSPA, 'Moderate' Pakistanis, are all out to screw India. If Delhi increases tensions with TSPA, the Iranian-Pakistani-Chinese Axis profits from that. Delhi may know what is happening, but India which plays defensive strategy finds itself without any meaningful cards in hand. To create options, one has to leave house.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 13 Sep 2011 09:05


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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 14 Sep 2011 19:11

X-Post.. Original by SSridhar:

Mohajir politics in post-Bhutto period
A fine summary. Do read.
The Muhajirs played an important role in the 1977 movement against Bhutto’s government and were happy when he was removed in a military coup by General Ziaul Haq.

The formation of the Sindh government and the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP’s) government in the Centre finally opened doors for the Sindhi-speaking middle class. They started getting more jobs in the government and public sector, particularly with head offices in Karachi. The Muhajir bureaucracy and leaders were not willing to accept that their share in jobs and economic opportunities in future would be in proportion to their demographic position, which was more or less the position by 1989 in the federal government.

Once again the Muhajirs were faced with the same position that they thought they had left behind in the Muslim minority areas of India and for which they had supported the Muslim League’s politics under the British. Remember Sir Syed had asked for a 50 percent quota in jobs for the Muslims although they formed 13 percent of the UP population.


That was the main reason that Muslims of the Muslim minority provinces played a leading role in the Muslim League’s movement, although eventually it evolved into the demand for Pakistan comprising Muslim majority provinces. This movement, as convincingly explained by Hamza Alavi, was driven by the “Salariat...that class of people who receive a formal education to qualify for jobs in the colonial state apparatus” and professionals. In UP, according to Alavi, the Muslims constituted 13 percent of the population in 1857 but held 64 percent of the jobs. However, after the British takeover by 1913, their “share of jobs fell to 35 percent”.

Once the demand for Pakistan was accepted, a large number of migrants had actually come to Pakistan scouting for better opportunities. After settling down, they invited their kith and kin. They were again not willing to accept the shrinking share of jobs and other economic opportunities after the restoration of Sindh as a province. They got the major share of the evacuee properties in Sindh.

However, there was reverse discrimination against the Muhajirs as power started shifting into the hands of Sindhis. In the good old times when the Punjabis and Muhajirs had the second largest share in the establishment, the discrimination was against the Sindhis. However, there are still more Muhajirs in government jobs if the public sector is included, as against a 7.5 percent share in the population.

Bushra Zaidi’s killing in a bus accident in 1985 unleashed violence against the Pakhtuns, who controlled Karachi’s transport sector thanks to Ayub-era favouritism. There was pent-up anger against the transporters because of the rough behaviour of the drivers and frequent accidents due to rash driving of the buses and mini-buses. Inadequate public transport was and is also irritating for the Karachiites. The Muhajirs, who form a bulk of the commuters, started burning buses; the Pakhtuns attacked some Muhajir settlements in retaliation. And soon what started as a spontaneous reaction to an accident turned into an ugly ethnic conflict, killing many people.

Meanwhile, the Muhajir youth, who are equal sons of the soil of Sindh as they were born and bred in this province, started feeling the pinch of unemployment and lack of educational institutions. Bhutto had nationalised all the educational institutions in 1972; thereafter not a single new college was added in Karachi. At an average, by the late 1970s and mid-1980s some 20,000 students who got lower grades in matriculation could not get admissions to any college or technical institutes every year. It was this crowd of unemployed Muhajir youth standing idle at the corners of the streets who were given a voice by Altaf Hussain and Azeem Tariq by founding the All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation (APMSO). Azeem Tariq was assassinated after he parted ways with his comrade Altaf Hussain.

Hussain had himself said in an interview that when he went to the University of Karachi to join BSc Pharmacy, he was shocked to see welcome banners of various ethnic student organisations and forced to think about his own identity. The Muhajir students till that time used to rally on the basis of ideology behind leftist groups of the National Students Federation (NSF) or the rightist student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami called the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba (IJT). The creation of a Muhajir organisation delighted Zia’s intelligence, who thought it an antidote to the rising Sindhi nationalism after Bhutto’s hanging by the military government.

The division of students on ethnic basis did raise a question in the minds of the founders of APMSO: what is their identity? They were told by their older generation that all Pakistanis belonged to one Muslim nation. The second generation of Muhajirs soon realised that they do not need religious reasons to be here in Pakistan. The rise of ethnic politics around them made them think that there was no such thing as one Muslim nation. Instead, strong ethnicity-based politics was the order of the day. Addressing the APMSO rally at the University of Karachi on December 15, 1980, Altaf Hussain maintained that the Muhajirs should be accepted as the fifth nationality of Pakistan. He thus moved away from the thinking of the older Muhajir generation, which by and large — leaving aside some leftists — always strongly proclaimed that Pakistan has one Muslim nation and those who raised the issue that it has four nationalities are traitors or agents of the Jews and Hindus. However, the MQM later dropped the fifth nationality slogan officially and declared that Muhajirs were Urdu-speaking Sindhis; a position reiterated by Altaf Hussain in his marathon press conference on September 10, 2011. That is what the Sindhi nationalists had advised them in the early 1980s. But in spite of this official declaration, the MQM had to privately stick to their earlier political formulation that the Muhajirs are a separate ‘Qaum’ (nation) to keep its vote bank intact. The politics of constituency is not allowing the MQM to expand.

As a matter of fact, MQM literature shows that both Altaf Hussain and Azeem Tariq dismissed the theory that Muslims were one nation on the basis of common religion. They argued that if religion makes one Muslim nation, why were the Muslims divided on national basis in many countries. APMSO Secretary General Azeem Tariq maintained in a speech in December 1980: “Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the ideology of Pakistan or ideology of Islam was negated because Muslims from the Indian Muslim minority areas going through the phase of migration were stopped at the borders of Pakistan in 1954 and returned” (MQM booklet published in ‘Muhajir Qaumi Movement — Tashkil aur Jedojahad’, Edited by Ahmed Salim).

MQM leaders courageously exposed the hypocrisy of the Pakistan movement’s basic argument. They asked that if Muslims are one nation then why Muslims from anywhere in the world — and particularly from India — can be denied entry into Pakistan at any given time. They were courageous to refer to the analogy of Israel where Jews from anywhere in the world can go and acquire Israeli nationality. It was courageous because any comparison of Pakistan with Israel is deplored by the majority of people here. It was on the basis of this thinking that Altaf Hussain “has on several occasions said that the creation of Pakistan was a mistake” (The Idea of Pakistan by Stephen P Cohen).

The Muhajirs’ younger leadership led by Altaf Hussain had taken the sensible course to declare that they do not want the division of the province, a position they continue to hold even today. They also supported Sindh’s major demands at the National Finance Commission (NFC) and on the water distribution issue. At the one end they have been rightly supporting Sindh’s stance against the domination of Punjab, but within the province the MQM has been asking for control over the big cities — Karachi and Hyderabad. In a foreword to Altaf Hussain’s recent book, My Life’s Journey, Professor Matthew A Cook rightly pointed out: “The principle of negation also appears to drive tension between Muhajirs [sic] and Sindhis from one historical crisis to another. Nonetheless, while these crises are anti-Sindhi, Muhajir politics not only illustrates how negation produces alterity but — by opening socio-political conversation—the possibility of mimesis.”

Alliance of the PPP and the MQM in Sindh suffers from this mimesis and alterity between the parties that represent the Sindhis and Urdu-speaking Sindhis. It is unfortunate that in spite of officially announcing a few years back that the ‘M’ in MQM stands for ‘Muttahida’ (united) and not for Muhajir, the leadership vacillates between the two incompatible positions.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 16 Sep 2011 20:04

RajeshA,

Pakistan: A Hard Country By Anatol Lieven
Publisher: Public Affairs 2011 | 592 Pages | ISBN: 1610390210 |


Lieven (Chechnya), who has reported on Pakistan off and on for 20 years, offers a compelling argument for reorienting Western interests (and investments) in its wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given its enormous population (six times that of Afghanistan), the key role Pakistani intelligence plays in Western efforts against terrorism, the strong ties between Pakistan and Western countries (especially Britain), and the fact that Pakistan's army is one of Asia's strongest (complete with nuclear weapons), Lieven writes, "Pakistan is quite simply far more important to the region, the West and the world than is Afghanistan: a statement which is a matter not of sentiment but of mathematics." His extensive history and cartography of the country comes equipped with solid policy prescriptions—for drone attacks to be ceased and for the U.S. to acknowledge how powerfully the bungled invasion of Afghanistan contributed to instability in the region—and particularly the growth of the Taliban. Though his language can occasionally be patronizing, Lieven's writing is generally excellent. He wrestles huge amounts of material into a coherent whole, cogently explaining the intricate and interconnected roles played by kinship, regional allegiances, religion, and the military, shedding light on the country "in all its complex patchwork of light and shadow."


all the more reason for this thread.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 17 Sep 2011 00:45

ramana garu,

Anatol Lieven does talk about the importance of Pakistan, however this importance is as a challenge or even a target and not as a partner, as many Americans presume.

I believe, on BRF we are often confounded by how Americans make the right analysis, but reach diametrically opposite prescriptions as us. By using a thorough analysis, by painting a realistic image of Pakistan reality, these Americans establish respect for their work. This allows them to push through any stupid prescriptions they want or which suits their agenda.

This is something one needs to keep on pointing to the global audience. Just because an author demonstrates intellect or honesty in analysis, does not mean he has the right prescription. In fact he uses a damning analysis to better sell snake oil.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 17 Sep 2011 01:58

Most of TSP generals have US or UK visas due to their progeny. Colonel level folk will seek Gulf safe haven. It's the lower ranks on tap.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 26 Sep 2011 12:21

X-Posting from TSP Thread

Rudradev writes:

To me it's all about the money.

Total cost of the Afghan war, 2001-2011: approximately $444 Billion to the US exchequer.

This has been with "fighting on the cheap". Getting the Northern Alliance to do the fighting on the ground, initially, with only air support from ISAF. Counting on the Pakis for intelligence and for security along the Paki side of the Af-Pak border.

Results: No control over Afghan territory except for Kabul, a few other urban areas and the perimeters of various NATO bases. Northern/Western Afghanistan in the hands of warlords who must be allowed to cultivate and sell opium in exchange for their temporary cooperation. Southern/Eastern Afghanistan in the hands of Haqqanis, Hekmatyar and various Taliban leaders. Even Kabul is not secure: US embassy and political leaders can be targeted at will by Haqqanis.

In addition some $20 Billion has been spent by the US in aid to the Pakis.

On BRF, there are two main arguments as to why this expenditure of $444 B + $20 B has been such a total loss:

1) US should never have trusted the Pakis. They should have attacked and destroyed the Pakis because they were the root of the problem, instead of invading Afghanistan with Pakis as "allies."

Maybe so. But stop and think for a minute. It cost the US $444B over ten years to get almost nowhere in Afghanistan.

For $444B spent on the Afghan war effort, the US has been able to get rid of one ragtag Taliban government from Kabul in 2001, and secure some logistical bases for aircraft, marines, bredators etc. That's all.

For the $20B given to Pakistan, at least there has been some better ROI. Many Al-Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have been rendered by Pakistan. Drone attacks, allowed by the Pakistan government, have killed many leaders and cadres of anti-US Islamist groups in Pakistan.

Also, OBL was killed in Pakistan. Though this did not happen with the cooperation of the Paki govt, it could be argued that US intelligence networks in Pakistan (which could only be cultivated in an atmosphere created by $20B in aid) were critical to getting OBL. Net net, there have been no successful attacks on US soil from Pakistan (and many attacks foiled while being planned in Pakistan) since 2001. Net net, the US has some idea (however limited or incomplete) of where Pakistan's crown jewels are and who is responsible for them.

Has there been a downside? Of course. The Taliban, Haqqanis and Hekmatyar continue to fight and kill US forces in Afghanistan, only because of the safe havens and facilities provided by the ISI in Pakistan. Even $444 B to Afghanistan war effort, plus $20B to Pakistan, have brought the US to a losing stalemate where it apparently cannot do much about this situation. It has to absorb things like Raymond Davis, Embassy Attack, Rabbani etc. and retaliate only with harsh words of protest.

We on BRF think that the US has a better option: attack Pakistan, with B2s or daisy cutters or boots on the ground or all these things at once. Fight a war to destroy the TSPA/ISI and gain control of Pakistan. We think that somehow the expense that the US incurs in this process... not only of defeating TSPA/ISI in open conflict, not only of fighting all the 16 million armed jihadis scattered around Pakistan, but of managing an aftermath that includes securing the crown jewels with zero error and establishing a functioning government to take charge of 180 million Islamized c***tiyas... will be justified by the fruits that the US will reap IF it succeeds.

First, this is because we haven't given any thought to what the expense actually will be. If it was $444B over ten years to defeat a ragtag Taliban army and secure a few bases in Afghanistan (there is still no stable national government in Afghanistan, even with a much smaller population than Pakistan.) What will it cost, in Pakistan, for the US to defeat a much better conventional armed force, to defeat a much larger non-conventional fighting force of Tanzeems, to establish a functioning central government over the vast defeated population as an endgame, and to do all this without any chance of a nuke going missing and turning up in a Western city? Will it be 4X the cost of the Afghan war so far? 5X? 10X? Are we looking at a war effort of $2-4 Trillion?

But that's not all. Even if the US had $2-4 Trillion to spend on this, what guarantee that it will succeed? The US has spent $444B on the war in Afghanistan... not a SUCCESSFUL war in Afghanistan, just a war. Is it worth spending 5X, 10X that much on a similar war in Pakistan with a similar degree of "success" for the outcome? How much will the US have to spend for a "guaranteed to succeed" war in Pakistan? 10 Trillion? 20 Trillion? And what do they get at the end of the day?

Seriously... Unkil's pockets are not infinitely deep. In fact they are stretched very thin already. Even with another attack in the mainland US (let alone Haqqani prickles in Kabul) there is NO chance of the US going to war against Pakistan... they didn't do it in 2001, when their economy was better off than it is now. Today they know the Pakis to be snakes; yet, as we can see, most of the "War on Terror" successes owe more to the $20B they spent on aid to these Paki snakes than to the $444 B they spent on occupying Afghanistan!!

In fact, looked at objectively it makes sense for Unkil to give Pakistan $3B a year in annual aid for another 100 years, as long as they can do a face-saving pullout from Afghanistan and get a guarantee of no more terrorist attacks on US soil. It is still less expensive than even the most optimistic scenario of attacking Pakistan militarily.

That's all there is. Unkil won't attack Pakistan because Unkil can't afford to fight a war with Pakistan and sustain it towards a reasonable chance of a favourable endgame. They don't have money. They are kadkaa.

2) This brings us to the second argument. "But what about Iraq?? Unkil could have afforded to fight the AfPak war properly (by making kheema of Pakistan) if they had not been distracted by Iraq no??"

Actually, I'm not so sure about this. The total cost of the Iraq war was more than Afghanistan... $806 B. But I will argue that in terms of serving America's economic and geostrategic interests, Iraq was a MUCH more successful war than Afghanistan is, or than a Pakistan war would ever be.

The Iraq operation is over. At once stage it looked like a disaster, but the endgame is now played and done with... and it hasn't turned out so badly for the US. An extremely anti-US regime running one of the largest oil-producing countries in the world, a major country of strategic importance in the Middle East, has been knocked out. Power has now devolved to three clearly demarcated ethnic groups which can be played against each other by Washington in the colonial style. Northern Iraq/Kurdistan affords the US a welcome military and strategic presence that they never had before. Neither the Sunnis of Central-Western Iraq nor the Shias of Southern and Eastern Iraq have any love for the US, but both groups hate each other and are prone to accepting US influence in their fight to curb the power of the other. Washington has a lot of leverage in this important country which it never had under Saddam. Furthermore, Iraq's oil is set to make an unimpeded comeback to the world market, without the destabilizing effects of Saddam-era sanctions to aggravate any potential energy crisis.

To some extent there is a downside of increasing Iranian influence in Baghdad, because of the empowerment of Iraq's Shias. Still, it does not overbalance the gains America has made.

In fact, this is the most convincing argument I have heard, to counter the notion that "US does not attack Pakistan in the War on Terror because it wants to keep India down." The US did attack Iraq, and left there with a dispensation that was relatively favourable to Iran (which is more of an enemy to Washington than India.) The US was prepared to countenance some gains for Iran as a side-effect of getting rid of Saddam, because the gains were higher for the US.

If the US saw a war on Pakistan as affordable, AND saw that destroying the current order in Pakistan would produce results at least as beneficial to the US as they are to India... then the US, I think, would do it. The US is not holding back from destroying Pakistan for the sole reason that destroying Pakistan would help India... after all the Americans destroyed Saddam's Iraq in a way that benefited Iran, even though they definitely would like to keep Iran down.

The US is holding back from destroying Pakistan because they cannot afford it, and when all is said and done, even if they could afford it the benefits would not justify the costs. NONE of the present naatak will bring matters to a position where the benefits do justify the costs... and even then, it is an open question how the US would manage to afford it. Would the Chinese finance the destruction of their deepel than deepest fliend by lending the US money to finance an invasion of Pakistan? :mrgreen:

There is a third option for the US (besides attacking Pakistan militarily in an unaffordable war, and besides cut & run + annual jizya to Pakistan to prevent further terrorist attacks on US soil.) That is to cooperate with India to manage the dismantling of Pakistan as it exists today; in a way that will involve India bearing most of the short/medium term costs (especially the endgame, absorbing Pakistan) but ultimately cannot help giving India most of the long-term benefits (if India bears the economic costs and bears the political/social costs, it will emerge as Akhand Bharat.) Will the US think about this option? Will India go with it?

RamaY wrote:^ Could it be done in Pak, if US brakes TSPA and split Pakistan in to pieces? Wouldn't that make world a safer place with that cost?

If Palestine can be an independent state why cant sindh or Balochistan ?

No, RamaY garu, it would not. It is not enough to break TSPA and split Pakistan into pieces. If you want the world to be a safer place from your POV you have to stay there for however many years it takes... hold the hands of your chosen people in each particular piece of Former Pakistan... protect them against everyone from pan-Islamists to TSPA chauvinists... help them establish a government that their people will have confidence in (social services, infrastructure, economic stability etc.)... empower them to keep their hold on power despite repeated attacks decade after decade, by various groups who want to seize power away from them. What is the "cost" of all that? It is a lot more than the "cost" of cluster munitions to break the TSPA and kill 16 million cadres of Pakistani Tanzeems, and even THAT cost is great compared to the cost of simply paying off Pakistan for whatever benefits it gives you.

And in the end, what is the benefit? Unlike Shia southern Iraq or Kurdish Northern Iraq, Sindh/Baluchistan won't even produce oil to pay some small portion of the cost of taking care of them.

No chance the US will go this route, IMHO.

Pratyush wrote:Looking at the US options and the lack of them. What will happen to TSP if the US prevails upon the KSA to impose an oil blockade on the TSP.

How much oil can Iran provide to the TSP at the rates the KSA could provide.

Even if KSA agrees to this, it isn't only Iran that TSP can rely on. I think China will prevail upon Iran to supply oil to TSP at subsidized rates, even if Iran is angry about treatment of Shias in Pakistan; Iran fears/needs China more than it is angry with TSP. But even apart from Iran, there are options. E.g. Re-export via Chinese intermediaries from many gulf nations, maybe even KSA! It won't be painless for the Pakis but tallel than deepel will go to great lengths to ensure that the effects of such a punitive action by Unkil are minimized as far as possible.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Philip » 26 Sep 2011 12:30

What did Pres.Nixon once supposedly say? "When you have their **** in your hand and squeeze,they'll come around". The US can emulate Nixon's tactics and bring Pak to heel.That both nations are heading for a showdown has been inevitable for a very long time.One cannot hunt with the hounds and hide with the hares as Pak has successfully done for decades.Despite hiccups now and again,Indo-US relations have improved enormously especially economically.The US no longer views India through the prism of the Cold War.

Having now openly declared Pak to be the equivalent of an "offender",if I was the US president,I would immediately take out not the haqqani's etal,but the entire Paki N-arsenal,which the ISI will happily hand over to its partners in terrorist crime,the jihadi movements,who have an international dimension.The spectre of the next attack on US soil from an Islamist terror organisation using a Paki nuke is simpoly unaccepable to any nation,leave alone the US.It is therefore "time to draw the curtain" on Pakistan.That is the only way in which Pak can be "handled".Come on Obama,first squeeze hard and then if nothing happens,take Pak out!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 26 Sep 2011 13:13

X-Posting from TSP Thread

Rudradev ji,

The costs to USA in attacking Pakistan are in fact the lowest - lower than Afghanistan, lower than Iraq.

The case is made that USA has to do nation-building in Pakistan, that US will be forced to do nation-building in Pakistan in order to support its stooges there. This would be the case if one wants to subdue to region completely. But should that be a mission goal?

There is no need for either USA or India to want to subdue the whole of Pakistan. There is a monster living in Pakistan. Let the monster live on there! All we need to do is to ensure that the monster doesn't get much to eat, that the monster cannot get out of his cave, that the monster is otherwise distracted by having the monster fight with his brother, monster II! That is all! We don't need to adopt the monster, we don't need to reform the monster, or let the monster live in our homes! We only need to constrain the monster's ability to hurt us - US and India.

USA and India have 4 Goals in Pakistan:
  1. Denuke Pakistan
  2. Tear Pakistan's Strategic Arms Away - Baluchistan, Southern Sindh, PoK
  3. Create a Schism Between Pushtuns and Pakjabis
  4. Degrade TSPA's military capacity

There is no need for USA or India to try to set up a puppet regime in Pakjab or even Pushtunistan. All we need to ensure is that whichever hostile regime comes up there, it is always under attack from other claimants to power, and as such does not have the time to indulge in hostilities.

Now which one of the above goals would be financially unbearable? It is almost all breaking, no building!

The monetary benefits are immense for both India and USA. What does India get?
  1. Full freedom to dictate India's Agenda towards the Muslim World
  2. Reduced Threat of Nuclear Attack
  3. India gets access to the natural resources of Iran and Central Asia at a reduced cost
  4. Much Reduced Enemy, India does not need a huge conventional force in the West, and we can concentrate on the North
  5. Baluchistan, Southern-Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan are integrated into India, thus increasing our area, two areas (Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan contributing small populations with respect to area, and South-Sindh contributing an important port - Karachi)

India's cost come in providing border security to Baluchistan, Southern Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan, which may not be much more than what we pay today!

What does USA get?
  1. Reduced Threat of Nuclear Attack
  2. Free Transit to and from Central Asia through Baluchistan (Can be agreed in a treaty)
  3. Jihadis in the region losing out on their Freedom of Movement (air, sea, land), thus Reduced Terror Threat

The cost may not go beyond a 100 billion USD borne by both India and USA! That is of course if we manage to get all the nukes!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Philip » 26 Sep 2011 13:37

The one huge problem that Pak possesses is the size of its population.Even if one castrates it of its nukes and then dismembers it,the chaos with its millions running around totally out of control is a nightmare.India frankly cannot take on te cost of feeding the Paki population! Remember the cost of feeding one million Bangladeshis in '70? In any solution-rarrangement of Pak's borders and within,Baluchistan must be carved out of the rump of Pak as an independent state.The US needs Iran too aboard for thus to happen.

However,for the "splittists" to achieve their ambitions,a fundamental is required,that of the "castration" of Pak of ots nukes.Once that takes place,then the rest wl follow.Deprived of its nuclear umbrella,Pak will "fault "along ethnic lines.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 26 Sep 2011 14:36

We should learn to treat Pakistan's big population as a positive feature. Pakistan's big population would make it extremely difficult for any political system or regime to get full control over it, including the Islamists. The Islamists can often manage to provide sustenance to a small populations through their dawas - Gaza, various madrassas, etc. The resources come from charity from well-off Muslim communities - Gulf, Muslims in the West, some Feudals, etc. This model however cannot serve a whole country.

It is huge populations that will break the Islamists' back! They too would not be able to provide for all, leading to fragmentation of polity. Many other groups would come up and lay claim to leadership and few resources.

Secondly India does to allow any refugees into India. We can set up safe havens within Rump-Pakistan itself, but all unauthorized people approaching the Indian border should be just shot down for trespassing. That would be the real meaning of stewing in one's own juice. Pakistan is not really doing that fully right now!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2011 19:54

X-Post....
parsuram wrote:Threading a crooked needle, with a crooked thread
There once was no Paki.....

There is a lot that the Gurus have written here, cogitated upon the events or non events to come, and the likes of me hesitates to step into this fast flowing stream. But then I notice that an aspect or two that may be relevant to the current situation about the paki [n; nomenclature describing the collective enterprise of terrorist jihadi Islam, its adherents, practioners, organizers & leaders, as well as the infrastructure for all that to function – loosely, the present state of Pakistan and its army]. But the paki is not so pure, notwithstanding its claim to paki-ness. There are residual elements in the paki which may represent a possibly useful way out of the current impasse between the US and the paki. Any reading of the English press from the paki over a month or so will show the presence of a WKK equivalent among the pakis – RAPEs who bemoan the terrible quality of life in the paki, and RAPEs with an intense case of perpetual nostalgia for the way things were in the new born paki state, when the monster had not fully developed and when the strange residual colonial society was still functioning in paki stan, with the RAPE a homogeneous lot, not multiply fractured by religious, political, and geopolitical considerations, allowing them all to coexist in a common hallucinogenic environment. Almost all these RAPEs – excluding those in the military – can today be brought together under one umbrella, that represented by their severe nostalgia. And these nostalgic RAPEs represent a fairly large & influential part of society in the paki today – people who would have nothing to do with jihad, “strategic depth” and conquering India (well, may be in their most intimate of dreams, but only briefly). These aging bumbling RAPE class, though a miniscule part of the paki society, are, however, a significant part of the ruling class, and can have a disproportionate effect on the paki’s future, principally its dismantling.

Consider that the US has to disarm the paki – leaving the paki state with no army, air force, navy, and the ISI – and certainly not any nukes – the bum will be gone. At the most, the paki will be reduced to having a very modest self defense force, not much above a group of law enforcement organizations. Now we have taken the paki back to the early days of paki stan, and nostalgia is almost within reach. Let us get the US and the UK together, and with the enthusiastic support of the non army RAPEs, reestablish the Dominion of Pakistan (DOP). UK reestablishes its minimum colonial structure to govern DOP under the 1935 Govt. of India (now Pakistan) act; sends a Governor General to Lahore (new capital), and moves forward with re establishing the rule of law, the feudal structure, and associations with the UK. The paki army may find some gainful employment with British forces, like the Gurkhas, but most will have to be rehabilitated. Ditto the jihadi infra structure. And so, painfully, the paki will be converted back to the “enlightened muslim” state that has so far existed only in the dreams of its creators. This will be the first step in destroying the paki. Second will be the co-opting of the mohajir community. For those delusional folks that ran way to paki stan, there will be established the Free City state of Karachi – some what like Singapore, that can function by behaving itself and aspiring to function as a commercial and transportation hub serving India and the Pakistani State. This will separate the mohajir community emotionally from Pakistan, allowing its inevitable re absorption into India. Pakistan will give up all parts of J&K State to India, in return for which India will provide for Pakistani reconstruction (post US deconstruction). The DOP will be a loose federation of west Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP, governed by and large under the 1935 act as a British dominion, under a British Governor General, until its people grow up and decide what they should be – separately as provinces, or jointly as a country, or part of India.

No doubt the US will get its pound of flesh and then some – typically through a string of security and transit agreements, and the UK will also take a bit of what there is – after all they will provide the DCs, DMs and all that wonderful administration that will keep the elite and the feudal society so happy. It will be a challenge integrating the Union Jack and the star & cresent, but harder things have been done.

So this is what I think all the Gurus overlooked – the retrofitting of the paki to the Dominion of Pakistan, 1947, and start all over again. I do believe there will be some strong support for this outside of the paki, and if the US is willing to destroy the paki, then it is a possible scenario that could work for every one’s interests through agreements and compromises. Not only that, best of all, the PRCees get their marching orders.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Oct 2011 12:47

X-Posting from TSP Thread

Philip wrote:Menon,you are spot on,as PS has said,the "crooked tail" cannot be straightened out! It also underscores what a well-known Pakistani-very much in the know of events and with access to anyone in the corridors of power there,told me a few years ago.I asked him whether it was possible for the Paki military to look at the Indian armed forces as a co-guarantor of peace in the sub-continent,each looking after the other's back so to speak,through joint military cooperation.His reply to me was a speechless sad look,in wonderment as if I had arrived from a distant planet and the accompanying shake of his head was answer enough!

The core of Pak's existence today,ruled by its military which commands its ISI,is undying hatred of India.This will never change unless Pak is dismembered.This is a hard truth that Pak's track record has underscored.There is no use at all for India to try cosmetic attempts at eco-cooperation,etc. expecting Pak to change tack.Laudable though these efforts may be,even if Pak is a wealthy and healthy nation,what will it do? Buy even more arms and try to destabilise India internally and wrest Kashmir from us.Despite its eco situ,it is still building more unsecured N-plants and increasing production of N-wepaons with Chinese help.

Gentlemen,it is an inescapable truth today given the mentality of Paki leaders who are almost all in uniform,that the future of India-its survival depends upon the dismantling of the Paki terrorist state.While our strategic enemy is definitely China,China uses Pak as a proxy,not wanting to reveal its hidden fist to the world which will then unite to defeat its global ambitions.The weakening and ultimate defeat of the PRC proxy ultimately weakens China itself! Pak is the weaker of the two and easier to deal with.The Q now is how the Paki state can be dismantled or dismembered,either by its internal contradictions becoming ungovernable or with a little help to the anti-Pak ethnic entities from abroad.Will a few little "shoves" in the right direction serve as a catalyst?

Whether this regime in Delhi has the gumption and the neccessities for the job is a huge Q mark.It is fighting for its very survival .One must look to the entire Indian security apparatus to take the neccessary measures themselves with respect to Pak and prepare the ground for the task at hand,when the decision-makers are caught in political quicksand.The years fly fast and a future new regime that will inevtably appear must have a master-plan at hand to secue the nation's security and survival.If the task has been completed in part by the time they arrive,it will be well worth it.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Airavat » 18 Oct 2011 07:05

Ajai Shukla: Managing Pakistan

But the AfPak region will remain on Washington’s radar even if closer to the periphery. Some 30,000 US troops will remain stationed in Afghanistan even beyond 2014, their charter including drone strikes into Pakistan’s tribal areas in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, the “epicentre of global terrorism”. This will create a mutual dependency with Pakistan: America would need ground intelligence and airspace co-ordination from Pakistan; while Rawalpindi would want to direct drone strikes towards anti-establishment jehadis (like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) while safeguarding its cultivated killers (like the Lashkar-e-Taiba). Paradoxically, therefore, even as US logistical dependency on Pakistan reduces, its place would be taken by an enhanced intelligence and operational relationship.

New Delhi, therefore, is far-sighted in its realisation that Washington’s ability to influence Pakistan and nudge that country away from the abyss is perceptibly declining. The US continues to tackle symptoms rather than disease, warning against support to the Haqqani network, but seemingly unwilling to take on the underlying ecosystem that nurtures terror as an instrument of national policy. America deploys aid and exchange programmes in fruitless attempts to win Pakistani hearts and minds, but seems unwilling to put pressure for reforming an education system that breeds exclusivity and hate.

In the circumstances, can China be expected to manage the Pakistan problem? Certainly Beijing has a bigger stake than Washington in a less dysfunctional Pakistan. Recent statements from Beijing indicate growing concern over the spread of Islamist militancy to the Muslim Uighur areas of Xinjiang. The Karakoram highway and a planned infrastructure corridor linking Xinjiang with the Bay of Bengal only make sense if they pass through secure areas. The soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army already guard Chinese construction teams working in the Northern Areas, in the Pakistan-occupied side of the Khunjerab Pass. As Pakistan’s military grows ever more conservative, Beijing will also come to share America’s apprehension about nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 19 Oct 2011 10:48

X-Posted from TIRP Thread

As posted by Dilbu

A massive towel is being thrown in by a former diplomat. I am posting only the nuggets after avoiding all the whining. The entire article is worth a read.
Factors threatening Pakistan’s survival
The rudest and unforgettable jolt that sliced this country into two halves came in 1971. Pakistan’s former smaller part now called Bangladesh is believed to have become a haven for the Pakistani entrepreneurs and industrialists. They are seeking refuge and investing in that erstwhile part of Pakistan. Bangladesh is one fifth of the size of the existing Pakistan while its population is a little less than that of Pakistan. Yet the violence, the social disorder, the colossal upheaval, the gross mismanagement, the loathsome governance; the chronically corrupt, self serving and inept leadership that one can witness in Pakistan is not hugely attributed to Bangladesh.

India is dreaming to walk into the shoes of an economic and technological giant and a regional power that aspires to countenance China. Pakistan looks a midget in comparison to neighboring India now leaping forward at a terrific speed in technology, with its stable democratic tradition and with ballooning economic boom.Pakistan is trapped in huge debts and earns unenviable reputation as a failed state. The leadership that we have is not worth a stack of chaff. A country ablaze with leaping fires of violence, with shameful and futile proxy wars being fought by its armed forces on its own territory, with the contagious curse of sectarian, ethnic and regional bad blood spilled all over; the hope for a better future is dimming fast. Is there is way-out for revival of Pakistan?

And.. [drumroll] :D
If there are no immediate short-term or long term solutions of these and similar other burning questions that revolve around the viability, welfare and survival of Pakistan, then mark my words there is no hope for the people to survive in a cohesive united, geographically contiguous land as it is now. The drift and disintegration is hovering over horizons of Pakistan and sooner or later it would descend and lead to an unstoppable decay and further dismemberment of the residue Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Army is a privileged class by itself. Army bungled in East Pakistan in 1971 and has donned a mercenary role for the past two decades. It devours most of the state funds and sits idle otherwise. Kashmir cannot not be gained by force or by the military means. India militarily is several times powerful than Pakistan. So when would the time to protect the territorial integrity of Pakistan come? And if it comes can our meager army repel the aggression? Are our civil and military leaders aware that Pakistan army is outmatched by India in relation to its military equipment and number? The religious bands of all hue and cries are busy always in wrecking the peace and tranquillity of the state. They mercilessly annihilate each other in the name of sectarianism and different strands of faith. The Islamic Republic has become the hunting ground for Islamic sectarian chauvinism. The religious multitudes pose a stupendous threat to the normal and smooth functioning of Pakistan.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 19 Oct 2011 11:02

North Waziristan does represent a unique opportunity. In not too distant future, we will know if the Pakistanis have been pure idiots, cunning foxes or just plain lucky.

If the North-Waziristan and perhaps Kurram operation by the American forces goes through, either directly through Americans or indirectly through pressuring the Pakistanis, it would definitely create the schism between the Pakjabis and the Pushtun!

The Haqqanis are the crux, because hitting out at them, regardless of whether the Americans do the hitting or the Pakistanis do the hitting, would define whether Pakjabi-dominated TSPA is aligned with the Pushtun-heavy Taliban or not! If the Paki Army takes American bombing of North-Waziristan lying down and do not come to the aid of the Taliban, then they would have lost the trust of their proxies - the Pushtun-heavy Taliban! If the Paki Army is itself pushed to bomb North Waziristan, then the Pushtuns of the area who fight in alliance with the Paki state would also feel betrayed.

An India-Afghanistan Entente is very much dependent on whether it is ((India + Northern Alliance + Pushtuns) vs. the Pakjabis) or ((India + Northern Alliance) vs (Pushtuns + Pakjabis)! Is Afghanistan extending into Pushtun areas of Pakistan or is Pakistan extending into Pushtun areas of Afghanistan?

India cannot really turn the Pushtuns against the Pakjabis! India can only play the field! Only Americans can really turn the Pushtuns against Pakistan! And it looks like they would now that they are amassing their forces off North Waziristan!

Impression is everything! What do the Pushtun think?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Pratyush » 19 Oct 2011 11:28

Meanwhile a useless bleat from some one to the effect, ‘If Pakistan breaks up, it will create 10 times more problems’

:((

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 19 Oct 2011 12:13

A BS article trying to sympathize with Paki PoV!

Published on Oct 19, 2011
By John R. Schmidt
Pakistan's Alternate Universe: Foreign Policy
What possible motive does Islamabad have for supporting Afghanistan's bloody insurgency?
India, for its part, has moved into Afghanistan in a big way since 9/11, opening an embassy and four consulates, sending in thousands of aid workers, and providing almost $2 billion in aid. Just last Tuesday, Oct. 4, Kabul and New Delhi signed a strategic partnership agreement in which India agreed to help train and equip Afghan security forces. The Indians, long angered by Pakistani support for jihadi groups in Kashmir, sense a golden opportunity to threaten Pakistan on its western border and are determined to make the most of it.

Observing these developments, the Pakistanis have become increasingly alarmed at the prospect that they may be encircled by their historic foes. Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban needs to be understood in this light. It is not that the Pakistanis like the Taliban, whose support for al Qaeda prior to 9/11 ended up causing them so much grief, or even that they trust them, since they almost certainly do not. :rotfl: But faced with the alternative of a hostile Afghan government allied to India, supporting the Afghan Taliban is a relatively easy choice for Islamabad.

The United States is well aware of Pakistani concerns about the Indian presence in Afghanistan but has done little to address them. The Indians do not like outsiders meddling in their affairs, and Washington has been unwilling to risk alienating a country it seeks as a partner in countering Chinese influence in Asia. Instead of pressuring India, Washington has tried to buy off the Pakistanis with financial and military assistance and even offered them a strategic partnership of their own. Its message to Islamabad has been that it intends to remain engaged in the region and that, despite the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, there is really nothing to worry about. This has proved to be a hard sell for Pakistanis, who remember all too well that the United States abandoned the region after working together with Islamabad to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan and then imposed sanctions on them only 18 months later in retaliation for their nuclear program.


My comments
Let's show more understanding for Terrorists!
The author seems to be making a case that we need to only understand the motivations of the terrorists, show some consideration for their political aims, give them what they want, and all our problems would be solved!

USA, its generals and the think-tanks have been taken to the cleaners by the Pakistani Generals and politicians.

1) The Taliban + Al Qaeda regime in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 was supported wholeheartedly by Pakistan. There would have been no Taliban if Pakistan had not supported the movement. There would have been no Al Qaeda in Afghanistan if Pakistan had not facilitated their movement to and fro from Afghanistan.

2) It was ISI itself which facilitated the 9/11 attacks on USA, as one knows from the money transfer made to Mohammed Atta in Hamburg, the 9/11 hijacker. Al Qaeda was simply an accomplice of ISI.

3) It was Pakistanis who gave US the impression that Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, and directed US ire towards Afghanistan, even though all major Al Qaeda figures have been captured in Pakistani cities itself.

4) It was Pakistan which facilitated America's invasion of Afghanistan, with the express condition of having their "assets" in Afghanistan airlifted by none other than USA to Pakistan.

5) Pakistan was able to save all their assets in Afghanistan including all Taliban leaders, most Al Qaeda leaders, all of whom found sanctuary in Pakistan.

6) By getting America occupying Afghanistan, Pakistan had American exactly where it wanted it - dependent on Pakistan for supply routes.

7) Through this dependence Pakistanis have been able to blackmail Americans to finance their anti-Indian war machine and to bolster their economy.

8 ) What Pakistanis have provided to America were some Al Qaeda members who were dispensable and disposable after they had done their part.

9) When Pakistanis speak of their casualties, they mean the Pushtuns from their paramilitaries, who too are just cannon fodder. It is a big joke when Pakistanis say they have made big sacrifices in the War on Terror. They have only thrown a whole lot of dispensable poor Pushtuns to the wolves. The Pakistanis themselves are sitting pretty in their defense colonies with all the facilities subsidized by the American taxpayer.

10) Pakistanis have basically made America into a monkey, whose hand is now stuck in the Afghanistan jar, and America is begging Pakistan to get its hand free.

11) Let's not forget that Osama bin Laden was ensconsed in Pakistan for almost 10 years under the loving care of the Pakistani Army. When Americans took down OBL in Operation Geronimo, the Americans experienced a unique moment of clarity when Pakistan's mask slipped.

12) Pakistanis completely control the whole anti-American insurgency in Afghanistan. Americans call it the Taliban insurgency. The blood of 1812 US soldiers is on the hands of the Pakistanis. Of course, it is an old habit of Pakistanis to plead for plausible deniability.

13) When Adm. Mullen recently said that the Haqqani Network is a veritable arm of the ISI, there was another moment of clarity for Americans.

So America has paid so much in blood and treasure to prop up the Pakistanis, and America has been made a fool all the way!

And all this author comes up with is how to appease the Pakistanis even more, by first understanding what they want! Ack-thoo! There are many American leaders still intent on putting the mask back on on Pakistan's face!

The Truth is: Pakistani Army is the Godfather of Al Qaeda and Taliban! Pakistani Army is the HQ. of Global Jihad! And it exerts its power by getting America and Saudi Arabia to finance its Global Jihad and getting China to provide it with a nuclear shield. Pakistani Army is the Head of the Snake!

If America takes down Pakistani Army, it would have crushed the Head of the Jihadi Snake! But there are all sorts of journalists interested in convincing the Americans that actually the tail of the Snake is the head!

Pakistan is veritably like the Snake with a Fake Head on its Tail!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 20 Oct 2011 23:11

X-Post...
shiv wrote: <SNIP> India will have to surprise Pakistan and overrun Pakjab and split Pakistan in a matter of one week. That is why Indians come up with things like "Cold Start" whether the idea is workable or not. The one thing that does not get discussed on here very often is what role the US can play. Simply put, the US can warn Pakistan of impending attack and monitor Indian activity and tell them about that during a hot war. There is no way we could prevent that. We can argue on the forum and say that "We should be strong enough to beat Pakistan despite that" but "beating Pakistan" would mean concluding a Pakistan breaking war in ten days flat. If it goes on longer Pakistan will be able to muster enough forces to stop India. US intelligence and arms can help to prolong the war just enough to help Pakistan survive. If India are planning military action against Pakistan we have to dhoti shiver about these uncertainties before we fight the war rather than find out that it happened after an unsuccessful war. We owe it to our military to be aware of this sort of outcome. I bet my left testimonial that the day India acquires the capability of doing this to Pakistan despite US or Chinese help, Pakis will start talking seriously about peace with India. We are not there yet.<SNIP>


Excellent, Sir, really excellent. Thank you for putting this up so clearly. I hope those who propose restructuring in terms of lesser Strike Corps or lower number of tanks read this.

My two useless two cents to the above: -

(a) It is the Pakistanis which have defined the definition of victory in any India-Pakistan war. The same definition which you've written above – and which holds for terrorism and insurgencies – I win by not loosing and you lose by not winning. The ‘I’ is the terrorist and ‘you’ is the nation state. It is exactly this logic which applies to any Indo-Pak war and which you’ve so succinctly put into words above. PA and other services have enough assets to ensure that PA does not loose – where loosing is defined as per the logic of Pakistan. The Indian war objective earlier, as famously propounded by General Sundarji, of cutting Pakistan into half and reaching RYK, is what the PA was geared to deter and claim victory.

(b) Now, please put in perspective the discomfort caused by Cold Start Doctrine. Indian Army has put the entire argument of victory on its head – when the objective is not to ‘dismember’ Pakistan and is limited, then, we can claim victory once we meet these limited objectives. This also makes the entire structure of PA – geared to meet the earlier threat – at odds with changing threat scenario from India. Plus, we call the nuclear bluff.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 22 Oct 2011 08:51

X-post...

ramana wrote:I just had a thought. So far we are thinking that either Afghanistan or Pakistan will emerge as the survivor after US leaves.

Now both are articial states stitched together in the colonial and post colonial period and survived as entitites due to Cold War circumustances.

Afghanistan is a grouping of Pashtuns with the Northern Areas peoples. Similarly TSP is Pakjab grouped with Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan. These areas do not have anything in common except the Westphalian construct of post World War II and the UN system.

India has supported the legitimate faction that came to power in Kabul as a matter of course and this was to hedge against TSP.

The Cold War ended in 1988 and with it superpower support for both states. The end of Cold War ended the FSu too by 1992. The war on terror has brought out the contradictions in the two states of holding/stitching together different people.

What if the end result of the end of War on terror is the collapse of both states? I mean what if Afghanistan and Pakistan both get re-organised like Yugoslavia or CIS or what not. Maybe the ultimate result of the end of Cold war is the collapse of the state systems among the pre-modern people of Af-Pak due to the collapse or irrelevance of the Great Game itself.

Are we ready for it?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 22 Oct 2011 09:19

Pakjab is like Serbia holding on to Yugoslavia expect Pakjab has nukes. So it wont be like Kosovo or Yugoslavian war. It will be more like FSU to CIS. Russia was able to retain the nukes and withdraw them from all over the CIS states under Nunn Lugar and later Obama Lugar. Similarly we need a way for Pakjab to withdraw the nukes from where ever they are and corral them with themselves. US on other hand wants to commandeer the TSP nukes in case there is state failure. And state failure will accelerate if the US makes such moves as the jihadis will make grab for the nukes.
So what is needed is a model that allows the Pakjab to let the others go free of the yoke of two nation theory which was a Great Game construct. The game is over with the British having exhausted from WWII and the financial turmoil. And Soviet Union collapsed.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 22 Oct 2011 16:01

From a person who doesn't read BRF

Published on Oct 21, 2011
By Hisham Wyne
No one wants anarchy on their doorstep: The Express Tribune (Pak)

Code: Select all

http://tribune.com.pk/story/278909/no-one-wants-anarchy-on-their-doorstep/

One can also imagine India’s dismay. What was once a somewhat dysfunctional state on its borders will have suddenly turned into a delightful free-for-all where all strategy is useless. The problem with strategy as expounded by Sun Tzu and Machiavelli is it always assumes the enemy as rational. And by rational, one means capable not just of coherent thought but also concerted action. Multiple groups leave practical rationality adrift, because there is no overriding writ. So India, rather than tangoing with a foe it knows and comprehends, is suddenly left dealing with factions that do what they want when they want, based on whim and impulse, for they already have precious little left to lose.

No one wants a dead Pakistan. No one — not even India — wants a Pakistan so incapacitated it can’t keep itself in partial order. Despite all the jingoism, even if India has the military might to skewer Pakistan in half, what might it achieve by following through? It’d only have more states to add to the ones it can barely manage as is.

Flippancy aside, our purported carcass would turn into an excellent playground for opportunists. These will include Russia and China, who would quickly extend influence into the failed state. It’s easy to see how America won’t be happy with that. Iran will quickly mobilise its resources too, which would leave Saudi Arabia in conniptions. And all this will be happening on India’s borders. Not a good outcome for that erstwhile neighbour.

Yes, India is undoubtedly sponsoring the Baloch insurgency, but that’s only to keep us sufficiently busy that we can’t stir things up in Kashmir.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 25 Oct 2011 05:49

RajeshA, Try to model the FSU collapse and the TSP. You will see analogs and dissimilarities. So need to identify the remedies.

FSU was a nuke power that collapsed. It also hada dominant ethnic group: Russians. It had ethinc appurtenances in the many Republics.

So far we have many explanations. What we need is a unified theme.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby devesh » 25 Oct 2011 08:25

going by FSU logic, Pakjab is much smaller proportion of Pakistan compared to Russia in FSU. even population also Pakjab proportion in Pak is smaller than Russians in FSU. so, these factors will play crucial role in making sure Pakjab doesn't reemerge in regions that go their way. also, if this is to be the game plan, then the geographic limitations on Pakjab should be such that any little adventurism and they stand to loose hugely. that is how the major river ways and infra should be divided so that any chest thumping by Pakjab and they will be taken care of. this requires detailed geographic intel gathering via satellite imagery. the terrain of Pakjab boundaries need to be carefully studied to see which portions are the "jugular vein" which can be easily reached and if damaged can deliver devastating blow to Pakjab.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 25 Oct 2011 14:32

Dissolution of Pakistan: Parallels with Soviet Union

ramana wrote:RajeshA, Try to model the FSU collapse and the TSP. You will see analogs and dissimilarities. So need to identify the remedies.

FSU was a nuke power that collapsed. It also hada dominant ethnic group: Russians. It had ethinc appurtenances in the many Republics.

So far we have many explanations. What we need is a unified theme.

ramana garu,

this would require some long thinking! For the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are a few theories out there. Some talk about the unsustainable arms race. Some about the unsustainable overreach. Some about public disaffection. Some about Gorbachev's opening of the iron fist. Some about the fall in the price of Siberian Oil.

IMHO, there was a unique combination of factors which came together and pushed Soviet Union over the brink. As things stand, it is difficult to make a one-to-one mapping of all those crucial factors which contributed to Soviet Union's collapse with the situation in Pakistan. The similarities could turn out to be superficial.

One major dynamic of the Cold War was the individual claims of the two parties - the Soviet Union and the West. Both claims were that their system allowed the best possible path to attain social and economic justice and advancement. Both systems were in a competition to prove their superiority across the board - military, economics, space, technology, production, standard of living, world-wide influence, etc.

It was a competition for superiority between two man-made economic models - communism and free-market capitalism. Even the political systems which were built around these two economic models - dictatorship of the proletariat vs democracy were secondary battlefields of ideology.

To cut a long story short, one system recognized that it had lost the race, so it packed up and collapsed. The nature of the "-ism" of the losing system was an important factor in the evolution.

The -ism of Pakistan is markedly different. It is an otherworldly "-ism". The rewards it promises are all otherworldly. The founder of the "-ism" contributes only by example and allegedly not in message and as such supposedly plays no part in the theory of the "-ism". That is all ordained by the otherworldly. The "-ism" does not make any claims to want to prove anything in this material world - neither the prospect of rewards to its adherents nor its invincibility to rational critique. Or so it seems.

The -ism of Pakistan chooses its enmity with other "-isms" on its own terms. It is against Communism, because of Communism's Godlessness. It is against the West, because of the latter is a degraded society of immorality. It is against Hindus, because of our "non-equality", i.e. casteism, our idol-worship, and our polytheism!

Soviet Union's "-ism" was about bringing order to society in order to increase the society's productivity. Pakistan's "-ism" is all about only propagating itself, expanding the adherents of "-ism", without even seriously getting in into how that would improve human society as a whole. There is no benchmarks for economics, freedom, justice, scientific advancement, ecology or culture. All the "-ism" promises is to make everything conformant with Sharia, which provides just straw men manifesto points on these issues - Islamic Banking, speedy justice, etc. There are thousands of prescriptions in HoKo but nothing that really deals with developing the human society in the conventional meaning of "developing"!

The Pakistani "-ism" is authoritarian too, but does not need order. It can exist and prosper in chaos and anarchy just as well.

It is like the guidelines to write some thesis, which goes into a discourse on text alignment, line spacing, paragraph indents, footnote writing, bibliography, table of contents, index, formatting, etc. It is all about form! It does not say anything about the content. The demands on content are shifted to the otherworld.

The breakdown of law and order is not going to be considered as a deathblow to the viability of the "-ism"! Nor is the impoverishment of Pakistanis going to constitute any reprimand of the "-ism"! Nor is the defense of the "-ism" necessarily dependent on its protection by a strong central military.

The reason for discussing the "-ism" in this context is simply to say, that no group in Pakistan is going to stand up and say, that the "-ism" has failed and there is a need for course correction.

On the one hand in Soviet Union, it was the nature of the "-ism" that brought its downfall and on the other the empowerment of the reformers at this crucial stage, who were either not up to the task or connived to bring about the downfall of the "-ism" as well. In Pakistan we will see no such thing!

... to be continued!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 25 Oct 2011 15:30

Dissolution of Pakistan: Parallels with Soviet Union

That however does not mean that there are no parallels. There are indeed parallels. But the parallels may not suffice to effect a similar outcome. So it may be necessary to render some outside support to strengthen the energy of those parallels.

By the late 80s, the Soviet Union's population had become totally disenchanted by the system and wanted change. They were dissatisfied and angry with the ruling regime. In this situation, the combination of Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislau Shushkevich led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

On December 22, 1991 the Presidents of Russia (Boris Yeltsin), Ukraine (Leonid Kravchuk) and Belarus (Stanislau Shushkevich) met and decided the dissolution. Mikhail Gorbachev's role was crucial in ensuring that that the situation was allowed to deteriorate to such an extent and he did not let the military take over. Boris Yeltsin also played a crucial role in pushing back the putsch.

Basically the local satraps decided that they would be able to enjoy full power in their territories only if the country was dissolved. If one may have noticed, it was not Islam in the Caucasus or ethnic strife in Central Asia which caused Soviet Union's dissolution but rather the meeting of minds of the satraps of the three most integrated regions in Soviet Union - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

Basically that is the way to go in Pakistan as well.

1) Pakistani people would have to be very dissatisfied and angry at the real power brokers in Pakistan - the Army. So the Army has to be the face of their misery. The Army has to be in power in Islamabad, and everything that goes wrong with Pakistan has to be pinnable to to the shirts of the Army Generals. A coup would be nice, with another ten years of army rule, only this time Pakistan getting no support from outside. This could have happened in Musharraf's time itself, but America threw in too much money.

2) One would have to have a head of the regime, who is to some extent hesitant in mercilessly finishing off all political opposition, one who is willing to keep back his soldiers as the political opponents incite the people.

3) One would have to have strong regional satraps with strong leaders who feel suffocated under the regime, and also think that they can enjoy more power if the overall state collapses. Till now the Army has been able to play one politician against the other, one political party against the other, keeping all weak. Also there are parties which have trans-provincial strongholds like PPP in Sindh, but also in Seraikistan. ANP too is strong not just in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa but also in Pushtun areas of Karachi. Several are strong in Baluchistan. These non-local spheres of influence of political parties also give them an added reason to keep Pakistan together. This must change.

4) Pakjab would have to have a strong leader who comes to the view, that he will never be allowed to taste power in its fullness unless he gets rid of the constituency holding Pakistan together. Nawaz Sharif could be such a leader. He needs to be told that the only way he will become Emir of Pakjab is if he allows Pakistan to be dissolved.

5) The Army has to be severely degraded. It should be in such straits that it is unable to pay its soldiers its salaries or pensions. Indiscipline in the army with some going their separate ways would help.

6) There can be a phase in Pakistan, where there is talk of devolution of power in the federation, giving more power to the provinces, more federalism. This process can eventually lead to the desired result, that the federal units decide to go their separate by choice, where the main non-military power brokers from the provinces and ethnic groups decide to dissolve Pakistan.

7) In such a situation, nuclear weapons would not help.

All in all, it is a distinct possibility, but this involves four things.
  1. Army Coup in Pakistan
  2. Financial Emasculation of the Pakistani Military
  3. Strengthening of Regional Satraps
  4. Breaking of Trans-Provincial Strongholds of Political Parties

The Islamists as such may not be able to hold Pakistan together. First of all, the Mullahs in Pakistan are more the agents of anarchy at the national level than of order. It is not possible to hold a country together just by bombs and intimidation. Secondly there are political parties much bigger than those of the Islamists. PML-N, PPP, MQM can define the agenda if they want to in their territories vs. the Islamist parties.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby A_Gupta » 25 Oct 2011 16:10

There is a case to be made that the "-ism" of Pakistan predicts worldly success if it is followed with sufficient purity. The "-ism" becomes more virulent as the illusion of success (relative to the enemies) is peeled away, as failures are blamed on the less pure.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 25 Oct 2011 16:24

A_Gupta wrote:There is a case to be made that the "-ism" of Pakistan predicts worldly success if it is followed with sufficient purity. The "-ism" becomes more virulent as the illusion of success (relative to the enemies) is peeled away, as failures are blamed on the less pure.

Well the lords of the "-ism" do make that claim, but they still have some work to do in explaining exactly how a full-shuttlecock burqa helps a man get on the moon or increases the production of solar-cells.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 25 Oct 2011 17:02

Dissolution of Pakistan: Parallels with Soviet Union

In the Communist Bloc among the people, slowly but surely the idea set in that the Western countries were far more advanced than them. In East Germany, people saw, that those whom they considered as the same people - West Germans, were suddenly the ones who were sending aid packets to their relatives in West Germany. American and British Music captured the imagination of a whole generation of Eastern Bloc youth! Most importantly the West, especially America was able to present itself as cool, fashionable, prosperous, and more advanced. The Eastern Bloc only managed to beat the West for a time in space and at the Olympics.

It was this overall impression of being uncool, drab, and living on scarcity that created shame among the East Europeans. It was with its Hollywood films and Music of Freedom that West won the respect and yearning of the youth in Eastern Bloc! There was all of these things in Soviet Union as well - films and music, but even the artists there were full of praise for Western cultural products.

Ultimately India too would be able to impress the same dynamic on Pakistanis. How long can the RAPE convince the Pakistanis that there is something good about them? That is why looks, skin color, height, Karachi fashion shows, Aaloo Andey, Junoon, are given such importance and publicity in Pakistan.

When the RAPE class finally gets kicked out by the Islamists, can the Indian domination of Pakistani cultural scene be complete!

Just like many Indians crave for Western recognition before considering something Indian worthy of our respect, similarly Pakistanis crave for Indian attention. We should categorically refuse to acknowledge anything worthwhile in Pakistani culture. Let's say we just don't have the time for Pakistani culture after having our fill of Indian culture. It is this Indian tendency to fall head over heels on seeing Pakistani FM, Ms Hina Rabbani Khar, or on listening to Aaloo Andey etc. that breaks this consolidation of ignoring Pakistan completely.

Nothing other than pity over their cultural depravity should be our message to them! Lets try to ignore RAPE completely.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2011 02:18

RajeshA, Thanks for the parallels. More detailed than what I thought.

But here are a few of my own:
- Both are agglomerations of multi-ethnic groups (Russia: Russians, Ukranians, Central Asians etc; Pakistan: Pakjabis, Sindhis, Baloch and others)
- Both had productive core(Russia: Pakjab) and unproductive periphery(CIS: Pashtunwa etc.)
- Both had dominant ethnic group (Russians:Pakjabis) embrace an ideology (Communism:Islam) for preservation
- Both saw are seeing the ideology is not serving them
- Both are nuke powers with clown jewels dispersed

Key to FSU unraveling was the Red Army stayed in barracks when the old timers launched a coup to halt the 'decline'. FSU case the cabal didn't go along with the prestroika reforms of Gorby. In TSP case it could be something else that they hold dear.

Analogous condition would be if some old time TSPA cabal launches a coup to restore TSP glory and the rest of them stay in barracks either due to US inducements or self realization that their instituion's key role is to defend their country and not be part of the problem.

A leader (Yeltsin) of the dominant ethnic group led a people's protest. Recall he was part of the establishment earlier. Similarly if a Pakjab national leader who has some following protests against the cabal.

Some deal similar to Russia to keep the nukes for their safety and or prestige where in Pakjab brings back the maal and ensures the safety. Massa wants to remove them if such a thing happens.

A kelptocratic elite (RAPE) that siphons off the funds abroad to safe havens (Swiss banks, Londonium etc.) And bring it back as investments!

Russian mafia analog is TSP Dawood type gangs. Are there any such gangs in TSP?

What am I thinking.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 26 Oct 2011 03:42

Dissolution of Pakistan: Parallels with Soviet Union

ramana garu,

you are of course right about the similarities.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union showed how the most dominant part of a federation is willing to allow its dissolution if a certain dynamic can be triggered.

One needs the cabal, the reformer and the usurper all acting out their roles. Gorbachev the reformer kept the cabal on the leash as long as possible allowing the usurper to build his power.

So I think, it would indeed be good for say some West-friendly face to assume charge of the TSPA. As such Musharraf would have been good. Where America did not stay with the script in say 2008 elections was when instead of bringing in Nawaz Sharif, they brought in Benazir Bhutto.

If Nawaz Sharif had become say Punjab's Chief Minister with Musharraf remaining both the President and the CoAS, and the country had been run down instead of being propped up, then the Soviet Union Dissolution dynamic could have kicked in. Nawaz Sharif would have always felt hampered by Musharraf as the President of Pakistan, and could have chosen first to go for more space through more federalism, and at some point for downright break-up.

Nawaz Sharif could have broken up Pakistan, rather than share power with Musharraf or play second fiddle to him. It will take some time revisiting that particular constellation of forces again in Pakistan! Also the usurper would need other strong regional satraps in Sindh, MQM strongholds, etc. who are willing to support him, under the working assumption that leaders across Pakistan are working together to get rid of the dictatorship.

This is where I think, Pakistan's political parties should be financed from India, and appropriate leaders set up in those parties. So that when the time comes, they can cooperate to throw out the military.

Secondly I think it is a good idea to get the feudals addicted to India, to Indian market and Indian lifestyle and freedoms. We have to get 50% of all agricultural produce of Pakistan to be exported to India and 80% of all the revenue from those sales to be also spent in India by the feudals.

Thirdly we should do all we can to contribute to keeping Karachi on the boil, so that no feudal wants to risk sending his produce anywhere else in the world, rather than selling it to India through Wagah!
Last edited by RajeshA on 26 Oct 2011 11:56, edited 1 time in total.


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